
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BORDERS IN ARMS. POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN THE NORTH-EASTERN ADRIATIC AFTER THE GREAT WAR

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ABSTRACT

This article analyzes forms of political violence in the area of the former Austrian Littoral in the first years after the Great War. This period was characterized by extreme political instability, economic insecurity and violence. The question of how different societies managed to interact despite volatile and hostile political conditions is of enormous importance to the history of the region. Based on archival research the essay will investigate questions related to ruptures and continuity of violence before and after 1918, forms of military and paramilitary violence and the role of the new Italian authorities in the management of violence until the beginning of the Fascist regime.

Keywords: political violence, North-Eastern Adriatic borderland, Italy, Yugoslavia, Great War, fascism

CONFINI IN ARMI. VIOLENZA POLITICA NELL'ADRIATICO NORD-ORIENTALE DOPO LA GRANDE GUERRA

SINTESI

Il presente articolo analizza diverse forme di violenza politica nell'area dell'ex Litorale Austriaco nei primi anni dopo la Grande guerra. Il periodo in questione fu caratterizzato da una costante instabilità politica, insicurezza economica e ondate di violenza. La questione di come diverse società interagirono nonostante condizioni politiche ostili e insicure è di fondamentale importanza per individuare ed esaminare i processi storici in atto in un periodo cruciale dell'area. Sulla base di materiale d'archivio il saggio si concentra su questioni relative a rotture e continuità nelle pratiche della violenza prima e dopo il 1918, su forme di violenza militare e paramilitare e sul ruolo delle nuove autorità italiane nella gestione della violenza fino agli inizi del regime fascista.

Parole chiave: violenza politica, Adriatico nord-orientale, confine, Italia, Jugoslavia, grande guerra, fascismo

INTRODUCTION[1]

The Great War and the disappearance of the Habsburg Empire turned the northern Adriatic into a "shatter zone" (Bartov & Weitz, 2013), where the ambiguity of the situation created a space without a clear, defined state authority. The Austrian Littoral was replaced by the Italian Venezia Giulia, however this *sortie de guerre* was not linear. The transition lasted several years and has been characterized by extreme political instability, economic insecurity, the military and cultural demobilization of hearts and minds and it became a laboratory for new forms of military and paramilitary violence. This occurred in the vacuum left by the collapse of the Habsburg Empire, however at the same time violence served as an adjunct to the new state power and its legitimization. Thus, waves of state violence occurred in different forms in the 1920s and 30s and gave rise to various forms of counterviolence. Although the period between the collapse of Austria-Hungary and the Second World War is designated as the "interwar years", which implicitly suggests a period of peace, this time was anything but peaceful. This essay aims to show how the violence of the First World War persisted into the postwar period and to research in what way it changed, modified, ideologized, systematized, legitimized, and adapted itself to the new reality, as well as what forms of counterviolence it provoked.

Both the context of violence as well as counterviolence reflect the thesis of Hannah Arendt (1970), which states that violence appears only where there is an absence of absolute power. However, state control has to be analyzed case by case and its relation towards violence represents an important and useful concept. As recently underlined by Sabine Rutar, public violence is useful both for studying the sociopolitical mechanisms that aim to subdue and contain violence and for examining the intentional exertion of violence to maintain or restore public order (Rutar, 2015, 205). In fact, throughout the past decade and a half, scholarship focused upon the study of political violence and terrorism has rapidly increased. Approaching the issues of postwar violence has also long been a question for historiography dealing with the northern Adriatic area. If in the last decades the period after the Second World War has been the subject of intense focus mainly due to the spectacular use of political purposes in the public sphere, the first years after the Great War and the 1920s in general were also the subject of careful investigation. However, these histories frequently put in focus particular national groups as agents or subjects of action. Homogeneous national categories were used to understand and describe violence, and narratives of the abuses of one group against another have often prevailed. This approach has made it easier to describe the twentieth century in the Adriatic as an itinerary through violence (Un percorso/Po poteh, 2006).

Furthermore, this vision was canalized by a unilateral approach to sources which have shaped the analytical framework according to top-down interpretations of the events.

1 This article is the result of research activities in the following research projects: *Adriatic Perspectives. Memory and Identity on a Transnational European Periphery*, financed by a Marie Skłodowska Curie grant at the European University Institute [REA Grant Agreement n. 655609], *Oborožena meja. Politično nasilje v severnem Jadranu, 1914–1941* n. J6-7152, and *Antifašizem v Julijski krajini v transnacionalni perspektivi, 1919–1954* n. J6-9356, financed by the Slovenian Research Agency (ARRS).

Thus, with the exclusive use of institutionally produced sources, researchers have often reused and reproduced these perceptions. Several studies have showed us the diplomatic confusion of the "peacemakers" (Macmillan, 2001), and territorial disputes were settled only in 1924, when Rijeka/Fiume was annexed to Italy (Pupo, 2014). Despite a political rapprochement having been reached on the diplomatic level however, political violence did not cease to be part of everyday practices on the ground. These practices were often overlooked because a bottom-up approach has only rarely been adopted. How diplomatic stagnation and institutional incapacity of the new states and their armies to control the new territories affected the life of the local population has not yet been properly studied. Moreover, existing international scholarship has concentrated mainly on national cases, while the regional and transnational perspectives often remain neglected. This study intends to re-direct the attention from the national to the regional level.

In the former Austrian Littoral, cultures of victory and cultures of defeat, to recall a book by Wolfgang Schivelbusch (2003), of two victorious allies overlapped, intertwined and clashed. If both the Kingdom of Italy and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes could claim to be on the victorious side, in both cases cultures of defeat developed. The mutilated victory in the Italian case, and resentment for the loss of parts of their ethnic territory among Slovenes and Croats characterized a postwar understanding. Moreover, the great majority of local soldiers fought in the defeated Habsburg army. Indeed, as stated by Schivelbusch, defeat should be seen not only in military aspects and political consequences, but also as a state of mind. However, this feeling of defeat, even if often described as *national* trauma, if studied on the transnational level and on the regional rather than the national scale, it enables us to see extremely entangled and complex situations. This is particularly true for European borderlands. Robert Gerwarth and John Horne affirm that "defeat was infinitely more real for those who lived in ethnically diverse border regions of the Central Powers than it was for those in Berlin, Budapest or Vienna […]" (Gerwarth & Horne, 2012, 4) and the northern Adriatic after the collapse of Austria-Hungary is not an exception. It is rather a laboratory within which it is possible to test the complex relationship between new state orders in post-Habsburg Central Europe and local societies at the sub-national, regional level. Yet if in the past, from a nation-centered perspective, post-war violence in the northern Adriatic was considered a marginal phenomenon, recent studies have shown that the attitude of the Italian post-war elite towards its borderlands and ethnic minorities was central, both in internal and foreign policy (Pergher, 2017).

In my essay I will use the case of the former Austrian Littoral to first address the question of continuity and change in the level of violence before and after the Great War. I will next investigate aspects of the organization of violence and the role played by militaries and paramilitary groups, and, lastly, I will discuss the role of the state in the transition from so-called liberal Italy to a Fascist state.

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE: PRE- AND POSTWAR POLITICAL VIOLENCE

As Richard Bessel reminds us, "it would be a mistake to assume that violence began suddenly to feature in political life only after the First World War" (2015, 102). In the

northern Adriatic too, political and ethnic violence did not start in the post-war period: even before the war, the region often saw brawls between the police and protesters, socialists and nationalists, between Slovenes and Croats on the one side and Italians on the other. In Trieste, in February 1902 a gathering of the stokers of the Austrian Lloyd shipping company was followed by a strike. It ended with the massacre of fourteen people, which demonstrates how moments of intensified political activism, such as elections, but also everyday political discussions, such as language use or the school question often involved violence. For prewar nationalists, language and schools represented the real "cornerstone of the struggle", as the Italian nationalist Ruggero Fauro Timeus urged in the days before the municipal elections in Trieste in 1913.[2] He emigrated to Florence and Rome and later died as volunteer in the Italian army. In his writings he explained with racist determinism the clash between a supposedly superior Italian civilization and the barbaric "Slavs" in the northern Adriatic (Verginella, 2011). His statements originated from nationalist struggles in the late-Habsburg era, when language represented a tool of political demands, which transformed schools in a ring of political and nationalist confrontation. In March 1913 bloody fights among the 71 students of the high school of commerce in Trieste broke out: Italian students on one side and Slovene and Croat on the other violently clashed because of language use. Nationalist newspapers such as *Il Piccolo*, *L'Indipendente* and *Edinost* instigated polemics, while the socialist press attacked them from its internationalist positions. Nor were brawls between nationalists and socialists an exception, either as the Mayday parade in 1914 was particularly violent: Italian nationalists opposed the Slovene workers marching in Trieste and the incident provoked long lasting reciprocal accusations.[3]

Even if further comparative studies are needed, it seems that violent political dynamics in the Austrian littoral were not a local peculiarity. They can be considered part of the political confrontation that broke out in many areas of the Habsburg monarchy in the second half of the nineteenth century (Judson, 2016). Unsurprisingly, it was during the war that violence escalated: already the assassination of the Habsburg crown prince Franz Ferdinand in June 1914 sparked a wave of violence against Serbs and "Yugoslavs" in several Austrian towns. In Trieste especially, the local Slovene population was the target of daily physical and verbal aggression at the hands of their fellow citizens. At the state level the Habsburg authorities, both military and civil, organized a strict system of control. The mass mobilization, the departure of soldiers, the starting of the war and the first news from the front had a negative impact on the local situation and aggravated social tensions. In the Austrian Littoral the local 97th Austrian regiment was sent to Galicia. It suffered heavy losses and more than half of its members died during the first battles in August and September of 1914. The war proved to be a crucial catalyst and had an enormous impact on the way the state regarded its own citizens. Furthermore, riots broke out in spring 1915 due to the lack of basic foodstuffs and violence escalated after Italy's declaration of war on its former ally on 23 May 1915, when offices of Italian organizations were vandalized.

2 L'Idea Nazionale, 5 June 1913, 3, Le elezioni a Trieste. Cfr. Fauro, 1929, 154.
3 Edinost, 2 May 1914, 1, Krvava proslava prvega majnika.

When in late spring of 1915 the Italian army attacked Austria-Hungary, the region was turned into a war front. This had terrible effects on the lives of the local population. The battles left the Isonzo valley and the Karst in ruins while the rear was reorganized to serve the army. If military operations have been relatively well examined, the social aspects of warfare and especially the interaction between military authorities and civilians have only recently become the focus of more careful investigation. The hundredth anniversary of the Great War saw a growing number of publications such as diaries, memories and life stories of local individuals which demonstrate how the experience of the war went well beyond the trenches. Official condolence letters and lists of those who had perished were published daily in local newspapers and reveal the omnipresence of death and sorrow. This demonstrates that a linear separation between front and home-front, both in time and space, is rather misleading: first, because war violence entered local households before the region was transformed into the frontline, and second, because it heavily influenced the lives of peoples in places left untouched by material destruction and far away from battle sites, as is the case of Istria and Trieste.

On the other side of the front, in the Friuli region initially conquered by the Italian army, the impact of the war was not less violent. Even if war propaganda depicted the conflict as the fourth war of independence for the unification of the "unredeemed brothers" and the fulfillment of the Risorgimento, the Italian army was not welcomed by cheering crowds and it imposed its military regime violently (Apollonio, 2001, 37–38). Both high commando officials and lower officers were highly suspicious of the local population. Shortages of food and the general impossibility of movement as well as the executions of suspect civilians additionally worsened an already dramatic situation (Svoljšak, 2003; Chersovani, 2008). After the defeat at Caporetto in October 1917 and the retreat of the Italian army behind the river Piave, the area was left "to the mercy of the barbarians", as the Italian priest Giovanni Battista Trombetta entitled his war diary published soon after the war (Trombetta, 1919). The image of the Austrian soldier as a barbarian, rapist and usurper, was particularly heavy in Italian war propaganda (Cornwall, 2000). It was based on a traditional anti-Austrian irredentist image and perpetuated by "war needs" after the area was conquered by the Central Powers. If the relocation of the front to the West resulted in a migration that accompanied the Italian army in its retreat, on the other side it made possible the return of several displaced persons previously moved to internal parts of Austria (Ceschin, 2006). After their return, however, many found their houses destroyed and their everyday existence precarious, which warns us that even if violence has not been a peculiarity of the war, it brought to the region different experiences of violence. In the northern Adriatic it was not only qualitatively and quantitatively different from its prewar dimensions because of the direct experience of local soldiers in European trenches, but because of the destruction of local communities, their social structures and the political framework that followed the conflict.

FROM WAR TO PEACE?

In October 1918 the Austrian administration was gradually losing control. Italian nationalist political forces in particular took advantage of this situation. In Trieste they

formed a *Comitato di salute pubblica* (Committee for public well-being) with the socialists and on October 31 they took the formal administration from the last Habsburg *Statthalter* Alfred von Fries-Skene. The Committee was soon joined by two Slovene socialists and two nationalists, members of the local Slovene National Council, a body established in every major town with its centers in Ljubljana and Zagreb. Even if politically underrepresented, the Slovenes controlled what was left of the Austrian army and its naval force. In days when robberies, homicides, attacks on coffee houses, restaurants, shops and warehouses, and general vandalism were the main preoccupation of the population they played an important role in the administration of an undetermined, chaotic and unprecedented postwar period. The Committee could count on sixty German soldiers of the Viennese division and on "Yugoslav" and "Czechoslovak" units.[4] They guarded streets and warehouses to prevent the escalation of violence, but the situation was deteriorating and the Committee asked the Allies and the Italian Army stationed in Venice for help.

On 3 November 1918 an armistice was signed, and it officially ended warfare between Italy and Austria-Hungary. On the same day the General Petitti di Roreto disembarked on the San Carlo pier in Trieste and took control over military and civil administration of the region that the Allies had promised to Italy in 1915 (Visintin, 2000, 27). However, the imposition of authority was far from immediate. On the Miramar castle, a magnificent Habsburg residence West of Trieste, a flag with Yugoslav national colors was waving for several days after Italian soldiers entered the city. Only on November 8 was it removed by a large contingent of the Italian military, which speaks of hesitation, ambiguity and overlapping power relations.[5]

The Slovene National Council in Trieste functioned until November 22 1918, when Petitti ordered its closure and in the following weeks Italian militaries expanded all over the region. With the exception of minor incidents, the occupation proceeded smoothly and relatively peacefully (Kacin Wohinz, 1972, 69–79). However, even if it was not contrasted with mass revolts, in the following months several brawls were reported, especially between Italian soldiers and the local population. The situation was rendered even more tense by daily reports of possible upheaval and by extended practices of internment adopted by military authorities. If in the first months after the war former Austro-Hungarian soldiers were the main targets of this policy, hereafter several other potential enemies and their families were physically removed from the region and sent to remote parts of Italy. Socialists, anarchists, republicans, priests and members of the People's Party, "Austriacants" and "Slavophiles", Slovenes and Croats, especially their middle class and intelligentsia (teachers, lawyers, doctors, politicians, mayors) were interned, while many non-Italian workers and public servants were removed and replaced with Italians (Bajc, 2012). It was the army that had the final say in the region until August 1919, yet even later, when the region was administered by a civil governor, the conflict did not stop. Chaos, disorganization, poverty, disillusion, resentment took many forms of vandalism and violence, which confirms recent historiographical considerations, that even if the

4 Il Lavoratore, 1 November 1918, 1.
5 ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 72, Diario Storico-Militare, 3 novembre 1918–4 agosto 1919, 8 November 1918.

war officially ended in November 1918, the violence resulting from its destructive nature did not stop overnight (Cabanes, 2014, 173).

Mixed in the region were masses of soldiers, thousands of displaced persons, prisoners of war, demobilized soldiers, civilians with an enormous number of weapons left on the ground by the Habsburg army and a tremendous lack of food. Even after the war ended it still looked like a zone behind the front (Mattiussi, 2002, 1). The collapse of Imperial institutions, the passage of the demised Austro-Hungarian Army and the arrival of the new Italian Army represented an additional challenge for the overall deprivation of the local population after four years of war. The simultaneous return of Italian prisoners released from Austrian camps provoked a chaotic situation. Many tried to find their way home outside institutionalized frameworks. The case of a large group of Italian POWs meandering in the Istrian countryside not far from Pula/Pola while directed south towards Naples show us a situation of confusion and uncertainty.[6] However, the situation was particularly chaotic in Trieste. Soldiers wandered around the city and lived off the charity of the local people. The Governor had to admit that the conditions in Austrian captivity were better than what the Italian soldiers found in Trieste. Considering the political moment this was "assolutamente intollerabile".[7]

Despite questions of public order, food release, the exchange rate with the Austrian *Krone*, the repatriation of POWs and displaced civilians, multi-ethnicity was one of the main problems of the new rulers. Despite an extended multilingualism the majority of the region was inhabited by non-Italians, against whom the new authorities acted with suspicion and often with overt hostility. Archival sources show us that restrictive practices were not the result of a lack of information (Kacin Wohinz & Pirjevec, 2000, 143). Both political and military bodies involved in the occupation were well acquainted with the multiethnic composition of the region. Their severe policy derived not from a supposed "lack of understanding" of a liminal space such as the Adriatic borderland, but from the conviction that the region must be annexed to the rest of Italy as soon as possible. Therefore, it should be politically controlled and ethnically homogenized to the rest of the nation. Postwar cultural and physical violence was not a peculiarity of the post-Ottoman southern Europe, but it was also central to the Italian policy at the margins of the Balkans (Newman, 2012, 150). Its systematic program of remaking the national composition was one of the guidelines of the Italian government in the "redeemed territories". From the very beginning of the occupation, the Italian authorities operated with this aim. Already on November 19, the substitution of the Archbishop of Trieste Karlin, a "slavo", with someone else "known for his italianità", was requested of the Supreme Command of the Army, and similar measures were anticipated for the Archbishop of Gorizia Borgia

6 ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 72, Diario Storico-Militare, 3 novembre 1918–4 agosto 1919, 14 November 1918, Pratica prigionieri, allegato n. 23, Relazione. Ignoranza Soldati prigionieri italiani trovati a Pola diretti a sud verso Napoli.

7 ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 72, Diario Storico-Militare, 3 novembre 1918–4 agosto 1919, 14 November 1918, Pratica prigionieri, allegato n. 23, Relazione. Ignoranza Soldati prigionieri italiani trovati a Pola diretti a sud verso Napoli.

Sedej.[8] Slovene representative bodies were disbanded and a few days later, Petitti ordered the exclusive use of the Italian language in administration and of Italian symbols in public spaces.[9] His proclamation that Italy would grant even more national rights than Austria was in reality just smoke and mirrors. In fact, Italian policy was driven by ideas of ethnic engineering that took various guises and was supported by different forms of violence. As an immediate result of such occupational policy the Governor registered a "real exodus of Yugoslavs towards Zagreb and Ljubljana". In his thoughts this was problematic not only in its own right but because it could also "favor the establishment of armed bands".[10]

MILITARY VS. PARAMILITARY?

Diplomatic negotiations initiated in Paris in January 1919 proved to be anything but simple and lasted for months. On the local level this ambiguity supported uncertain visions of the future and narratives of the temporariness of the Italian occupation, invoked by Slovene and Croat representatives (Pirjevec, 2008, 93–101). On the other side doubts of a possible "mutilated" victory spread in the Italian public sphere. The Adriatic gained a central role in the imagination of Italians and the expression *vittoria mutilata* became an extremely powerful mobilizing password. On 24 October 1918, the nationalist poet Gabriele D'Annunzio published a poem with the following verses: "Vittoria nostra, non sarai mutilata" (Our Victory, you won't be mutilated) in the most important Italian newspaper *Il Corriere della Sera* (Albanese, 2008). He introduced a notion that was to acquire mystical dimensions in the months to come. Italian nationalists worried that the Paris Peace Conference would not grant Italy all those territories that it had won in the war. On 15 January 1919, D'Annunzio reinforced his statements in the Letter to the Dalmatians (*Lettera ai Dalmati*). The piece was published in *Il Popolo d'Italia*, a newspaper founded by Benito Mussolini, in which D'Annunzio proclaimed Italy's right to expansion towards Fiume and Dalmatia. Public meetings were organized in several Italian cities with a growing attendance of nationalists, *Arditi* (a special unit of the Italian army disbanded shortly after the end of war operations) and other demobilized soldiers, and members of the rising fascist movement. In many Italian towns (Milan, Turin, etc.), they got involved in bloody fights with their political adversaries, mostly socialists and anarchists (Millan, 2014).

In the former Austrian Littoral, a close interconnection between the army and nationalist organizations characterized postwar dynamics. Several civil organizations cooperated closely with military units in intelligence activity and propaganda. The most important soon became the *Associazione nazionale Trento e Trieste* (National Association for Trento and Trieste), whose office in Trieste opened at the end of 1918, and represented a hub for several members who, in the following months, joined paramilitary organizations such as the *Caval-*

8 ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 72, Diario Storico-Militare, 3 novembre 1918–4 agosto 1919, 19 November 1918.

9 ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 72, Diario Storico-Militare, 3 novembre 1918–4 agosto 1919, 23 November 1918. Petitti to the Comando of XIV Corpo d'Armata (P. C. C. Tenente Colonnello Sottocapo di S. M. Robotti), allegato 34.

10 ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 72, Diario Storico-Militare, 3 novembre 1918–4 agosto 1919, 30 November 1918.



Fig. 1: Fascist meeting on the Karst in Aurisina/Nabrežina in September 1922 (FCMSA – 025354).

lieri della morte and the *Sursum Corda*. The *Cavallieri della morte* were a secret group founded in 1902 by the Triestine irredentist Giovanni Longhi, while the *Sursum Corda* was formed in Trieste in February 1919 and was soon joined by hundreds of members. They were followed in April of the same year by the C*omitato d'azione antibolscevico*. This organization attracted the most active local nationalists including Fulvio Suvich, the future Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Italian ambassador to the United States. Owing to the engagement of Bruno Coceancig – later on renamed Coceani (who was to become the *Prefetto* during the period of the Nazi *Adriatisches Küstenland* between 1943 and 1945), this organization was soon joined by the local *Fascio di combattimento* (Mondini, 2006, 35).

In the public sphere celebrations of the Great War often played a decisive role in showing the synergies among nationalists, Fascists and the Army. On 24 May 1920 many events were organized in Trieste to mark the fifth anniversary of the Italian entry into the war. The Sursum Corda and the Giovane Italia celebrated in the Rossetti theatre; Bruno Coceancig, Piero Jacchia and Francesco Giunta were among the speakers. After the meeting the crowd violently marched through the city center to the former barracks of

the Austrian army. Italian soldiers were now based there: together, the demonstrators and soldiers sang *l'Inno di Garibaldi*, a song popular in patriotic circles, and other nationalist songs.[11] As described by Francesco Giunta, the leader of the local Fascists, this event stimulated and gave flight to the local fascist movement (Giunta, 1935, 15–16).

This meeting point between nationalists, irredentists and militaries with the financial support of the local economic and financial circles gained a crucial role when D'Annunzio and his legionnaires organized a march on Rijeka/Fiume in September 1919. Many local nationalists followed D'Annunzio to Rijeka and many others approved his methods. Even if the D'Annunzio march was a new form of political activism, a certain continuity could be seen between pre-war irredentism and post-war extreme nationalism. Even if this was not always a linear process this attitude was reflected in life stories of some local *squadristi'*. Domenico Costantino, a *squadrista* from Opatija/Abbazia, a maritime town near Rijeka/Fiume, wrote in his memoires that the vast majority of the first squadristi (*della prima ora*) in the Quarner region were former legionaries with D'Annunzio in Fiume (Costantino, 1930, 13–14). The leader of the *Fascio* in Opatija was Oscar (or Oscarre) Suban, an Italian nationalist activist during Habsburg rule. He was an active and violent nationalist supporter: on 20 September 1903, a day that Italian nationalists celebrated the unification of Italy after the Italian army entered Rome in 1870, he hung the Italian tricolor in the main square in Habsburg Trieste (Costantino, 1930, 13–14). Soon after, on December 7 of the same year, he participated in an attack on the German nationalist organization *Südmark*. German nationalists and many officers of the local k. u. k. garrison gathered at the Hotel Europa in what was the central Piazza della caserma. Brawls followed after a large group of Italian students entered the building and the police arrested dozens of youngsters.[12] This example shows how in the post-war period, pre-war nationalists took advantage of the new context and intensified their political claims, with violence as an inseparable part of their activity. More research should be done but if in many cases several violent, local young men did not spend a single day in the trenches, either because they were too young or because they were mostly members of information services branches of the army, the example of Suban shows continuity rather than change in the exercise of political violence.

As Costantino explains, even the *Fascio di combattimento* in Opatija was established in the seat of a local nationalist organization. This was often the case also in Trieste, where fascist squads were often formed among the members of the nationalist organization *Lega nazionale* and in some cases even in the same seats.[13] Thus, owing to similar objectives and common enemies rather than on a common ideological platform, the fascist movement soon united various forms, aspects and movements of local nationalism, squadrism, "fiumanesimo", irredentism and fascism. Despite their initial heterogeneity these groups represented the symbolic core of nationalist mobilization and they turned into one of the

11 Il Piccolo, 25 5 1920, 2. Similar events were frequent and both organizations organized a meeting supporting D'Annunzio on 22 September 1919 in the Fenice theatre. ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 19, Doc. n. 826/45, 23 September 1919.

12 ASTs, DP APr., b. 159, f. 3108.

13 ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 19, 2 January 1920.

most active fascist movements in the country (Cattaruzza, 2007, 168). In fact, in this borderland Fascist violence gained the image of the continuation of the patriotic war for the accomplishment of victory (Franzinelli, 2003, 32) and it shows how the direct support of military corps and of the police was crucial and transformed this struggle in a "continuation of the World conflict" (Mattiussi, 2002, 16).

A lack of a coherent, articulated ideology was compensated for largely by a common fascist habitus, with violence being an integral factor. Francesco Giunta, a Florentine lawyer who moved to Trieste in spring 1920 in order to guide an active but disorganized Fascist movement, turned the local *Fascio* into a proper paramilitary organization. Every *squadra* was given their own part of the city. They acted independently but were strictly interconnected with each other. They were quickly mobilized via trucks provided by local businessmen and the army. The direct support of the military corps and the ambiguity of the authorities were crucial for the fast growth of Fascist adherents (Mann, 2004, 105–107). As demonstrated by Jochen Böhler "these violent clashes were the result of a complete lack of demobilization in the borderlands" (Böhler, 2015, 74).

The targets of their violent attacks were national and political enemies. The list of homicides, arsons and aggressions is extremely long and variegated.[14] In the larger cities such as Trieste and Pula or in Istria where Italian nationalists were most deeply rooted, they called for sterner measures to be introduced against the "anti-national" strikes of the labor movement and the disloyal attitude of Slovenes and Croats towards Italian occupation.

Initially, the victims of such violence responded with resignation or contempt, some even with a sort of civil disobedience, as described by Jože Vadnjal, in the twenties a member of an anti-fascist underground organization and a partisan during World War II. In his memoirs he described how they boycotted parties and dances organized by the Italian army. Similar acts are revealed also by Janez Penko, a Slovene from Postojna, victim of a fascist attack in 1922 who later joined the anti-fascist underground movement. He remembers that they responded to fascist measures with "our behavior, singing, flags". […] "Fascists would assault us […] they would beat individuals, bully people […] while we tried to pay them back for their violence as good as we could. At nights, we would lie in ambush […] beat them and then disappear […]. As a result, we witnessed mass arrests […]" (Kacin Wohinz & Verginella, 2008, 18).[15]

The appeal of fascist ideas and practices, regardless of social and ethno-linguistic differences, deserves more attention: police reports of youngsters of Slavic origin among the perpetuators of anti-Slovene violence overlap with assassinations of Slovene adherents to the Fascist party by anti-Fascists. Slovene anti-Fascist activists considered them traitors and, in some cases, killed them, as was the case with Giuseppe Cerkvenik, a martyr of the cause for the Fascists (Apih, 1966). This not only complicates a linear ethnic division, but also shows the agency of anti-fascist activists.

Socialists, communists and republicans often organized counterattacks on fascist individuals. In Trieste and Istrian towns, funerals for dead activists interchanged in the

14 I refer to Milica Kacin-Wohinz (1972) and (1990) for a detailed chronology of violent attacks.
15 Several episodes are described in the files of the *Commissariato*. See for example: ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 284.



Fig. 2: Funeral of a Fascist in San Giacomo/Sveti Jakob (Trieste/Trst) (FCMSA – 192983).

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postwar years. However, with the support of state authorities and the local nationalist and conservative press the Fascists promoted a self-image of being victims of socialist violence and Slavic barbarism. Fascist funerals proved to be a successful showcase of self-victimization and stages for political promotion.

In the main cities, the fascists soon prevailed over socialists, anarchists and republicans, and suppressed the Slovene and Croatian resistance. The destruction of the *Narodni dom* in Trieste and Pula in July 1920 were among the most shocking and violent attacks that characterized the variegated landscape of post-war violence in the region. As stated by De Felice, the assault was the "real inauguration of organized squadrism" (De Felice, 1965, 624). However, the assault on the workers neighborhood of San Giacomo/Sveti Jakob in September of the same year even clearly demonstrates the close and explicit interconnection between state and non-state actors in their attitude towards real or supposed enemies of the nation. Local inhabitants raised barricades and attacked militaries; an urban guerrilla lasted for two days and left on the ground numerous victims among protesters. More than six hundred rioters were arrested. In this chaotic situation the Fascists presented themselves as the representatives of order and gathered growing support among the rest of the population. Here it becomes clear that the new context, in which the new Italian authorities wish to overcome the aversion to the new order, facilitated overt violence against the opposition. It was only in smaller centers that some forms of resistance were still possible. In localities such as Marezige, Prebeneg, Mačkolje, Osp inhabitants chased away the Fascists on their violent raids during the elections of May

1921. This resistance was short lived, however. In reprisal, Fascists burned down houses, a practice they often used against seats of Slovene associations in Trieste (September 3 in San Giovanni/Sveti Ivan, on September 8 in Roiano/Rojan and on December 12 in Barcola/Barkovlje) and in villages in Istria (Kacin Wohinz, 1972).

The majority of these attacks proved successful, and only rarely did the authorities stop the violence; on the contrary, and not infrequently, they even participated in it. This shows that a linear division between military and paramilitary violence is not only of little help to understand its consequences, but often simply impossible (Böhler, 2015, 63).

VIOLENCE AND THE STATE

On 12 November 1920, the Treaty of Rapallo was signed by the Kingdom of Italy and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Even if both countries could be presented as the winners of World War I, the border dispute provoked feelings of defeat in both societies. The nationalist stance on the Italian right to annex the entire eastern Adriatic was increasingly popular among the general public, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Carlo Sforza found it hard to oppose the nationalists who claimed that the Treaty of Rapallo had made concessions to Yugoslavia. The fascist used it as a successful political tool.[16] Rijeka/Fiume and Dalmatia remained in the collective memory of many Italians as the symbol of diplomatic defeat of liberal Italy, while Slovenes and Croats developed an emotional attachment to the "lost parts" of the national body. If on one hand, victorious Italy developed a culture of defeat and perceived their victory as mutilated, on the other hand the Slovenes and the Croats considered Venezia Giulia to be their "Alsace and Lorraine" (Naša Alzacija-Lorena, 1920). These two attitudes provoked a long-term period of bilateral tension at the international level and several forms of violence and ideological and ethnic confrontations at the local level that went well beyond the diplomatic agreement of November 1920.

Much of the scholarly research assumes explicitly or implicitly that violence is a result of the vacuum of state power, of the collapse of state control over the monopoly of violence and of its inability to control a specific territory (Bessel, 2015, 103; Burt, 2007, 25–51; Gerwarth & Horne, 2010, 270; Böhler, 2015, 63–64, 72). However, the case of Venezia Giulia shows instead how the boundaries between the action of state and non-state actors are rather ambiguous. If post-war paramilitary violence had been gradually domesticated in the following years, it was not only because its goals were achieved, and a Fascist state was gradually modeled, but because totalitarian and highly militarized state structures took its part in several forms. As Charles Tilly demonstrated, forms of collective violence nearly always in the end involve governments (Tilly, 2003, 9). Indeed, from 1926 a *Tribunale Speciale per la Difesa dello Stato* started to suppress forms of antifascism in a variety of

16 In his collection of early writings Francesco Giunta commented on 7 January 1921 in his Il Popolo di Trieste: "Abbiamo quasi perduto l'Adriatico, abbandonata la Dalmazia, compromesso forse l'esistenza stessa di Fiume. Ebbene, noi giovani, noi amanti del nostro paese, dobbiamo riparare agli errori dei governi, o ai colpi del fato: occhio a Fiume, occhio alla Dalmazia, occhio all'Adriatico. Penetrazione ed espansione con i nostri commerci, col nostro denaro, con i nostri prodotti, con la nostra intelligenza, con la nostra civiltà […]" (Giunta, 1932, 30).

forms.[17] In the years to come not (only) Fascist squads but the police engaged in extreme violence and torture, while the *Tribunale* and other State institutions suppressed anti-fascist activism. As demonstrated in this essay the (strong) presence of the state it is not a guarantee of stability and limited or non-violence. It rather shows how "state-sponsored violence" (Kershaw, 2005) mixed, overlapped and cooperated with paramilitary units and represented a factor of instability and unreliability in the eyes of large groups of local population (especially ethnic minorities and political opponents). Moreover, it shows that paramilitary violence is not only a phenomenon brought about by the collective shock over the military defeat. If the culture of defeat could be one of the reasons for the escalation of violence, it could not *di per se* provoke long-term and organized forms of violence. The myth of *vittoria mutilata* could generate violence because it was backed and supported by the state and especially by its various military forces. This had dangerous multilayered and long-term consequences: nationalist, irredentist and fascist statements not only constructed a myth around the notion of the Allied will to downplay Italy, but also served to legitimize the continuation of war conditions and psychosis after the official end of the war. The demonization of the enemy, not an invention of the war but heavily influenced by it, also caused long-term effects. Not only right-wing and nationalist mentalities were influenced by the war and postwar propaganda: the occupation of the northern Adriatic rather than being a "redemption" proved to be a civilizing mission to transform "savage Slavs" and reluctant Italians into proper, "buoni", Italians.[18] Such violence could only be committed from a position of power. It was at this point that the intertwining of nationalist forces and growing fascist squads proved to be successful, especially because it was not adequately opposed. It demonstrated the force of the fascists (and their supporters), as well as the unwillingness of the Italian government to react to fascist violence and its incapacity to defend the fundamental principles of its existence. The vacuum of power produced by the collapse of the state monopoly on violence after the war generated these groups. However, they would not have been able to proliferate and consolidate without the support of the state apparatus (militaries, police, governors, etc.). Giving examples from different cases in the twentieth century, Mark Mazower has carefully explained the political character of state-directed violence, both in times of weakness of the state as well as at the height of its power (Mazower, 2002). The fascists' position of power, which they succeeded in attaining in influential circles of local society, and in Italy in general, and their ability to legitimize their principles and methods of "everyday violence" against ethnic and political enemies, were among the main factors that ensured the prevalence of fascist violence (Ebner, 2011). In particular, if studied from the perspective of the victim and not of the perpetuator, postwar violence reveals its disruptive and long-term impact on the local society and it seems that in this case, the state was part of the problem, rather than part of the solution.

17 See the essay by Maura Hametz in this issue.

18 The Ufficio Informazioni Truppe Operanti or ITO used the term for a list of 200 people who should be interned or expelled from the region because of the "impossibilità che possano diventare buoni italiani in territorio redento" (ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 72, Diario Storico-Militare, 3 novembre 1918–4 agosto 1919, Allegati. N. 501 di prot. 23 December 1918).

OBOROŽENA MEJA. POLITIČNO NASILJE V SEVERNO-VZHODNEM JADRANU PO PRVI SVETOVNI VOJNI

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POVZETEK

V članku so analizirane oblike političnega nasilja na območju nekdanjega Avstrijskega Primorja po prvi svetovni vojni, ko je odločilno vlogo odigral mejni spor med Kraljevino Italijo in Kraljevino Srbov, Hrvatov in Slovencev (Jugoslavija). Obravnavano obdobje so zaznamovali izjemna politična nestabilnost, gospodarska negotovost in nasilje. Vprašanje, kako so različne družbene skupine uspele ohraniti stike kljub nestabilnim in sovražnim političnim razmeram, je bistveno za zgodovino regije in Evrope na splošno. Na podlagi arhivskih dokumentov članek preučuje oblike vojaškega, paravojaškega ter javnega nasilja in s tem povezano vlogo državnih in nedržavnih akterjev (fašistični oddelki, nacionalistične organizacije, demobilizirani vojaki).

Obstoječe mednarodne raziskave so bile osredotočene predvsem na nacionalni vidik, medtem ko so regionalne in transnacionalne perspektive pogosto ostale zanemarjene. Študija zato namerava ponovno usmeriti pozornost z nacionalne na regionalno raven in analizirati primer nekdanjega Avstrijskega Primorja (preimenovanega v Venezia Giulia po letu 1918), kjer sta se »kulturi poraza« dveh zmagovitih zaveznikov prekrivali, prepletali in spopadali. Če je na eni strani zmagovita Italija razvila kulturo poraza utemeljeno na ideji o domnevno »pohabljeni zmagi« (vittoria mutilata), pa so Slovenci v novi Kraljevini Jugoslaviji obravnavali regijo kot svojo »Alzacijo in Loreno«. Ti dve nasprotujoči si stališči sta na mednarodni ravni vodili do dolgoročnih dvostranskih napetosti, na lokalni ravni pa do različnih oblik nasilja temelječih na ideološki in etnični konfrontaciji.

Ključne besede: politično nasilje, severno-vzhodna jadranska obmejna regija, Italija, Jugoslavija, Velika vojna, fašizem.

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BETWEEN TWO FIRES. AUSTRIAN AND ITALIAN POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN THE AUSTRIAN LITTORAL 1914–1918

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ABSTRACT

The article analyses the political violence against civilians in the Austrian Littoral during the First World War in the context of total war and the violence provoked by the war. The violence against civilians reflected on the three levels: violence on home territory, violence against enemy civilians and violence during the occupation. The aim of the article is thus the analyses of the policy of violence of Austria-Hungary and Italy, the latter after the occupation of the Slovenian ethnic territories. The article is based on the research of the authoritarian Austrian war regime and the occupation policy of Italian occupier, the latter in the context of the war aims and the fourth Italian war independence.

Key words: First World War, violence, Austrian Littoral, war absolutism, Italian occupation

TRA DUE FUOCHI. VIOLENZA POLITICA AUSTRIACA E ITALIANA NEL LITORALE AUSTRIACO 1914–1918

SINTESI

L'articolo analizza la violenza politica contro la popolazione civile nel Litorale Austriaco durante la Prima Guerra Mondiale in un contesto di guerra totale e la violenza da essa provocata. La violenza contro i civili si rifletteva su tre livelli: violenza nel territorio domestico, violenza contro i civili nemici e violenza durante l'occupazione nemica. Il contributo vuole analizzare e paragonare le politiche di violenza dell'Austria-Ungheria e dell'Italia, nel caso di quest'ultima durante il periodo di occupazione militare del territorio etnico sloveno. L'articolo si basa sull'analisi del regime di guerra austriaco e delle politiche di occupazione italiane e, per quanto riguarda la seconda, nel contesto degli obiettivi di guerra di quella che veniva considerata dalla retorica italiana la quarta guerra d'indipendenza.

Parole chiave: Prima Guerra Mondiale, Litorale Austriaco, assolutismo militare, occupazione italiana

INTRODUCTION

"*Intentionally or incidentally, The Great War was a laboratory for the Twentieth Century: an experimental site to probe the practice of violence and to optimise its effects on men and material. More specifically, the zones of invasion and military occupations provided a full-scale testing ground for population displacement and repression* […]. *To some extent these zones became the laboratories of an atypical front whose "artillery" and "gas" took the form of exodus, deportation, forced labour or concentration camps,"* wrote Annette Becker at the beginning of the chapter on captive civilians in the Cambridge History of the First World War (Becker, 2014, 257). The violence against civilian population could be certainly framed by the concept of total war and mostly related to the term *atrocities*, already used "*by contemporaries as a breach of morality or the laws and customs of war; the victims are usually defenceless person*s *(non-combatants or disarmed combatants).* […] *'Atrocities' are distinguished from the legal term 'war crimes', first used in this sense by the British jurist Lassa Oppenheim (1858–1919) in 1906 to mean breaches of the laws of war, to attempted to confine the effects of military violence to combatants"* (Kramer, 2017). Acts constituting "atrocities" were often "war crimes", but the perspective is different: the term atrocities reflects the cultural framework, whereas war crimes concern the legal aspect of these deeds.

The term was again used by John Horn and Alan Kramer in their study of the German atrocities in Belgium and France in 1914, which has been lately put under severe criticism, lacking any convincing argument (Horn & Kramer, 2001). Just before the outbreak of the First World War, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace issued the *Report of the international commission to inquire into the causes and conduct of the Balkan wars*, where the violence against civilian population during the Balkan wars had been attributed to the barbaric peoples, or, as a Greek officer remarked: "*When you have to deal with barbarians, you must behave like a barbarian yourself. It is the only thing they understand*," (Carnegie, 1914, 95).

The atrocities were thus ascribed to the national jealousy, greed for territorial expansion, to mutual distrust that pushed towards what at the times seemed to be the most brutal war of modern times (Carnegie, 1914, 265). The assumption was, according to John Horn, that "*the rule of war would make such conduct less likely in the 'civilized world',*" (Horn, 2014, 565), but already the first months of the First World War on the "civilized" part of the European battlefields proved this assumption wrong, to such an extent, that caused the reaction of Siegmund Freud, who expressed his disillusionment of the war in *Thoughts for the Times of War and Death* (1915): "*Not only is it more bloody and more destructive than any war of other days, because of the enormously increased perfection of weapons of attack and defence; it is at least as cruel, as embittered, as implacable as any that has preceded it.* […] *Moreover, it has brought to light an almost incredible phenomenon: the civilized nations know and understand one another so little that one can turn against the other with hate and loathing. Indeed, one of the great civilized nations is so universally unpopular that the attempt can actually be made to exclude it from the civilized community as 'barbaric', although it has long proved its fitness by*

the magnificent contributions to that community which it has made. We live in hopes that the pages of an impartial history will prove that that nation, in whose language we write and for whose victory our dear ones are fighting, has been precisely the one which has least transgressed the laws of civilization. But at such a time who dares to set himself up as judge in his own cause?" (Freud, 1915). Or as it was experienced by R. A. Reiss in his report *Report upon the atrocities committed by the Austro-Hungarian army during the first invasion of Serbia: submitted to the Serbian government*: "*Never has a conflict been so fierce or so cruel as the present world war. As a matter of fact, one of the belligerent groups, not content with fighting the armies of its enemies, has considered it necessary besides to use every possible means of terrorizing the enemy civil population, which nevertheless ought to have been protected by the laws and conventions.* […] *Necessity knows no law, said the Germans, Austro-Hungarians, Bulgars, and Turks, and without scruple they have massacred their prisoners and the civil population of the countries invaded by them, pillaged, bled, and devastated occupied countries and deported their inhabitants without regard to age or sex ; they have bombarded open towns, employed projectiles and other means of destruction condemned as barbarous and strictly forbidden by all conventions, and so have rendered themselves guilty of the violation of all that we had deemed sacred!*" (Reiss, 1916, 5).

Even though the act of war acquired legal status and thereby became subject to the laws of war (1899, 1907), they did not specify whether a war was justified or not, but merely provided a code of rules governing the rights and duties of belligerents in an international war. The concern for the civil population in war, especially under the conditions of occupation, was primarily about the relationship between the occupant and the goods on occupied territory, and to a lesser extent on the rights and obligations of the occupying power to the civilian population; this is due to the sharp division introduced by the laws of war between the regular army and the civilian population. These laws protected the civilian population only if it remained peaceful in any situation. The civilians thus preserved their national status; since the belligerent power had no sovereignty over occupied territory they were not required to pledge allegiance to it. Article 45 of the IV Hague Convention stated that it was forbidden to compel the inhabitants of occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power. At the same time, the inhabitants had to subject to ordinances of the occupying power and were forbidden to perform hostile acts against the occupant or to obstruct its military operations.

The violence against civilian population can be divided in three categories, taking into account a appropriate and useful Alan Kramer's "classification": violence on home territory, violence against enemy civilians and violence during the occupation (Kramer, 2017).

The "honors" of the combination of all three categories were given to the Austrian Littoral during the First World War.

AUSTRIAN POLITICAL PERSECUTION IN THE AUSTRIAN LITTORAL

The cases of internal warfare against civilians usually refer to the exceptional and extraordinary cases, such as Armenian genocide, the killings of the Galicians by the

Austro-Hungarian army (30.000 without trial), the interior refugees in Russia, and a policy of scorched earth in Russian retreat in 1915 in Lithuania, Latvia, etc. On the other hand, all the belligerent states introduced more or less severe emergency measures and emergency regimes to take over the social, economic, and industrial control, to discipline the home front and to arrest, confine, intern, to concentrate those negative, dubious, hostile elements that could in any way disturb the righteousness of the war effort. The main difference between the states laid in the executive power of emergency measures, i.e. the civil or military authorities that took control over the state, the introduction of martial law for the civil sphere and the temporary suspension of the parliamentary control over the governmental and/or military decisions.

Let us briefly take a look at the Austro-Hungarian internal war, as Hannes Leidinger and his colleges defined as “Habsburgs schmutziger Krieg” (The Habsburg dirty war) (Leidiger, Moritz, Moser & Dornik, 2014), referring also to the system of extraordinary legislation, which worked almost exclusively against its own citizens. The beginning of the war and already the July crisis brought a new dynamics in the Habsburg civil life, which was defined by the introduction of extraordinary measures provided by the legislation from 1912, so called Dienstbuch J-25a (*Orientierungsbehelf über Ausnahmverfügungen für den Kriegsfall für die Reichsrate vertreteten Königreiche in Ländern*) which contained directives for the coordination of all the necessary provisions of military, economic, legislative and political character. The Ministry of war established a special institution, the War Surveillance Office – *Kriegsüberwachungsamt* (KÜA), which soon became a symbol of Austrian (but not also of the Hungarian) authoritarian regime (Scheer, 2010). The KÜA, “*which was designed to spy on Austrians, resident foreigners, displaced people, and POWs held in foreign camps*,” (Judson, 2016, 392), called upon reporting any suspect foreign element that could harm the state security and put it into the frame of patriotic duty towards homeland in war. The legal position of the KÜA was challenging, according to the Slovene jurist Lojze Ude it represented a secret office of Austrian dictatorship during the war (Ude, 1960, 4). The office was supposed to take control over both parts of the monarchy, but the Hungarian part in fact executed civilian control over the citizens and the political, i.e. civilian authorities functioned as a mediator between civilian and military authorities.

So, the declaration of the state of emergency and emergency laws put the civilians of Cisleithania under military legislation in the territory of military authority, where the mobilizations had been authorized. As Deak and Gumz put it, “*the declaration of a state of emergency* […] *changed the entire legal system of the monarchy.*” (Deak, Gumz, 2017, 1113), the breakdown of the *Reschsstaat* was, according to them, even the main reason for the dissolution of the monarchy (Deak & Gumz, 2017, 1106). The 13. paragraph of the Austro-Hungarian Constitution of 1867 (R.G.Bl. Nr. 142) enacted the freedom of speech and banned any kind of censorship, which could had been applied according to paragraphs 5 and 6 that enabled for the opening and confiscation of private letters in the case of the state of emergency and the political authorities could have executed a harsher surveillance over the civil societies. On 25, July, 1914 a decree was issued (R.G.Bl. Nr. 158), which suspended the paragraph on the general civil rights, i.e. personal freedom, inviolability of

private property, the secrecy of private letters, freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, publishing, writing and art-representations. The decree banned periodic newspapers, their translations and abstracts, whereas daily newspapers were put under severe censorship. Only on 29, March, 1918 (R.G.Bl. Nr. 118), periodic newspapers with scientific contents could had been published again, but with limited work frame (Spann, 1991, 49).

In this *internal war* (Deak & Gumz, 2017, 1106), the collection of potential criminal acts was quite impressive and easily led to arrests, internments or confinements, also because the incriminations could be based on anonymous reports and denunciations, which became a very frequent tool of people`s participation in the authoritarian war regime that even got the name of war absolutism, or, as T. Sheer put it: "*Although citizens suffered because of the harsh and oppressive measures, many of them used this war regime for their own interests,*" (Scheer, 2017, 1). Denunciations were the reflection of national, linguistic, cultural and personal relations and resentments, and national or linguistic affiliations were not the exclusive bases for the denunciations.

One of the first public announcements, published also in the Slovenian newspapers on August, 3, 1914 called upon denouncing the "*foreign subversive elements that are of the greatest danger for the security of the State,*" (Slovenski narod, August, 3, 1914). But the patriotic impetus reached such an extent that the office could not had handled all the reports and redirected the citizens to send the reports to the nearest police office. Thus, the responsibility of keeping eye on subversive elements was entrusted to regional authorities. The prewar ideological, political and ethnic prejudices had then taken the initiative to such extend, for example in Stiria, that the central authorities had to intervene because of an extremely high number of arrested Slovenian priests and other intellectuals (Moll, 2003, 253–283).

The Austrian Littoral thus could not had escaped this kind of patriotic actions. The police and military authorities had in fact prepared lists of suspected persons already before the war, which enlisted the names of 250 suspicious persons from the district of Gorica/Gorizia, Monfalcone and Tolmin, who could harm the monarchy in the case of war. As Janko Pleterski stated, the "Littoral" authorities did not work under the German nationalist pressure, as was the case of Stiria and Carinthia, but they had to deal with the Slovenes, the Croats and later also with the Italians (Pleterski, 1971, 27). The anonymous tips led to house searches and furthermore to arrests, internments and confinements of 305 persons from Austrian Friuli and Istria in 1914, mostly Slovenes and Croats, who were taken to the prison on the Castle of Gorica and later on to Ljubljana. The majority of them belonged to the middle class bourgeoisie (officials, lawyers, teachers, students, priest), for example the judge Alojzij Gradnik, the lawyer Dinko Puc, vice state governor Alojzij Franko, the candidate lawyer Gregor Žerjav, the politician and publisher Andrej Gabrščček, etc. The later examination of the denunciations, presented also by the Yugoslav club in the Vienna parliament after its reopening on May 1917, proved the confirmability of the denunciations and even the personal revenges that were at the basis of the reports (Slovenski narod, 9, February, 1918, 2).

At the time, the measures targeted neither Austrian citizens of Italian nationality nor the so-called *regnicoli*, i.e. Italian citizens residing or working in the Habsburg Monarchy,

as the Austrian authorities did not want to risk a diplomatic dispute with then ally Italy. During the time of Italy's neutrality some Austrians of Italian nationality set out for Italy; according to some statistics, 2000 citizens left Gorizia, some of them left legally, but the Austrian military servicemen had to leave illegally (Svoljšak, 2011, 86). A months before the outbreak of the war between Italy and Austria-Hungary the desertions to the Italian army increased drastically, the *regnicoli* began to leave the town and the first flights to the safe hinterland had begun, especially wealthy and prominent families from Gorica left for the interior of the monarchy. According to the statistics, some 7000 inhabitants left the County for the Kingdom of Italy before the outbreak of the war (Svoljšak, 2011, 86).

But a month before the Italian entry into war, the Austrian authorities began with the persecutions of Italian irredentists and after 24, May, 1915, the wave of political measures against the enemies of the monarchy reached its high point, cracking down on any Italian citizen in the monarchy aged between 18 and 50, and nearly any Austrian citizen of Italian nationality. Italian citizens who had had failed to leave the Littoral by 25, May, 1915 were deported to the Katzenau and Wagna camps (162); women, children and elderly Italian citizens were sent back to Italy via Switzerland in compliance with the agreement on the exchange of civilians. As a result, the Austrian Littoral witnessed 2987 internments, 1895 confinements and 9866 expulsions to Italy (Cecotti, 2001, 73). The Mayor of Gorica Giorgio Bombig was interned and the County authorities moved to Vienna.

The opening of the Austrian parliament in May 1917 opened also the debate on political persecutions; the political prisoners were released, but the interpellations of the Yugoslav club did not cease until the breakdown of the monarchy. The political persecutions had also great impact on the Slovenian remembrance of the war and influenced the perception of the Hapsburg monarchy as the "prison of nations" for long decades.

ITALIAN OCCUPATION

The violence of the war was also triggered by the state of occupations, and the compressed history of war in the Slovenian case has proved the assessment right. Violence against civilians usually occurred, as shown by Horn, Kramer and Liulevicius (Liulevicius, 2005) and also in "Austrian" case (Austrian Littoral), during the first months of the occupation, in the Baltic case it followed also the retreat of the Russian army, whereas the period of the occupation usually represented a period of settling the occupying administration, with important differences between occupational policies, the main difference being the final aims of the occupiers, such as the so called *Kulturmission* of the Germans in the *Ober Ost* or the Italian redemption and "Cultural – bringing" policy in the occupied zones of the Austrian Littoral.

The final Italian decision to enter the war on the Entente side, enabled Italy for the beginning of realization of the final stage of the unification of the state (*quarta Guerra d`indipendenza*) by "redeeming the unredeemed territories" between Trento and Trieste, regardless of the fact, that these territories had been populated also by non-Italian population. The relations between the Slovenes and Italians in the so called Venezia Giulia (Julian March) were marked by growing Italian irredentism. The Italian reference to the

region according to the glorious roman past encompassed for strategic reasons also parts of the Austrian (Slovene) province of Carniola and stopped south of Rijeka/Fiume, which was nominated by Dante as the eastern limit of Italy. Thus, the Italian nationalists as well referred to Dante as a legitimizing authority for their own political and territorial claims. This region had been, long before the outburst of Italian or Slovene/Croatian nationalism imagined as a boundary region and the outbreak of the First World War certainly proved to be a cross-reference of many unresolved issues (Svoljšak, 2003).

In all three parts of the Austrian Littoral (Trieste, the County of Gorizia and Gradisca, and Istria), Slovenes, Croats, Germans and Italians lived side by side. However, a growing Slovene political and ethnic self-confidence, encouraged by economic growth, upset the Italian population and motivated them towards a frequently narrow-minded policy of ethnic defense, which contributed to straining relations between the two ethnic communities. Instead of establishing political links, ethnic affiliation prevailed over ideological views and there had been practically no Slovene-Italian cooperation, especially in Trieste. Besides the political irredentism, a so called cultural irredentism intended to develop Italian culture through dialogue and cooperation with South Slavic and German cultures and Trieste was intended to become a meeting point. This idea was developed by the socialist Angelo Vivante and took into consideration Slovene and Croatian ethnic groups and their cultural and political achievements, in fact his goal was to create the proper conditions for multiethnic coexistence in the region, but there was no reaction from the Slovene side (Vivante, 1912). The Slovenes felt the Italian irredentism as a direct threat to Slovenes ethnic and cultural interests in the region. On the other hand, Italy did indeed iterate preconceptions as to the intellectual and cultural inferiority of Slovenes, and these were further propagated in the context of its territorial occupations during and after the First World War, and even more so during the Second World War.

The relations between Italians and Slovenes were also marked by stereotypes. The average Slovenes' perception of Italians was predominantly negative, the outbreak of the First World War and the Italian proclamation of neutrality deepened the Slovene`s mistrust and feelings of deception. The Slovenian politicians labeled the Italians as "promise-breakers" and thenceforth this epithet became a very popular stereotype, and henceforth Italy was seen as an unreliable ally and the Italians a hereditary enemy (Stergar, 1996). Italy's 23rd May 1915 decision to enter the war on the side of the Entente signaled the climax of Slovene negativity towards the Italians. It represented also the turning point in the Slovenian perception of war, even though they never expressed or "performed" disloyalty; thenceforth it was understood as a just and defensive war for national territory (Svoljšak & Godeša, 2014, 304–305).

On 24, May, 1915, part of the Slovene ethnic territory of the Austrian Littoral turned into a battlefield and was, with part of *Friuli orientale* (and Trentino) subject to Italian military occupation. The inhabitants thus passed from Austrian "war absolutism", to the Italian administration that introduced new measures of control and protection of public order on its territories. These measures were on one hand the consequence of prejudice and poor knowledge of the conditions in the occupied territory, and on the other hand a reflection of military uncertainty and the security situation in the immediate rear of the

Isonzo Front. It should be pointed out, that the expectations of the Italian troops and their commanders regarding the welcoming on the occupied territories had not come true: the population did neither welcome the invaders, nor acted in a hostile way. Benito Mussolini was in fact very disappointed about the Slovene adverseness towards the Italians, which lasted through the end of the war (Svoljšak, 2003, 274).

At the beginning of the occupation, the Italian chief commander general Luigi Cadorna issued a command according to which it was necessary to hit with the exemplary force in order to maintain order and obedience among the occupied population. The first days of occupation were marked by numerous orders; the majority of them were prohibitions, which had, in Cadorna's view, the only purpose to establish conditions for a normal everyday life.

But before such normalization occurred, the civilian population faced some acts of extreme violence. Already on 29 May, 1915, the Italian troops opened fire against some 149 men from a Friulan village of Vilesse in a rather strange circumstances and killed five of them. On 3, June, 1915 in the village Lucinico/Ločnik three men were killed without a trial and this practice continued for another two weeks. On 4, June, 1915 the Italian troops gathered all men (60) from the villages under the slopes of Mount Krn, accusing them of killing the Italian soldiers on their return from the bloody battles for Krn (the mountain was conquered on the 16th June in a night attack of Alpini troops). The Italians suffered great losses and thus the soldiers did not return to the positions, but they tried to escape the battles by accompanying their wounded comrades to the valley and hiding in the nearby woods. The missing soldiers were replaced by *Alpini*, who were described by a Slovenian peasant as mean and ferocious (Slovenec, 21 May, 1917, 3), but the Austro-Hungarian soldiers managed to reject all the Italian attacks.

During the escape from the slopes, the Italian soldiers even entangled in the combat with the Italian *carabinieri*, whereas the local population tried to avoid the fire. But not all of them managed to hide; two members of Fon family died on the field, hit by the Italian bullets. The Italian military authorities had to find a scapegoat for their military failure and they found it in the local population. They took the hostages, 61 men from the villages Krn, Vrsno, Libušnje, Smast in Kamno, across the river Soča and at the nearby village of Idrsko they questioned them with the help of an interpreter from a bordering Slovenian region Venezia Slava, but there was not a real trial, as the sentence was set in advance – the men were guilty of helping the enemy and of giving shelter to the Italian deserters.

Before the final act, the hostages had to dig their own graves and then the executional platoon shot every tenth men; they only spared a 17-old boy, who would serve as an Italian soldier after the war. Their remains were exhumed in 1920 and reburied at the cemetery of Kobarid. After the war the widows demanded the pensions from the Italian state, but were rejected because they were regarded as widows of the traitors, but the Slovenian attorney Henrik Tuma succeeded in proving their innocence and the wrongness of the Italian commander`s decision. The rest of the hostages were taken to Kobarid, then to Cividale and finally interned to Sardinia, where the living conditions were very difficult. After three weeks, the younger internees (aged under 18 years) and those over 50 years were sent on the basis of the exchange of the civil population, to the Austrian camp

Waidhofen in Lower Austria. On the same day, 4, June, 1915, and in the following days 6 locals died under the Italian fire.

These violent measures were followed by the evacuation of the villages in the range of 500 meters from the operation zone; the basic reason was security and the devastation suffered by the villages proved them right. But the reasons for the evacuation were not always linked to the security measures, at least not in a sense of the inhabitants' security. They seemed more of an excuse, as they had referred to the non-loyalty of a mayor, the alleged killings of the Italian soldiers, the Austro-Hungarian deserter or to non-placing the white flag on the bell tower. The villages of the Upper Soča Valley, those of Kambreško, the hilly region between the Italian – Austrian border and the Soča river, and the western part of Brda – Collio were evacuated soon after the beginning of the hostilities. The population was given a couple of hours to prepare the necessary luggage and afterwards taken to the nearby intermediate stations, where they were vaccinated against infectious diseases and after a week of quarantine the trains took them to various Italian towns. The Italian refugee system did not introduce the refugee camps as the main tool of systematization of the refugees, which was the case in Austria-Hungary, but they dispersed the refugees all over the peninsula, provided them with accommodation and a day-allowance. The map of the refugee location is thus very diverse and tells a lot about the refugees' distress of living in a foreign environment, with few visits of the Slovenian priests, and letters via Swiss Red Cross to communicate with their dears in the Austro-Hungarian army (Svoljšak, 1991).

Violence against civilian population manifested itself also in the arrests and the internments of all men between 18 and 50 years of age and the local intelligentsia, who could had influenced the population about the intentions of the Italian occupation. During the first days of the occupation the Italian occupants were driven by the so-called *espionage psychosis*, which manifested itself in the uncontrolled net of rumors, fake news, hidden telephones, even in the tabernacles and the illegal crossings of the border. The information about the spies were overwhelming, the Italian newspapers even published the news about the shooting of the priest from Kobarid, who was supposedly accused of spying for the enemy by using the telegraph behind the altar and of informing the Austrian units about the Italian positions. It took them a month before the newspaper revoked the news.

But the spies were seen everywhere, on the front, in the hinterland and especially in the border area, where the Italian authorities noticed great fondness of the Habsburg monarchy. The arrested were accused of being filo-Austrians and spies, they were taken to the Island of Sardnina, where 2226 Austro-Hungarian citizens were interned by the end of 1917 (Svoljšak, 2003, 165). The Italian authorities were particularly vigilant about the Slovenian and Friulian priest, who were supposed to be not only potential spies, but also unconditioned patrons of the Dual Monarchy. Their archbishop Frančišek Borgia Sedej had addressed a letter to the priests of the Diocese of Gorica, asking them to stay by their parishioners despite of the possible Italian occupation and instructed them to act carefully and righteously in the relation to the occupiers, above all, they should not had acted in any way to provoke the revenge of the Italian authorities; this should had been also the stand of the local population. The archbishop Sedej, in contrast with his own instructions, left

his post for Stična. The policy of the Italian authorities towards the Slovenian priest was not unambiguous, some priest had to leave their posts, some were given the possibility to stay and assist the local population. Thus 21 clergymen, 6 of them were Slovenes, were arrested and escorted by carabinieri and the soldiers to the prison of Cremona under suspicion of espionage. For the first months of the imprisonment, they were allowed to perform masses, otherwise they had no freedom of movement. In September 1915 their situation changed and they could move around, under strict control of the authorities and they could even visit and assist he Slovenian refugees in Italy (Svoljšak, 2003, 179–218).

In the second half of June 1915 the situation on the occupied territories calmed down, physical violence ceased and the Italian authorities adopted more refined strategies of ethnic violence against the non-Italian population. The authorities aligned their actions with the political goals of the occupation, which main objective was to prepare the population for the postwar inclusion of the territories in the Kingdom of Italy.

Apart from dealing with administrative and public matters, run by a special office called the General Secretariat for Civilian Affairs (*Segretariato Generale per gli Affari Civili*), the primary task of the Italian Supreme Command was thus the organization of public administration in all spheres of public life. They ran a very active and effective social politics, which had two main goals: immediate and prompt help for the population, and the long-term objective of persuading the Slovene population about the benefits of living under Italian administration and care. A high-ranking Italian official felt that this policy was expensive, yet very effective (Ojetti, 1964, 37). However, all of the administration measures were based on the Italian presumption that Julian March, including the territories with the Slovenian population, and Trentino were part of Italian ethnic territory in the enemy's hands, which needed to be redeemed and returned to the nation once and for all. The basic tool for achieving a gradual but effective fusion of public life in the occupied territories with the "domestic" Italian life was language and its use in public. The first step was the introduction of Italian as the official language in public life.

The next step in reinforcing Italian in ethnically Slovene territory and setting the groundwork for the future was the systematic transformation or adjustment of Slovene personal and place names to fit Italian spelling. But special attention was dedicated to the education system that dealt with the youngest generations of the Slovene population and was the most prominent sphere of public life where an effective language policy could be carried out. The issue of introducing Italian curriculum, i.e. learning of the Italian language, Italian *Storia Patria* and *Geografia Patria,* together with completely reformed physical education because the Austrian was obsolete, was very delicate and had to take into account the actual situation and future plans for the annexation. The sensibility of the issue was well understood by general Achille Papa, who was the commander of the town of Kobarid and recommended a careful and slow penetration "*into this population without hurting their feelings, into their language, which they appreciate very much.* […] *I hope we will gain affection, and with the affection of children we will also gain the affection of their parents,*" (Martinelli, 1989, 67).

The education system, adapted to the war times by carrying out a special form of lessons in the so called education – recreation facilities, performed a double mission,

just like the Italian social policy, i.e. they took concrete care of the education, health, clothing and nourishment, on the other hand they were constantly trying to convince the population about the benevolence of the present and future Italian authorities. Children as future citizens of the Kingdom of Italy, were targeted in the most successful strategy of preparing the population for future annexation to the Kingdom of Italy. The thunderous propaganda activities were directed to *open young souls* for the new motherland and to prove that that the "redeemed territories" were a self-evident part of Italian state territory.

AFTERMATH

After the Austro-German army's successful advance in the Twelfth Isonzo Offensive on 24, October, 1917, the Italian military administration withdrew from the Isonzo region to Padua and the 29-months physical occupation ended. But the Italian authorities kept in touch with the administration, in fact the accountings of the Slovenian communities were kept by the Italian administration and returned to the places of origins only after the war. Thus, the Italian authorities would not forget their control over the territory and hatched plans for postwar reoccupation in a year to come. The following period between November 1917 and the end of the war was a period of relative chaos, the Italian authorities left, but the Austrian local authorities were returning slowly and gradually. The displaced population slowly returned to their ruined homes, and provincial representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy began organizing postwar reconstruction. The end of the war brought about the re-occupation of the Slovenian ethnic territories according to the stipulations of the London Memorandum (1915). The re-occupation was based on the activity of the same office with the same personnel and was thus enabled to perform the same and even harsher suppressive and violent policy towards the Slovenian and Croat population as it was carried out during the war.

The wartime Austrian political persecutions influenced and infected the postwar Slovenian attitude towards the Austria-Hungary and pictured a rather black-and white image of the former Slovenian homeland. On the other hand, the Italian occupation paved the way for the postwar Italian ethnic policy against Slovene population in the Julian March, but as Horn and Kramer put it in their study on German atrocities, the topic could be defined as a *history of denial,* it is still an undesirable topic in the Italian historiography and completely neglected by the European historiography.

MED DVEMA OGNJEMA. AVSTRIJSKO IN ITALIJANSKO POLITIČNO NASILJE V AVSTRIJSKEM PRIMORJU 1914–1918

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POVZETEK

Članek analizira politično nasilje proti civilnemu prebivalstvu v Avstrijskem Primorju med prvo svetovno vojno, v kontekstu totalne vojne in nasilja, ki ga vojna povzroči. Nasilje nad civilnim prebivalstvom se je odražalo na treh ravneh: nasilje na domačih tleh, nasilje proti civilistom sovražnih držav in nasilje med tujo okupacijo. Politiko nasilja je Avstro-Ogrska izvajali v t.i. notranji vojni proti lastnim državljanom v Cislajtaniji. Politična preganjanja so bila rezultat izrednega stanja, ki je bilo razglašeno 25. junija 1914, s čimer so bile suspendirane državljanske pravice, uveden je bil vojaški nadzor nad civilisti ter je deloval na podlagi (anonimnih denuncijacij. Preganjanja v Avstrijskem Primorju so bila najprej naperjena proti slovenskim izobražencem, s približevanjem vojne proti Italiji pa so se obrnile proti avstrijskim državljanom italijanske narodnosti.

Italijanska okupacija slovenskega ozemlja je bila rezultata italijanskih vojnih ciljev ter je bila namenjena med drugim pripravi civilnega prebivalstva na prihodnjo aneksijo h Kraljevini Italiji. Prvi tedni okupacije so bili zaznamovani s primeri ekstremnega nasilja proti civilistom, čemur so sledile aretacije in internacije slovenskih duhovnikov in vseh moških med 18. in 50. letom starosti ter evakuacija slovenskih vasi in begunstvo v Italiji.

Vojni absolutizem in politično preganjanje sta vplivala tudi na povojni slovenski odnos do Avstro-Ogrske, do katere je bil vzpostavljen izrazito črno-bela podoba nekdanje domovine. Na drugi strani je italijanska okupacija slovenskega etničnega ozemlja in italijanska etnična politika proti slovenskemu prebivalstvu Julijske Krajine še vedno zanemarjena tema tako italijanskega kot evropskega zgodovinopisja prve svetovne vojne.

Ključne besede: prva svetovna vojna, Avstrijsko Primorje, nasilje, vojni absolutizem, italijanska okupacija

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INTERNMENTS AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR. THE CASE OF WOMEN IN THE NORTHERN ADRIATIC, 1918–1920

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ABSTRACT

In November 1918, at the end of World War I, the new Italian authorities arrested several persons in the territory of Venezia Giulia, Rijeka (Fiume) and some parts of Dalmatia and interned some of them in the interior of Italy. A detailed examination of many documents and lists that are kept in Roman and Trieste archives reveal that around 850 civilians were interned, including women. Internments after the First World War in the Slovenian/Croatian-Italian contact area have still not received in-depth analysis; however, even less is known about the internment of women.

Keywords: Venezia Gulia, Rijeka, Istria, Dalmatia, Italy, women, teachers, internments, violence, transition

INTERNAMENTI DOPO LA PRIMA GUERRA MONDIALE. IL CASO DELLE DONNE NELL'ALTO ADRIATICO, 1918–1920

SINTESI

Nel novembre del 1918, alla fine della Prima Guerra Mondiale, le nuove autorità italiane arrestarono diverse persone nel territorio della Venezia Giulia, a Fiume (Rijeka) ed in alcune parti della Dalmazia e ne internarono alcune nell'entroterra italiano. L'esame dettagliato di molti documetni ed elenchi che sono conservati negli archivi di Roma e Trieste rivelano che furono internati circa 850 civili, incluse donne. Gli internamenti dopo la Prima Guerra Mondiale nell'area di confine tra Slovenia, Croazia ed Italia non sono stati ancora analizzati in maniera puntuale, ed ancor meno si conosce riguardo agli internamenti di donne.

Parole chiave: Venezia Gulia, Fiume, Istria, Dalmazia, Italia, donne, maestre, internamenti, violenza, transizione

INTRODUCTION[1]

During the first stage of a problematic and traumatic transition at the end of World War I, the new Italian authorities arrested several people in Venezia Giulia, in the areas of Trieste and Gorizia, in the eastern part of the Udine area, in Istria, in Rijeka (Fiume) and in parts of Dalmatia (in what could be referred to as the area of Northern Adriatic) and interned some of them in the Italian interior. For a long time, this chapter of history received little scholarly attention and was even less known to the public.

A few years ago, I started analyzing the many lists of these internees and other related documents in a systematic way. The lists are kept in the central archives of the Italian Interior Ministry in Rome. I compared the lists with other sources and the literature; however, internments are referred to only in passing. Exceptions include works by Lavo Čermelj (1965), Milica Kacin Wohinz (1972) and Angelo Visintin (2000), which comprise the most relevant and still useful data, given the rich literature about the military occupation and violent interventions at the end of World War One (e.g., Visintin, 2012, 457–458). I found that around 850 civilians underwent internment from the area, although some contemporary sources provide lower and at the same time varying numbers. I published the main findings in 2012, emphasizing that the topic called for a more thorough examination (Bajc, 2012).

Among other things, the lists show that internees included women. Internments after the First World War in the Slovenian/Croatian-Italian contact area have still not received in-depth analysis; however, even less is known about the internment of women. The present article will focus on the question of interned women in the period between the end of the war and the time of drastic changes by the end of 1920. It was then that a demarcation was made between Italy and the new Yugoslav state, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SHS), ending the problem of post-war internments.

In addition to the materials from Rome, the archives of the new occupying authorities in Venezia Giulia were examined; these are kept by the Trieste branch of the state archives. The documents included extensive files of the Governor and Civil Commissioner for Venezia Julia, who represented the top tier authority in the "new provinces". In Rome, more lists of names are available, while Trieste keeps more documents about individuals who were arrested and interned. Documents in the two archives, in Rome and Trieste, thus are complementary.

My initial hypothesis was simple: the dynamics of female internment did not differ considerably from that of men.

1 The article was elaborated within the EIRENE project (full title: Post-war transitions in gendered perspective: the case of the North-Eastern Adriatic Region), founded by the European Research Council under Horizon 2020 financed Advanced Grant founding scheme [ERC Grant Agreement n. 742683]. The article is also the result of research activities in the following projects and research programs: *Preteklost severovzhodne Slovenije med srednjo Evropo in evropskim jugovzhodom* n. P6-0138, *Oborožena meja. Politično nasilje v severnem Jadranu, 1914–1941* n. J6-7152, and *Antifašizem v Julijski krajini v transnacionalni perspektivi, 1919–1954* n. J6-9356, financed by the Slovenian Research Agency ARRS (Javna agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije).

THE CONTEXT OF POSTWAR VIOLENCE

Several types of violence appeared in the initial years of World War I, when civilians were caught in the new circumstances and a difficult situation. Some less familiar stories have received considerable attention in recent years (e.g., Bianchi, 2006; Ermacora, 2007). This also applies to the individual areas of the Northern Adriatic, which were filled with refugees, migrants and internees because of suspicion, preventive measures etc. (see Malni, 1998; Cecotti, 2001; Trogrlić, 2011; Mandić, 2013; Purini, 2010; Purini, 2015), including particular information about the situation of women in this area. These women suffered hunger, forced labor, along with physical and psychological suffering (e.g., Ermacora, 2014; Ermacora, 2016). After the war, some types of violence continued and took place within a new political framework in the Northern Adriatic because of incomplete demarcation between Italy and the new Yugoslav state.

The aspirations to appropriate the Adriatic and primarily Trieste were exhibited by many even before World War I (e.g., Vivante, 1954; Pirjevec, 2007, 19–65; Monzali, 2004; Monzali, 2015, 48–84; Cataruzza, 2007, 15–68; Klabjan, 2011; Čok, 2017; Ivašković, 2017). During World War I, territorial aspirations continued and so did the antagonism between the Italian and the "Slavic" sides, culminating towards the end of the war. When Austria-Hungary disintegrated, a concrete opportunity for a new delimitation appeared in the territory of Venezia Giulia, Rijeka and Dalmatia. Italy enjoyed considerable advantage over the Slovenians and Croats because it had its forces on the ground, and the Allies had made secret promises to it during the war, so its units occupied the "disputed territories" without problems. However, the new Yugoslav state that was formed in the meantime partly thwarted Rome's plans. The peace conference in Paris complicated the situation further: the two sides failed to reach an agreement because neither wanted to give in. The question of the future affiliation of the Northern Adriatic thus turned into a complicated international problem.

The border and geopolitical dispute in turn affected the local situation, which resulted in several violent incidents. However, this is not the only way to interpret the main subject of this study. At the end of the war, the level of "local" opposition among Italians, on the one hand, and Slovenians and Croats, on the other, increased considerably. As the latest studies have confirmed (e.g., Toncich, 2017; Verginella, 2016; Žitko, 2015; Žitko, 2016; Klabjan, 2018), anti-Slavic sentiment, which began to develop in the second half of the 19th century was mostly reflected in public discourse (including prejudice and underestimation of the "other"); after November 1918, it experienced a "leap in quality" and grew even stronger with the rise of fascism (1922).

On the one hand, the new occupation authorities promised Slovenians and Croats that they would respect their tradition and culture to the highest extent possible in November 2018 (e.g. Čermelj, 1965, 25); on the other, military command acted rigorously against all forms of public promotion of "Slavic sentiment" and strongly supported manifestations of Italian spirit. The new authorities also began to remove "dangerous" Slovenian and Croatian civilians. The main target was the intellectuals: priests, teachers, lawyers, doctors, politicians, mayors and state officials, as well as some railway workers and former

gendarmes. Mere suspicion was sufficient for Slovenians and Croats to be arrested and put on trial (Kacin Wohinz, 1972, 99–116).

Arrests, internments and repatriation – general characteristics

Ample data from the published and unpublished primary sources[2] show that opposition to occupation was continuing; in order to deter the population from engaging in these "harmful" protests, the authorities, at least in the first few months, cracked down by arresting individual civilians and groups in small towns. The authorities were convinced that they would frighten the population by arresting and interning people, in particular the instigators; internment or forced removal of the leading propagandists was seen as the appropriate way to teach the population a lesson. In this way, the authorities hoped to win trust and demonstrate their power.[3]

With circular No. 105-2-862, dated 24 January 1919, the Presidency and the authorities in Rome recommended a gentler approach in order for the occupation authorities to win the sympathy of the population. For this reason, they warned the local administration to study each case carefully and to remove only the really dangerous individuals.[4] Nevertheless, Milica Kacin Wohinz concludes that those arrested and interned included many who had committed no crime against the new authorities; instead, they had only cultivated revolutionary or Slavic feelings. In practice, the logic of fear often prevailed in order to avoid excessive lenience, which could be interpreted by the populace as official weakness (Kacin Wohinz, 1972, 110–111). This analysis confirmed Kacin Wohinz's findings and provided additional information. In some cases, the authorities themselves admitted that they had arrested and interned individuals based on insufficiently verified data.[5] The Ministry of the Interior admitted in March 1919 that repatriation was slow and that the budget for funding repatriation was insufficient.[6] At the same time, communication between the responsible authorities was not always timely and contributed to the delays.

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2 E.g., ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 72, Diario Storico-Militare, 3 novembre 1918–4 agosto 1919; b. 140, f. Notiziario politico-militare 3a armata, 1918-19; Klen, 1977; Kacin Wohinz, 1972, 80–99; Visintin, 2000, 139–153; Apollonio, 2001, 43–56.

3 ASTs, RCGC Gab. b. 41, f. B: Commissariato Civile Pisino al R. Governatore [RG] della Venezia Giulia [VG] (Riservatissimo, N. 104), 20. 12. 1918; f. Complessivi: Cavalli, RG VG, Commissariato Civile Postumia al RG VG, Ufficio Affari Civili (N. 1288): *Propaganda antiitaliana*, 26. 3. 1919; b. 55, f. Elenco internati: Vaccari, Comando 3a Armata, Stato Maggiore [SM], al Comando del XXVI° Corpo d'Armata et al. (N. 2641): *Internamenti precauzionali*, 2. 4. 1919; b. 57, f. Jugoslavi, Cechi Slovacchi: Gandolfo, Comando XXVI Corpo d'Armata, SM al Comando 3 Armata (N. 2816): *Proposta d'internamento dell'impiegato Mrakoricic – persone sospette*, Abbazia, 22. 5. 1919; ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, 1920, b. 16, f. Propaganda jugoslava, Parte II, A 16: R. Esercito Italiano [REI] al Ministero dell'Interno [MI] Direzione Generale della PS [DG PS] (Ufficio Riservato) (N. 105-105282): *Internamento del Dottor Jenko Ludovico, residente in Aidussina*, 21. 1. 1919.

4 ASTs, RCGC Gab. b. 41, f. Internamenti, Disposizioni di massima: Badoglio, (N. 105-2-862), 24. 1. 1919 (also in b. 55, f. Elenco internati); cf. Kacin Wohinz, 1972, 110.

5 E.g., ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 42, f. M: Bruno Micol.

6 ASTs, RCGC Gab. b. 55, f. Elenco internati: MI, DGPS al RG VG (N. 12100.I.4): *Allontanamento di internati*, 19. 3. 1919.

The previously mentioned circular dated 24 January had still not been received by the Office for Military Affairs of the Venezia Julia Central Administration by 13 February.[7]

On 20 March 1919, the Supreme Command of the Italian Army recalled the decrees issued during the war ordering internment for military reasons; however, the decree on the removal or internment of persons proven to have engaged in hostile activities and endangering public order and Italian interests remained.[8] In other words, interpretation of the decree often depended in practice on the local authorities. The military command remained skeptical towards the population, and politicians sought to defuse the situation, knowing that negative publicity could be detrimental for Italian negotiators at the peace conference in Paris.

Given that the international press regularly repeated the argument about interned persons, Prime Minister Vittorio Emanuele Orlando ordered that only those be interned who posed a threat to public safety; the Italian administration was aware that too-strict measures could cause considerable political damage.[9] Following the instructions of the new Prime Minister, Francesco Saverio Nitti, and a circular of the Ministry of the Interior dated 13 July 1919, representatives of the local authorities began to collect data about internees, and only the most dangerous ones would remain interned; regarding repatriation, the local authorities had to provide their consent (or deny it).[10] The Italian Socialists supported the release of internees and Nitti, who was worried because of the many accusations, recommended to the local administrations on 11 August 1919 that they be generous.[11] The Italian Prime Minister expressed again his support for the idea at the end of August 1919 (Kacin Wohinz, 1972, 113–114).[12] Solving this problem entailed many further problems. The authorities were still highly distrustful of some internees.

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It is not known how many individuals were arrested in the regions of Venezia Giulia, Rijeka and Dalmatia. However, the number must have been higher than that for internees proper because not everyone who was arrested was also interned. It seems that the Italian authorities interned the most civilians in February and March of 1919; some of them were kept for up to a year after the war ended.[13] The dynamics of the arrests and consequent

7 ASTs, RCGC Gab. b. 55, f. Elenco internati: RG VG al Comando Supremo (N. 776), 13. 2. 1919.

8 ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 41, f. Internamenti, Disposizioni di massima: Badoglio (N. 105-1-2877): *Allontanamento ed internamento dalla zona di guerra*, 20. 3. 1919 (also in b. 55, f. Elenco internati); cf. Kacin Wohinz, 1972, 109.

9 ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 55, f. Elenco internati: Orlando a Petitti (Tel. 743128), 10. 6. 1919; Petitti ai Commisari Civili (Tel. 5950), 10. and 11. 6. 1919; Petitti a Orlando (N. 6295), 18. 6. 1919.

10 ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 55, f. Elenco internati: Nitti: *Copia dela circolare telegrafica a firma S.E. il Ministro, diretta ai Prefetti del Regno* (N. 19305), 13. 7. 1919; cf. Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Ufficio Centrale nuove Provincie al Comm. Gen. Civile di Trieste e Trento (N. 154): *Persone internate dai territori occupati oltre confine*, 15. 8. 1919.

11 ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 55, f. Elenco internati: Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri al Commissario Generale Civile Trieste (N. 27001-R): *Internati civili*, 11. 8. 1919.

12 ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 42, f. Internati – rimpatrio complessivi: Nitti, al Capo di SM (Circolare – Riservatissima, N. 1078.101): *Rimpatrio di internati nelle terre redente*, 25. 8. 1919.

13 E.g., ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 41, f. Internamenti, Disposizioni di massima: *Elenco degli internati dal 1 giugno 1919 al 20 agosto 1919* (also in b. 55, f. Elenco internati); cf. Bajc, 2012, 396.

internments was the same everywhere. The documents show that the reasons for denunciation and internment included the following: the person fostered "Slavic sentiment"; supported Yugoslav territorial claims; was anti-Italian; and somewhat later, that they were "slavocomunista". According to previous studies, more interned civilians were from Istria than from the regions of Trieste and Gorizia; some individuals from Dalmatia were also interned. Most civilians were interned in remote locations in southern Italy. In the beginning, they were sent to various municipalities, villages or settlements in Sardinia; as many as 25 were identified in the documents (Bajc, 2012, 398). After June 1919, most of them were sent to the island of Ventotene because the Sardinians disliked them. The authorities explained that the local population did not like persons "*who opposed Italian claims*".[14] At the end of 1919, the authorities allowed the internees to choose a location in Central Italy. Some of them agreed to be relocated from one internment site to another in Central Italy (Kacin Wohinz, 1972, 113); however, they were still being held against their will.

The civilians who were scattered around Italy did not know how long they would have to remain away from home. Some returned soon, after a few weeks or months; however, the majority returned after about a year or longer (Kacin Wohinz, 1972, 113–114). The least data is available about living conditions in internment. Lavo Čermelj wrote that in Sardinia many internees fell ill with malaria. When the Italian authorities began to release them at the end of 1919, almost all internees came back ill and exhausted (Čermelj, 1965, 279–280). The data show that six civilians died during internment (Bajc, 2012, 399). The requests for release that were submitted by the interned men and women do not include detailed information about the situation in internment because their authors did not want to provoke the authorities too much and thus be denied release or improvements in their status; the majority thus mentioned "only" health problems. All other sources indicate that the living conditions were poor, particularly for those with pre-existing health problems.

The data about internee age is incomplete: some lists and other documents provide age data or basic birth information; older persons are also listed: the oldest was 69. Most interned women were probably between 30 and 40 years old; one widow Cular, Mandina Baskovic, was 60.

INTERNMENT OF WOMEN

Teachers

Most interned women were accused of being pro-Yugoslav or of distributing pro-Yugoslav propaganda. Documents show that they actively participated in demonstrations against the new authorities. "*She participated in anti-Italian demonstrations where insults were thrown against Italy*"[15] was a typical accusation. The accusation went against

14 ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 41, f. Complessivi: D'Adamo al Governatore Affari Civili (Tel. 1432), Padova, 7. 6. 1919.

15 ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, 1920, b. 16, f. Propaganda jugoslava, Parte I, A 16: SM Marina alla DG PS (N. 541): *Persone sospette internate nel Regno*, 10. 5. 1919.

Antonia Duimovich/Dujmovič from the island of Cres (It. Cherso). In addition to her, others (men) found themselves on the list and were accused of similar "misdemeanors". The document is interesting because the military command admitted in a cover letter that the data about interned persons was incomplete. A general note next to Duimovich says that she was an official.[16] According to another list, she was interned in Vilandra in Sardinia.[17] According to yet another list, she worked for the District Court in Cres.[18] However, according to most other documents, she was a teacher.

As we shall see, relatively speaking, most "subversive" women belonged to this category. The authorities in general were highly distrustful of "Slavic" teachers, considering them dangerous anti-Yugoslav propagandists and irredentist (e.g., Andri & Mellinato, 1994, 39). Lavo Čermelj in his synthesis mentioned (1965, 279) that nine women teachers were expelled (i.e., interned), that the majority of them were from Istria and that they were imprisoned in the Venetian jail of *San Marco*, where the conditions were unhealthy. The data in the sources examined do not accord with Čermelj's. We found data about six more female teachers, most of whom were from the Dalmatian islands and were interned in Sardinia. It can be concluded that Čermelj collected data about other interned female teachers, meaning that the total number of interned women was higher.

For some interned female teachers, only limited information could be obtained. Zora Eussich taught in Poreč. The authorities did not consider her very suspicious because she was placed on the list of persons recommended for release in the summer of 1919.[19] Dinka Rade taught at a primary school in Mali Lošinj. She was first taken to Pula, then on 7 December 1918 to Venice and finally to internment. She was accused of being suspicious, of instigating people against Italy and of actively engaging in anti-Italian meetings.[20] The same applied to Stefania Goljevic.[21] This could perhaps be the same person as Stefania Pljevic/Paljevic/Palievich, who taught on Lošinj in the Cyril-Methodius school. After her arrest, she was taken to Venice and then interned in Cosenza. She was accused of inciting the population against Italy with her acts, for which her teaching job served as a cover. According to other lists, she was originally from Bjelovar in Croatia, and the authorities recommended in 1919 that she be returned to her hometown and not to Lošinj. After a while, the General Civil Commissioner relocated her to Croatia, whence she returned to Veliki Lošinj in 1920 on her own. The authorities immediately suggested that she

16 ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, 1920, b. 16, f. Propaganda jugoslava, Parte I, A 16: SM Marina alla DG PS (N. 541): *Persone sospette internate nel Regno*, 10. 5. 1919.

17 ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 55, f. Elenco internati: 1 list [s.a.].

18 ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 55, f. Internati civili e sacerdoti, Corrispondenza ed elenchi [...]: *Elenco A degli internati del distretto politico di Pula – esclusi i sacerdoti* [September 1919].

19 ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, 1920, b. 17, f. Propaganda jugoslava, a-16, Internati della Venezia Giulia: *Elenco A – Elenco degli internati pei quali si propone la revoca dell'internamento* [s.a.].

20 ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 55, f. Itnernati civili e sacerdoti, Corrispondenza ed elenchi [...]: *Elenco A degli internati del distretto politico di Pula – esclusi i sacerdoti* [September 1919]; cf. ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, 1920, b. 16, f. Propaganda jugoslava, Parte I, A 16: SM Marina alla DG PS (N. 541-IS): *Persone sospette internate nel Regno*, 10. 5. 1919, *Allegato al foglio nº 508 I.S.*, 9. 5. 1919, 4.

21 ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 55, f. Internati civili e sacerdoti, Corrispondenza ed elenchi [...]: *Elenco A degli internati del distretto politico di Pula – esclusi i sacerdoti* [September 1919].

should be turned back together with a priest who was with her and another teacher, Betty Markus. The latter had also taught at Cyril-Methodius school.[22] It was not possible to find additional information about her. Three possibilities exist: she was also interned; she was expelled; or she emigrated (fled) voluntarily. The authorities evidently believed that she opposed the regime, so she received a negative evaluation.

The documents also show that the authorities allowed two female teachers to return to Rijeka from Florence in early October 1919.[23] No other information is available about these two teachers. In the same period, twenty-four teachers reportedly returned from the city in Tuscany.

The most "subversive" was a group of five teachers from Lošinj/Cres. The greatest number of documents and amount of information is probably available about the following group: the mentioned Antonia Duimovich/Duinovich, Giovanna Opatic/Opatič, Gaspara Puric/Purich/Purič, Nicoletta Puric/Purich/Purič and Giovannina/Jasica/Giacomina Castellan/Castelan. Serious accusations against them included the following:

> [...] *spreading propaganda at the Croatian school of St. Cyril and Methodius. After our units had carried out the occupation, their anti-Italian activities did not cease: instead, they intensified and became the center of Yugoslav and secessionist propaganda, culminating in a rebellious manner on 7 December 1918 upon the arrival of the French destroyer H. B. in the port of Cres.*[24]

Castellano and Opatic were first transported to Pula, then on 7 December 1918 to Venice and finally to internment; the other three went to Venice on 10 January the following year and then to internment.[25] Together with a few other persons, they were interned on Sardinia. Despite the requests made by internees and their relatives to the authorities[26]

22 ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, 1920, b. 16, f. Propaganda jugoslava, Parte I, A 16: SM Marina alla DG PS (N. 541-IS): *Persone sospette internate nel Regno*, 10. 5. 1919, *Allegato al foglio n° 508 I.S.*, 9. 5. 1919, 3; b. 17, f. Propaganda jugoslava, a-16, Internati della Venezia Giulia: *Per l'Archivio degli Affari Est. e Riservati* [some handwritten notes, s.a.]; *Elenco B: Elenco degli internati non pertinenti alla Venezia Giulia pei quali si propone il rimpatrio nel paese di pertinenza* [twice, s.a.]; *Gli internati compresi nell'elenco a del Comm. Generale Civile per la Venezia Giulia sono stati tutti rimpatriati* […] [s.a.]; ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 55, f. Elenco internati: *Internati Distretto di Lussino* [s.a.]; f. Internati civili e sacerdoti, Corrispondenza ed elenchi [...]: *Elenco A: Elenco degli internati pei quali si propone le revoca dell'Internamento* [3 different lists, November 1919]. b. 95, f. Internati – Persone che non risultano attualmente internate in alcuna località del Regno: Lussino al Commissariato Generale Civile (N. 493 Gab.): *Internati civili*, 12. 9. 1919; f. Linea di armistizio, Vigilanza – conflitti: Lussino al Commissariato Generale Civile (Tel. 750), 1. 7. 1920.

23 ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 43, f. 1919 Internati (rimpatrio): De Fabritiis Firenze al Comm. Gen. Civile (Tel. 25813), 4. 10. 1919; Ministero della Guerra al Comm. Straordinario Militare VG (Tel. 656) [s.a].

24 ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 55, f. Elenco internati: Lussino al Comm. Gen. (N. 797): *Maestre della scuola Croata dei SS. Crillo e Matodio di Cherso internate in Sardegna*, 22. 11. 1919; also in: ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, 1920, b. 16, f. Propaganda jugoslava, Parte I, A 16; cf. ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 42, f. C: Giacomina Castellan; b. 57, f. Duimovich Antonia.

25 ASTs, RCGC Gab. b. 55, f. Internati civili e sacerdoti, Corrispondenza ed elenchi […]: *Elenco A degli internati del distretto politico di Pula – esclusi i sacerdoti* [September 1919].

26 ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 55, f. Elenco internati: Antonia Purich al MI, 19. 8. 1919; MI al R. Comm. Civ. VG (N.12186-54; 14378I), 6. 9. 1919; Lussino al Comm. Gen. (N. 589): *Purich Antonia. Istanza per il rimpatrio della figlia*, 22. 9. 1919; MI, DG PS al Comm. Gen. (N. 31419.R): *Purich Antonia*, 5. 10. 1919.

in many interventions for their return by important institutions, including the Vatican[27], representatives of the Italian civilian authorities on Lošinj in September 1919[28] and then at the end of 1919 opposed their return, claiming that additional investigation was needed in their case and arriving at the conclusion that they could endanger public order as follows:

> *The return of these teachers before the final deadline would no doubt lead to regrettable incidents* [...] *we can expect an immediate escalation in Yugoslav propaganda, which could be lethal to the national interest*.[29]

The central civilian commissariat for Venezia Giulia shared the opinion about the five teachers' past actions.[30] We can add that all five teachers were on the *C list* even in late 1919, when the authorities concluded that they should remain in internment.

The situation was still volatile because the demarcation (of new national boundaries) had not yet been completed in Paris. This was also the main reason that many were kept in internment or had their return delayed. The authorities were convinced that these teachers could endanger Italian interests with their activities.

The documents also show that some of them accepted relocation from Sardinia to Perugia. After reaching Perugia, there followed a stay at the *Pontificio di Santa Maria* tavern in Rome, from where they fled to Zagreb on 3 March 1920.[31] (The military command warned in early 1919 that[32] the internees frequently left the internment location on their own in an attempt to cross the former border). They probably never returned to their hometowns. This made the job easier for the authorities. The latter would probably not have allowed them to return because they had left without permission. We should also add that, in the spring of 1919, the authorities decided[33] that those persons who were no longer interned but had returned without permission should be stripped

27 ASTs, RCGC Gab. b. 55, f. Elenco internati: Quaranta, Santa Sede (N. 30856) [17. 11. 1919] [twice]; cf. Comm. Gen. Civile a Lussino (Tel. 1558), 20. 11. 1919 [six times]; ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, 1920, b. 16, f. Propaganda jugoslava, Parte I, A 16: Direttore Generale del Fondo per il Culto a Nitti, 26. 1. 1920.

28 ASTs, RCGC Gab. b. 95, f. Internati – Persone che non risultano attualmente internate in alcuna località del Regno: Lussino al Comm. Gen. Civile (N. 493 Gab.): *Internati civili*, 12. 9. 1919.

29 ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 55, f. Elenco internati: Lussino al Comm. Gen. (N. 797) *Maestre della scuola Croata dei SS. Crillo e Metodio di Cherso internate in Sardegna*, 22. 11. 1919 [three times]; also in ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, 1920, b. 16, f. Propaganda jugoslava, Parte I, A 16.

30 ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, 1920, b. 16, f. Propaganda jugoslava, Parte I, A 16: Comm. Gen. Civile al MI DG PS: *Internati di Lussino*, Trieste, 3. 12. 1919; cf. ASTs, RCGC Gab. b. 95, f. Internati – Persone che non risultano attualmente internate in alcuna località del Regno: *Allegato N 2*.

31 ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, 1920, b. 17, f. Propaganda jugoslava, a-16, Internati della Venezia Giulia: Prefettura Cagliari al MI DG PS (N. I822): *Puric Gaspara di Antonio e Castellan Giacomina di Biagio internate*, 12. 11. 1919; Salata al MI DG PS: *Internati della Venezia Giulia* (N. 10183-12 H), 7. 9. 1920; b. 16, f. Propaganda jugoslava, Parte I, A 16: Mosconi al MI DG PS (N. 0712-438): *Purich Gaspara e Castellan Filomena, ex internate*, 27. 2. 1920; ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 55, f. Elenco internati: 1 list [s.a.]; b. 57, f. Duimovich Antonia; b. 95, f. Purich Gaspara e Castellan Filomena, Purich Nicoletta, Opatic Giovanna, Duimovic Antonia maestre a Cherso.

32 E.g., ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 55, f. Corrispondenza ed elenchi [...]: Luzzato al MI DG PS (N. 1031), 25. 2. 1919.

33 ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 55, f. Elenco internati: Luzzato all'Ufficio Affari Civili del R. Gov. (N. 1731), 3. 4. 1919.

of financial support ("*sussidio*") and that they should be monitored if still considered dangerous.

Among the interned teachers were two sisters from Vižinada in Istria (in some lists the name was written as Castellier – Visinada, in others, Omišlje – Castelnuovo Istria), Rosa/Rosalia and Zorka/Albina Rusich/Ruzich. Documents about their case are numerous; however, only the most relevant information will be presented here. The case is interesting because it shows that internment was often delayed. The two sisters were the main and most adamant organizers of the anti-Italian movement in the area of Motovun; they were also members of the Cyril-Methodius Association. In 1919, the local military command in Vižinada made the first suggestion that one of the sisters, Rosa, be relocated because she insisted on Slovenian as the language of instruction instead of Italian. The military command in Motovun proposed either internment on 14 April or the removal ("*allontanamento*") of the two. Military command had been receiving intelligence about their harmful activities; for this reason, they were strictly monitored, which yielded additional evidence that they were carrying out anti-Italian propaganda among the peasantry and high-school students; in the home of one sister, they found a document that served as additional evidence (definitive for the authorities) about their harmful activities. For this reason, the authorities proposed on 21 April 1919 that they be removed or interned. The local authorities once again proposed internment on 1 May; two days later, the Governor of Venezia Giulia did the same (in addition, he proposed the internment of five priests: cf. Kacin Wohinz, 1972, 112). The Supreme Headquarters (*Comando Supremo*) decided on 7 May that they must immediately be escorted to the city of Civitavecchia, which the gendarmes did on 21 May; from there, they were taken to Sardinia and were interned in the town of Macomer. In November, they accepted the offer to be moved to Perugia. In the fall of 1919, both were placed on the list of persons to be repatriated; on 2 September, the military command in Pazin judged that the two were no longer a threat to "*our occupation*". The Central Commissariat shared this opinion by the end of 1919.[34] The documents do not reveal when the two sisters returned or left the city of internment.

Less information is available for some other teachers, who had a fate different from the ones mentioned above. The terminology used suggests that they had not been

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34 ASTs, RCGC Gab. b. 57, f. Ruzich Rosa e Zorka; b. 55, f. Elenco internati: *Persone per le quali sono state inoltrate al Comando Supremo proposte per l'internamento*, 1. 5. 1919; *Elenco degli internamenti politici affettuati nel territorio di giurisdizione del Governatorato della Venezian Giulia nel periodo novembre 1918 – giugno 1919* [s.a.] and 2 other lists [s.a.] and *Elenco degli internati già disinternati* [s.a.]; Parenzo al Comm. Gen. (N. 488): *Internati civili*, 2. 9. 1919; Parenzo: *Internati civili / privati*, 2. 9. 1919; f. Corrispondenza ed elenchi [...]: *Elenco A: Elenco degli internati pei quali si propone le revoca dell'Internamento* [3 lists, November 1919]; b. 41, f. Complessivi: Dalla Favera, RG VG al Comando Supremo (Nº 3205, Riservato): *Allontanamenti*, 3. 5. 1919 (also in b. 55, f. [miscellanea]); D'Adamo, 7. 5. 1919; Gov. VG (N. O13048), Minuta, Trieste, 9. 5. 1919; Dalla Favera, RG VG al Comando Legione CC.RR. VG. (N. 3769), Trieste, 10. 5. 1919 (cf. in b. 57); ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, 1920, b. 17, f. Propaganda jugoslava, a-16, Internati della Venezia Giulia: Prefettura della Provincia di Cagliari al MI DG PS (N. I853): *Rozic Zorka di Giovanni e sorella Rosa, insegnanti internate*, 12. 11. 1919; *Elenco A – Elenco degli internati pei quali si propone la revoca del'internamento* [s.a.]; *Internati (Ven. Giulia) elenco a* [s.a.].

interned, just relocated by force. One such example was Maria Hrzick/Herzick, who worked as a teacher near Pazin and had reputedly exploited her profession for anti-Italian propaganda; in 1919, the authorities decided to move her to her hometown, the island of Krk.[35] Teresa Golmayer/Golmajer/Galmajer was a different case: in mid-March 1919, the authorities planned to "move" ("*allontanamento*") her from Buzet in Istria because she had reportedly engaged actively in pro-Yugoslav propaganda; she repeatedly claimed that Istria would soon become part of Yugoslavia; moreover, she had frequently traveled to Pazin, from where she brought news about the Yugoslav movement. She was notified on 12 May that she had to leave Buzet. She was allowed to choose the destination in Istria to which she would relocate. She immediately appealed that the authorities had been misinformed about her and requested permission to stay because of ill health. The military command decided to grant her request on 22 May 1919; however, the agents in the field opposed that, claiming that she was still a threat. The documents show that various military and civilian posts had corresponded about her before early July 1919.[36]

Families in internment

The leader of the Slovenes in Primorska and Istria, Josip Vilfan, had been informed that the headmaster (in Marezige) Tončič and his daughter from Podgrad had been interned.[37] The documents we examined did not include information about the internment, which again suggests that not all lists and documents have been preserved. Neither is much information available about the internment of the Rusig family from Ronchi. They were all discharged on 20 June 1919 and allowed to return home.[38]

The Sindic/Siercich/Sindicic couple, husband Bartolo/Bortolo and wife Olga, born Duniricaua, housewife, of Cres and Lošinj, were in a "joint" internment. The two had participated in an anti-Italian demonstration at which insults against Italy, the king and the queen were heard, which is why both were first taken to Pula, then to Venice on 7 December 1918 (according to other data on 10 January 1919) and finally interned in Inglesias on Sardinia, followed by Siena. In September and December 1919, the authorities opposed their return. The documents also show that they fled from internment in February 1920 and secretly returned to their hometown of Baška on Krk island. Both were then

35 ASTs, RCGC Gab. b 41, f. H: Brunero, CC.RR. V.G. (N. 11/62): *Proposta di trasferimento di Hrzich Maria* […]., 14. 7. 1919 (also in b. 55, f. Istruzione pubblica); Luzzato all'Ufficio Affari Civili R. Governat (N. 8389), 31. 7. 1919 (also in b. 55, f. Istruzione pubblica); b. 55, f. Istruzione pubblica: Commissariato Civli del Distretto Politico di Pisino al Cap. Grassini (N. 3786): *Maestra Herzich Maria – Chersano*, 21. 7. 1919.

36 ASTs, RCGC Gab. b 41, f. G: Luzzato, RG VG al CC.RR. (Riservato N. 3556): *Allontanamento maestra Golmayer Teresa di Ponguente*, 4. 5. 1919; b. 55, f. Istruzione pubblica: correspondence regarding Teresa Golajer, March–July 1919; Novogardo Capodistria al Gov. (N. 83): *Maestra Teresa Galmajer*, 30. 5. 1919; Robotti al Comado Supremo (N. 6710): *Galmajer Teresa*, 1. 7. 1919.

37 ARS, SI AS 1164, Vilfan, t.e. 822, a.e. 9: [to Josip Vilfan]: *Internacije iz Podgrada* [s.a.].

38 ASTs, RCGC Gab. b. 41, f. Internamenti, Disposizioni di massima: *Elenco degli internati dal 1 giugno 1919 al 20 agosto 1919 – Prosciolti dall'internamento e rimpatriati in seguito al decreto luogotenenziale 29 giugno 1919 N. 1054*. (also in b. 55, f. Elenco internati).

arrested and interned one more time, according to available data until at least September 1920. It seems that one child was with them.[39]

The couple Federico Baucer and his wife Maria Kirchoff from Monfalcone were interned in Sardinia. In March 1919, they asked for a transfer to Grado. They claimed that they had personal matters to resolve and that they had been labeled as refugees just a month previously. The Intelligence and Security Service (Ufficio Informazioni Truppe Operanti or ITO) from Monfalcone opposed their return in April, claiming them to have been politically unreliable and opposed to Italy.[40]

Another special case is that of Zorka Jaksa, who was granted permission to visit an interned and ailing relative in Sardinia, Attanasio/Atanasio/Anastasio/Antonio Lukavac/Lucavac/Lukovac/Lukavach. The allegation was very serious: that he had participated in the demolition of a bridge in order to hinder the arrival of Italian forces. The court could not prove him guilty; however, since the occupational forces did not find it appropriate for him to be in his home area, because they thought that he would continue with anti-Italian propaganda, they interned him on 8 April 1919, together with seven other Dalmatians. Lukavac wrote a letter to the authorities, explaining that he had major problems, and the Ministry of the Interior permitted him to change the location of his internment. In August 1919, Zorka Jaksa asked for permission to visit her relative. The authorities granted her permission and adopted safety measures; among other things, they sent the authorities her photograph and other information. The authorities in Dalmatia also decided that she could travel to Sardinia free of charge. However, she still had to pay a price for her visit: documents show that she stayed in Sardinia until October, joining her relative in internment. In September, the Governor of Dalmatia planned to release Lukavac and 24 others from Dalmatia; however, this happened only after the release of everyone on the *B list* – this means that Lukavac was on the *C list* of the most dangerous internees. After their return, the procedure was deliberately delayed. Lukavac again requested permission for both himself and Jaksa to be allowed to return via Venice, Trieste and Ljubljana to

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39 ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, 1920, b. 16, f. Propaganda jugoslava, Parte I, A 16: SM Marina (N. 541-IS): *Persone sospette internate nel Regno*, 10. 5. 1919, *Allegato al foglio n° 508 I.S.*, 9. 5. 1919, 4; R. Prefettura Siena al MI (N. 953), 15. 9. 1920; Mosconi al MI DG PS (N. 37856): *Sindicic Bartolo – internato*, 16. 12. 1919; b. 17, f. Propaganda jugoslava, a-16, Internati della Venezia Giulia: *Elenco C* [s.a.]; *Elenco C: Elenco internati civili pei quali si ritiene opportuno mantenere il provvedimento di internamento* [end of 1919]; Salata, al MI DG PS: *Internati della Venezia Giulia* (N. 10183-12 H), 7. 9. 1920; *Elenco di jugoslavi internati non compresi nelle liste presentate dal Governo della Venez. Giuli e della Dalmazia* [s.a.]; ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 55, f. Elenco internati: *Internati Distretto di Lussino* [s.a.] and 1 more list [s.a.]; f. Internati civili e sacerdoti, Corrispondenza ed elenchi […]: *Elenco A degli internati del distretto politico di Pula – esclusi i sacerdoti* [September 1919]; Comm. Gen. Civile VG al PS Trieste (N. 1789): *Internati*, 3. 12. 1919; *Elenco C: Elenco di internati civili pei quali si ritiene opportuno mantenere il procedimento di internamento* [November 1919] and some handwritten lists; b. 95, f. Internati – Persone che non risultano attualmente internate in alcuna località del Regno: Presidenza Consiglio Ministri, Ufficio Centrale nuove Provincie al Comm.Gen. Civile VG (N. 11219/12): *Internati della Venezia Giulia*, 14. 10. 1920; *Allegato N 2*; Lussino al Comm. Gen. Civile (N. 493 Gab.): *Internati civili*, 12. 9. 1919; b. 96, f. Sindicic Bartolo e Olga internati.

40 ASTs, RCGC Gab. b. 42, f. Rimpatrio internati e profughi: Federico Baucer, Maria Kirchoff al Commiss. Affari Civili Monfalcone, 15. 3. 1919; I.T.O. Monfalcone-Cervignano a I.T.O. Trieste (N. 57B), 30. 4. 1919.

Belgrade. At the end of the year, he was finally allowed to leave Sardinia and stop for business reasons in Trieste for two days.[41] It is very likely that this also marked the end of Mrs. Jaksa's adventure – if this had not already taken place.

Other examples of female internments

Among the interned were people from particular professions that the new authorities considered peculiarly problematic. One such example was a postwoman from Rihemberk (adjacent to today's Nova Gorica) with the surname Bandelj. The information about her went to Vilfan,[42] who frequently received messages about arrests and internments. Unfortunately, no other information is available about this woman; her name does not appear in the archival documentation from Rome and Trieste, not even under another surname (in Italy, the surname Bandelj was typically changed as Bandelli). It is very likely that the authorities took action against her immediately after the war.

Another interesting example is that of Mrs Mandina/Maddalena Baskovic/Bascovic/Boskovic/Bašković, widowed Cular from Zadar. On 6 April 1919, she was interned on Sardinia, in Oschiri (near the city of Sassari). This person wrote a letter to the Minister of the Interior, dated to the end of July, stating that her health had deteriorated considerably (malaria fever) and that she had turned 60. The following month, the authorities began a correspondence about her case. After four months of internment, she was moved to the *B group* of interned civilians, who were due for gradual release in groups of ten per week – of course, they first wanted to release the ones considered less prominent and less suspicious (*A group*). However, her internment saga was not yet complete: she had to wait two more months before she was sent to Ancona on 14 October 1919, from where she was finally able to travel to Zadar on the 20th. Her crime was as follows: she ran a tavern in which the opponents gathered, and she herself constantly made propaganda towards Italy.[43] Taverns were always training fields for public discussion. In accordance with the

41 ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, 1920, b. 16, f. Propaganda jugoslava, Parte II, A 16: REI Comando Supremo, al MI DG PS, 17. 4. 1919; Lukavac Attanasio al MI, 9. 5. 1919; MI (Tel. 8634, 6825 and 9160), 9. [twice] and 16. 5. 1919; Millo al Comando della Brigata Gaeta: *Internato Lukavac Attanasio*, 23. 7. 1919; Municipio di Niš: *Foglio d'identità*, 14. 8. 1919 [and a photo]; Governo della Dalmazia: *Permesso di transito*, 27. 8. 1919; Lukavac Attanasio al Governo Italiano della Dalmazia, 22. 10. 1919; Millo al MI (N. 42661): *Istanza di Lukavac Attanasio di Kistagne (Dalmazia) internato in Sardegna*, 8. 11. 1919; MI (Tel. 22135): 19. 12. 1919; Prefettura Cagliari al MI DG PS (N. 1448): *Lukovac Atanasio di Spiridione*, 20. 12. 1919; ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, 1920, b. 17, f. Propaganda jugoslava, a-16: *Allegato C – Nota degli internati cui si ritiene inapportuno chiedere il rimpatrio* [August 1919]; *Elenco degli internati per i quali si propone il rimpatrio a scaglioni di 15 per volta non appena afferruato il ritorno in Dalmazia degli internati compresi nell'elenco B* [September 1919].

42 ARS, SI AS 1164, Vilfan, t.e. 822, a.e. 9 [s.a.].

43 ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, 1920, b. 16, f. Propaganda jugoslava, Parte II, A 16: MI (Tel. 6825), 9. 4. 1919; REI al MI DG PS (N. 105-1-5200), 27. 4. 1919; MI, Minuta (N. 1453), 6. 5. 1919; MI (Tel. 8634), 9. 5. 1919; Mandina Bašković al MI, 31. 7. 1919; MI, Minuta (N. 26891 and 26891): *Baskovic Mandina vedova Cular, nata a Makarska e domiciliante a Zara*, 14. and 30. 8. 1919; Millo al MI DG PS (N. 35027): *Rimpatrio Baskovic Mandina*, 24. 8. 1919; al MI, 26. 9. 1919; b. 17, f. Propaganda jugoslava, a-16: *Allegato B – Proposti per rimpatrio a gruppi di 10 per settimana quando questo Governo informi essere giunti gli*

famous saying “in vino veritas”, people became more relaxed and willing to share their thoughts, which they would never have done when sober. The documents we examined also show warnings that opponents were gathering in taverns; one such example comes from Pazin, where pro-Austrian propaganda dominated and was tangible.[44] We expected more documents of this kind. We can also mention the case of a Slovenian teacher Alojz (Lojze) Sardoč of Podgraje pri Ilirski Bistrici: he sang Slovenian songs in the tavern together with the local young men, which is why the authorities arrested all of them; he was put on trial in Trieste and sentenced to 6 months in prison; upon release, he lost his job (Lavrenčič Pahor, 1994, 30, 360, 505).

In April 1919, the authorities in Pula decided on internment exile to Sardinia (to a place called Golfo Aranci) for 18 people who worked in the shipyard and were accused of participating in “*dangerous Yugoslav demonstrations*”. All of them were first laid off, then arrested and taken to Venice, accompanied by gendarmes, whence they were supposed to proceed for Civitavecchia and then to internment in Sardinia. The group included Giuliana Ramas and Giustina Rüche/Ruche. The former was a dactylographer at the hydroplane port office; the latter worked in an office as a typist. When they reached Venice, the authorities decided that they would delay the internment of Rüche because she said she was unwell. She stayed in Venice, waiting to recuperate before being sent on to internment. They decided to release Mrs Ramas at the end of the year; she was supposed to move back to her home in the Czech Republic.[45] Although the documents do not reveal whether Rüche was ultimately interned, it is clear that she was taken away and accommodated in Venice away from home against her will.

Relatively little data was found about the following three interned women. Rosa Priorar/Piocar of Monfalcone was evidently less suspicious. She appears in the lists of interned persons from the summer and fall of 1919. These were people for whom the authorities suggested release, which obviously happened in her case, in either late 1919 or early 1920. She most likely went across the border to Yugoslavia, because the authorities wrote in 1920 that she was no longer among the internees; at the same time, information about her location was unknown. The reason for internment was her anti-Italian orientation.[46] Even less information is available about Antonia Zorzin; we know only that

internati elencati nell’allegato A [s.a.]; *Dalmati jugoslavi internati nel Regno* [s.a.]; Prefettura Sassari al MI (Tel. 380), 7. 10. 1919; Prefettura Sassari al MI (Tel. 391), 16. 10. 1919; Prefettura Ancona al MI (Tel. 4045), 20. 10. 1919.

44 ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, 1920, b. 16, f. Propaganda jugoslava, Parte I, A 16: SM Marina, (N. 323RR8): *Situazione politica e propaganda jugoslava nel Distretto politico di Parenzo*, 11. 2. 1919.

45 ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, 1920, b. 16, f. Propaganda jugoslava, Parte I, A 16: Prefeffura Venezia al MI (N. 4486): *Persone allontanate da Pula*, 13. 4. 1919 and the list; P.S. Golfo Aranci al DG PS (N. 555A): *Persone allontanate da Pula*, 23. 4. 1919 and the list; cf. ASTs, RCGC Gab. b. 55, f. Corrispondenza ed elenchi [...]: *Elenco A: Elenco degli internati pei quali si propone le revoca dell’Internamento* [3 lists, November 1919]; b. 95, f. Internati – Persone che non risultano attualmente internate in alcuna località del Regno: Monfalcone al R. Comm. Gen. Civile (N. 1931), 27. 9. 1920.

46 ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, 1920, b. 17, f. Propaganda jugoslava, a-16, Internati della Venezia Giulia: *Elenco A – Elenco degli internati pei quali si propone la revoca dell’internamento* [s.a.]; *Internati (Ven. Giulia) elenco a* [s.a.]; *Gli internati compresi nell’elenco a del Comm. Generale Civile per la Venezia Giulia sono*

she was interned in Lucca.[47] Antonia Urdich was acquitted on 11 June 1919 and allowed to return from internment.[48]

One interesting example is that of a woman from Gorizia, Orsola Keber/Weber. No information is available about her "subversiveness"; she was simply labeled a housewife ("*donna di casa*"). She was 55, first interned on the island of Ponza, then after 25 July 1919 on the island of Ventotene; she was still there in December 1919. She was on some list that most likely appeared in late 1919; written on it is the somewhat illegible word "repatriation" ("*rimpatrio*"). The woman was then transferred to Lucca; she could also chose between relocation to Pisa, Siena or Perugia. The authorities finally granted her release in February 1920.[49] No information is available about the alleged crimes of some of these women. They were probably hostile in one way or another towards the new occupying authority.

Authorities' disorganization

It turned out that repatriations were complicated and often took a long time. The local administration blamed others for that. There was also confusion between different levels of administration, and bureaucracy played a role in the delays.

Many documents on the subject are available. Some cases also reveal the disorganization of the authorities. For example, the clerks struggled with Slovenian and Croatian (and some other) family names. We found that they misspelled the names, which caused misunderstanding and delays.

Another problem involved people with the same name from the same place. For instance, near Kastav Spinčići, as many as six people shared the name Giovanni Spincic; the carabinieri had the job of arresting and interning him.[50]

Occasionally, some of the authorities dealing with interned persons became aware of these mistakes. One such example was a note from the Commissariat in Lošinj in October 1919 that the General Commissariat in one of its letters, had misspelt the name of Olga Sindicic as Siervincich. It is interesting that in Lošinj they misspelt the given and

stati tutti rimpatriati […],[s.a.]; ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 55, f. Internati civili e sacerdoti, Corrispondenza ed elenchi […]: *Elenco A: Elenco degli internati pei quali si propone le revoca dell'Internamento* [3 lists, November 1919].

47 ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, 1920, b. 17, f. Propaganda jugoslava, a-16, Internati della Venezia Giulia: *Elenco di internati non compresi nelle liste della Venezia Giulia* [s.a.].

48 ASTs, RCGC Gab. b. 41, f. Internamenti, Disposizioni di massima: *Elenco degli internati dal 1 giugno 1919 al 20 agosto 1919 – Prosciolti dall'internamento e rimpatriati in seguito al decreto luogotenenziale 29 giugno 1919 N. 1054*. (also in b. 55, f. Elenco internati).

49 ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, 1920, b. 17, f. Propaganda jugoslava, a-16, Internati della Venezia Giulia: Napoli al MIDG PS (N. 1038): *Persone allontanate dalla Venezia Giulia – Revoca di inernamento*, 12. 12. 1919: *Elenco degli internati civili della Provincia di Napoli originari dei territori occupati oltre il vecchio confine, non compresi negli elenchi A e B compilati dal Comiss. Gen. Civ. della Venezia Giulia* [s.a.] and another list without the title [s.a.]; cf. ASTs, RCGC Gab. b. 95, f. Internati – Persone che non risultano attualmente internate in alcuna località del Regno: *Allegato N 3*.; f. Keber Ossola internata.

50 ASTs, RCGC Gab. b. 55, f. Elenco internati: Brunero, CC.RR. al RG VG, Ufficio Capo S.M. (N. 11/25): *Internamento*, 11. 5. 1919.

family name of the husband as Sindecic Bartolomeo.[51] As has already been mentioned, the couple's names appeared in several versions, in particular their family name.

In addition to these cases of incomplete or incorrect data held by the authorities, it should be noted that the documents also prove that the authorities sometimes did not know where a particular person was interned. These "desaparecidos" included one woman, Cafanna Busicich/Busicic, from the vicinity of Lošinj. The authorities kept asking for her location in May of 1920.[52] Some lists prove only that she had been interned and that the authorities believed at the end of 1919 that it would be better to keep her in internment. Just like the five teachers, she was on the *C list*.[53] The same applied to Nicoletta Busicich from Lošinj. No other information was available about her, which suggests that she must have been considered a dangerous element.

One open question is the extent to which misspelt first and/or family names and other inaccuracies or lack of organization delayed the release of internees and caused other problems. The same applies to expulsions or exclusions. The latter term was used for refugees who did not have their residence in Venezia Giulia and consequently were denied the right to return to the area for several months or longer (they were referred to as the "*non pertinenti*"). For instance, in the summer of 1919, the authorities inquired about Lydia Franzutti Zuccaro from Monfalcone. As a refugee with four children, she was still in "internment" in Acquate in the Lecco municipality (the northern province of Lombardia). As the authorities themselves admitted, a mistake must have occurred because the husband had been allowed to return in the meantime. They sought to resolve this unfortunate complication.[54]

Unexplained cases

The first lists from December 1918 of suspicious persons due for arrest or forced relocation included several women. They were as follows: the widow Catterina Vucetic, the wife of Davide Horn, further Antonia Sanzin, Maria Gregorec and Valeria Flego of Trieste; Lucrezia Platzer of Gorizia; Mrs Slavez, the teacher Maria Muscovich and Maria

51 ASTs, RCGC Gab. b. 55, f. Elenco internati: Lussino al Comm. Gen. (N. 606): *Internati*, 2. 10. 1919.

52 ASTs, RCGC Gab. b. 95, f. Internati – Persone che non risultano attualmente internate in alcuna località del Regno: Ufficio Centrale nuove Provincie al Comm. Gen. Civile VG (N. 3944/12 H): *Internati della Venezia Giulia*, 2. 5. 1920; ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, 1920, b. 17, f. Propaganda jugoslava, a-16, Internati della Venezia Giulia: *Nota delle persone segnalate dal Commissariato civile delle Venezia Giulia delle quali non si conosce il luogo d'internamento* [s.a.] [twice].

53 ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, 1920, b. 17, f. Propaganda jugoslava, a-16, Internati della Venezia Giulia: *Internati dalla Venezia Giulia: Elenco C* [s.a.]; *Elenco C: Elenco internati civili pei quali si ritiene opportuno mantenere il provvedimento di internamento* [end of 1919]; *Tra le persone comprese nell'elenco C del Gommisariato Civile della Venezia Giulia sono stati segnalati i seguenti individui quali internati* [s.a.] [twice]; ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 55, f. Internati civili e sacerdoti, Corrispondenza ed elenchi […]: Comm. Gen. Civile VG al Comando Divisione Interna Trieste (N. 1789): *Internati*, 3. 12. 1919; *Elenco C: Elenco di internati civili pei quali si ritiene opportuno mantenere il procedimento di internamento* [November 1919] and some lists.

54 ASTs, RCGC Gab. b 41, f. F: Lydia Franzutti Zuccaro.

Gariboldi-Polesini of Pazin; Francesca Milic, Dora Ercigoj, Amalia Zidaric, Leopoldina Ferlic and Giuseppina Slatic of Buzet or its vicinity; Darinka Deglic of Nerezine; Militza Flego of Sveti Ivan (probably near Koper) and Anna Catarinic, Ella Glazar and Emilia Madraz of Mali Lošinj.[55] No other information about their fate was available; they were not on the list of internees. Given the serious accusation that they had collaborated with the representatives of authorities of the previous regime or that they were propagandists or even spies, it can be concluded that the authorities adopted strict measures against them; they were most likely arrested and had to leave the area. Our interpretation rests on the assumption that the new authorities had already adopted strict measures by then, which they mitigated for political reasons only in a few months' time. We can also conclude that there had to be several such lists; however, we could not find them in the Trieste archives. What is particularly notable from the point of view of the present study is that, towards the end of the war or in the first few months after it, the authorities showed great distrust of women in Venezia Julia. The situation did not change much over the next few months.

Some individuals were "only" arrested and then imprisoned for some time; it can be assumed that some of them were later interned. At the Peace Conference in Paris, the Yugoslav delegation sent a memorandum to French President Georges Clemenceau regarding Italian violence in Venezia Giulia, stating that many important Yugoslavs had been arrested for no good reason and imprisoned in Trieste. These persons included one woman: the gendarmes arrested Mrs. Poscic on 15 March 1919 while she was traveling from Rijeka to Volosko (near Opatija) because they found in her possession of a few copies of the newspaper *Primorske Novine* from Sušak, which the censors had declared illegal. She was taken to the prison in Trigor Street in Trieste. She was given a suspended one-year sentence. Her "guilt" was also that she was married to an important person: her husband, Dr. Ivan Poscic, was a lawyer, deputy and President of the National Council of the Volosko area, and had been arrested by the gendarmes together with two notable colleagues as early as 25 November 1918.[56] Another case of a woman under arrest was described in the memoirs (first published in 1928 in Ljubljana) of Jakob Soklič, one of the many "Slovenian" priests, who was persecuted by the authorities after the war. He writes that the authorities arrested Marija Ivac, a woman who sold milk in Trieste, on 6 July 1919. The arrest happened together with the arrest of a priest from Pregarje (a settlement in today's municipality of Ilirska Bistrica) (Soklič, 1989, 10). No information about the fate of the two women could be found.

At the end of February 1919, Italian authorities accused 33 persons of anti-Italian sentiment and propaganda. Consequently, the Navy proposed that they be denied the right to movement by not issuing them passports. This group included two women.[57] Evidence

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55 ASTs, RCGC Gab. b. 57, f. Jugoslavi, Cechi Slovacchi, RG di Trieste: *Elenco di cittadini* […], 1. 12. 1918; b. 72, Diario Storico-Militare, 3 novembre 1918–4 agosto 1919; Allegato 9: ITO (N. 354): *Lista A) Elenco di cittadini* […], 15. 12. 1918; (N. 501): *Lista A) Elenco di cittadini* […], 23. 12. 1918; (N. 502): *Lista C) Elenco di cittadini* […], 23. 12. 1918; (N. 506): *Elenco di cittadini* […], 23. 12. 1918.

56 ARS, SI AS 1164, Vilfan, t.e. 823, a.e. 7: *Mémoire présenté à G. Clemenceu* [s.a.], *Annexe M*, 33.

57 ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, 1920, b. 16, f. Propaganda jugoslava, Parte I, A 16: SM Marina al Ministero degli Affari Esteri (N. 193): *Persone alle quali è opportuno negare il permesso di circolazione*, 26. 2. 1919.

that all of them were interned is not available (however, other documents prove that some of the men were interned).

Other cases are also interesting. Viliem Safranko, reportedly a well-known Yugoslav propagandist, had already been removed from Rijeka by the authorities (he most likely was excluded). The Navy had collected highly incriminating intelligence against his wife, Maria: it suggested that she was very intelligent, smart and actively engaged in pro-Yugoslav propaganda; she socialized with French officers; she was also among the efficient confidantes of the Government in Zagreb and the pro-Yugoslav committee in Sušak; during one demonstration, she dared to spit on the Italian flag in scorn. In early February 1919, the authorities recommended that she be removed from the area.[58] The authorities also sought out the Schusterschic/Schusteschitc/Sustersic couple. The husband Alois, a former Austro-Hungarian navy officer, at the end of the war developed strong pro-Yugoslav and anti-Italian sentiments; he was also related to the famous Slovenian politician Ivan Šušteršič. In March 1919, the Navy Command wrote that his wife Alice reportedly even surpassed him and entertained British and French officers and many Yugoslav agents at her home on a daily basis. The husband was reported to travel to Budapest and Zagreb frequently; he had also been seen in Paris and then returned home with the help of the French navy. The Italian navy managed to outfox Alice by infiltrating a person who reported on her and her husband's activities to the occupying forces. It was decided in March that both had to be excluded from Rijeka immediately.[59]

There also exist a few lists of suspicious persons who were considered dangerous and would have to be excluded. The documents we examined do not provide much information about their fate. One of the names that appears on the list was that of Vele Feberta, who most likely was from Dalmatia.[60] Giuseppina Uicic, most likely also from Dalmatia, was accused of pro-Yugoslav propaganda. No evidence exists that she was interned, although the context suggests that she was, most likely together with a relative of hers.[61]

For some of them, the authorities suggested "only" forced relocation across the demarcation line, i.e., to the Kingdom of SHS; this measure was called "*allontanamento*" or "*sfratto*". Among them were a few women. The decision to intern Mrs. Carla Spellich from Trieste was dated 5 January 1919. She was accused of harboring pro-Austrian ideas and openly opposed fellow citizens who supported Italy. She had demonstrated her position several times during the war. The Governor decided within a few days that "helping" her

58 ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, 1920, b. 16, f. Propaganda jugoslava, Parte I, A 16: SM Marina (N. 120): *Segnalazione di persone da Vigilare. Coniugi Safranko e Dvorski Emanuele*, 5. 5. 1919; *Elenco delle persone menzionate nel fascicolo* [s.a.].

59 ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, 1920, b. 16, f. Propaganda jugoslava, Parte I, A 16: SM Marina al Ministero degli Affari Esteri et al. (N. 274): *Pericolosi propagandisti Schusteschitc (detto Sustersic) Alois e di lui moglie Alice*, 10. 3. 1919.

60 ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, 1920, b. 16, f. Propaganda jugoslava, Parte I, A 16: *Elenco delle persone menzionate nel fascicolo* [s.a.].

61 ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, 1920, b. 16, f. Propaganda jugoslava, Parte I, A 16: [one hand-written list, s.a.].

get across the border would suffice.[62] On 18 January 1919, the military command issued a decree that six foreign nationals be relocated from Trieste. The group included Guglielmina Niederhofer, who worked at the S. Rocco shipyard.[63] The names of the following five appear on another list: on 30 January 1919, the authorities proposed this measure against Luis Milos (widowed Bram), of Trieste; on 7 February against Maria Globognin and Maria Lahaine of Postojna; two days later against Elisabetta Blazet of Trieste; on 22 March against Giovanna Cibin of Radece.[64] The "*allontanamento*" measure was envisaged for the 68-year-old Mrs. Maria Oblak of Materija: she was the mother of the teacher Giovanni Krizinick, who returned to his hometown in June 1920 (he evidently evaded the authorities) and then proceeded for Trieste and across the border to Yugoslavia. The authorities also decided that a new teacher, who replaced her son, would move into the house.[65]

The circle of suspicious individuals was wide and included those who held suspicious political views, regardless of their ethnic background and/or gender. A special register contained data about suspicious persons for 1919–1929; there are a few cases of suspicious women who most likely happened to be in Trieste at the time or were connected with it in one way or another. In addition to ten women, there were seven women who were suspicious because of the new "red danger" or Bolshevik ideas. The authorities wrote that some of these women were extremely dangerous followers of Bolshevism ("*pericolosissima bolscevica*"). However, I believe that the register is incomplete.[66] Leopoldina Bonamie, who was of Hungarian origin, was very dangerous and a forceful activist against Italy. In May 1919, the authorities in Rijeka wrote that she had connections with the top Bolsheviks and worked in the *Danubius* shipyard. They proposed that she and a few others be excluded as soon as possible.[67] She thus worked in the shipyard that, according to the security service, included many dangerous individuals, who needed to be removed as quickly as possible because they spread anti-Italian propaganda, had spied during the war and had spread Bolshevik propaganda.[68] No other evidence could be obtained about these 18 women and whether or not they were ultimately removed. Evidently, there were relatively high numbers of women engaged in propaganda, particularly Bolshevik propaganda.

62 ASTs, RCGC Gab. b. 57, Questura al RG VG (N. 19/3): *Proposta di internamento di Spellich Carla fu Giovanni*, 5. 1. 1919; Governatore alla R. Questura Trieste (N. 229): *Allontanamento di Spellich Carla*, 9. 1. 1919.

63 ASTs, RCGC Gab. b. 57, f. Jugoslavi, Cechi Slovacchi: RG VG al Ten. Colonnello CC.RR. Celoria (N. 72): *Allontanamento di sudditi stranieri*, 18. 1. 1919.

64 ASTs, RCGC Gab. b. 55, f. Elenco internati: *Elenco delle persone per le quali è stato ordinato lo sfratto oltre la linea d'armistizio* [s.a.]; cf. b. 57, f. Jugoslavi, Cechi Slovacchi.

65 ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 57: Brunero, CC RR al RG VG (N. 118/2): *Esito informazioni*, 13. 7. 1919.

66 ASTs, CC, Registro 86 [register of some suspects in alphabetical order, s.a.].

67 ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, 1920, b. 16, f. Propaganda jugoslava, Parte I, A 16: SM Marina (N. 578): *Proposta di espulsione da Fiume di alcuni operai ed impiegati del Cantiere Danubius*, 20. 5. 1919.

68 ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, 1920, b. 16, f. Propaganda jugoslava, Parte II, A 16: SM Marina alla Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri (N. 13578): *Igegneri impiegati al cantiere "Danubius"*, 9. 2. 1919; SM Marina (N. 189): *Proposta di espulsione da Fiume di quattro impiegati del Cantiere "Danubius"*, 19. 2. 1919; SM Marina (N. 296): *Proposta di espulsione da Fiume di sei impiegati del Cantiere Danubius,* 8. 5. 1919.

The most dangerous two included Marina Brncic and Linci Prisić, who were active propagandists and activists for the Yugoslav movement in the Volosco municipality. Military command proposed internment for them on 9 April 1919.[69] The documents we examined do not show whether they were interned in the end.

One telling example is that of Giovanna Gregorich from Trieste. In late May 1919, Trieste carabinieri proposed that she be interned for anti-Italian propaganda. The following month, the central authority in Venezia Giulia decided only to issue her a strict warning and closely supervise her. She was not considered dangerous because she was illiterate and had no personality; she thus could not influence her environment.[70]

CONCLUSION

Women in the area of the Northern Adriatic were exposed to various kinds of violence at the end of the First World War, regardless of their ethnicity. So far, however, research has shown that the strict measure of internment was used almost exclusively against Croatian and Slovenian women. Regardless of the partly problematic documentation (the data is inconsistent and time-consuming to process; in addition, Italian authorities themselves and consequently the internees experienced problems because of unreliable information), it can be said that the sources from both archives provide considerable information about a story that has so far received little attention, in particular its female side.

The occupation forces had a simplified view of the situation: for example, when it came to the names of Slovenians and Croats, they simply referred to them as Slavs (*slavi*), while simultaneously looking down upon them. On the other hand, the population showing any open disagreement was severely sanctioned. Generally speaking, the documents reveal a strong anti-Slavic sentiment; in addition, disrespect for the "other" and stereotypes are common. The schizophrenia of the new authorities was also evident because almost any kind of disagreement was perceived as suspicious.

The documents include several examples of requests by parents or other relatives for the return of their loved ones from internment or "merely" for information about them. At least indirectly, this could be considered a form of postwar violence that mostly affected women, who already had to care for their families, property, their children's upbringing etc. Consequently, internment affected a much wider circle of the postwar population, including the mothers, women and children who stayed at home.

It is also assumed that the authorities refrained from using internment indiscriminately; instead, they referred to milder forms of forced relocation. The main objective of the authorities was to prevent dangerous or potentially dangerous individuals – including women – from harming the new regime.

Based on my analysis of the documents, I can say that the treatment of internees was more or less the same, regardless of their gender. My initial hypothesis has thus been

69 ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 55, f. Elenco internati: Comando XXVI° Corpo Armata: *Allegato al foglio N° 2158*, 9. 4. 1919.

70 ASTs, RCGC Gab. b 41, f. G: Giovanna Gregorich.

confirmed. The only real difference concerned the numbers: out of around 850 interned civilians, a “mere” 35/45 were women. These numbers are inaccurate because some of the lists are partly illegible, and it is possible that some last and first names were duplicated. Nevertheless, internments represent an indirect indicator of the reality in the Northern Adriatic 100 years ago. It shows that women played an equal role, if to a smaller extent, in the dynamics of political and national conflict. They were active members of society in one way or another; they were not passive, which makes them look similar to interned men from the same period. This also means that the situation of women, at least with regard to the subject of this study, should be analyzed in the same way as that of men.

INTERNACIJE PO PRVI SVETOVNI VOJNI. PRIMER ŽENSK ZGORNJEGA JADRANA, 1918–1920

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POVZETEK

Novembra 1918, po koncu prve svetovne vojne, je na območju Zgornjega Jadrana (v Julijski krajini, na Reki in delu Dalmacije) italijanska stran – kot nova zasedbena oblast – aretirala več oseb in nekatere internirala v notranjost italijanske države. Podrobna analiza številnih dokumentov in seznamov, ki so shranjeni v osrednjem arhivu v Rimu (Archivio Centrale dello Stato) in tržaškem delu državnega arhiva (Archivio di Stato di Trieste), je pokazala, da je bilo iz omenjenega območja internirah kakih 850 civilnih oseb, čeprav so se v tedanjem času in se tudi v nekaterih sodobnih delih pojavljajo precej nižje, a hkrati različne številke. Pregled virov med drugim pokaže, da so bile med interniranimi osebami tudi ženske. Če na splošno o internacijah po prvi svetovni vojni na slovensko/hrvaško-italijanskem stičnem območju še zmerom nimamo neke poglobljene analize, ostaja tematika interniranih žensk še manj raziskana. Avtor je ugotovil, da so oblasti večino interniranih žensk obtoževale, da so projugoslovansko usmerjene oziroma da so izvajale projugoslovansko propagando in da so se aktivno vključevale v druge protiitalijanske aktivnosti. Največ takih "subverzivnih" žensk je spadalo v kategorijo učiteljic. Izkazalo se je tudi, da so bile repatriacije precej komplicirane in so se v nekaterih primerih močno zavlekle. Lokalne uprave so na primer odgovornost prenašale na druge, med raznimi resorji pa je obenem vladala zmeda in birokracija je očitno imela svojo težo pri zavlačevanju izpustitev. Hkrati beležimo nekaj primerov slabe organiziranosti oblasti: zapisovalcem so na primer slovenski in hrvaški (in nekateri drugi) priimki povzročali težave; večkrat so jih zgrešeno zapisovali in je zaradi tega prihajalo tudi do nesporazumov in zavlačevanj. Pravzaprav ni bilo razlik v ravnanju do interniranih – ne glede na to, ali so to bili moški ali ženske. Prava razlika je bila le v kvantifikaciji: izmed kakih 850 interniranih civilistov je bilo žensk približno "le" 35/45. Številke niso povsem točne, ker je del seznamov slabo čitljiv in dopuščamo možnost podvojitve priimkov in imen. Kakor koli že, internacije so posredni pokazatelj razmer izpred 100 let, ko so bile na območju Zgornjega Jadrana – v prvi fazi problematične in travmatične tranzicije ob koncu prve svetovne vojne – tudi ženske, čeprav v manjšem številu, polnopravno vključene v dinamike političnih in nacionalnih sporov. Na tak ali drugačen način so bile angažirane oziroma niso bile pasivne in tudi v tem je slika zelo podobna glede na internirane moške. Z drugimi besedami: njihove razmere – žensk – moramo, vsaj v okviru naslovne tematike, preučevati ravno tako kot razmere moških.

Ključne besede: Julijska krajina, Reka, Istra, Dalmacija, Italija, ženske, učiteljice, internacije, nasilja, tranzicija

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POLITICAL ACTIVISM OF SLOVENE WOMEN IN VENEZIA GIULIA AFTER WORLD WAR I AND THE RISE OF FASCISM. FROM AUTONOMY TO SUBORDINATION

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ABSTRACT

The paper addresses Slovene women's activities in organizations in the Julian March and opens questions associated with their political and national activity after World War I and after the rise of fascism in Italy. Attention has been paid to the transition from legal to illegal activity and the role played by women in the Slovene anti-fascist movement of the 1920s and 1930s. It is evident from police sources that women (particularly students and educated women) often appeared in lists of persons who were deemed a threat to the fascist regime. The extent and features of women's illegal activities were only partly documented by historiography, which, notably, failed to explore the extent and characteristics of women's illegal activities. The article sheds light on two remarkable antifascists, Fanica Obid and Ljudmila Rutar, whom the authorities regarded as a grave threat to Mussolini's regime.

Keywords: women, antifascism, fascism, Julian March, post-war period

L'ATTIVISMO POLITICO DELLA SLOVENE NELLA VENEZIA GIULIA DOPO LA PRIMA GUERRA MONDIALE E L'ASCESA DEL FASCISMO. DALL'AUTONOMIA ALLA SOTTOMISSIONE

SINTESI

Dopo la fine della prima guerra mondiale si costituirono nella Venezia Giulia numerose associazioni femminili slovene. Soprattutto a Trieste e a Gorizia l'attivismo femminile aveva una forte impronta politica e contrastava la politica di italianizzazione e fascistizzazione dell'area di confine. Al centro dell'attenzione è il passaggio dall'attività legale a quella clandestina e il ruolo svolto dalle donne nel movimento antifascista sloveno degli anni Venti e Trenta. Dalle fonti di polizia emerge che soprattutto le studentesse e le maestre venivano incluse negli elenchi delle persone pericolose per il regime fascista. La storiografia ha finora ricostruito solo in parte la loro attività in pubblico e nella clandestinità. L'articolo mette in luce due figure importanti dell'antifascismo giuliano, Fanica Obid e Ljudmila Rutar.

Parole chiave: donne, antifascismo, fascismo, Venezia Giulia, primo dopoguerra

INTRODUCTION[1]

Individual political and national players strove to restore the social fabric after the end of World War I and after the disintegration of the Habsburg Monarchy in the territory of the former Austrian Littoral, which had been renamed to *Venezia Giulia* (the Julian March) after November 1918. The organizational impetus was palpable among the Slovene population, as was its aversion towards the Italian occupation and the military administration and, consequently, the inclusion in the new state framework. The fear that the Italian authority would take away Slovenes' national rights after the arrival of the Italian army – rights they had been granted under Austria – became the impetus for diverse political activities and social organizing. The article seeks to explore the extent of women's activity in organizations and the reasons behind its occurrence after the military occupation of the former Austrian Littoral and its integration into the Kingdom of Italy. These activities were modelled after women's bourgeois pre-war sociability; initially, they included women's emancipatory aspirations. The rise of fascism, fascistization and Italianization of the multiethnic border area saw the emergence of new demands for organizing national defence activities and abandonment of ideological leanings as well as feminist demands among the Slovene population. This transition is best exemplified by autobiographical testimonies of Slovene teachers working in Trieste.

Marija Kmet, a teacher at a Slovene school in Trieste,[2] described in her memoirs her enthusiasm for the formation of the new Yugoslav state at the end of the war, but also her disappointment following the Italian occupation of the Austrian Littoral:

> *I achieved what I had wished for throughout the war: I will be happy when I can cry out at the top of my voice in public: 'That damn Austria!' At that point I was allowed to do that. I returned to Trieste triumphantly, I wore the Slovene tricolored flag in public and was repeatedly disappointed when I was attacked by Italians, and, indeed, hit on the head with a stick by some man. We made large and small flags in classrooms for the English; looking forward to their arrival, we waited for them day after day and devised grand plans. I argued with a housekeeper who learnt from some influential Triestine magnates that Trieste would be occupied by Italians, who would go as far as Logatec. I was outraged and rejected her claims, saying that it was nothing but Italians' wishful thinking, until that unforgettable, sad day came.* (Kmet, 1933, 79–80).[3]

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1 The article was elaborated within the EIRENE project (full title: Post-war transitions in gendered perspective: the case of the North-Eastern Adriatic Region), founded by the European Research Council under Horizon 2020 financed Advanced Grant founding scheme [ERC Grant Agreement n. 742683]. The article is also the result of research activities in the following research project: *Oborožena meja. Politično nasilje v severnem Jadranu, 1914–1941* n. J6-7152, financed by the Slovenian Research Agency (ARRS).

2 Marija Kmet (1889–1972) was a teacher at a private school in Trieste, which was established by a branch of the society Ciril Metodova družba (Cyril and Methodius Society), whose operation was based on the same principles as that of Schulverein and Lega Nazionale.

3 Marija is astonished that they did not learn beforehand "*that Trieste was handed over to Italians along with the rest of Karst*," referring to the Treaty of London and adding "*or did we subconsciously overhear such announcements?*" (Kmet, 1933, 81).

Marija Kmet held several lectures on Slovene literature in Delavski dom[4] (the Labourers' Hall) and was soon blacklisted by the Italian authorities for not concealing her anti-Italian sentiments.[5] She was forced to relocate to Ljubljana and search for a new job (Kmet, 1933, 83).[6]

The despair felt by the most active amongst Slovene women upon the arrival of the Italian troops in Trieste and Gorizia was addressed in the memoirs of the Trieste-based author Marica Nadlišek Bartol.[7] The joy felt upon the disintegration of the Habsburg Monarchy was followed by the sadness over the arrival of the Italian authorities.

> *Slovene women, who made bows, rosettes, and ribbons in Slovene national colours in Narodni dom (the National Hall) pledged to face the Entente with a Slovene threecolour. However, something heavy lay in the atmosphere among these national workers, since some of them had heard that the Slavs were waiting in vain for the Entente's arrival. Nevertheless, Slovene national symbols were sold and worn in the streets of Trieste. Those who only yesterday pretended to be our friends now looked daggers at us. We grew more depressed day by day, hearing from many sides that only Italians were coming to Trieste, without the French, the English or Americans, contrary to Slavs' hopes.* [...] *Already in several days' time our symbols had to disappear, they were removed by force and their bearers ridiculed. By and large, it was claimed that from that point onwards we were all Italians and that only Italian colours were allowed. In late November the schools opened; however, only Italian ones. Naive as we were, we still hoped and waited for Slovene schools to open, as promised; however, subsequently, these promises were broken.* (Nadlišek, 2005, 339).

Discomfort, disappointment, and fear spread among the broader Slovene rural and urban population after the war and with the arrival of the Italian army, which is documented by memory literature. Women's and men's testimonies are similar in terms of accents and descriptions; however, they differ in terms of quantity. A memoir penned by Jožefa Lakovič Jarc, a farm woman from Doberdob, is thus particularly valuable. She depicted her experience as a refugee during World War I and her return to her war-torn hometown, where she saw the arrival of the Italian army:

> *In the beginning, when we were under Italy, we thought that perhaps things would be better than in Austria, that we would retain the same rights in schools, in church*

4 On Slovene workers' political and cultural activities in Trieste see Regent, 1967.

5 "*However, we remained hopeful that liberators would arrive and that Trieste would be a free port, at least. Some of us hardened "patriots" thus remained in Trieste until the end. What contempt I felt for Italians then, I spat in their presence, expected them to leave for good!* [...] *There was no school any more, but nobody was driving us away, so we stayed and devised secret plans and were even ready to die for the homeland.*" (Kmet, 1933, 82).

6 On conditions in Trieste's socialist circles, in which Marija Kmet was active, see: Regent, 1967, particularly 108–116; Piemontese, 1974.

7 Marica Nadlišek Bartol (1867–1940) taught in Slovene municipal schools up to 1889; she was the editor of *Slovenka*, the first Slovene-language women's periodical, which was published in Trieste between 1887–1900.

and in the village. However, that was not the case; we soon felt that Italy wanted to Italianize all Slovenes. We were told that 'si parla solo italiano' in Italy. (Lackovič Jarc & Gergolet, 2010, 53).[8]

Author Ilka Vašte also addressed problems women active in the Slovene national and socialist ranks faced when dealing with the Italian military and administrative authorities. She started working as a teacher in the Slovene-language Cyril and Methodius private school in Trieste in 1913. After the war, similarly to many other Slovene teachers and educated women who were not born in the former Austrian Littoral, she was unable to obtain Italian citizenship and was thus made to relocate to Ljubljana in 1919.[9]

I remained in Trieste for another three months. The conditions were difficult, the city was occupied by the Italians. We waited in vain for them to open our schools. The entire inventory of our school at Acquedotto was thrown to the street and burnt down. They denied me my bereavement benefit and pension after my husband's death. I had to provide for my two children with my small salary. I was in dire straits; however, I persevered for as long as I could. (Vašte, 1964, 131).

Memoirs penned by Ilka Vašte and other teachers who provided written testimonies of that turbulent period shed light on trauma experienced due to loss of employment or expulsion from Trieste. By leaving the city, many of them also left their space of social and political engagement, but also that of their emancipation. Having been forced to leave Trieste, many women teachers' autonomous public activities ceased and they relocated to areas, which were more conservative and less favourably disposed towards emancipated women.

A mere 392 schools out of a total of 540 schools in operation before the war were open in late 1919 even though the Italian military governor had promised that Slovene and Croatian schools would be restored (Andri & Mellinato, 1994, 65–95). Later on, their number was reduced and they were eventually banned and removed by the Gentile Reform of 1925 (Čermelj, 1974, 41–45). The fate and experience of Slovene teachers is known; the Italian authorities transferred a part of the teaching staff to the country's interior, while others left for Yugoslavia after the removal of Slovene schools. Specific aspects of this removal and transfer of teachers in terms of gender are yet to be examined (Lavrenčič Pahor, 1994). The question of how Slovene teachers who accepted their transfers to Italy's interior adjusted to the fascist redefinition of a woman's role and how they experienced it has not been addressed yet (De Grazia, 1992, 15).

8 Jožefa Lakovič Jarc's memoir depicts life in the Gorizian region before and after World War I. This is an extraordinarily valuable written source that bears witness to her understanding of epoch-making changes and highlights forms by means of which watershed political events cut into individuals' lives and into that of their respective rural community.

9 On the exerted pressure and the departure of the non-Italian population during the Italian military administration see Purini, 2010, 42–51.

In the uncertainty of the first post-war months,[10] when the Italian authorities started to install the new institutional frameworks and introduce the Italian legislature, the Slovene population began to restore its network of societies (Hočevar, 1969, 112). Along with the restored pre-war cultural, professional, and economic societies, new ones came into being, including women's societies. It is significant that this occurred in a period when the premises of the most important Slovene organizations were demolished and targeted by fascist arsonists. The arson attack of Narodni dom in Trieste took place on 13 July 1920; the headquarters of Slovene societies, the premises of Jadranska banka and privately owned shops were attacked and ruined. The premises of Delavski dom and Ljudski oder were demolished as well.[11] The fascist violence in the Julian March escalated with Benito Mussolini's rise to power and the repressive policy aimed at the Slovene population – in Istria also at the Croatian population – exacerbated.

WOMEN'S ACTIVISM DURING THE RISE OF FASCISM

In the early 1920s, the chronology of the fascist violence coincided with that of women's activity in organizations and with an increased number of women's societies, which is yet to be clearly recorded by fascist and border-related historiographical studies. The society Goriško splošno slovensko žensko društvo (the Gorizian General Slovene Women's Society) was established in Gorizia in September 1922. The society Žensko dobrodelno udruženje (Women's Charitable Association) was founded in Trieste on 8 November 1922[12] and was in operation up to mid-1928. Prosvetna zveza (Cultural Association), whose girls' section commenced operation in 1924, was established in Gorizia in 1920. Women's sporting sections played *hazena*, a team game similar to handball (Sardoč, 1983, 50). The main goal of the expedited formation of girls' circles throughout the Littoral was to include women in the national defence activities, which can be seen as a continuation of women's pre-war activities in organizations, but also as a completely new attempt to defend the Slovene population from fascist denationalization. The authorities regarded women's organizations as less dangerous than men's organizations; consequently, they subjected them to more severe persecution. Women's theatre groups and choirs, which spread the Slovene national sociability among the female population in urban and rural areas, were formed concurrently with the discontinuation of Slovene institutions and schools. In the 1920s and 1930s, a similar role was played by the societies

10 The border between the Kingdom of Italy and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was decided upon on 12 November 1920 in Rapallo.

11 On the destruction of the largest Slovene library and on how the dream of a multiethnic coexistence was buried see Hočevar, 1969, 111.

12 On 2 September 1933, the local authorities approved the statute of Slovensko dobrodelno udruženje. A note was added that Udruženje collaborated with Šolsko društvo and that both societies were founded to replace the discontinued sections of the Cyril Methodius Society. The statute was signed by Ivanka Kapun, Marija Premerl, Felicia Ferluga, Danica Perhavec, Ana Gombač, and Marija Sancin, whom the authorities deemed morally and politically fit (ASTs, RCGC Gab., b, 125, f. 055, Associazione femminile di beneficienza, 13 October 1926).

Marijina družba (Mary's Society), which were restored after the war. Their operation was obstructed by the Italian authorities to a lesser degree due to their religious nature; nevertheless, the national activities organized by the Slovene clergy were often hidden behind their religious goals.[13]

The end of World War I brought new developments to the sphere of women's journalism in Trieste and Gorizia. *Jadranka* was first published in Trieste in 1921.[14] It was edited by Marica Gregorič Stepančič, who aimed to encourage women's public activities in the period when the Julian March saw the emergence of fascist politics and the introduction of the basis for the anti-Slovene policy (Vinci 2011, 5–32): "*We must start from scratch. We were degraded to the lowest point a nation can reach. Let us show them that we can rise from the lowest depths*." (Gregorič Stepančič, 1922)[15] *Slovenka* was published in Gorizia in 1922–1923.[16] Both women's periodicals were discontinued in 1923 so that they would not stand in the way of a more ambitious journalistic project, i.e. *Ženski svet*, which was first published that same year in Trieste; it was a journal of the society Žensko dobrodelno udruženje, which was established in Trieste in 1922 and was intended for a broad female readership.

The post-war wave of women's activities in Slovene societies and in journalism is to be seen additionally as a continuation of women's charitable activities during wartime. Antonija Slavik,[17] one of the initiators of Žensko dobrodelno udruženje and *Ženski svet*, was the heart and soul of Slovene women's charitable activities in Trieste during the war. She was active in the women's branch of the Cyril and Methodius Society and in the Triestine Red Cross, where she worked alongside Italian and German women from Trieste. Milka Martelanc also engaged in humanitarian work during wartime and was active in the Triestine Red Cross. She accompanied a group of war orphans to a 10-week holiday to Switzerland in 1918. In Geneva, she contacted Slovene emigrants and representatives of the Yugoslav Committee in Paris, and they gave her instructions for the National Council Committee in Trieste at the end of the war. After the arrival of the Italian army in Trieste, the authorities threatened her with internment; however, she relocated to Ljubljana in time, where she helmed the Office for the Occupied Territory in Trieste (Nećak, 1972).

13 On the operation of the Marijina družba societies in Slovene ethnic territory see Zalar, 2001. On the operation of the Slovene clergy in the Littoral see Pelikan, 2002.

14 "The journal of nationally conscious women in Trieste" was a monthly edited by Marica Stepančič – Gregorič. After World War I, she "*committed to the idea of establishing a women's monthly that would help save national consciousness.*" (Samsa, 1954, 51).

15 In her polemic with someone who signed their article in the second issue of *Jadranka* as a Woman from Idrija and supported the struggle of the "nationally conscious women" for women's right to vote, Marica Gregorič – Stepančič emphasized the importance of national defence work. She believed that Slovene women will be given the right to vote when the "rest of Italy's womanhood" will (Gregorič Stepančič, 1922, 25).

16 Edited by Gizela Ferjančič, the monthly was named after the first Slovene periodical, which was published in Trieste from 1897 to 1902 and represents the very beginning of Slovene women's movement and feminism.

17 Antonija Slavik, née Lavrenčič, (1868–1938) graduated from the teachers' training school in Gorizia. She was actively involved in the Slovene cultural life in Trieste and wrote for *Edinost*. She was a member of the women's branch of the Cyril and Methodius Society, the Red Cross, and of the Widows' and Orphans' Organization. On her activity during the war see Hočevar, 1969, 96.

She returned to Trieste in 1921 and became head of the secretariat of the political society Edinost; she left the city the following year to study journalism in Prague. Following the establishment of Žensko dobrodelno udruženje, she became its secretary and one of the most prominent contributors to *Ženski svet.* She became its editor-in-chief after the periodical's relocation to Ljubljana. Namely, Slovene-language press was banned and, consequently, the editorial office was forced to leave Trieste for Ljubljana, where she took refuge to avoid fascist prosecution.[18]

Pavla Hočevar,[19] a teacher at the Cyril Method school in Trieste, was an active Slovene social democrat. In her memoir, she described the reasons behind the establishment of women's society and the periodical *Ženski svet* in the period of the increasing fascist violence and Italian authorities' obstruction: "*We must create a form of licit assistance – let us found a charitable organization! Fascists might allow that!*" (Hočevar, 1969, 121). She explained the reasons behind women's involvement in charitable work in a similar manner. In the post-war period, employment in the public sector and state benefits were granted on the basis of nationality, meaning that the Slovene population was often deprived of material support.

> *Many Slovenes lost their income: Our poor families do not get the same state support as the Italian ones. Schoolchildren in Sv. Jakob/San Giacomo are in need of everything, the women's branch of the school society (the successor of the woman's branch of the Cyril and Methodius Society) cannot do everything.* [...] *Several weeks later, on 8 November, the founding general assembly of the new society Žensko dobrodelno udruženje took place. The society was helmed by Antonija Slavik and Milka Martelanc was its secretary.* (Hočevar, 1969, 121).

The society consisted of a charitable section, which gathered means for supporting families and children, and a crafts section, which saw to it that national embroidery was tailored and sewn. Hočevar maintains that their courses were "*also a delightful meeting point where only Slovene words could be heard, occasionally also a Croatian one, and where the related terminology could be learnt*." (Hočevar, 1969, 121). These activities represented a step towards women's traditional roles and digressed from moderate pre-war and post-war ideals promoted by the circle of women who established *Slovenka*, the first women's periodical, in Trieste in 1897. However, they opened possibilities for raising political awareness of that part of the female population which would due to their class or ideological orientation remain outside the network of women's organizations.

Hočevar also argues that she was somewhat apprehensive to take on the editorship of *Ženski svet* at the invitation of Antonija Slavik, Milka Mankoč, Marica Nadlišek Bartol, and Milka Martelanc, since her view of life differed from theirs and because she did not identify herself merely in terms of national values. On account of increasing fascist pressure experienced by the Slovene population, she was prepared to put her social-

18 She retired after World War II and edited the fashion section in the women's periodical *Naša žena.*

19 Pavla Hočevar (1889–1972), a teacher and a writer.

democrat and feminist ideas aside. She gave in to "the rule of the middle ground" and agreed to stress national consciousness and foster hidden Sloveneness and Yugoslav dom. "*I listened to such and similar instructions, got lost in thought and remained silent. A cold shadow fell on my horizon, which was once so daring, on my grand plans and my independent view of life. I could not contradict, our people's position was too bleak – I had to yield*" (Hočevar, 1969, 122–123). Fanica Obid and Ljudmila Rutar, who will be addressed in the further course of the paper, acted in a similar way.

Slovene women's post-war organizational enthusiasm was also closely associated with the politicization experienced by women at the end of the war, partly also beforehand.[20] Many Slovene women in Trieste and Gorizia supported the May Declaration and the emergence of the new Yugoslav state. Similarly, their politically active Italian counterparts strove for Trieste to become a part of Italy. Pavla Hočevar's efforts and those of other Trieste-based Slovene women activists aimed at organizing women's rallies in Ljubljana, Zagreb, and Belgrade in protest of the occupation and secession of Slovene and Croatian areas undoubtedly attest to the extent of women's autonomous political operation immediately after the war and in the 1920s.[21] Their political activity was strengthened with the general belief that only mass activism and national efforts can prevent the materialization of the fascist programme, whose goal was to Italianize the entire border area.

In 1928, when the fascist authorities banned Slovene societies and the Slovene press, the *Žensko dobrodelno udruženje* society was dissolved. With more than 18,000 subscribers, its periodical was forced to find a new publisher and relocate to Ljubljana, i.e. Yugoslavia. Despite its relocation, Pavla still edited the periodical in Trieste:

> *The articles were sent to me via a secret route. Individual issues were paginated in a print shop in Trieste, matrices were made and sent to a Ljubljana-based print shop. Every month we feared for the periodical's fate, dreading that the prepared materials would be confiscated and that the periodical would not be sent to our subscribers in the Littoral, which indeed happened. We received complaints that the periodical was delivered with a considerable delay or not at all, and some subscribers had to explain themselves to the authorities and thus chose to cancel their subscriptions. For a while, each issue was sent to Italy by registered mail, which was quite costly. Several issues were sent in a single sleeve in order to minimise the threat of our subscribers being prosecuted by fascists.* (Hočevar, 1969, 125–126).

Italian authorities regarded the editorial team of *Ženski svet* as a dangerous political enemy, which is attested by the documents kept in the political records Casellario politico,

20 On national efforts in Trieste's circles see Catalan, 2007; Verginella, 2006, 115–135.

21 Pavla Hočevar wrote about her trips to Ljubljana, Zagreb, and Belgrade in the spring of 1919 to organize rallies in support of the demands voiced by Slovene Littoral women. In the Slovene capital, she sought support among the refugees from the Littoral and in the Office for the Occupied Area; in Zagreb, she appealed to the well-established author Zofka Kveder. Assisted by the Slovene politician and member of parliament Anton Korošec, she came into contact with the organization Kola srpskih sestara in Belgrade (Hočevar, 1969, 108–109).

in the Central State Archive in Rome. Pavla Hočevar was subject to the Italian police surveillance even after her relocation to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, i.e. to Ljubljana, in 1929.[22] Fascist police informants kept watch on her as a fervent anti-Italian and propagandist, who was active in Klub Primork (Littoral Women's Club) and in the editorial staff of *Ženski svet*.[23] They also followed Milka Martelanc for "*spreading Slovene irredentist sentiments*"[24] and for having contacts "*with all persons arriving in Ljubljana from Italy, particularly from the Julian March, for keeping in touch with the well-known irredentist Maša Grom and for having an informant in Trieste, a woman named Godina, a representative of the aforementioned periodical Ženski svet for the Julian March*."[25]

Maša Dolenc Grom was a member of numerous women's associations. After having relocated from Trieste to Ljubljana, she was one of the key figures in the ranks of the Littoral emigrants from the Julian March. It is stated in a notice sent by an informant of the Ljubljana OVRA to Rome in 1930 that she "helmed various associations, was decorated by Karađorđević's monarchy and acted as a mother figure to Slovene political refugees from the Julian March."[26] The fascist authorities were aware that women's public activities were often less visible and underground. On the basis of their anti-Italian orientation, which was demonstrated by women intellectuals and activists in Trieste in the early 1920s, the Italian Secret Service kept track of them also outside Italy, i.e. in Yugoslavia of the late 1920s and early 1930s.

The Littoral women refugees' and activists' escape, retreat, and operation in the new Slovene environment and in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was neglected by historiography. The transition of women's activity from the legal to the illegal sphere, and the forms and characteristics of Slovene women's anti-fascism in the Julian March in the interwar period after the removal of all Slovene women's societies were also poorly researched. By 1929, the Littoral illegal organization Tigr,[27] in Trieste also Borba, consisted of 134 cells[28] and was, as a rule, regarded as a men's organization.[29] Nevertheless, the investigation leading to the first trial before the Special Tribunal in 1930,[30] in which members of

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22 ACS, MI, DGPS, DPP, b. 660, f. 32, Paola Hocevar, 18 August 1930.

23 ACS, MI, DGPS, DPP, b. 660, f. 32, Paola Hocevar, Lubiana, 30 December 1929.

24 ACS, TSDS, b. 790, f. 54, Ministero dell'interno, Direzione generale della Pubblica sicurezza, Divisione Polizia Politica, Martellanz Ludmilla, Trieste, 24 August 1928.

25 ACS, TSDS, b. 790, f. 54, Ministero dell'interno, Direzione generale della Pubblica sicurezza, Divisione Polizia Politica, Martellanz Ludmilla, Lubiana, 2 July 1930.

26 ACS, MI, DGPS, DPP, b. 635, f. 19, Massa Grom, Lubiana, 16 May 1930.

27 The acronym stands for Trst (Trieste), Istra (Istria), Gorica (Gorizia) and Reka (Rijeka), which is the full name of this revolutionary organization in the Julian March. This was a militant anti-fascist and insurgent organization established in response to the fascist Italianization of the Slovene and Croatian population in the Julian March. It is considered to be one of the first antifascist resistance movements in Europe.

28 The data stems from Ivan Regent's report to the KSI (Komunistična stranka Italije – Partito Comunista Italiano) directorate in Paris. Cited after Kacin Wohinz, 1990, 238.

29 Interesting insight into how an illegal movement is regarded as a male one even when women play an important role within it is provided in the study addressing women's illegal movement in the Polish Solidarity. (Penn, 2005).

30 The trial took place after members of Tigr had attacked the headquarters of the Triestine periodical *Il Piccolo* (Klabjan, 2007).

Tigr were tried, included also Sofija Frančeskin and Ljudmila Rutar. The presence of two women in the list of 101 individuals who were investigated and interrogated might be considered statistically irrelevant, but only if we do not examine in detail the documents of the trials and the related memory literature.

Similar conclusions can be drawn from the investigation encompassing more than 200 individuals and led to the second Triestine trial, when 60 persons were tried by the Special Tribunal for the Defence of the State in December 1941. The bulk of people who were investigated, tried and sentenced consisted of men. They also included several young girls and women from Trieste,[31] the majority of whom were reprimanded before the beginning of the trial and a small number of whom were sent to confinement or internment. Marija Urbančič,[32] who was arrested on 18 March 1940, was the exception and had to appear before the tribunal on 2 December 1941. Being a member of Bobek's group,[33] she was charged with counter-Italian espionage in the area of Ilirska Bistrica. Silvija Boštjančič, a resident of Ljubljana and the editor of the periodical *Istra*, and Marija Gorup, who was a shop assistant in one of the shops in Ilirska Bistrica, also collaborated with the defendant. If the latter was suspected of being Bobek's associate, Marija Urbančič's activities were substantiated by OVRA's pieces of information, according to which she was in suspicious contact with other "*irredentist Slavic elements*" that she occasionally visited in Yugoslavia.[34] The involvement of three women in Bobek's inner circle (totalling eight members of both genders, two of whom were Italians) is not negligible, also because it attests that when choosing his associates, Viktor Bobek did not stick to domains which were according to historiography viewed as a Littoral anti-fascist conspiracy. Unlike other groups (nationalists, communists, terrorists) that were captured and tried before the Special Tribunal in December 1941, Bobek's group, which was active also in counter-espionage, allowed women to take part in its operations, this applies also to Italians, which was not a common occurrence in other groups.

In a lengthy memorandum added to the remaining body of evidence in the second Triestine trial, Viktor Sosič, a university student and member of the so-called nationalist group, confirmed that women were in the group of nationalists for decorative purposes only. They were said to have served merely as "choreography".[35] This statement could be considered exculpatory if it did not contain an additional remark stating that Tigr members who worked in espionage and sabotage tolerated women as treasurers or librarians at best. They shared the opinion that only men were suitable for the most dangerous

31 The trial records include, inter alia, documents about Vojka Šmuc, Milena and Danila Sila, Ada Bolčič, and Darinka Veljak, secondary-school students active in the Slovene anti-fascist movement in Trieste.

32 Marija Urbančič (1907–1988) worked as a clerk with the company Zanzi, which supplied military posts along the Italian-Yugoslav border in the area of Ilirska Bistrica. She was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment. She spent three years and nine months in Italian prisons; she was kept in solitary confinement for a total of 15 months. She was released in December 1943 following an intervention by the Ljubljana-based Red Cross (Bobek, 2017, 46.)

33 On Viktor Bobek and his group Verginella, 2008, 280–287.

34 On the harsh regime in prison and in solitary confinement see Bobek, 2017, 41–47.

35 ACS, TSDS, b. 760, f. IV, Esami testimoniali, Pro memoria Vittorio Sossi, Tomasi Giuseppe et al. See also Čermelj, 1972, 149.

operations. They had to be unmarried, support the cause and be some sort of missionaries or priests (Sardoč, 1983, 54).

Milica Kacin Wohinz, an eminent researcher of the fascist period and the Slovene anti-fascist resistance in the Littoral, argues that Tigr did not consist merely of single men, since "*a number of women were mentioned in memoirs, particularly in the area of Gorizia and Pivka. Sometimes they were friends of members of the organization; they were entrusted with carrying books and notices also because they were believed to be less suspicious*" (Kacin Wohinz, 1990, 239). A footnote published in her text provides the names of the most active women: "*Fanica Obid, Jelinčič's wife, was among best known ones, she worked in the press and was in June 1930 confined for a year; Fanica Ažman emigrated and was afterwards active particularly in emigration; the teacher Ljudmila Rutar, who was confined alongside Fanica Obid, Albert Rejc's sisters in the Tolmin area, Kati Lenar, Roza Oblešcak, the poetess Ljubka Šorli, in the Bistrica area Marija Urbančič, Marija Valenčič.*" (Kacin Wohinz, 1990, 239).[36] In the footnote included in the updated reprint of the text in 2008, she mentioned alongside the aforementioned women also Justina Kacin, Terezija Klinkon, *"in Gorizia sisters of Avgust Sfiligoj, Jelinčič's mother and sisters, Slilič's mother, Dr. Potrata's sisters, in Bistrica Marija Valenčič, and a number of girls' and mothers' names*." (Kacin Wohinz & Verginella, 2008, 110).[37] That their names were listed below the footnote separator is indicative of historiography's attitude towards women's illegal and anti-fascist activity in the Littoral.

The list of people who were tried and sentenced before the Special Tribunal for the Defence of the State (1927–1943) indicates that the circle of politically active Slovene anti-fascist women in the Julian March was a large one. It includes names of girls and women who were either accused of collaborating with the national liberation movement that came into being after Italy's occupation of Yugoslavia or of being active in the communist ranks (Renko, Kenda & Vilhar, 1970, 103).[38] Documents from regional archives throughout the Apennine Peninsula provide additional names to the list of Slovene women from the Julian March who were either confined or interned due to their abundant anti-fascist activities. An in-depth analysis of documents produced by the fascist authorities in the interwar period is required for a more comprehensive overview of Slovene women's anti-fascist activity in the Julian March of the 1920s and 30s. It is evident from the intelligence gathered by the Triestine police about the lawyer Dr. Boris Furlan that the authorities also monitored the activity of his wife Ana Černigoj, who was considered to be a more dangerous activist than her husband, even though the former held an important position among the Slovene political representatives. Unlike her husband,

36 Andrej Gabršček lists Marija Tul, whose death on 16 May 1921 was the result of violence, among the first victims of fascism. Gaberšček, 1934, 597.

37 This list should also include Kati Lenar and Marija Majnik. The former hosted an illegal circle of students of the teachers' training school, who secretly taught children from the area of Tolmin to read and organized courses for girls who would teach children Slovene; the latter was an active member of the organization Tigr (Cenčič, 2002, 49–50).

38 See also: Dal Pont, Leonetti, Maiello & Zocchi, 1976.

Ana did not hold any posts; however, she was active in the Triestine women's association and in Slovene charitable circles.[39]

Photographs taken during many illegal youth rallies in the 1920s and 30s also bear witness to women's involvement in the illegal anti-fascist movement (Cenčič, 1997, 141–145). They were mentioned in individual testimonies and memoirs, from which can be gathered that it was not only men who adhered to the culture of boldness[40] but also women, particularly young girls, students, and educated women. This is, inter alia, confirmed by the correspondence between Bruno Trampuž and his fiancée Marija Babič. The intimate bond between them that was formed in 1941 stemmed from their activities in the illegal movement of Trieste's young people, but also from Marija's intention to stay in touch with Bruno after his arrest and confinement (Verginella, 2015, 28–48). Nationally active Slovene girls from Trieste wrote letters of encouragement to friends and acquaintances in fascist prisons, internment, and in camps. Their correspondence was reminiscent of that kept by women during World War I, who aimed to instil courage and bravery into the minds of soldiers on the front, which was typical of other insurgent movements as well.

TWO EDUCATED AND DANGEROUS SLOVENE ANTIFASCISTS

Let us take a closer look at two prominent women who were shunned by the historiographical limelight; they were mentioned in memory literature, but not in a manner that would be anticipated on the basis of archival sources and correspondence. They were both from the area of Tolmin, where they attended the Slovene teachers' training school. They were active in the Slovene anti-fascist movement and collaborated with the illegal organization Tigr. They were under police surveillance and, eventually, experienced imprisonment and internment.

Ljudmila Rutar (1903–1979), much like her three brothers and two sisters (Rutar, 2000, 234), was a trained teacher. "*After the rise of fascism, she and her sister could have escaped across the border to Yugoslavia, but the general principle was that we had to persevere in the Littoral. This was a difficult time for our entire family, with devastating consequences for all brothers*," wrote Ljudmila's sister, Marija Rutar, in her memoir (Rutar, 2000, 223), where she speaks about her sadness about the annexation of the Littoral by Italy in 1921: "*we wore black ribbons on our shirts and jackets, and numbly observed the celebration at the present-day Trg 1. maja square; only Oskar could not refrain from making a derogatory gesture*." (Rutar, 2000, 239).

Ljudmila's first arrest took place on 18 October 1929 on a bus ride from Tolmin to Spodnja Tribuša. Her fiancé Slavko Bevk and Ciril Kosmač, both of whom were members of Tigr, were arrested that same day. After her second arrest, on 15 March 1930, the Gorizia Prefecture confined her for two years, even though five years were planned

39 ACS, Prefettura Gab., b. 103, On. Regia Prefettura, 13 October 1926.

40 On K. Jug's and Jelinčič's boldness see *Požrtvovalnost, tovarištvo in drznost dr. Klementa Juga*, in: Rovšček, 2011, 33–34.

initially. She was charged with collaborating with Slavko Bevk, who in turn was charged with working in a secret anti-Italian organization and military espionage for Yugoslavia. Having been accused of exchanging letters with Bevk, she replied that they had engaged in friendly correspondence.[41] "*All I have to say is that I am blameless and hence innocent. Please, allow me to return to my people*."[42]

In her personal folder, which is kept in the Central Archives in Rome, she is referred to as a Slavic irredentist, *irredentista slava*, but also as an intelligent, young, educated woman from a family of workers. Although fascist authorities could not prove her participation in anti-Italian propaganda, they were convinced of her involvement in Slavko Bevk's attempted escape from prison in Tolmin. and his counter-espionage activities. It is mentioned in one of the preserved documents that she was the only Slovene teacher who managed to stay in the Tolmin area, specifically in Cerkno, after other Slovene teachers had been either laid off or transferred to Italy's interior. During her employment as a teacher she was able to get support from her superiors, which was regarded as a great skill by the fascist authorities.[43] "*She managed to win everyone over,*" says a communication dated to 15 July 1930 and sent by the Gorizia Prefecture. She was no beauty, yet the police believed that she could charm anyone with her smiles and feminine ways. The fascist authorities continued to regard her as a mysterious and suspicious figure since they could not justify her contacts with "*members of a secret society that was named on several occasions, i.e. persons who demanded a homeland, the soil that was "redeemed" with the blood of its many sons, and spread hatred of Italy and the regime* [...]."[44] Statements issued by representatives of the police are marked by ambivalence towards women's charm and beauty, which are, on the one hand, perceived as a plus and as a deceiving feature that inhibits the discovery of illegal and counter-state activity in the Julian March, i.e. a politically and nationally sensitive territory, on the other.

The evidence used against Ljudmila Rutar and other members of Tigr by the fascist police consisted of confiscated files, statements written by detainees in their own writing or by the police, but also memoranda, observations written by police informants and investigators' findings. It would be wrong to deem this comprehensive investigation material to be thoroughly unreliable and false. It was, in fact, produced for the benefit of the repressive fascist apparatus and the highest military judicial body operating under the top fascist authority and Mussolini himself; nevertheless, it has preserved the significance of the substantive material, from which the Special Tribunal drew its sentences. Despite the totalitarian features of this fascist judicial body's operations we cannot make a priori claims that the investigation material is unreliable and, historiographically speaking, irrelevant. In terms of historiography, its use calls for a critical analysis and detection of its

41 ACS, CPC, b. 4503, f. Rutar Ludmilla, Interrogatorio di Rutar Ludmilla, Rome, court prison, 10 May 1930.

42 ACS, CPC, b. 4503, f. Rutar Ludmilla, Interrogatorio di Rutar Ludmilla, Rome, court prison, 10 May 1930.

43 ACS, CPC, b. 4503, f. Rutar Ludmilla, Prefettura di Gorizia, Riservata, 15 July 1930. Her sister Marija was transferred to Trivio di Ripatransone (Ascoli Piceno), where she worked as a teacher for five years, her brother Mirko to Sardinia, and Štefanija, her other sister, to Lombardy (Rutar, 2000, 223).

44 ACS, CPC, b. 4503, f. Rutar Ludmilla, Riservata, Prefettura di Gorizia, 15 July 1930.

credibility, and, consequently, for the identification of instances in which the investigators falsified testimonies to their own benefit or coerced detainees into giving false testimonies.

The writing of Ljudmila's sister Marija is in several places complementary to police reports. For instance, she states that on 15 March 1930 her sister had been pushed into a car by agents and taken to Trieste and, later on, to a prison in Koper, where she had spent 45 days in solitary confinement and had been interrogated on several occasions. She was transferred to Rome, placed in solitary confinement, further interrogations followed. In the period when Trieste saw the first trial between 1 and 5 July where Ljudmila Rutar was among the 87 accused, Ljudmila was imprisoned in Gorizia. After having spent six months in prison, she was confined to the island of Ponza; she was the youngest detainee there and the first political confinee from the Julian March (Rutar, 2000, 253). There were 400 confinees on the island, including Tigr members Roman Pahor from Trieste and Rudi Uršič from Kobarid, etc.

We learn from her sister's writing that her fiancé was sent to the island of Ventotene and that they married in Rivello, Calabria, in early May 1937. They were relocated to Matera in 1938 and to Nocera near Salerno in 1939 (Rutar, 2000, 258). Marija Rutar maintained also that Ljudmila and Fanica Obid met in prison in 1930, when Milka was sentenced to two years in confinement on Ponza, while Fanica, who had her one-year-old Rada with her, was sentenced to one year in confinement in Matera (Rutar, 2000, 252).

It could be concluded from the documents concerning Fanica Obid (1903–1940)[45] which are kept in Rome that her prosecution was linked to her husband's activities; namely, Zorko Jelinčič, was the leading representative of the secret Slovene anti-fascist movement (Rovšček, 2005, 13). However, if we dig deeper into her biography, we realize that her political activities had begun before she met Jelinčič, which can cast doubt also on Ljudmila Rutar's political activity, which is in the police records brought in connection with that of her fiancé. The fascist authorities would not have been so persistent in their prosecution of Ljudmila and would not have subjected her to rigorous imprisonment if they had not held her responsible and deemed her to be a dangerous individual.

The Gorizia Prefecture described Fanica as "*young, intelligent, vibrant, smart*," adding that she "*was respected and highly esteemed in the Slovene milieu*."[46] The police sources claimed that she dressed elegantly, belittled everything Italian and praised everything that was Slovene. Similarly to her husband, she devoted her body and soul, *anima e corpo*, to Slavic nationalist propaganda. The police authorities also knew that she initiated antifascist circles, spread propaganda literature, exchanged letters with informants from many centres, and was a correspondent for *Edinost*. In short, she was believed to have been a sworn opponent of the regime, a communist agitator and thus posed a threat to the public order and the state.[47] She was reprimanded, inter alia, for being a subscriber of the periodical *La confederation Balcanique*, which was banned in fascist Italy. She organized women's sections of the cultural society Prosvetno društvo, she was active in the Gorizia

45 ACS, CPC, b. 3576, f. Obid Francesca, detta Faniza.

46 ACS, CPC, b. 3576, f. Obid Francesca, detta Faniza, Prefettura di Gorizia, Riservata, 24 August 1929.

47 ACS, CPC, b. 3576, f. Obid Francesca, detta Faniza, Prefettura di Gorizia, Riservata, 6 March 1931.

Hills, in the area of Idrija, the Vipava Valley, the Soča Valley, and had friends among students abroad.

It is stated in Slovene memory literature that she was very well-read, had a strong sense of national awareness and socially just education, which is believed to have been encouraged by the village teacher Jože Močnik, for whom she did housework as a young girl. During her stay at Francesco Scodnik's educational establishment, who aimed to enthuse students of the teachers' training school with the Italian culture, and during her years at the Slovene teachers' training school in Tolmin, which was established in 1920, she joined the secret communist circle and encouraged her fellow students to revolt. She published *Pika in britev* together with her classmate Ivanka Iva Volarič[48] and the illegal bulletin *Naše delo* with some of her other classmates.[49] Later on, she also published *Šolski list*, but also poems and prose in women's periodical *Jadranka*.

She was one of the organizers of the student strike in 1923 and left school in protest just before her secondary school final exams, i.e. *matura*. She returned home to Bukova, where she organized a women's circle in order to spread Marxist ideas. Her friendship with Vladimir Martelanc, the future communist representative in the Italian parliament, and poet Srečko Kosovel was very intense[50] in this period (Kosovel, 1977, 356), which is, inter alia, also documented by Kosovel's extant correspondence. Meeting Zorko Jelinčič on the one hand, and the escalated denationalization and fascistization of the Slovene society on the other, played an important role in her increasing closeness to the national-defence circle. This is evident also from a letter sent by the insightful Srečko Kosovel: "*Different people are needed to take the edge off the unnecessary fights when our common cause is at stake. We need men whose word will be valuable again and whose ideal will be selfless work. I think that many a good young man or woman will come from the Tolmin teachers' training school, with willingness to work and zest for life, for we cannot give in, we want to live*" (Kosovel, 1977, 370).

Similarly to Pavla Kočevar, Fanica responded to this appeal. She grew close to Jelinčič after he took on the post of secretary of the association of cultural societies in Gorizia in the autumn of 1924. In 1925, she participated in an illegal meeting on Krn and became an informant of Tigr. She relocated to Gorizia, where weekly and biweekly meetings were held in her flat in the winter of 1926 (Jelinčič, 1994, 133–134). Fanica and Zorko got married on 18 July 1929, and their daughter Rada was born on 15 September 1929 in Bukovo. The couple was summoned to the Gorizia Prefecture two days before the birth of their daughter. In his memoir, Jelinčič stated that after the attack on Bergant (Verrocchio, 2003) in 1929 they were under constant police surveillance for two years (Jelinčič, 1994, 143). Additionally, their illegal activities were made difficult by their daughter's birth, wherefore Fanica's sister Viki took over some of their contacts (Jelinčič, 1994, 143). Even though

48 She was born in Kobarid and attended elementary school in Ljubljana and teachers' training school in Tolmin. *Pika in britev* was a hand-written bulletin. (Rutar, 2000, 238).

49 Šavli, Kogoj, and Krašna were also involved in the publishing of this cyclostyled bulletin, which was edited by Fanica (Rutar, 2000, 239).

50 She engaged in correspondence with Srečko Kosovel from 1922 to 1925.

some of Zorko's writings are extraordinarily interesting in terms of evaluating Fanica's illegal activities, attention should be drawn to his claim that Fanica "*was not allowed to be a member of Tigr according to the rule book*"; however, her "*innocent explanations to the unbidden*" helped save the day in many a threatening situation and for that reason danger could be avoided. This applies also to her selfless sister Viki in Bukovo, who also "*had a nose*" for danger regardless of where it came from (Jelinčič, 1994, 167).

The allocated space does not allow me to address Fanica's biography in detail. It was marked by her one-year-long confinement in Tricarico, in Basilicata, and her being away from her husband, who was confined in Civitavecchia from the spring of 1934 onwards. In the autumn of 1934 Fanica and her daughter Rada made an illegal move to Yugoslavia; for a short while she stayed in Jesenice, where Zorko's siblings Milena, Nada, Slavko, and Ljubo lived. Her experience at the time was marked by her discomfort and aversion to Zorko's family. Fanica Obid was too independent and emancipated to submit to her husband's family and, in particular, to her mother-in-law. As maintained by Žarko Rovšček, "*despite her kind-heartedness, willingness to help others and her social sensitivity*" she did not meet her mother-in-law's criteria for a wife who was expected to "*do the housework and bring up children*" (Rovšček, 2005, 17). Fanica did not allow Zorko's mother, Josipina Trebše, to interfere with her daughter's upbringing. She wrote the following in a letter to her sister Viki about her mother-in-law: "*I say 'no, thank you' to her upbringing! To produce a puppet like her own, unable to find a husband!*" (Rovšček, 2005, 17).[51]

She relocated to Celje, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, where she experienced loneliness and distance from her husband, which probably resulted in her insistence on high-risk pregnancy and, consequently, her untimely death:

> *Jasna, in whom the family could have found solace, was born in this situation. But to us, this was a catastrophe of unprecedented proportions. I believe that we will never understand the secrets of Fanica's noble soul. Due to the necessary operation doctors prohibited Fanica to fall pregnant again. And yet she did not allow them to perform an abortion. She was hospitalized in Celje, and I was not even aware of it – otherwise, hopefully, I would have made her have an abortion. Even though I am not convinced of that, she was stubborn with things that touched her very core. Anyway, who would understand a woman's soul? Even in the period when we were still deciding on the form of our cohabitation, only one thing mattered to her – having a child at any cost; to her, that was the meaning of life.* (Jelinčič, 1994, 202).

However, Zorko's interpretation of Fanica's final days cannot be refuted without Fanica's words. They cannot be confirmed or contradicted, not even by means of an extensive personal folder kept in the Central Archives in Rome. It is evident from the fascist authorities' political records that the fascist police regarded her as a dangerous

51 She refused to leave Rada in the care of the Jelinčič family, who relocated to Jesenice, when she did not have a permanent employment (Rovšček, 2005, 17).

enemy of Mussolini's Italy, who was capable of independent activity but was due to her arrest, her separation from her husband, and as a new mother weak and, consequently, considered to be less dangerous.

CONCLUSION

The national and political operation of Slovene women's organizations in the Julian March of the 1920s and 1930s has been neglected by Slovene and Italian historiography until recently not only due to modest amount of documentation but mostly due to lack of attention paid by historiography to women's organizations and political activity. The illumination of women's illegal activities brought up by women and occasionally also by men in their testimonies is particularly deficient. Further exploration of causes associated with the gradual subordination of women's organizations to the male-run movement, which was roughly outlined in this article, is required to obtain a more systematic and in-depth overview of women's anti-fascist activities. The escalation of the anti-Slovene fascist policy in the Julian March led to the loss of autonomy maintained by publicly active Slovene women up to the late 1920s. The fascist politics associated with the redefinition of the public and private sphere will have to be taken into consideration as well, which applies also to the promotion of fascism's "new woman" (De Grazia, 1992, 1–2), which was felt also in the Slovene segments of the society in the border area. Historiographical insufficiency resulting from deficient historicization of women's anti-fascist activities in the Julian March prior to the beginning of World War II is to be ascribed to fragmentary documents but also to the long-lasting historiographical belief that women's political operation in the interwar period was a minor phenomenon, unworthy of close historiographical attention. This belief was upheld also by former activists who often retreated to the private sphere once they got married and became mothers.

POLITIČNI AKTIVIZEM SLOVENK V JULIJSKI KRAJINI PO KONCU PRVE SVETOVNE VOJNE IN VZPONU FAŠIZMA. OD AVTONOMNOSTI DO PODREJENOSTI

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POVZETEK

Po koncu prve svetovne vojne in razpadu habsburške monarhije so si na ozemlju nekdanjega Avstrijskega Primorja, preimenovanega v Julijsko krajino (Venezia Giulia), posamični politični in nacionalni akterji prizadevali za hitro obnovo družbenega tkiva. Posebno velik je bil organizacijski zagon med slovenskim prebivalstvom, ki je z nenaklonjenostjo sprejelo italijansko vojaško zasedbeno upravo in z njo vključenost v nov državni okvir. Po prihodu italijanske vojske je bojazen, da bodo italijanske oblasti odvzele Slovencem pod Avstrijo pridobljene nacionalne pravice, postala vzvod za razvejano politično aktivnost in družbeno organiziranost. V pričujočem članku so osvetljeni obseg ženske organiziranosti in vzroki za njeno pojavljanje po vojaški zasedbi nekdanjega Avstrijskega Primorja in njegovi priključitvi h Kraljevini Italiji. Gre za žensko delovanje, ki je sledilo predvojnim vzorom meščanske ženske sociabilnosti in je sprva vključevalo tudi ženske emancipatorne težnje. Z vzponom fašizma, fašizacijo in italijanizacijo multietničnega obmejnega prostora pa se je podredilo novim potrebam organiziranja narodnoobrambnega dela, kar je povzročilo opustitev tako ideoloških razhajanj kot feminističnih zahtev. Gre za prehod, ki ga najbolje ponazarjajo avtobiografska pričevanja slovenskih učiteljic, aktivnih v Trstu, ki dokumentirajo razočaranje ob italijanski zasedbi Avstrijskega Primorja, narodnoobrambno aktivnost, a tudi izgubo učiteljskega mesta in prisilno izselitev, ki je za mnoge pomenila izgubo avtonomnega javnega delovanja in preselitev v bolj konservativna ter emancipiranim ženskam manj naklonjena okolja.

Na začetku dvajsetih let je kronologija fašističnega nasilja sovpadala s kronologijo ženske organiziranosti in povečanim številom ženskih društev, kar obmejne in fašistične zgodovinopisne študije doslej niso dovolj jasno zabeležile. V Gorici je bilo leta 1922 ustanovljeno Goriško splošno slovensko žensko društvo, v Trstu pa je istega leta nastalo Žensko dobrodelno udruženje, ki je delovalo do sredine leta 1928. Glavna namera pospešenega ustanavljanja dekliških krožkov po vsej Primorski je bilo vključevanje ženskega članstva v narodno obrambno delo. Leta 1928, ko so fašistične oblasti prepovedale slovenska društva in slovenski tisk, je bilo razpuščeno tudi Žensko dobrodelno udruženje. Njegovo glasilo, Ženski svet, ki je imelo 18.000 naročnic, je moralo najti novega izdajatelja in je premestilo najprej upravo, potem pa tudi uredništvo v Ljubljano. Zaradi odločne protiitalijanske usmerjenosti, ki so jo nekatere izobraženke in aktivistke pokazale v Trstu na začetku 20. let, so jim italijanske tajne službe ostajale na sledi tudi zunaj italijanskih meja. Zgodovinopisje je zelo pomanjkljivo preučilo delovanje primorskih begunk in aktivistk v novem slovenskem okolju v Kraljevini Jugoslaviji. Podobno so tudi slabo raziskani

prehodi ženskega delovanja iz legalne v ilegalno sfero in nasploh oblike in značilnosti slovenskega ženskega antifašizma v Julijski krajini med obema vojnama po ukinitvi vseh slovenskih ženskih društev. Čeprav so nekatere posameznice sodelovale s TIGR, jih moška memorialistika obravnava kot manj pomembne, slovenska historiografija pa jih omenja v opombah pod črto. Iz policijskih in sodnih virov pa je razvidno, kot dokazujeta primera Ljudmile Rutar in Fanice Obid, da so jih fašistične oblasti obravnavale kot nadvse nevarni sovražnici Mussolinijeve Italije.

Zaostritev fašistične protislovenske politike v Julijski krajini je nedvomno prispevala k izgubi avtonomije, ki so jo v javnosti aktivne Slovenke vzdrževale do konca 20. let. Podobno bo potrebno v večji meri upoštevati fašistično politiko redefiniranja javne in zasebne sfere kot tudi njegovo promocije »nove ženske« (De Grazia, 1992, 1–2), ki ni ostala brez učinkov niti v slovenskih segmentih obmejne družbe. Zgodovinopisni manko, ki se je zgodil zaradi pomanjkljivega zgodovinjenja ženskega antifašističnega delovanja v Julijski krajini pred začetkom druge svetovne vojne, je treba pripisati ne le fragmentarni dokumentarni bazi, temveč tudi dolgotrajnemu zgodovinopisnemu prepričanju, da je bilo politično delovanje žensk v času med obema vojnama minoren pojav, nevreden večje zgodovinopisne pozornosti.

Ključne besede: ženske, antifašizem, fašizem, Julijska krajina, povojno obdobje

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"ZONES MORE RELATED TO IMMORTAL SPLENDOR OF GLORY": ITALIAN WAR MEMORIALS AND COMMEMORATIVE PRACTICES IN VENEZIA GIULIA (1918–1922)

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ABSTRACT

The paper analyses war memorials and commemorative practices in Venezia Giulia from 1918 to 1922. In this regard Venezia Giulia offers an especially relevant case study, as, due to heavy fighting along the Isonzo front, various local settlements and territorial features became present in the Italian national consciousness. They thus became typical Italian sites of memory, a process which was stimulated by national commemorative policy. Furthermore, presence of the Slovene population in the region contributed to the fact, that monuments to fallen soldier did not represent only sites of memory and mourning for the Italian nation, but also sites of national demarcation. They served as a physical reminder of Italian claims over these lands, for which so much ''Italian blood'' had been spilled. Lastly, they also represented sites of mourning, where the suffering caused by the war was at least implicitly expressed.

Keywords: Isonzo front, commemorative practices, war memorials, sites of memory, Venezia Giulia

"ZONE PIÙ LEGATE AD IMMORTALI FASTI DI GLORIA": MEMORIALI DI GUERRA E PRATICHE COMMEMORATIVE ITALIANE NELLA VENEZIA GIULIA (1918–1922)

SINTESI

Il saggio analizza i memoriali di guerra e le pratiche commemorative in Venezia Giulia dal 1918 al 1922. A tal riguardo, la Venezia Giulia offre un caso di studio particolarmente pertinente poiché, a causa dei pesanti combattimenti sul fronte dell'Isonzo, vari insediamenti locali e caratteristiche territoriali divennero presenti nella coscienza nazionale italiana. Sono così diventati tipici siti italiani di memoria, un processo che è stato stimolato dalla politica commemorativa nazionale. Inoltre, la presenza della popolazione slovena nella regione ha contribuito al fatto che i monumenti ai caduti non rappresentavano solo i siti di memoria e di lutto per la nazione italiana, ma anche i

siti di demarcazione nazionale. Servivano come promemoria fisico delle rivendicazioni italiane su queste terre, per le quali era stato versato così tanto "sangue italiano". Infine, rappresentavano anche luoghi di lutto, in cui la sofferenza causata dalla guerra veniva espressa almeno implicitamente.

Parole chiave: fronte Isonzo, pratiche commemorative, memoriali di guerra, luoghi della memoria, Venezia Giulia

WAR MEMORIALS AND COMMEMORATIVE RITUALS IN POST-WAR WORLD WAR I EUROPE[1]

American diplomat and scholar George Kennan famously described World War I as "the seminal catastrophe of this century" (Kennan, 1979, 3).[2] Kennan was referring to the influence of the great conflict on the later historical developments during the 20th century, but his quote can also be used to illustrate the loss and devastation caused by the war. It is impossible to comprehend the post-war state of European societies without taking into account the profound disruptions caused by the catastrophe of the war. The unprecedented loss of human life[3] was accompanied by the new reality of industrialized mass fighting, which deprived the soldiers of their individuality (Todero, 2010, 52). The interrelated experiences of loss and mass fighting had profound effects not only on family and social life, but also on the very ways of comprehending reality; historian Paul Fussel, for

1 This article is the result of research peformed as part of my PhD study at the Science and Research Centre Koper under the supervision of Dr Borut Klabjan financed by the Slovenian Research Agency ARRS.

2 Kennan coined this phrase in his study about the development of Franco-Russian relations in the 19th century. He saw World War I as a historical fault line, which marked the beginning of a series of catastrophes that followed, above all World War II (Kennan, 1979). The thesis has remained influential, but also controversial. See Jahraus & Kirchmeier, 2014.

3 The exact number of deaths caused by World War I is impossible to clearly ascertain, as it depends on the criteria chosen to delineate World War I in relation to other armed conflicts which accompanied the dissolution of the Russian, Ottoman and Habsburg Empires. Furthermore, the number also drastically increases if the victims of the great "Spanish flu" pandemic from 1918 to 1920, whose severity was strongly augmented by the war exhaustion, are included. The influenza pandemic alone is supposed to have claimed between 50 and 100 million lives, whereas the fighting from 1914 to 1918 is estimated to have caused approximately 10 million deaths (Grant, 2014, 332–333).

example, has shown that industrialized fighting led to the re-emergence of various myths and a pre-modern way of thinking (Fussel, 2013, 179–240), whereas others have pointed out the rise in traditional religiosity (Winter, 2015, 119–144), as well as the emergence of new forms of "secular religion" (Gentile, 2001). All of this influenced the post-war process of grieving, with which societies tried to comprehend and then transcend these tragic events. The search for the "meaning" of the Great War began as soon as the war itself, but intensified in its aftermath (Winter, 2015, 78).

This process of grieving found its reification in the building of war memorials: sculptures, war cemeteries, plaques and other commemorative objects. They represent physical remainders of this quest which are still visible in cities, towns and villages throughout Europe. But whom or what do they commemorate? What about the Great War do they ask us to remember? There are no straightforward answers to these questions. Early historical research into this topic has emphasized especially the role which after-war memorials throughout Europe played in the shaping of public memory regarding the war experience. The memorials and associated commemorative rituals were comprehended by scholars primarily as carriers of ideological messages, which emphasized the value of sacrifice in order to give the war experience a positive meaning and "explain" the importance of sacrifice to the nation (Mosse, 1994; Gillis, 1996; Evans & Lunn, 1997). In this way they served both as the legitimization of political elites who had taken the decision to enter the war, as well as other ideologies, from republicanism to various forms of nationalism and totalitarianism (Becker, 1994; Kämpfer, 1994; Gentile, 2001; Rossol, 2014).

Without repudiating these findings, the newer research has stressed the multifaceted nature of their expressive functions and their roles in post-war societies. As American historian Jay Winter points out, although many, if not most, of the war memorials were meant to express nationalistic or other political ideas, we still have to deal with the fact that they ultimately also point to the losses and suffering experienced during the war (Winter, 2015, 78–79). Moreover, it is necessary to take different national contexts and religious traditions into account when evaluating their role (Winter, 2006).

This paper follows Winter's conclusions by analysing the role of Italian World War I monuments and accompanying commemorative practices in *Venezia Giulia*,[4] a multinational borderland, which was first occupied and then annexed by the Kingdom of Italy, from the end of the War until the rise of the Fascist regime in late 1922. Although this topic has already been the object of extensive historical research, some limitations have to be pointed out. First, most of the attention has been devoted to the war monuments built

4 The territory belonging to *Venezia Giulia* cannot be easily described by referencing other administrative divisions. This has to do with the fact that the name itself was not known until 1863, when it was coined by Graziadio Isaia Ascoli, an Italian historical linguist from Gorizia. Ascoli based his designation on (his own) division of the ancient Augustan *Regio X Venetia et Histria*. The westernmost part of this ancient Roman region was said to constitute *Venezia Giulia*, so named for the Julian Alps (Cattaruzza, 2007, 20). *Venezia Giulia* thus roughly corresponded with the Austrian administrative region Austrian Littoral, which encompassed Gorizia with Gradisca, Trieste and Istria, but it was also augmented with parts of the former Habsburg lands of Carniola and Carinthia. For the exact (changing) boundaries of *Venezia Giulia* in the interwar period, see Čermelj, 1965, 11–12.

in the time of the Fascist regime (especially to the monumental ossuary at Redipuglia/Sredipolje),[5] which are characterized by the aesthetics of a totalitarian Fascist regime and thus unrepresentative of the whole interwar period. Second, most of the authors have approached this topic by studying this process mostly as a conveyor of Italian nationalist aspirations.[6] The aim of this paper is to supplement the already achieved results, first, by focusing on war memorials and commemorative rituals in *Venezia Giulia* before the rise of Fascism, and second, by proposing a new analytical model of their functionality in the post-war historical context.

WAR MEMORIALS IN *VENEZIA GIULIA* AS ITALIAN SITES OF MEMORY

Ever since French historian Pierre Nora introduced the concept of *lieux de mémoire*, it has remained a central theoretical framework for research dealing with the topics of memory and national identity. Nora defined the term as "any significant entity, whether material or non-material in nature, which by dint of human will or the work of time has become a symbolic element of the memorial heritage of any community" (Nora, 1998, XVII). Nora's thesis is related to the earlier conceptualizations of memory as a socially dependent construct, theoretically grounded by French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs. Halbwachs coined the term "collective memory" to emphasize the rootedness of all memory in distinct social-cultural frameworks, as well as the importance of collective memory in creating shared identity and social cohesiveness (Halbwachs, 2001).

The various types of memorials are typical sites of memory, as they refer to distinct (real or imaginary) historical events and thus shape collective memory by creating and/or reinforcing dominant narratives about the past (Misztal, 2003, 160). Semiotically speaking, monuments as architectural works act as a signifier which refers to a specific notion from the material or immaterial world (Norberg-Schulz, 1974, 428). They have an analogous function with respect to other forms of communication. Since they can be understood as a kind of "text", they have to be read through a recognized code. Their meaningfulness thus originates from the dialectic relationship between architectural forms, which readers invest with meaning through a culturally transmitted code (Eco, 1997, 181).

As monuments and memorials are thus continuously "read" through shifting socio-cultural codes, their meaning is not fixed, but subject to change (Širok, 2012, 634).[7] In

5 See some of the most important studies in Tragbar, 2017; Dato, 2014a; Dato, 2014b; Dogliani, 2010; Fabi, 1996.

6 See for example Kavrečič, 2017; Nicoloso, 2015; Nicoloso, 2012; Širok, 2012; Klabjan, 2010; Wörsdörfer, 2009, 34–45.

7 A typical example of this process is the central Italian war memorial in *Venezia Giulia*, the ossuary at Redipuglia/Sredipolje. Built according to Fascist monumental aesthetics, it was first conceptualized as a reification of the most important Fascist ideological postulates (Tragbar, 2017). Since then, it has been continuously re-invented in accordance with the cultural-political situation; during the Trieste crisis in the 1950s, it served as a symbolic site of anti-communism; in the last decades, however, it has been presented mainly as a testimony to the tragic experience of World War I in accordance with the dominant European narrative, which sees European nations as joint victims of purposeless killing (Dato, 2014a, 63–140; Klabjan, 2010, 401).

order to recreate the (shifting) conveyed messages, we then have to study not just the architectural forms of the erected monuments, but also the historical context in which they were erected, as well as the performative collective rituals centred around them. The role of war memorials in *Venezia Giulia* in the first post-war years was thus characterized by the volatile situation in post-war Italy and the significance which the region acquired in Italian society before and during the war.

Role of *Venezia Giulia* in post-war Italy

The post-war Italy was, like other former belligerent countries, a nation in grieving. The presence of the losses sustained[8] was ubiquitous as there was hardly any family who did not lose a husband, son, relative or a friend. The need to commemorate the lost relatives started with the fighting itself but intensified after the end of the war (Mondini, 2014, 318–319). Commemorations enabled the communities to face their grief, but they were also identity-forming elements. As Jay Winter argues, commemoration during and after the war was an act of national affirmation. To remember was to affirm the community, to assert its moral character and to exclude from it those values and groups which placed it under threat (Winter, 2015, 80). Consequently, it was very much in the interest of the political elites throughout Europe to shape the process of grieving by giving it a role which would strengthen the national community. In the process of the nationalization of the masses, the dead soldiers who sacrificed themselves for the nation/nation-state have played an important role since the French Revolution (Koselleck, 1994). As Benedict Anderson pointed out, the fact that a lot of people were ready to give their lives for the nation granted it a special, pure character, which other forms of association could not hope to match (Anderson, 2007, 176).

Since nation-building processes in Italy before World War I were lagging behind other European nation-states, mainly as a result of the economically backward state of large parts of Italian society (illiteracy was still widespread in rural areas in the South), as well as many profound cultural and historical differences between the constituent parts of the country,[9] the role of the fallen soldiers was especially important. War was supposed to have finally forged Italians into a single nation through the shared suffering and sacrifices made during the war (Janz, 2016, 2). State-led memory politics in post-war years was meant to shape memory according to this goal by establishing the narrative of victorious war, which was conceptualized as the successful completion of the long-desired aims of *Risorgimento*.[10] In this process the territory of the *Venezia Giulia* played a doubly preeminent role for two intertwined reasons.

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8 During the war Italian armed forces sustained approximately 650 000 deaths from various causes (in combat, as well as due to wounds and as a result of illnesses), as well as 984 000 wounded. This number represents 12% of the mobilized soldiers (Mondini, 2014, 316; Cadeddu, 2011, 46).

9 Furthermore, as the Italian state was constituted as a liberal monarchy, it was met by deep hostility from many citizens, at first by many Catholics and then also by socialists and radicals. Cf. an overview of the problematic Italian national project and its development until 1918 in Gentile, 2009, 19–130.

10 Regarding the appropriation of *Risorgimento* in war-propaganda, cf. Ridolfi, 2010, 29.

First, although the frontline between Austria-Hungary and Italy was approximately 650 km long, reaching from the Stelvio Pass to the Adriatic Sea, the main theatre of operations was in the territory of the Austrian Littoral along the Isonzo River, where the flatter terrain facilitated the massing of troops and matériel. Consequently, the Italian army undertook its main offensive thrusts in 11 battles along the middle Isonzo and on the Karst plateau between June 1915 and late October 1917, when the fighting along the Isonzo ended, as the combined Habsburg-German army had completely routed the Italian 2nd Army in the Battle of Caporetto (Schindler, 2014; Sema, 2009).[11] Consequently, during the war, as a result of intensive war propaganda, as well as fighting with thousands of casualties, the names of formerly unknown villages, hills and mountain peaks along the Isonzo River became generally known throughout Italy. The ubiquitous presence of regions, villages and peaks around the Isonzo in the Italian collective memory was strengthened by naming a great number of streets and squares throughout Italy after them (Rafaelli, 2010, 269–271). The spatial features of *Venezia Giulia* thus became part of the national mental landscape (Klabjan, 2010, 402–403).

Second, the decision to enter the war was hardly consensual. Neutrality[12] was widely popular among broad swathes of the Italian population and also (at first) commanded a parliamentary majority. The decision to attack its former ally was formally justified by the need to liberate the "terre irredente", chief among them Trieste and Gorizia (Milza, 2012, 700–701; Duggan, 2007, 387–389). It was therefore to be expected that Italian political elites in the crisis-stricken post-war situation[13] tried to score political points by maximizing the political demands made at the Paris Peace Conference, where they remained largely unsuccessful.[14] The fiery political debates surrounding these themes, the emerging conviction of "mutilated victory" and D'Annunzio's Rijeka/Fiume expedition (Duggan, 2007, 410–419) additionally strengthened the role of these territories in Italian national consciousness.

The building of war memorials and staging of commemorations in these territories was thus on the one hand a result of the importance of *Venezia Giulia* in post-war Italy, but on the other hand it also strengthened the emotional significance of former war sites and monuments in the mind of Italian citizens. Following the war, state-sponsored

11 Afterwards, the frontline stabilized along the Piave River in the Po Basin, until the underfed and underequipped Habsburg army was decisively beaten at the Battle of Vittorio Veneto in October 1918. For a general account of the Italian front during World War I, see Thompson, 2009.

12 At the beginning of the war, the Kingdom of Italy proclaimed its neutrality; it declared war on Austria-Hungary only on 24 May 1915 following the territorial promises made by the Entente in the Treaty of London in April 1915 (Lipušček, 2012).

13 The war profoundly affected the Italian economy. Although some parts of industry profited enormously from the high state-led demand during the war, the demobilization of war economy caused deep shocks after 1918 (Milza, 2012, 704–706). The economic crisis led to social and political unrest, as Italy became engulfed in a number of workers' strikes; both sides of the political spectrum were radicalized, which led to increase in violence (Duggan, 2007, 407–410).

14 The new Italian eastern border was not determined in Paris; it was a result of bilateral negotiations between the Kingdom of Italy and the newly established Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. They reached an understanding with the Treaty of Rapallo, signed on 12 November 1920 (Cattaruzza, 2007, 159–164).

narratives thus additionally intensified the emotional meaning of these places. What were the most important strategies in this process? Some distinct processes have to be especially emphasized: the celebrations connected with the honouring of the Unknown Soldier, the establishment of cemeteries, monuments and *zone sacre* and finally the propaganda campaign, which, together with high-profile visits of members of the Italian Royal Family and other political dignitaries in this region, sought to encourage Italian citizens to visit them. In practice, these distinct features of memory politics were often closely intertwined.

Celebration of the Unknown Soldier

In post-war Europe, the central part of the state-led commemorative process was the celebration of the so-called Unknown Soldier. The solemnities associated with the Unknown Soldier were conditioned by the nature of industrialized fighting, which led to many soldiers being left unidentified and unburied on the battlefields. The honouring of the Unknown Soldier enabled the remembrance of all soldiers and at the same time no particular individual. It thus corresponded with the characteristics of the war (Klabjan, 2010, 404).

In Italy, *milito ignoto* was solemnly buried in Rome in 1921,[15] but *Venezia Giulia* played an important role in the commemorations, as official celebrations started in this area, more precisely in Gorizia, and then reached their first peak in the small town of Aquileia near the Adriatic coast. The Italian authorities exhumed the bodies of 11 fallen unidentified soldiers all along the former frontline. Their remains were collected in Gorizia, from which a solemn truck column drove them to Aquileia. In the basilica of Aquileia, one of the corpses was chosen by the *mamma spirituale*[16] of fallen soldiers to be buried in Rome. The ceremony took place on 28 October 1921 in the presence of the Duke of Aosta, member of the royal family and former commander of the Italian 3rd Army, and numerous other political and military dignitaries, as well as veterans' organizations. Following a mass in the basilica celebrated by the Bishop of Trieste, Angelo Bartolomasi, the "spiritual mother" Maria Bergamas chose one of the corpses, which was then solemnly put on a train which started its way towards Rome, where the Unknown Soldier was solemnly buried at the central pre-war Italian national monument, the *Altare della Patria*[17] in the centre of the city on 4 November 1921, the anniversary of the signing

15 The Italian symbolic burial of the Unknown Soldier was not the first among the former belligerent countries. In 1920, the United Kingdom and France jointly buried one British and one French unidentified soldier in Westminster Abbey and Arc de Triomphe respectively. The United States of America followed them the year after (Mosse, 2007, 105–107).

16 The authorities chose Maria Bergamas, living near Trieste; her son Antonio was an irredentist who joined the Italian army and fell in 1916 on Monte Cimone. Since his body was never identified, Maria could play the symbolical role (Cadeddu, 2011, 148–151).

17 The monument, dedicated to Victor Emmanuel II, the first king of unified Italy, was meant to represent the central monument to unified Italy, but also to "Italianize" the state capital, long considered primarily as the seat of the Papacy. The building started in 1885; it was formally inaugurated in 1911 and finally completed in 1925. Due to its monumentality, it dominates the city centre of Rome (Tobia, 2010).

of the armistice at Villa Giusti and thus the Italian victory in the war, in the presence of the highest state civilian and military dignitaries.[18]

The ceremonies accompanying the burial of the Unknown Soldier are considered to be the first truly popular national celebration of unified Italy (Janz, 2016, 3). As the central state-led commemoration of the fallen, they played a preeminent role in shaping the dominant narrative regarding the war. The rituals, imagery and discourse employed in the speeches of public figures as well as by most of the Italian press stressed the importance of the sacrifice of the fallen soldiers for the greater good of the whole nation. The path of the column was solemnly decorated with flags, wreaths and patriotic signs. For example, when the train composition reached Aquileia, the train station was decorated with a big banner stating "O divino ignoto / Aquileia genuflessa ti salute"[19] (cited after Cadeddu, 2011, 155). Not far away, a triumphal arch with the inscription "Non chiedono lacrime/ gli eroi/ gloria gloria gloria/ nel sacro nome d'Italia"[20] was erected (Cadeddu, 2011, 155). On its way to Rome, the train frequently stopped at railway stations, where big crowds paid homage to the dead soldiers by approaching it, touching it or even kissing the casket (Fili, 2016, 18).

Besides the main commemoration starting in Aquileia and concluding in Rome, countless smaller local commemorations honouring the fallen soldiers were organized throughout Italy by local committees made up of local civil, military and Church dignitaries. They organized various public rituals (encompassing speeches, the singing of patriotic songs etc.) and funeral masses. In some places, smaller memorials were erected (Klabjan, 2010, 412–413).

The *terre redente* played a central role in the public rituals. Not only because the solemnities started in Gorizia[21] and Aquileia and because the railway cars were constructed in the shipyards in Monfalcone especially for this purpose, but above all by employing discourse which conceptualized and justified the death of Italian soldiers as a noble sacrifice for the redemption of these lands (Todero, 2010, 61). The whole territory was thus implicitly sacralized. This feature of memory politics was most clearly exemplified by the choice of Maria Bergamas as the spiritual mother of the Unknown Soldier – the woman had to come from the "redeemed territory", for the liberation of which the fallen soldiers had sacrificed their lives.

War cemeteries and *zone sacre*

The solemn burial of the Unknown Soldier represented only the tip of the iceberg of Italian post-war commemorative practices, though. Following the war, the whole country was engulfed in a whirl of commemorations, which ranged from the publishing

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18 For a detailed description of all the solemnities, see Cadeddu, 2011.

19 "O divine unknown / Aquileia salutes you on her knees", (translation by the author).

20 "They do not ask for tears / heroes / glory glory glory / in the sacred name of Italy", (translation by the author).

21 The town of Gorizia played a special role in the dominant narrative, which conceptualized World War I as a victorious war, as its capture in 1916 represented practically the only significant success of the Italian army during their 11 offensives along the Isonzo River (Thompson, 2009, 169–177).

of obituaries and memorial booklets to the erection of plaques and monuments. Italian journalist Enrico Janni described the process as "l'invasione monumentale" (cited after Pisani, 2017, 6). In Italy, where a substantial part of the population was still illiterate, monuments and memorials represented an especially appropriate and popular narrative source, compared with medieval *Biblia pauperum*. Solely between 1921 and 1925, 1700 of them were reproduced on the pages of *La Domenica del Corriere* (Mondini, 2014, 326–327), whereas the number of all erected memorials is considered to range between 10 000 and 20 000 (Pisani, 2017, 1).

In *Venezia Giulia*, there was likewise a number of new memorial plaques and smaller monuments.[22] Most of them were erected by local communities, as well as nationalist and veterans' organizations, but the state authorities took special care to give this process an orderly and ideologically conforming character. The agency for the protection of monuments, *Ufficio Belle Arti*, established by the military administration in Trieste,[23] sent a circular letter emphasizing its mandate to approve all the monuments commemorating the events of the war. In the case of important monuments, the Office was obliged to assemble a special commission to evaluate the project.[24]

But all along the former frontline, an even more important role in this process was played by war cemeteries. Due to the high number of casualties along the Isonzo front, some of the biggest and emotionally charged Italian war cemeteries were situated here. The Italian state authorities played a leading role in the process; its action was necessitated by the enormous task of finding thousands of dead soldiers, whose remains had been left on the former battlefields or quickly buried in provisional cemeteries, but at the same time it also gave the state an opportunity to shape these central sites of the grieving process to its liking. This task was first entrusted to the *Commissione nazionale per le onoranze ai militari d'Italia e dei paesi alleati morti in Guerra*, established on 13 April 1919. The following year, the Italian government also established the *Ufficio centrale per la cura e le onoranze alle salme dei caduti in Guerra* (COSCG), with the seat in Udine/Videm. The soldiers who could be identified were buried individually, whereas the rest were put in mass graves (Tragbar, 2017, 5–7). By the end of 1922, the office removed 760 provisional war cemeteries, enlarged or regulated more than 1400 and constructed about 30 new ones (Fabi, 1999, 54–55).

In *Venezia Giulia*, one of the most symbolically charged cemeteries was the *Cimitero degli eroi* near the basilica in Aquileia. Following the departure of the train composition with the Unknown Soldier to Rome, the remains of the other 10 unidentified soldiers were

22 See for example La Voce dell'Isonzo, 25. 6. 1919: Un monumento ai caduti del 57.o. fanteria sul San Gabriele; La Voce dell'Isonzo, 10. 12. 1919: Lo scoprimento della lapide a Carlo Favetti, 1; La Voce dell'Isonzo, 13. 5. 1922: Castagnevizza: tomba di fanti, 2.

23 The occupied territory of *Venezia Giulia* was at first administered by the Italian military. In August 1919, the military administration was substituted by a civilian governor, who was then subordinated to the new *Ufficio centrale per le nuove provincie.* The same structure persisted also after the annexation until 1922 (Kacin Wohinz, 1972, 75–80, 117–123, 379).

24 ASGO, CCGLIT, b. 19, f. 100, Cat. 6.14 (Belle arti e monumenti): Attribuzioni dell'Ufficio Belle Arti e Monumenti, 25. 11. 1920.



Fig. 1: Typical post-war military cemetery near Vrtojba (PANG 667, Vrtojba 1048).

left in the basilica until 4 November 1921, when they were likewise buried in the small cemetery nearby (Cadeddu, 2011, 209–210). The second important war cemetery was the *Cimitero degli Invitti della terza armata* near the Hill of Saint Elia at the outskirts of the Doberdob Karst. The cemetery housed the remains of approximately 30 000 soldiers of the Italian 3rd Army, most of them unidentified, which were mostly exhumated from various provisional cemeteries throughout the former war zone. It was formally inaugurated on 24 May 1923 in the presence of Italian king Victor Emmanuel III and new Prime Minister Benito Mussolini (Fabi, 1999, 55; Dato, 2014b, 704).

Beside war cemeteries, which soon began to attract visitors who wanted to pay homage to the fallen soldiers, other important sites of memory in the territory of *Venezia Giulia* were the so-called *zone sacre*. *Zone sacre* were meant to serve as monuments containing the remains of former battlefields. Already during the war, the Italian Army began preparing plans for preserving the sites of the heaviest battles as sacred sites of the nation. In the area of *Venezia Giulia*, the commands of the Italian 2nd and 3rd Armies proposed the establishment of *zone sacre* encompassing the hills of Sabotin, Kuk, Vodice, Skalnica and Škabrijel, whereas the whole Karst plateau in the south was to be declared *Monumento alla guerra nazionale* (Mantini, 2016, 27–29). The plan, elaborated in 1919 by professor Guido Manacorda, proposed the establishment of a *zona sacra* encompassing most of the Karst Plateau where the principal war operations took place; the stated aim was to

conserve most of the war remains left after almost three years of continuous fighting, whereas the places of notable battles were supposed to be connected by *via sacra*.[25]

The original proposal was not put into practice, chiefly because of the sheer dimensions of the project and the necessary financial expenditures. The Army decided, based on the order of the Italian government, to reduce the protected area to the localities most important to the war effort, as well as most well-known and evocative (Mantini, 2016, 30–31). The hills of Sabotin and Monte San Michele, which were the sites of the heaviest battles during the first six Isonzo offensives, were declared to be *zone monumentali* on 29 October 1922 by the *Regio decreto n. 1386*. Both were chosen because they were "più legate ad immortali fasti di gloria"[26] and to ensure the gratefulness "della Patria verso i Figli che per la sua grandezza vi combatterono epiche lotte nella guerra di redenzione 1915–1918".[27] Both areas were placed under the care of the Ministry of War, which was obliged to ensure the maintenance and the accessibility of the monuments (Gazzetta Ufficiale del Regno d'Italia, 3. 11. 1922, 2807–2808).[28]

War cemeteries and *zone sacre* soon began to attract visitors; the first were former soldiers and relatives, who wished to pay their respect and grieve for their lost ones (Kavrečič, 2017, 144). But at the same time, the stream of visitors to war cemeteries and former battlefields along the Isonzo River was also a result of the propaganda campaign led by Italian nationalist organizations. For example, in June 1919 a branch of *Lega Nazionale* from Servola near Trieste asked the military governor to provide them with 16 trucks in order to arrange a trip to the former battlefields around Gorizia and on the Karst Plateau.[29] The young members would thus gain an opportunity to appreciate the "[…] grandezza del sacrificio compiuto dal soldato italiano […]".[30]

Visits to the sites were also promoted by a number of private and state-owned companies and organizations, among which the roles of the Italian National Tourist Organization (ENIT – *Ente nazionale per le industrie turistiche*), the *Touring club Italiano* and the Italian Michelin Company (*Agenzia italiana pneumatici Michelin*) were especially important. Starting with the *Guida dei campi di battaglia* published by Michelin in 1919, a number of tourist guides, which were meant to encourage Italians to make "pilgrimages" to former

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25 See detailed plan in Manacorda, 1919.

26 "most linked with the immortal splendours of glory", (translation by the author).

27 "of the Fatherland to the Sons who for her greatness fought epic struggles in the war of redemption 1915-1918", (translation by the author).

28 At the time when the discussion about the establishment of *zone sacre* was taking place, Monte San Michele was seriously considered to become a place of one of the most imposing Italian World War I monuments ever erected, as it was chosen by the *Comitato Nazionale per il Monumento Ossario al Fante Italiano* as the site to host a monument honouring the sacrifice of Italian soldiers. The proposed projects were all characterized by excessive monumentality, which was met with negative reactions from the Italian public. After deliberations and postponements, the commission finally chose the project proposed by Eugenio Baroni, which provided for a construction of a giant staircase leading up to the top of Monte San Michele, where an enormous platform would be built. Due to financial difficulties as well as the progressively lower public opinion, the project was finally cancelled by the Mussolini government in March 1923 (Savorra, 2015).

29 ASTs, RCGC Gab., b. 15, Direttive edilizie, Commerciali, Naviglio: Richiesta dela Lega Nazionale a Servola.

30 "greatness of the sacrifice made by the Italian soldier", (translation by the author).

battlefields, were published.[31] One of the most successful was an illustrated seven-volume guide titled *Sui campi di battaglia* [On the Battlefields] first published in 1927 by the *Consocazione turistica italiana* in collaboration with COSCG (Kavrečič, 2017, 150–153). *Touring club Italiano* also organized excursions to the former battlefields. Between 25 August and 2 September 1920, around 500 members of the Club visited the sites of battles from the upper Isonzo Valley to Trieste and then sailed to the Kvarner islands (Mantini, 2016, 49). The trip was described in the local press as "pellegrinagio patriotico".[32]

Visits of highest state and military dignitaries, as well as members of the Italian Royal Family, likewise strengthened the awareness about these places and encouraged new visitors. It is noteworthy that monuments and war cemeteries comprised a large part of the itinerary when King Victor Emmanuel III and Queen Elena, accompanied by Princess Jolanda and the Duke of Aosta, made their first official visit in this area. After an enthusiastic reception in the town centre of Gorizia, the Royal Couple first visited *Cimitero degli eroi* in Gorizia and then headed to Oslavia/Oslavje near Podgora, where they laid a wreath at an obelisk commemorating the fallen Italian soldiers. The following day they also visited the war cemetery near Redipuglia, before heading to Monfalcone and Trieste.[33] Monuments dedicated to fallen soldiers and war cemeteries remained a central part of the (frequent) visits[34] of the highest Italian state dignitaries in the region, as they did not serve only as sites of memory for the Italian nation, but also as physical reminders of Italian claims for sovereignty over these multinational lands.

WAR MEMORIALS AS SITES OF NATIONAL CONTESTATION

Although Italian nationalist discourse described the war as a war of liberation fought by the need to free "unredeemed Italian brothers" suffering under the Habsburg yoke, the new Italian eastern borderline, established with the Treaty of Rapallo,[35] also meant that up to 550 000 Slavic speakers lived in the new provinces (Čermelj, 1965, 13–15). The presence of a non-Italian-speaking population in the area, most of which fought on the opposing side during the war and would prefer the incorporation of these territories into the Yugoslav state, automatically meant that Italian war memorials and commemorative practices did not function only as a site of national unity, but also played another role, the role of national contestation and demarcation (Wörsdörfer, 2009, 34–38; Klabjan 2010, 403). Maria Bucur and Nancy Wingfield have argued that "although commemorations

31 The guides found an echo in the local nationalist press, which strongly supported these efforts. See for example La Voce dell'Isonzo, 11. 4. 1922: Escursioni alla fronte dell'Isonzo, 1.

32 La Voce dell'Isonzo, 4. 8. 1920: Escursione nazionale nella Venezia Giulia, 1.

33 La Voce dell'Isonzo, 23. 5. 1920: La trionfale giornata goriziana dei Sovrani, 1–3.

34 The King and the Duke of Aosta visited *Cimitero degli Invitti* near Redipuglia again the next year, accompanied by Benito Mussolini. In the following years, members of the Italian Royal Family made several visits to Venezia Giulia; Crown Prince Umberto, to name just one example, came to Gorizia and Tolmin in 1929 in order to inaugurate the monument dedicated to fallen irredentists from Gorizia (Fili, 2016, 65).

35 With the Treaty of Rapallo, the new Yugoslav state agreed to renounce its claims to the territories of the former Austrian Littoral, some bigger islands in the Upper Adriatic and the Dalmatian town of Zadar with its surroundings) (Cattaruzza, 2007, 159–164).

seek to validate feelings of pride and entitlement among these groups, they also attempt to legitimate distinct legacies and to cultivate pride about specific moral and cultural traits that differ from those of other groups" (Bucur & Wingfield, 2001, 3). This is certainly true regarding Italian commemorative practices in *Venezia Giulia*, but this function is context-dependent and often multifaceted. How, then, did Italian war memorials and commemorations concretely serve as means of national contestation?

Different discourse strategies have to be pointed out. First, by establishing the narrative of a victorious and eminently just war of national liberation, commemorations in various forms automatically served as a reminder of Italian claims over these lands, for which so much "Italian blood" had been spilled. As national sites of memory in a contested border region, the nation-building function of memorials was intertwined with the expression of territorial claims over the Northern Adriatic, which was further reinforced by the discourse employed by the Italian nationalist press and rhetoric at commemorative rituals. Beside the aforementioned celebration of the Unknown Soldier, there were countless smaller commemorations honouring the dead Italian soldiers and irredentist "martyrs" and at the same time celebrating the incorporation of this territory into Italy in the years following the war. They were mostly characterized by a typical mix of patriotic pathos and exclaiming the ancient Italian character of *Venezia Giulia*. From 1920, local Fascist *squadristi* were frequently part of the celebrations.[36]

Second, they fulfilled this role by reinforcing the historical narrative which was very often employed by irredentist writers in order to justify their claims of the Italian character of *Venezia Giulia*. Appealing to the legacy of the ancient Roman Empire, which began the settlement of this area in the 2nd century BC, nationalist intellectuals conceptualized the complex history of the whole region as one epic struggle for the preservation of its Latin/Italian character. Even though this legacy was supposed to be partially obscured by centuries of German occupation and Slavic pressure, the region has managed to retain its ancient Latin/Italian character, which should now be put to light again.[37]

In this regard, choosing Aquileia, the first Roman colony in the Upper Adriatic region, which had served as a springboard for the spread of Roman power into the Balkans and Central Europe, to host the first main ceremony connected with the commemoration of the Unknown Soldier was highly ideologically charged. The local accompanying commemorations also linked the sacrifice of the Unknown Soldier with the redemption of *Venezia Giulia* – as part of the celebrations in Trieste, a plaque commemorating the destroyer *Audace*, the first Italian warship to enter Trieste Harbour at the end of the war, was erected (Fili, 2016, 21). Likewise, in Trieste, on 4 November 1921, when the corpse of the Unknown Soldier was inhumed in Rome, an official city delegation paid their respects at the memorial plaque commemorating 130 fallen war volunteers from Trieste (Todero, 2010, 61).

36 See for example La voce dell'Isonzo, 1. 2. 1919: Le solenni onoranze a Nazario Sauro, 1; La Voce dell'Isonzo, 13. 5. 1922: Castagnevizza: tomba di fanti, 2; La Voce dell'Isonzo, 24. 10. 1922: L'inaugurazione della targa al Timavo, il 3 Novembre, 2.

37 See Caprin, 1915; Litta-Visconti-Arese, 1917.



Fig. 2: The votive chapel of Saint Mark above Šempeter (PANG 667, Šempeter pri Gorici 1001).

A typical example of Italian commemorative practices reinforcing the narrative of the ancient uninterrupted Italian/Latin character of the Northern Adriatic was the construction of a votive chapel of Saint Mark on the hill above the Slovene village Šempeter near Gorizia, dedicated to soldiers fallen on the hill during the war. It was characterized by a statue of the Venetian Lion of Saint Mark underlined by the inscription "Leo semper vigile" above the entrance. The Lion of Saint Mark, the symbol of Venetian Republic, was meant to represent the historical continuity of the Italian character of the whole region, as the Venetian State was understood as the carrier of Italian cultural and political presence in the area.[38]

38 As Iginio dal Ri, writing about art in *Venezia Giulia*, put it, the presence of Italian art, from Roman ruins to Venetian lions, testified to the Italian character of the lands around the Adriatic Sea (1932, 296).

On 8 August 1922, the anniversary of Italian troops entering the town in 1916, a solemn inauguration took place. Local nationalist and civic associations, as well as schoolchildren, carrying flags formed a column heading to the hill, accompanied by local Fascists. There, they were joined by local civil and military dignitaries. The inauguration encompassed a holy mass celebrated by the Bishop of Trieste, Angelo Bartolomassi, as well as patriotic speeches recording the importance of the sacrifice of soldiers for the liberation of Gorizia. The local Italian newspaper accompanied the celebration with the following commentary: "Su questo, alto e imponente si rizza il monumento ai valorosi eroi caduti per la liberazione di questa terra superbamente italiana."[39]

But perhaps the clearest example of the importance which memorials dedicated to fallen Italian soldiers gained in the national contestation in *Venezia Giulia* was the so-called "Krn affair". The characteristic shape of Mount Krn/Monte Nero[40] above Kobarid/Caporetto dominates the landscape of the upper Isonzo valley; its capture in 1915 represented one of the most daring achievements of the Italian mountain troops, *Alpini*, during the war.[41] In June 1922, a simple monument in the shape of a pyramid dedicated to the *Alpini* was solemnly inaugurated below the peak of Krn. The ceremony was attended by Italian veterans' associations from Torino as well as local nationalists. A few days later, the monument was damaged by a lightning strike.[42] When the news about the damage to the monument reached Kobarid on 21 June, it was assumed to be an act of Slovene desecration. As an act of revenge, during the same night, local Italians attacked the monument dedicated to Slovene composer Andrej (Hrabroslav) Volarič in the centre of Kobarid and destroyed it. In the following days, Fascist squads from the whole Friuli descended on Kobarid and the village of Drežnica at the foot of the mountain, where they burnt the vicarage and terrorized the local inhabitants.[43] Italian *carabinieri* present in the town failed to defend the local Slovene inhabitants.[44]

The events in the upper Isonzo valley clearly show the symbolical importance which Italian World War I memorials acquired in the struggle for national supremacy. The local Italian press immediately denounced the presumed act of vandalism and threatened the Slovenes with severe consequences.[45] Following the end of riots, not a single member of the Fascist perpetrators was charged and tried; Slovene dignitaries, on the other hand, were obliged to attend the ceremony of re-dedication, which took place in

39 "On this [hill], stands the high and imposing monument to the brave heroes fallen for the liberation of this superbly Italian land." (translation by the author). (La voce dell'Isonzo, 10. 8. 1922: La celebrazione di VI anniversario della liberazione di Gorizia, 1).

40 Italians named the mountain Monte Nero.

41 The peak was conquered by the Alpine battalion Exilles in the summer of 1915. The capture itself was not of great military importance, as the Austrian troops simply established a new frontline on the nearby mountains. Nevertheless, the success of the Italian troops naturally found a wide echo in the contemporary war propaganda (Thompson, 2009, 72–73).

42 ASGO, CCGLIT, b. 51, f. 322, Cat. 10.2: Verbale della commissione nominata dal vice commissario generale civile per la accertamenti sul monumento del Montenero, 24. 8. 1922.

43 ASGO, CCGLIT, b. 51, f. 322, Cat. 10.2: Incursione fascista in quel di Caporetto, 26. 6. 1922.

44 Goriška straža, 28. 6. 1922: Dogodki na Kobariškem, 1.

45 La Voce dell' Isonzo, 24. 6. 1922: I profanatori del Montenero, 1.

Kobarid and below the top of the mountain on 16 July 1922, at which local (Slovene) schoolchildren had to sing the Italian patriotic song *Fratelli d'Italia*.[46] The Slovene press loudly protested against the aggression and even expressed the perception that Italian war memorials represented one of the factors in the process of rising Italianization of the province: "Among completely Slovene villages, a great number of both modest as well as magnificent monuments commemorating and celebrating fallen sons of the Italian nation is now rising. They are rising on *our* mountains, hills and plains […]"[47]

CRACKS IN THE IDEOLOGICAL FAÇADE

But as convincing as the picture of nationalist functions of Italian memory politics in *Venezia Giulia* is, can we find another side to the aforementioned processes? As Jay Winter argues, although most, if not all, World War I memorials in post-war Europe were meant to express nationalistic or other political ideas, they ultimately also pointed to the losses and suffering experienced during the war. Even though a segment of political elites used them to create nation-building narratives, they were still a place of grieving, where the suffering and grief experienced during the war was explicitly expressed. For a majority of the population, their meaning was "as much existential as artistic or political, as much concerned with the facts of individual loss and bereavement as with art forms or with collective representations, national aspirations, and destinies" (Winter, 2015, 79).

Traces of this process can be observed in most of the major commemorative practices and strategies described so far. The celebrations associated with the burial of the Unknown Soldiers, the enthusiastic participation of crowds throughout Italy can partially be understood as a result of a carefully planned successful propaganda campaign. On the other hand, the official celebrations also corresponded with the needs of citizens, who simply wished to honour and grieve for their lost ones. The consensus achieved during the celebrations could then be gained only at the price of a certain ambiguity, which was reflected also in the absence of speeches at closing the ceremony. As Oliver Janz succinctly put it: "From the political right, the ritual was celebrated as an apotheosis of patriotic duty, while other groups primarily perceived it as a mourning ceremony that recalled the human cost of war" (Janz, 2016, 3).

But what was the situation in the nationally mixed borderland of *Venezia Giulia*? A strong case can be made that Italian war memorials and commemorative practices in *Venezia Giulia* should not be understood solely as a straightforward reification of the dominant narrative, which served to instil into Italian citizens a new sense of national unity, supposedly reached through the sacrifice of fallen soldiers. Nor were they just a manifestation of nationalist ideology, which was used to legitimate exclusive Italian claims over this multinational borderland. The private aspect of the grieving process must also be considered, as it was not completely incorporated into the collective sphere dominated by the prevalent ideological structures described above. The post-war years

46 Goriška straža, 18. 7. 1922: Dogodki na Kobariškem, 2.
47 Goriška straža, 28. 6. 1922: Obramba Slovencev, 1, emphasis added.

were characterized by a multitude of commemorations precipitously caught between personal expression of grief and the need for healing, as well as culturally conditioned forms of understanding as conveyed through the media and the state apparatus (Todero, 2010, 51, 59).

However, when considering this topic, it is necessary to differentiate between two interrelated but distinct features. The first relates to the architectural language of the erected monuments, the second to their perception in the post-war local context. We can find some traces of Italian war memorials and commemorations transgressing the ideological and national boundaries both in the shape of the built monuments, as well as in the reception of the local populace.

Recent research performed by Borut Klabjan has confirmed that the celebration of the Unknown Soldier not only exceeded the boundaries of political and social divisions, but partially even the national divides. Although the local Slovene and Croatian elite and a substantial majority of the population remained indifferent towards the celebrations, the main Slovene daily newspaper *Edinost* at first characterizing them as exclusively Italian,[48] a part of the non-Italian population nevertheless took part in them. The Civil General Commissioner thus reported that commemorations had been very successful in the whole province, with no noisy festivities, but in the form of simple, heartfelt ceremonies. He underlined that the population as a whole, without political and racial division, participated in the ceremonies, and specifically commented on the unexpected episodes of kindness by German and Slovene subjects. In Tolmin, for example, the commemoration was attended by vast crowds, including the authorities and "the entire population without regard to any national or political distinction" (cited after Klabjan, 2010, 415). It seems then that in localities where the ceremony was presented and understood as a general commemoration of the war victims, the local Slovenes and Croats also participated (Klabjan, 2010, 418).

Furthermore, although Italian war memorials were deeply linked with the process of the national appropriation of *Venezia Giulia*, they were also inseparably connected with the honouring of fallen soldiers. This automatically guaranteed them a certain aura of sacredness and sheltered them from political attacks. We can thus hardly find any negative reporting about them in the local Slovene press, which instead mostly ignored this process. Even in the case of the supposed act of vandalism directed against the monument on top of Krn/Monte Nero mentioned in the previous section, which enflamed national passions in the region, the Slovene press and politicians were quick to condemn the desecration and to assure that this act was by no means characteristic of the wider Slovene community. The Slovene newspaper *Goriška straža* thus wrote that Slovenes deeply respect Italian war memorials, because they "bow their heads and their souls before the grandeur of death".[49]

Furthermore, it has to be pointed out that many monuments themselves often expressed mainly themes of pre-political suffering, which exceeds the ideological divisions. Such was the case with the aforementioned *Cimitero degli Invitti della terza armata* near

48 See the analysis of reports about this topic in *Edinost* in Fili, 2016, 22.

49 Goriška straža, 28. 6. 1922: Obramba Slovencev, 1.

the Hill of Saint Elia, which represented the biggest Italian war cemetery in the region. The structure of the cemetery was designed as a series of concentric circles rising up to the top of the hill. The graves were "decorated" with old military equipment (barbed wire, helmets, etc.), as well as many individually made inscriptions. The whole structure was supposed the invoke the impression of the ascent of Christ to Calvary, as well as Dante's description of hell (Todero, 2010, 64–66). It is not surprising that the cemetery did not correspond with the needs of the coming Fascist regime. The realism of the cemetery clearly invoked the tragedy of war; furthermore, the cemetery was too personal, intimate and fragile; it was a site expressing above all personal suffering and loss (Dato, 2014b, 705; Fabi, 1996, 22).

Other war memorials in *Venezia Giulia* likewise clearly express similar messages. Many of them are characterized by the need to cope with the loss caused by the war. In a geographic and historical context deeply imbued with Catholicism, the sculptors mainly employed the traditional images of the suffering of Christ on the cross or other Christian imagery.[50] Two memorials situated at the symbolically important *Cimitero degli Eroi* in Aquileia, where the remains of the other ten Unknown Soldiers were buried, clearly convey this message.

The monuments are named *L`Angelo della Carità* (Angel of Mercy) and *Il Cristo della trincea* (Christ of the trenches); the former was made by Ettore Ximenes, the latter by Edmondo Furlan. Both monuments were placed in the cemetery in the spring of 1921, but had been made earlier. Ximenes' statue (made of bronze) represents an angel spreading the hands of a fallen soldier into the sign of a cross; it was made in 1917 at the express wish of the Duke of Aosta. Furlan's composition, made out of Karst stone, on the other hand, shows Christ reaching down from the cross comforting a wounded soldier. Furlan started working on the monument as a wounded soldier during the war and finished it in 1920 (Daffara, 1998, 62–63). Both sculptures directly address the suffering of Italian soldiers through traditional religious images without clearly invoking any nationalist aspirations.

On the other hand, considering the fact that the meaningfulness of architectural "texts" originates from the dialectic relationship between them and their "readers", it is understandable that even (supposedly) apolitical manifestations of loss and suffering could be given political interpretations. The "problem" was that by associating the war loss and suffering with exalted religious images, they implicitly presented the war as both tragic and sacred. In a referential frame dominated by notions such as "victory", "liberation" and especially "*italianità*", a contemporary could easily describe the meaning of Furlan's monument as follows: "La passione che portò l'Italia attraverso il martirio alla sua redenzione ha il suo riscontro nella passione e morte di Cristo – che è il primo e il più grande martire – per la Redenzione dell'Umanità"[51] (cited in Daffara, 1998, 62). The Christian

50 As Jay Winter points out, the recourse to traditional religious imagery was very common in all European countries during and following World War I (Winter, 2015, 117–222).

51 "The passion that brought Italy through martyrdom to its redemption is reflected in the passion and death of Christ – who is the first and the greatest martyr – for the Redemption of Humanity.", (translation by the author).

idea of salvation was thus directly associated with the struggle of the Italian nation for the liberation of its last "unredeemed" brothers and sisters. The instrumentalization of the sacrifices of Italian soldiers during the war could thus paradoxically reach its peak exactly with these, at first sight, apolitical monuments.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it is necessary to emphasize the multifaceted nature and even a certain ambiguity of Italian war memorials and commemorative practices in *Venezia Giulia* before the rise of Fascism. The existing research has focused mostly on the ideological dimension of this process, i.e. its role in the legitimization of Italian political elites and its importance in the process of establishing Italian claims over these multinational borderlands. As convincing as these arguments are, I have argued that it would be an oversimplification to approach this topic solely from this perspective. Although a lot of Italian commemorative rituals in *Venezia Giulia* clearly conveyed such messages, often coupled with triumphalist panegyrics and nationalist pathos, a personal or pre-political dimension of grief and sorrow was not completely obscured in the features of erected monuments, nor in their perception by the local populace. War memorials thus incorporated a spectrum of all three main factors working and co-existing together.

However, when we consider specific memorials, it is evident that the boundaries between the three different layers of meaningfulness were far from clear or even final. On the contrary, they often overlapped and even contradicted each other, depending on the context and the "reader". Due to the ubiquitous presence of nationalist notions in public discourse, even seemingly apolitical memorials could easily be given ideologically conformable interpretations. This paradox can help uncover the key to the understanding of the functionality of Italian war memorials and associated commemorative practices in *Venezia Giulia* in the first post-war years. Far from being static, their meaningfulness was constantly subject to change, as they could easily be given different interpretations according to the needs and expectations of their makers and visitors.

"OBMOČJA BOLJ POVEZANA Z NESMRTNIM SIJAJEM SLAVE": ITALIJANSKI VOJAŠKI SPOMENIKI IN KOMEMORATIVNE PRAKSE V JULIJSKI KRAJINI (1918–1922)

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POVZETEK

Razprava obravnava italijanske vojaške spomenike ter pokopališča in z njimi povezane komemorativne rituale na območju Julijske krajine od konca prve svetovne vojne do oktobra 1922. Obmejna in večnacionalna Julijske krajina, ki jo je po koncu prve svetovne vojne in propadu Habsburškega imperija najprej zasedla in nato tudi priključila Kraljevina Italija, ponuja zanimivo študijo primera pri preučevanje vloge, ki so jo komemorativne prakse odigrale v povojni Evropi.

Sporočilnost tukajšnjih spomenikov padlih italijanskih vojakov ter komemorativnih praks je odločilno zaznamoval obmejni in večnacionalni značaj tega območja, ki si ga je Italija priključila po Rapalski pogodbi sklenjeni 12. novembra 1920. Poleg tega je potrebno upoštevati tudi dejstvo, da so se naselja, gore, griči in druge teritorialne značilnosti Julijske krajine vtisnile v italijansko nacionalno zavest zaradi hudih bojev s tisoči žrtev, ki so tu potekali v času prve svetovne vojne. Na ta način so postali tipični italijanski kraji spomina; ta proces je nacionalna komemorativna politika še dodatno utrjevala in spodbujala. Prisotnost številnega slovenskega in hrvaškega prebivalstva v regiji pa je prispevala k temu, da spomeniki padlih vojakov niso delovali samo kot nacionalno konstitutivni kraji spomina, temveč tudi kot kraji nacionalne razmejitve. Služili so kot fizični opomin italijanskih zahtev po tem območju, za katerega naj bi bilo med vojno prelite toliko »italijanske krvi«.

Nazadnje pa so bili v očeh velikega dela prebivalstva spomeniki in pokopališča predvsem mesta pred-političnega žalovanja, kjer so svojci lahko žalovali za svojimi preminulimi, medvojno trpljenje pa je bilo marsikje tudi eksplicitno upodobljeno.

Kjučne besede: soška fronta, komemoracije, vojni spomeniki, kraji spomina, Julijska krajina

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"THE MOST MODERATE ITALIANIZATION?" SOCIAL ACTION AND NATIONALIST POLITICS IN THE NORTH-EASTERN ADRIATIC BORDERLANDS (1919–1954)

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ABSTRACT

This article explores the development of a comprehensive network of Italian nursery schools in the highly mixed "Venezia Giulia" in the immediate aftermath of World War One. The schools were implanted by the largely female voluntary welfare association Italia Redenta with an eye to "Italianizing" the young children of slavophone and mixed language families.

Keywords: Social welfare, north-eastern Adriatic borderland, gender, childhood, social politics, voluntary welfare associations

"LA PIÙ SERENA ITALIANIZZAZIONE?" AZIONE SOCIALE E POLITICHE NAZIONALISTE NELLE TERRE DI CONFINE DELL'ADRIATICO NORD-ORIENTALE (1919–1954)

SINTESI

L'articolo esplora lo sviluppo di un'articolata rete di asili nido e scuole materne italiane nella regione multietnica della Venezia Giulia all'indomani della prima guerra mondiale. Le scuole furono rette dall'associazione volontaria Italia Redenta, che, formata principalmente da donne, si occupava anche di "Italianizzare" i bimbi slavofoni e di famiglie linguisticamente miste.

Parole chiave: stato sociale, Adriatico nord-orientale, confine, genere, politiche sociali, politiche giovanili, associazioni volontarie

INTRODUCTION

This article is part of a larger project titled "Social politics in European borderlands; A comparative and transnational study, 1870s to the present." This project seeks to reshape the history of European social provision by retrieving the contributions of local, borderland actors and associations in shaping national welfare systems. For understanding welfare provision in ethnically mixed borderlands gives us insight into how processes of inclusion in and exclusion from social assistance have functioned and evolved from the end of the 19th century until the present day. Hence, the experience of local social reformers, their knowledge of local conditions, but also their nationalist, racist, gender or religious prejudices profoundly shaped patterns of systemic involvement of the state.

Examining the politics of borderland regions through the lens of social politics allows us to deploy a lens that is different from, but complementary to, that of national/ethnic identity politics. As key objects of competing social actions in the northeastern Adriatic, children offer a royal road into the complex social politics of this highly contested border region (Klabjan, 2011). For the relationship of children to social provision has long been indirect, mediated through the welfare responsibilities and social rights of their parents. This is because, as workers and as citizens in the making, children stand in an indirect, future-oriented relationship to both employment and citizenship; the two central categories through which welfare states are structured.

One of the most important welfare measures targeting children, undertaken by the state and civil society actors alike, was ensuring their civic education through full-time primary schooling, which constituted a critical step in nation building throughout Europe, including European borderlands. In multilingual regions, as borderlands often are, tensions between civil society actors and the state (which was often perceived as "foreign") could be and often were particularly intense, as the former sought to "renationalize" their own, allegedly "denationalized" children through schooling in their "true" native language. Alternatively, a state that aspired to control the region might move in and, with the necessary collaboration of supportive local actors, strive to assimilate people of "other tongues", beginning with the very youngest children. The largely female association *Assistenza all'Italia Redenta* ("Assistance to Redeemed Italy"), which was active in the north-eastern Adriatic borderlands from the end of WWI, offers a telling example of the latter strategy.

Conceived by a group of nationalist and irredentist women, most of whom had seen service as nurses on the Alpine front, *Italia Redenta* returned to those same battlefields eight months after the Armistice in order to deliver emergency assistance to the surviving civilian population, primarily by distributing work to unemployed mothers. Very quickly, however, *Italia Redenta* shifted its focus from establishing workshops to organizing nursery schools in the small towns and villages that were dispersed across the highly mixed "Venezia Giulia" (North-eastern Friuli and Istria, Trieste, Gorizia and parts of Dalmatia).[1] Unsure of its dominance over the numerous Slovene, Croat and mixed

1 The name "Venezia Giulia" comes from the irredentist claim that Italy's true northern and northeastern boundaries were made up of the so-called "3 Venices": Venezia Trentina in the north, Venezia (the north and

language families that populated this former Habsburg region, the Italian state seized swiftly on school policy as a key instrument of state-building on the new Adriatic frontier (Andri & Mellinato, 1994). *Italia Redenta* worked in concert with the liberal state (which, in the immediate postwar years, took the form of the occupying Italian army), creating schools where the youngest children of local, mixed language or slavophone families were taught – in Italian – basic reading, writing, and numeracy, as well as gardening and other rural working class skills. For the next fifty-eight years, *Italia Redenta* would continue to deliver nursery school services in the Venezia Giulia under a dizzying succession of political regimes and geopolitical conjunctures. It is in many ways an emblematic borderland welfare association, blending as it does local actors (notably the female school teachers) with a few key players from the Italian interior while borrowing templates from international actors like the Red Cross and the (American) Federation of Day Nurseries.

Based on research that is still at a very early stage, this article explores the shifting frontiers between social and political action, and between male versus female forms of action as these traversed the *Italia Redenta* movement across its very long life (1919–1978). I am particularly interested in grasping the complex and shifting relation between voluntary action and the Italian state from the last years of Giolitti's liberal régime through the fascist *ventennio* and beyond, into the early decades of the First Republic. For, among other things, the tale of *Italia Redenta* allows us to tell a very different story about the evolution of the Italian state, one that is told from the point of view of civil society actors who engaged regularly with that state and shaped some of its most important contemporary functions, namely, those of social protection. It also allows us to explore the process of nation-building from the perspective of a heterogeneous and highly contested borderland, where the meanings of *italianità* were of necessity rather different from those in the Italian interior (Sluga, 2001; Cattaruzza, 2017).

FROM THE AUSTRIAN LITTORAL TO THE VENEZIA GIULIA: BUILDING A SOCIO-EDUCATIVE NETWORK IN THE NORTHEASTERN ADRIATIC

In July, 1919 the first 18 volunteers from the *Opera Nazionale Assistenza all'Italia Redenta* (ONAIR), all of them women, arrived in Trieste, spearhead of a carefully meditated socio-educational initiative in the impoverished, war-torn Venezia Giulia. For nearly four years this frontier district, formerly of the recently vanished Austro-Hungarian empire had seen some of the most punishing battles of the Great War. Those who remained when the fighting finally stopped were a bombed-out, malnourished and under-employed population of italophone, slavophone and mixed language families, ill-housed (when not entirely homeless altogether) whom the Italian government was eager to welcome

northeastern Veneto region), and Venezia Giulia in the northeastern Adriatic. Of the three only one – Veneto – belonged to Italy before WWI. Possession of the other two was a part of the irredentist dream of fulfilling Italy's "true" borders, first evoked by Garibaldi and then appropriated by irredentist nationalists toward the end of the 19th century. On 26 April 1915, Italy extracted the promise of these lands in return for joining the war on the Allied side.

(or press) into the newly expanded nation. Nearly two years before the frontiers of this borderland region would be settled, the women of *Italia Redenta*, most of whom had seen service as nurses on the Alpine front, seized the initiative and redeployed their skills in a program of immediate relief to these distressed families. Beyond the emergency distribution of food, clothing and medicine lay a longer-term socio-educative project of ministering to the region's very poorest women and children with an eye to conquering their loyalties for Italy's expansive nationalist program.

At a time when aid organizations were proliferating rapidly in the Venezia Giulia, some of which, like the Habsburg-era *Lega Nazionale*, had been quite active before the War, *Italia Redenta* had to define its niche very carefully in order not to duplicate (let alone compete with) its colleagues in this domain.[2] As many of the already active organizations targeted children of primary school age, particularly orphans (who made up fully 2% of the local population), *Italia Redenta* set its sights on a younger population, creating nursery schools and maternal and child health services that were all linked to those same schools. Here, the women of *Italia Redenta* fed, clothed and educated – in Italian – the young children (aged 3–6) of local slavophone and mixed language families while offering their mothers paid work making clothing in the organization's numerous sewing and knitting workshops.

In a region ravaged by malaria and tuberculosis, and beset by high levels of malnutrition, the women of *Italia Redenta* were immediately obliged to expand their mission to include badly needed medical services to mothers and young children. These latter were delivered via a network of dispensaries and walk-in clinics that were attached to several of the larger ONAIR nursery schools, as well as through the organization's *Casa Materna* on the via Manzioni in Trieste, where 16 mothers (most of them unwed) and 22 nurslings, some of them orphaned or abandoned, were housed and cared for by ONAIR staff.[3] Pressed by the desperately poor public health conditions in the region, *Italia Redenta* pioneered two forms of social assistance that were new to Italy at the time. The first of these was the nursery school complex, which placed the school at the heart of a larger, polyvalent health, education and welfare center; an unusual structure that doubtless owes its shape to the fact that the initial organizers and leaders of this socio-educational initiative were nurses rather than teachers. The second was the *Casa Materna*, whose novel structures of mother and infant welfare would be faithfully reproduced some five to ten years later by fascist Italy's premier child welfare organization, the *Opera Nazionale Maternità e Infanza* (ONMI) (Gobbato, 2012).

Italia Redenta's social action was thus at one and the same time an eminently political/nationalist one, concerned with the "patriotic penetration" of Venezia Giulia's slavophone population and their assimilation into the Italian nation via socio-medical assistance and

2 Lega Nazionale was Austrian-Hungary's main Italian school association. It ran cultural associations, after school programs and Italian nursery schools in mixed Italo-German (Alto Adige) or Italo-Slovene/Croat-speaking regions of the Empire (Friuli, Trieste, Istria, Dalmatia) from the late 19th century (1891 in the Venezia Giulia) until the end of the 1920s. See Apollonio, 2001.

3 By 1923, the number of nurslings would rise to 30.

language instruction, especially to the very young. In a region that had been laid waste by four years of war, with high levels of unemployment and infant mortality, thousands of orphaned and abandoned children and an illegitimate birthrate that was 3–4 times higher than the average for the rest of Italy (though fertility rates were in fact quite low), the blending of a social mission with a nationalist and educational one was a winning formula: by November 1919, *Italia Redenta* had already established an important beachhead in Trieste and had opened nursery/workshop complexes in several of the most important frontier towns: Gorizia, Monfalcone, Tolmino, Gradisca.

Italia Redenta's ever-more expansive activity in the Venezia Giulia region reminds us of just how porous the frontier between social and political/nationalist action was in interwar Europe. Indeed, these were the years when understandings of politics across the ideological spectrum were expanding to include social politics. If the left had long understood social action to be an integral part of its political mission, the right would soon come to see the point as well, as Europeans sought to come to grips with the massive destruction and socio-economic dislocation that the war had imposed across the continent (Downs, 2014).

The realm of social action had long been a women's world, particularly (though not exclusively) a terrain of public action for bourgeois and aristocratic women. At a time when women in most European nations were excluded from formal political participation (Italian women would not receive the franchise until the end of WWII), social action in connection with a political movement, or in the context of municipal socialism, swiftly became an important avenue by which women could participate publicly in advancing their chosen movements' social and political goals. But as the social dimension of politics gained in importance, this formerly female domain began to be colonized by male activists as well. In post-WWI Italy, the shape and timing of this masculine colonization had everything to do with the rise of fascism and the centrality that socio-medical services to poor women and their children acquired in the context of Mussolini's struggle to raise the birthrate while lowering infant mortality. *Italia Redenta* offers an especially revealing lens through which to examine this process, as the sexual division of labor within the organization would shift markedly with its gradual transition from liberal-era nationalist/irredentist aid organization to fascist para-statal educational structure after 1924.

The idea behind *Italia Redenta* was originally conceived by the Duchessa Elena d'Aosta. A fervent nationalist with irredentist leanings (she was good friends with Gabriele D'Annunzio), Elena d'Aosta had already shown herself ready to act in service of her political convictions; first in Libya, where she had served on the frontlines in 1911, then as Inspector of voluntary nurses for the Italian Red Cross during WWI. In the spring of 1919, d'Aosta gathered around her a like-minded network of noble and upper-bourgeois women, plus a few well-placed (male) politicians. These women and men would make up ONAIR's Executive council, which coordinated (from Rome) activities on the ground in both Venezia Trentina and Venezia Giulia. So here we have an example of an association with close ties to the state and, as we shall see, to the army as well. While this may not fit everyone's idea of a civil society organization, it is by no means an isolated example in 20th century Europe. Moreover, *Italia Redenta's* close collaboration with the army

reminds us of many forms that the "state" takes in borderland regions: imperial, absent, weak, occupying army, etc. (Hametz, 2017).

ONAIR's founding statutes stipulated that the vast majority of volunteers be former Red Cross nurses; women who had been "put to the test during the war" and proven their valor in the face of extremely harsh conditions on the Alpine front. The hard climate, poor housing and generally desolate conditions that awaited them in war torn Venezia Giulia would demand every ounce of that courage.[4]

The association's regional organization was centered in Trieste, where the organization's Regional Inspector for the Venezia Giulia managed the activities of her volunteer workers whilst forging good relations with regional and city government as well as other *Opere* active in the region. ONAIR's first such Inspector, the Contessina Gigliucci, arrived during the summer of 1919 with 17 volunteers and began setting up operations. Soon after their arrival, D'Annunzio organized his infamous Marcia di Ronchi (11/12 September 1919) in order to support the uprising by Fiume/Rijeka's Italian population, which hoped to join their multi-ethnic city to Italy.[5] *Italia Redenta's* volunteer company gladly accompanied him, supporting his seizure of the city by distributing material and medical aid to local citizens during the initial weeks of the Fiume adventure. By late September/early October, however, the *Italia Redenta* volunteers had withdrawn from Fiume and returned to Trieste in order to develop their local operation. Although *Italia Redenta* would swiftly implant schools and clinics throughout the Venezia Giulia and along the Istrian peninsula, they would not return to Fiume/Rijeka until the early 1930s.[6]

By the end of August, the Contessina Gigliucci saw herself replaced by the decidedly non-aristocratic, but very experienced Clara Valli, who, during her three-year tenure during ONAIR's crucial early years created many of the policies that would govern ONAIR action on the ground.[7] The role of the Regional Inspector was extremely powerful, as she was head of all operations on the ground; Roman oversight very distant and the Executive Council trusted her implicitly. Valli thus established the practice whereby less experienced volunteers were paired with trained Red Cross and social work professionals so that they might learn the work more quickly. By the same token, Valli refused to take voluntary workers for less than three months, given the amount of time it took to train them. This effectively weeded out any dilettantes and ensured a high level of commitment among the volunteers.

4 ASTs, ONAIR, Scatola 1, dossier 1919, Statue, 1–2.

5 In theory, Fiume/Rijeka had 24.212 people who declared Italian as their primary language of use, and 12.926 who declared as their primary language Serbo-Croatian, German, Slovenian or Hungarian. But this census was based on a carefully gerrymandered drawing of the city boundaries so as to leave out the overwhelmingly Croatian port district of Sušak which, if included, indicated a clear Yugoslav majority (27.393), versus 24.870 Italians, 6.856 Magyars and 3.870 "others." (all ethnic identifications being based on self-declared language of primary usage) (Comité Yougoslav de Paris, 1919). See also Alatri, 1959, and Ledeen, 1975.

6 ASTs, ONAIR, Ex-scatola 1, b. 2, Dossier «Autorità scolastica 1932-5».

7 Crocerossina from Narni, in Umbria.

Valli left a second, important legacy from her years as Regional Inspector: as the network of ONAIR nursery schools expanded (to 8 by the spring of 1920), she began sending the neediest and most physically fragile children to *colonie marine* along the Adriatic coast for a month each summer, aided by a generous subsidy (L 20.000) from the Ministry of Public Health, which subsidy was renewed annually. During the early 1920s, some 80-100 tiny children left home each summer for a *cura marina* by the sea. They returned "robust and in remarkably better health" to families that were "fully satisfied with the treatment offered to their little ones."[8]

Finally, Clara Valli brokered a very advantageous deal with Professor Paolo Jacchia, head of the *Opera Orfani di Guerra*, that allowed her to move ONAIR headquarters from their sadly dilapidated building on the via Franca and join the *Orfani di Guerra* in larger, more comfortable and – crucially – more hygienic facilities on the via Manzioni. It was here that Inspector Valli would officially establish ONAIR's *Casa Materna*, transferring the 22 nurslings and 16 desperately poor and malnourished mothers who had been parked provisionally in the decrepit via Franca premises to lodgings actually worthy of the name. "If the *Opera* can build this, the only nursling hospital in Trieste and then implant 12 more like it in the Venezia Giulia, *Italia Redenta* will have given a benefit of unquestionable value to this region," wrote Valli to the Executive Council back in Rome, hoping to gain both moral and financial support for this unexpected venture, taken on Valli's initative when the opportunity for collaboration with another *Opera* suddenly presented itself.[9] She also profited from the association with Professore Jacchia, who was an expert in child medicine, to establish ONAIR's first professional training courses, intended to give volunteers and staff further training in infant hygiene and care (*puericultura*) and in practices of child assistance more generally.

Valli's activism around the Casa Materna and the collaboration with Prof Jacchia remind us of the crucial role that well-chosen opportunism on the ground played in the success of a venture such as *Italia Redenta*, whose success rested on the ability of local activists like Valli to cultivate ties with individuals and institutions already active on the terrain. But it also reminds us of the importance that the ONAIR attached to technical training, professional qualifications and scientific social work as means of distancing their association from earlier traditions of charitable ladies.

When the first *Italia Redenta* workers arrived in Venezia-Giulia sights of devastation, destruction and profound human misery awaited them at every turn. Helping women (especially mothers) to find sources of employment was therefore one of *Italia Redenta's* top priorities. Absolutely everything was in short supply in these "desolate regions" – food, clothing, medicine, transport. So ONAIR's first act was to set about creating workshops where women could knit and sew clothing for a small wage while their children were looked after in adjacent ONAIR nursery schools. The first of these complexes opened in Gorizia in early October 1919, thanks to a helping hand from the Army, which assisted

8 ASTs, ONAIR, ex-scatola 1, b. 1, dossier 1922, Rapporto del 13 gennaio 1922.

9 ASTs, ONAIR, ex-scatola 1, dossier 1920, 10 September 1920. Valli seems to have had a personal mission to improve the lives of poor, unwed mothers.

the *Opera* by offering them two empty barracks for their workshop and school plus a third one nearby where they could stock material (tinned food, clothing, thread, cloth, wool, shoes, school supplies, etc.).

If the Army's timely offer of former barracks allowed *Italia Redenta* to establish early on an important workshop and nursery school complex in the frontier town of Gorizia, the drastic shortage of buildings in reasonable repair obliged the *Opera* to distribute much material directly to women workers across the region, who would then produce the garments in their own homes. Alas, lack of rolling stock hampered this form of assistance as well, given the wide dispersion of peasant homes across the region. Happily for ONAIR, the Army once again came to their aid, offering them free passage on military trains so that they might distribute work, food and clothing to the neediest families.

As October turned to November, and the *Opera* opened two more nursery school/medical dispensary complexes (Monfalcone and Gradisca), the autumn rains began to fall in earnest. The wretchedness of the cold, wet northeastern climate struck a hard blow for these missionaries from Italy's warmer and sunnier interior. All found that the problem of acquiring sufficient wood to heat their schools merely added one more woe to the already lengthy list of concerns over how to accomplish, materially, the task of social, economic and educational assistance they had set themselves.[10]

ONAIR's nationalist activism on the early education front was by no means a novelty in the linguistically mixed borderlands of the former Habsburg empire. On the contrary, Slovene nursery schools had been established throughout the region during the decades leading up to the war, and local Slovene activists did what they could to re-open these schools after the Armistice. But in the struggle for the souls and tongues of Venezia Giulia's smallest children, *Italia Redenta* had the benefit of state support plus considerable material assistance from the Italian army, while Slovene activists, formerly supported by the Slovene School association (St Cyril e Methodius), could only count on their own, considerably reduced resources. This put ONAIR activists in a position to target neighborhoods and villages where the prewar nursery school had been a Slovene one: "The Committee [in Trieste] proposes that the *Opera* open under its own sign a nursery school that is currently closed in an ultra-working class district of Trieste (Rozzol), which is in desperate need of healthy Italian moral propaganda," declared Regional Committee Secretary Argentino in June 1921. To this end, the Committee granted the Rozzol project a L 20.000 subsidy so that it could fly the ONAIR flag over the formerly Slovene school which had had to close its doors for lack of funds, "as it no longer receives aid from the [Habsburg] 'Institute for poor neighborhoods' [St Cyril e Methodius] that had maintained the school under the Empire. It has all the necessary furniture which they would cede to us," concluded Argentino on a smugly confident note.[11]

10 ASTs, ONAIR, ex-scatola 1, busta 1, dossier 1920, Valli to Bona Luzzato, 11 December 1920. Valli went on to note that the situation in ONAIR nursery schools outside Trieste was «critical».

11 ASTs, ONAIR, ex-scatola I, busta 1, dossier 1921, 9 giugno 1921, «Proposte».

ACTIVISM – AND PUSH-BACK – IN THE NORTH-EASTERN ADRIATIC BORDERLANDS DURING THE EARLY YEARS OF THE FASCIST VENTENNIO

After an initially strong implantation, growing political and economic crisis throughout Italy in 1921–1922 obliged ONAIR to interrupt its planned expansion and retreat to a simple holding operation. In the fall of 1922 came additional bad news: the government subsidy (L 180.000) that had allowed ONAIR to maintain that holding operation was about to be cut to L 100.000, a move that would surely "paralyze" ONAIR activism.[12] Fortunately for ONAIR, the ascendant fascist regime, with which a number of ONAIR stalwarts had close ties (including d'Aosta and Luzzatto) soon stepped into the breach and assured ample funding over the next three years.

Once again in a position to wage a ground war village by village for ONAIR against existing slavophone nursery schools, Italia Redenta rapidly expanded its network of schools, workshops and consultoria across the region in 1923–24 while defending existing schools on the linguistic frontier: "It is essential that this nursery school not be abandoned," wrote the secretary of the Padova Committee to the Marchesa Bettina Casanova of the school in Devin/Duino on 20 May 1923. "We must keep it even if it demands sacrifices; otherwise, it will become a Slavic nursery school."[13]

The Devin nursery school was indeed hotly contested, as journalists at the region's premier Slovenian newspaper *Edinost* underscored in September 1924:

> *Since 1890, hundreds and thousands among our parents have been just like foolish flies when faced with 'de-nationalizing spiders' like Lega Nazionale or ONAIR, sending their children year after year into the denationalizing webs of non-Slavic kindergartens* […] *where they are taught to despise all that is ours and authentically Slavic!* […] *Italia Redenta alone has set up kindergartens in the following municipalities: Devin/Duino, Kanal/Canale, Tolmin/Tolmino, Bovec/Plezzo, Kobarid/Caporetto, Podbrdo/Piedicolle, Idrija/Idria, Zaga/Saga, Sveta Lucija/Santa Lucia, Cerkno/Circhina, Dolina/San Dorligo della Valle, Podgrad/Castelnuovo, Matulje/Mattuglie, etc.* […] *and proudly boasts about how successful they've been, especially among children of 'other nations/other kin.' The kindergarten in Tolmin has 52 children, Kobarid has 32, Idrija, 100. They were least successful in Devin and Kanal, which are the two municipalities with the most nationally conscious parents* […].[14]

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12 ASTs, ONAIR, ex-scatola I, busta 1, dossier 1922, 26 settembre 1922, Bona Luzzatto to Valli, quoting Commandant Aldo Mayer (of Trieste's ONAIR Committee).

13 ASTs, ONAIR, ex-scatola 1, busta 1, dossier 1923, 20 May 1923, Lucrezia Manzoni Brunelli to Marchesa Bettina Casanova on the subject of the Duino nursery school, which the Marchesa had been obliged to quit for reasons of poor health in spring 1923.

14 Edinost, 16 September 1924, 1, "Pajek in Muha," translated by Dasa Ličen. Interestingly enough, the expression "of other nations/other kin" was used by both Slovenian and Italian activists in the region: *drugorodci* by *Edinost* (literally "of other kin"); *allogene* ("of foreign origin") by *Italia Redenta*. Unlike the term "foreigner," *drugorodci* and *allogene* refer to people of long-term (i.e., many generations) residence in the region who are nonetheless "of other nations." The choice of these terms defined the problem as one of people who were there for generations and yet somehow should not be because the former Austrian littoral was "really" Slovene, "really" Italian.



Fig. 1: The Italia Redenta school in Trnovo / Tarnova (Archivio Civico Museo di Storia Patria, Trieste, Fonds Opera Nazionale di Assistenza all'Infanzia delle Regioni di Confine – ONAIRC).

Several months later, Council Delegate Bona Luzzatto reminded the Regional inspector that "His Excellency Mussolini has urged us to redouble our efforts in *la Slavia* and especially the area around Isonzo. "For the real purpose of the *Opera*" lay in the aggressive "patriotic penetration" of these "Slavic centers."[15] As we shall see below, wars of position in the former Habsburg littoral raged particularly strongly in these years of rapid – indeed, aggressive – ONAIR expansion.

The following October (1924), the young fascist regime decided to transform the ONAIR into an *ente morale*, that is to say, a public body with private civil society origins that performs work that the state has identified as strategic. At the same moment, the Gentile law (October 1923) was already transforming the status of nursery schools all over Italy, which were henceforth attached to the public elementary schools and given a new statute – that of "preparatory elementary grade." Under this law ONAIR nursery schools were given the official task of Italianizing children in the frontier territories of Venezia Trentina and Venezia Giulia. From this day forward, ONAIR would receive subsidies from the Ministry of Public Instruction while retaining its autonomy as a private organization.

15 ASTs, ONAIR, ex-scatola 1, busta 1, dossier 1923, Bona Luzzatto to Edwige Costantini, 11 October 1923. Izonso was, at the time, the most heavily Slovene-speaking district in the entire region.

The Gentile law spurred a profound transformation of the ONAIR, which henceforth sought to professionalize its staff not only on the socio-medical front but on the pedagogical one as well. Well aware of the youth and inexperience of the young women teachers whom ONAIR had recruited from the immediate environs (nearly all of whom were bi-, if not tri-lingual in the major languages of the region: Slovene, Croat, Italian), the *Opera* decided in 1926 to inaugurate its first summer classes in the burgeoning field of kindergarten teaching. The development of summer training courses coincided with the *Opera's* larger pedagogical turn in favor of the child-centered methods of the sisters Agazzi, Rosa and Carolina. The Agazzis' "intuitive" methods for pre-primary school teaching shared a number of features with other "new pedagogies" of the era, notably that of Maria Montessori. But the Agazzis placed the emphasis on the teacher's "maternal mission," which was conceived in quasi-spiritual terms.[16]

To the extent that it was child-centered, the Agazzi method had much in common with Montessori's approach. But the Agazzis used poorer, more ordinary materials than did Montessori; materials that these impoverished children would have been likely to find around their own homes – cords, pebbles, bobbins and the like. These homely and familiar objects were meant to furnish the child occasions for spontaneous self-expression and discovery. Moreover, the Agazzi sisters stressed the importance of kind and gentle motherliness on the part of the *maestre giardini.* Indeed, the idea was to make the *scuola materna* as much like the child's home as possible, a kind of transitional space between home and the world. These schools therefore also had gardens and animals (rabbits, chickens, geese, etc.) that the children were meant to care for, thus expanding their repertoire of practical, rural working-class skills.

Finally, the children were taught the Italian language via an "intuitive" method that was grounded in a combination of constant dialogue with the teachers and – crucially – singing accompanied by movement. For the Agazzis had given considerable thought to the question of language acquisition; a reasonable preoccupation in a nation where so many children arrived at school speaking dialect, if not a different language altogether. It was here that song entered into their approach, offering children a ludic pathway into their new language, one that passed by their bodies and the human capacity for (and interest in) rhythmic sound and movement.[17] And indeed, it was the Agazzi songbook above all that drew ONAIR officials to their methods. By 1927, the Trentino division of ONAIR had organized summer classes in Trento that Rosa Agazzi – "the spiritual guide for all our nursery schools" ran herself, classes that *maestre* from Venezia Giulia were only too happy to attend.[18]

16 Not surprisingly, the Agazzi sisters drew their primary inspiration from Froebel's approach, which had its own mystical/spiritual base in the idea that the geometric shapes of the froebelian «gifts» to the child (balls, triangles and rectangles made of wood) speak directly to the child's spirit.

17 Which we now know to be closely linked to our capacity for language. See recent studies of parrots' capacity to dance in rhythm and the link to their capacity for language, both in inter-parrot communication and in their mimicry of human language.

18 ASTs, ONAIR, ex-scatola 1, busta 3, dossier 1928, rapporto di Adele Amegnani Spini (Regional Inspector from 1927–1933), 10. In 1933, Rosa Agazzi would succeed Spini as Regional Inspector.

Between the Gentile reform and ONAIR's summer training course, the *Opera* found itself more and more entangled with town and village administrations, as well as with local education authorities, a fact that only deepened ONAIR roots in the region. (As a general rule, municipalities provided the classrooms, housing for the *maestre* and sufficient wood to heat both, while ONAIR supplied the staff, socio-medical expertise and basic supplies for both schools and dispensaries: pedagogical, alimentary and medical.) Moreover, the Gentile reform plus the *Opera's* transformation into an *Ente morale* poised the ONAIR for further expansion during the middle years of Mussolini's regime.[19] By the end of the 1920s, the ever-expanding ONAIR would absorb a further 80 nursery schools in Venezia Giulia, Istria and Dalmatia, originally created by the *Lega Nazionale,* whose deep roots as a Habsburg institution had aroused profound mistrust on the part of fascist nationalists. By 1930, the ONAIR found itself abruptly in charge of a vastly expanded network of 167 village schools (and 8.193 children) spread across the small towns and villages of Dalmatia, Istria and the Adriatic islands; regions where the ONAIR had organized very few schools during the 1920s.

ONAIR's success may be measured by the force of local slavophone resistance, which, in the spring of 1924 mounted a fierce propaganda campaign in the Yugoslavian border district around Castua/Kastav against Italy and the ONAIR, prompted largely by the numerous Italian schools that had recently arrived in the region.[20] Nor was this an isolated case: "The 6th of August (1928) marks a dark day in the story of the *Opera*" wrote Regional Inspector Adele Spini in the fall of 1928. For that night "several fanatics burned down the nursery school in Storie (Sezana) which was housed in a Decker pavillion."[21] In the war of position that *Italia Redenta* was waging in Venezia Giulia, each territorial/linguistic victory was counted up, but never taken for granted "the nursery school in Mattuglie (Matulji) will modestly initiate with our noble means the most serene Italianization, especially here in Mattuglie, which will surely be a site of struggle."[22] The language of struggle permeates ONAIR discourse about its civilizing mission in Italy's northeastern/Balkan frontier zone, with each school a site of struggle, standing on the front line of ONAIR's battle to "fare penetrazione di italianità, and so "guide the region to Italy by teaching the language to local children."[23]

Yet overt resistance to ONAIR's battle to "Italianize" the region was in fact quite narrow (if at times, spectacular); confined to small circles of Slovenian activists, many of whom were linked to the Slovenian TIGR (Trieste-Istria-Gorizia-Rijeka) resistance

19 ASTs, ONAIR, ex-scatola 1, busta 2, dossier «Autorità scolastica 1932–5; 1937–8», undated document describing the history of ONAIR (1 p.).

20 These ranged from the ONAIR nursery school in nearby Mattuglie (which lay just over the border, on the Italian side) to post-elementary vocational schools.

21 ASTs, ONAIR, ex-scatola 1, busta 3, dossier 1928, A Spini to Giunta Esecutiva, Autumn 1928. Spini hastened to note that the school had been rebuilt quickly, thanks to the assistance of the «healthy part» of the population that had raised money for the new school.

22 ASTs, ONAIR, ex-scatola 1, busta 3, dossier 1924, E Costantini to Bona Luzzatto, 4 March 1924.

23 ASTs, ONAIR, Ex-scatola 1, Busta 3, dossier 1925, Dir Regionale to Comune di Rovigno d'Istria, 10 December 1925.

movement (Kacin Wohinz, 1988 and 2010; Vinci, 2011). Far more common were those thousands of parents who accepted the ONAIR schools, even sought eagerly after them. For in this desperately poor region, with both parents working, the schools provided child care, medical assistance, clothing, shoes and a hot meal daily to children who would otherwise be gnawing on a piece of bread for lunch. If the price to pay was learning a few songs and poems in Italian, well, this, too, could prove useful in a world that, as far the locals could see, would continue to be run by the Italians.

If fascism brought more resources to the ONAIR, it also introduced a new sexual division of associational labor. For when, in winter 1925–1926, Council delegate Bona Luzzatto retired, she was replaced not by another female member of the Executive Council but rather by a man: Colonel Nino della Santa. With his accession to the key post of Council Delegate (linchpin of the entire ONAIR operation) an entirely new phase opened for the *Opera*, whose stabilization as a key *Ente morale* on the linguistic frontiers of fascist Italy was accompanied by a new sexual division of labor where all posts on the ground (teachers, visiting nurses, regional inspectors) remained in the hands of an increasingly trained and professionalized corps of women, while posts of direction/administration gradually passed into the hands of men, beginning with the Executive council in Rome.

EPILOGUE

There is much that could be said about the ongoing expansion of the ONAIR during the 1930s, usually in response to requests from local mayors across the region, most of whom were at the head of fascist municipalities. ONAIR’s regional inspectors refused the vast majority of these requests, pleading lack of resources. But these dossiers reveal as well a distinct reserve on the part of ONAIR’s local leadership vis-à-vis the local fascists that merits further exploration.

ONAIR’s relationship with the national fascist regime was another matter altogether; indeed, ONAIR prospered throughout the *ventennio,* reaching its peak during the winter/spring of 1943, with a network of over 200 schools (more than 10,000 children) that reached as far east as Ljubljana. After Mussolini’s fall, however, the ONAIR was inexorably sucked into the violent politics of retreat and retribution that devastated the region from July 1943 onward. By June 1945, the towns and villages of Venezia Giulia had been traversed repeatedly by all the players: Italy’s fast-retreating fascist army, the German army (which subjected the region to a punishing scorched earth retreat), and the Italian and Yugoslav partisans. The exactions of all these forces, both material and human, would cost the region as much as a third of its prewar civilian population by the time the British and American Allied Military Government (AMG) had arrived (June 1945). From the outset, the AMG sought to calm the intense civil strife by whatever means necessary while coming to a temporary agreement with Tito’s socialist republic regarding the areas of occupation to be assigned to the AMG versus Tito’s partisans (Duroselle, 1966; Novak, 1970; Rabel, 1988). The temporary agreement (which soon became permanent) divided what had been Italian territory since 1919–1920, leaving a significant part of *Italia Redenta’s* schools and school teachers on the Yugoslav side of the occupation (Dalmatia and

Istria) while moving ONAIR headquarters from AMG-occupied Trieste to the Friulian (hence Italian) town of Udine, 40 km to the north.

The ONAIR's ongoing activism in the First Republic's much reduced Venezia Giulia was soon buttressed by President Alcide De Gasperi who, in 1948, signed a new law confirming the ONAIR's central role in delivering nursery school services to the region. The law named former ONMI stalwart and convinced eugenicist Aprile Lo Monaco to ONAIR's head, thus assuring an important continuity with the fascist years in early Republican social policy regarding maternal and child welfare[24] Present at the ceremony was Regional Inspector Costantino Cologna, confirming the ongoing masculinization of ONAIR's administrative layers, but now at the regional level as well. The ONAIR would continue running the region's ever-growing network of urban and rural *scuole materne* along firmly agazzian lines until 1977; 9 years after the Italian state would finally make the *scuola materna* an obligatory phase of Italian education across the nation.

24 This kind of politically ambivalent gesture, officially de-fascist-izing an institution by overturning its fascist statutes but then placing a fascist functionary at its head, was typical of postwar Italy, especially under the Christian Democrats, who single-handedly ensured tremendous institutional continuity between Italy's fascist and post-fascist bureaucracy while allowing much of the South's local government to slide *de facto* into the hands of the Cosa Nostra, 'Ndrangeta and Camorra.

"NAJBOLJ UMIRJENA ITALIJANIZACIJA?" SOCIALNA AKCIJA IN NACIONALISTIČNE POLITIKE V JADRANSKI SEVERO-VZHODNI OBMEJNI REGIJI (1919–1954)

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POVZETEK

Članek prikaže razvoj celovite mreže italijanskih vrtcev na etnično mešenem območju Julijske krajine po prvi svetovni vojni. V teh inštitucijah so ženske prostovoljke, vključene v društvo Italija Redenta, bdele predvsem nad "italijanizacijo" otrok iz t. i. slovanskih in mešanih družin. Kot ena od redkih tovrstnih servisov v regiji, je organizacija Opera Nazionale Assistenza all'Italia Redenta (ONAIR) dominirala na tem področju. Njeno delovanje je segalo v obdobje od dvajsetih let vse do leta 1977, ko so državni vrtci končno nadomestili izobraževalne "postojanke" ONAIR. Avtorica je preučila bogat dokumentarni fond omenjene organizacije, ki je shranjen v tržaškem delu držvnega arhiva. Na primeru društva Italija Redenta jo je tudi posebej zanimala meja med tedanjim družbenim in političnim delovanjem ter med moškimi in ženskimi oblikami tega delovanja oziroma v kolikšni meri je prihajalo do prepletanj in nato preoblikovanj v razmerju med prostovoljnim delom na eni strani in uradnimi – državnimi inštitucijami na drugi.

Ključne besede: socialna država, severo-vzhodna jadranska obmejna regija, meja, spol, socialna piltitika, politike otroštva, dobrodelne organizacije

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FASCIST VIOLENCE IN ZADAR BEFORE THE MARCH ON ROME. AUTHORITY AND MASCULINITY IN A POST-IMPERIAL SETTING

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ABSTRACT

This article discusses the role played by political violence in the emergence of fascism in post-WWI Zadar. In a former multi-ethnic imperial setting, fascist violence in the early years of Italian occupation led to a redefinition of the local political landscape and to a new performance of masculinity within the political field. The threats, the actions, and the language of violence became the distinctive marker of fascism and they allowed this faction to marginalize local competitors, such as the political representatives of the Serbs and Croats in town or the Republican Party. Moreover, violence was crucial to achieving a symbiosis with the ruling conservative elite of Zadar anticipating, and facilitating, the seizure of power in 1922. Through the use of archival material and the local press, the article provides a close reading of episodes of violence involving fascists. These used a new semantic and praxis of violence to create a convergence between masculine honor and the honor of the new national Italian sovereignty in Zadar.

Keywords: violence, fascism, Zadar, Dalmatia, masculinity, politics

VIOLENZA FASCISTA A ZARA PRIMA DELLA MARCIA SU ROMA. AUTORITÀ E MASCOLINITÀ IN UN CONTESTO POST-IMPERIALE

SINTESI

Questo articolo analizza il ruolo della violenza politica nell'ambito dello sviluppo del fascismo a Zara dopo la Prima guerra mondiale. In un contesto post-imperiale e multietnico, la violenza fascista nei primi anni dell'occupazione italiana porta a una ridefinizione del paesaggio politico locale e a una nuova performance della mascolinità in politica. Le minacce, le azioni e il linguaggio della violenza diventano una caratteristica distintiva del fascismo e permettono a questa fazione di marginalizzare avversari locali, come i rappresentanti politici di serbi e croati in città o il Partito Repubblicano. Inoltre, la violenza è cruciale per arrivare a una simbiosi con l'élite conservatrice al potere a Zara anticipando – e facilitando – la presa del potere nel 1922. Attraverso l'uso di fonti d'archivio e della stampa locale, l'articolo offre un'analisi dettagliata degli episodi di

violenza che coinvolgono fascisti. Questi ultimi usano una nuova semantica e una nuova prassi della violenza per creare una convergenza fra l'onore della mascolinità e l'onore della nuova sovranità nazionale italiana a Zara.

Parole chiave: violenza, fascismo, Zara, Dalmazia, mascolinità, politica

INTRODUCTION

> *We are tired. Zadar has been annexed by Italy and, as tolerant as one can be toward the foreigners (*esotici*) that proliferate in the streets, one cannot tolerate that they continue to display the signs of their origin. There are too many shops frequented by Italians and unconsciously supported by officials and soldiers of the Royal* [Italian] *Army, whose owners keep on propagating hate and rancor to our damage. There are too many Croatian signs, too many newsvendors that spread poison and plague; too many houses that should belong to* [Italian] *refugees while they are still inhabited by families who persecuted our brothers. There are too many restaurants where the owners try to stage pro-Yugoslav demonstrations after serving nectar and ambrosia to their Mongolic guests. All of this must stop, as well as the apathy of many more or less opportunistic citizens who, during solemn occasions, do not expose at their windows the three-colored flag of the Fatherland. A decision is needed because otherwise the initiative will be taken by the fascists. Got the point?*[1]

This article appeared on a local newspaper in Zadar in June 1921. It is one of the first statements from the press of the Dalmatian town in which fascists appear as a political entity. In this text, many aspects of everyday life in post-Habsburg Zadar are listed and stigmatized as unbearable. The explicit red thread is that the Croatian (and broadly speaking Yugoslav) presence in town was not tolerated. Interestingly, however, the criticism was directed against apathetic "opportunists" as well. This term likely refers to individuals who, regardless of their ethnicity, were still relatively indifferent (Zahra, 2010) to an identification with the nation. Thus, this category also included Italian speakers who did not perform their "Italianness" properly, that is through the specific code of patriotism hailed by the fascists. The latter emerge from the text as an ambiguous element in between the first person, with which the article begins, and the third person, in which it ends. Thus, the author voices the discontent of the entire "patriotic" population of Zadar and

1 L'Adriatico, 1. 6. 1921: Siamo stanchi.

sees the fascists as the instance within this population that can settle the issues tormenting the town. On another level, the text can be interpreted as a tension between the anxiety of social disorder and the apology of violence evoked to end it. Starting from these considerations, this article scrutinizes fascist violence as a key to interpret the complex political landscape of Zadar after the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy, on the way to the Treaty of Rapallo of 1920 which sealed the Italian sovereignty in the town. Moreover, the article discusses the struggle of fascism for reaching a dominant position among the political factions that remained active in the aftermath of the Treaty.

As the newspaper quoted above suggests, the situation in Zadar was still quite unstable in 1921. Following the diplomatic agreement of Rapallo, several institutions and actors negotiated their role in a new political and social landscape. Against this background, the use of intimidation and violence, both verbal and physical, became a resource for the rising fascist movement. By competing with other factions, violence allowed fascism to gain visibility through its transformative capacity. It became identified as a force which could intervene in the local public space bypassing political and diplomatic stasis. Most importantly, threats and actions of violence became increasingly linked with a marker of active *Italianità*, an element which would fulfill the empty promises of diplomats and established politicians in terms of national sovereignty.

A close reading of episodes of violence requires considering fascism a "community of action", for which its praxis is a central element. Fascism, in other words, "cannot be understood without the concrete situation to which the attitudes and the actions of the fascists relate" (Reichardt, 2014, 75). Violence within fascism has been widely studied as one of its constitutive elements, as an "organization, as a mentality, as a political culture and as a style of life and struggle, to say nothing of the fact that it was the main reason for its triumph" (Gentile, 2013, 85). In recent years, Giulia Albanese offered a new perspective that put a particular stress on the period just before and just after the March on Rome (Albanese, 2001; Albanese, 2003; Albanese, 2006; Albanese, 2012; Albanese, 2014).

In these and other classic works, however, Zadar and Dalmatia remain marginal (Vivarelli, 1965; Lyttelton, 1973; Gentile, 1989). This neglecting is common in more recent studies that see fascist violence as, at the same time, a transnational anti-communist praxis (Traverso, 2008), or the main factor of convergence between the *squadrismo* and the conservative state institutions (Ebner, 2010), for which the broader national level is predominant. The marginality of Zadar is, however, more surprising in studies explicitly centered on "borderland fascism" and irredentism in the Northern Adriatic (Sluga, 2003; Wörsdörfer, 2004; Cattaruzza, 2007; Verginella, 2016). An exception is Luciano Monzali's study on Dalmatia, although fascism is represented as an almost collateral entity in the shadow of the local political elite's capacity to rule until the balance of power on the national level turned in Mussolini's favor (Monzali, 2007; for a different interpretation see: Guidi, 2016).

The focus on a locality like Zadar here is motivated by the assumption that "[m]uch of the struggle over what Fascism stood for and over the direction the movement should take was played out at the local level" (Corner, 2012, 3). This choice allows to scrutinize the relationship between provincial and metropolitan politics, the landscape of loyalties

and polarizations in a multi-ethnic setting, as well as the transformation of authority and activism in a post-Habsburg town.

A closer look at the praxis and discourse of fascist violence in Zadar, though, makes it necessary to include reflections on gender, since masculinity emerges prominently from the sources. In studies on Italian fascism, gender is still overshadowed by "neutral" categories such as the "collective" or the "mass" (Passmore, 2011) or discussed within women's history (De Grazia, 1992; Pickering-Iazzi, 1995; Wilson, 2003). In regard to masculinity, the historians' attention was mainly drawn to the construction of a "new man" after the seizure of power through the cult of sport or youth, but less to the aftermath of World War I, when fascism was emerging and struggling for gaining new adherents. For sure, this aspect is to be placed in a historical development of a nationalized and violence-prone masculinity that anticipates fascism (Bellassai, 2005) and dates back at least to the process of nation building in the 19th century (Banti, 2005). Such stereotypes evolved at an accelerated pace at the turn of the twentieth century, and the reenactment of a "warrior" profile ready to use violence developed from a sense of masculine decadence before, and especially during World War I, until it was coopted by fascism (Mosse, 1996).

This was not a peculiarity of the Italian state. In Zadar, as elsewhere in the Habsburg Empire, previous gymnastic and shooting clubs were often bound in the formation of manly collectivities on the basis of ethnic belonging and the cult of the nation. For example, an Italian *Società dei Bersaglieri* was opened as early as 1871. It replicated forms of sociability of a military unit (but also its cultural praxis such as the fanfare) in the Kingdom of Italy, although as a mere cultural association due towards its being in Austrian territory (Ricciardi, 1999). Later on, Croatian activists founded the local branch of the *Hrvatski Sokol* (Mendeš, 1999). However, these spaces of activism and collective identifications emerged in a different international context and relied on a different relationship to violence, which was not practiced openly in the public space.

The crossed reading on violence and masculinity in Zadar thus intersects the heritage of a post-Habsburg multi-ethnic setting, which was transformed by fascism through its interactions with other entities. Episodes of violence in Zadar between 1920 and 1922 not only prompted the passage from imperial to national, multilingual to Italian politics. They also shaped a new image of masculinity in politics which, in turn, helped impose the legitimacy of the new, post-war order. In other words, violence was a tool used against elements targeted as incompatible with the national body envisioned by fascism (Reichardt, 2002, 661–673), but also a way to reclaim authority and power by imposing a new praxis of masculinity against rival Italian politicians. The focus of the article is thus situated in the intermediary phase between violence as a legacy of World War I and the production of the so called "new man" by the fascists in power.

ZADAR AFTER WORLD WAR I

Dalmatia, and Zadar in particular, acquired a key symbolic and rhetoric emphasis for Italian politics after the armistice of November 1918. Already before World War I, irredentist agitators included it, together with Dalmatia, in the imagined national space,

and Italy's entry in the war in 1915 represented the peak of such rhetoric (Federzoni, 1915; see also Dainelli, 1915). In a pattern observable in many European contexts before, during, and especially after the war, a new political language influenced by the "Wilsonian moment" (Manela, 2007) suggested that nations could gain what empires could lose, namely the legitimation of sovereignty. In the Italian-versus-Habsburg case, this rationale was to be based on past historic rights (the Venetian and Roman past), achieved through warfare, and secured through a post-war order that would reinforce the idea of ethnic homogeneity within the state boundaries.

Already before the end of the conflict, diplomatic discussions about the fate of Zadar and Dalmatia were ongoing and tense. The scenarios changed from ceding a large portion of Dalmatia to Italy according to the secret London Pact of April 1915 between Italy and the *Entente*, toward Woodrow Wilson's quite different position on the Dalmatian question from 1917 onwards. Straight after the armistice of 1918, the US American president proposed to offer the whole Dalmatian coast to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SHS, later called Yugoslavia) with the exception of Zadar, "in order to acknowledge and keep upright the Italian character of the town" (ACS, MI, A5 MFD, b. 3, f. 12/6, 10. 11. 1919; Bralić, 2015). According to Wilson's project, Zadar was to become a free city under the supervision of the International Community, with privileged links to the Yugoslav State surrounding it.

All these plans, as well as the early diplomatic talks at the Peace Conference of Versailles in winter 1918-1919 were confronted with the uncertain reality and the relation of power in flux on the ground (Bralić, 2006). As soon as Italian warships arrived in Zadar in November 1918, Admiral Enrico Millo, the first military governor of Zadar, started to implement repressive measures (Peričić, 1973; Ivoš, 1999; Pupo, 2009a; Pupo, 2009b). These aimed at imposing an Italian character on the occupied territories to raise more solid claims at the diplomatic negotiations. In fact, Zadar had already been ruled through a state of emergency during the Great War, which included increasing censorship, surveillance, limitations to freedom of movement and even forced displacement for some elements of the local population.[2] Therefore, in a way Millo continued the repressive policy of the Habsburgs in a post-war context. The Admiral banned newspapers in Croatian, closed the local *Sokol* club, while his forces searched places such as the Croatian Kindergarten, the Civil Courts, and the Monastery of Saint Michael, deemed exposed to anti-Italian propaganda (ACS, MI, PS NP, b. 56, f. 8/2, 23. 6. 1920).

The situation in Zadar was furthermore directly linked to the developments in other territories under Italian occupation, especially Fiume. In September 1919, the poet and "war hero" Gabriele D'Annunzio occupied Fiume with some hundred paramilitary volunteers called *legionary*, and he then prepared an expedition to Zadar in November. There,

2 The most dramatic episode was a raid by the Austrian authorities during the *Julikrise* of 1914. Hundreds of inhabitants, from peasants to political leaders suspected of pro-Serbian sedition, were transported mostly to Maribor. The Dalmatian deputy Juraj Biankini described these events a few years later as a clear example of widespread violence used by the state (of emergency) on civilians (Lacmanović-Heydenreuter 2011, 165–166).

he met Millo and talked to a crowd that included many ardent supporters ready to act at his command. The Italian police reported shouts against the Italian government and in favor of D'Annunzio, but no significant incidents occurred (ACS, MI, A5 MFD, b. 3, f. 12/6, 26. 11. 1919). Through this action and its discursive representation, Zadar became associated with Fiume as a sacred site of *Italianità* – D'Annunzio often referred to it as *Zara la Santa* (the Holy) – that had to be defended at any cost. The Dalmatian town would thus provide an outpost from which Italy should continue the struggle for a wider territory regardless of the outcome of the then ongoing diplomatic negotiations with the Kingdom SHS. Dalmatia was thus at the core of the notion of *Vittoria Mutilata*, the "mutilated victory" resulting from sacrifice on the battlefield with unsatisfactory territorial gains. This "mobilizing power of defeat" (Gerwarth & Horne, 2012, 3) mostly related to the perception of injustice in the distribution of the spoils of the Habsburg Empire. It coexisted, however, with a self-portrait based on victorious heroism, which these irredentist groups elaborated through an apology of violence supposed to fulfill the nationalist tasks for which the Great War was fought. Thus, the setting of Zadar facilitated the formation and the praxis of paramilitary groups, also due to the fact that state military institutions were yet to be efficiently implanted.

An important event in this broader context was the assassination of two Italian citizens, Tommaso Gulli and Aldo Rossi, in Split in July 1920. Only one day after this incident, abrupt violence directed against "Slavs" broke out in Trieste, culminating in the fire of the Hotel Balkan hosting the *Narodni Dom*, the most important Slovenian institution in the city. The Tuscan fascist leader in Trieste, Francesco Giunta, claimed his movement's decisive role in this action, deemed the "baptism of organized *squadrismo*" (De Felice, 1965, 624). Violence erupted in Zadar as well. Although the town was even closer to Split, the reaction to the murder of Gulli and Rossi was not as fierce as in Trieste. This is how Millo notified the Italian government about the events:

> *In Zadar, the crowd has attacked and pillaged some stores, smashed some windows and doors, set a small and old wooden canopy on fire, all of which belonged to Yugoslavs STOP no wounded STOP the order has been reestablished through the troops whose conduct, together with the Fiuman battalion was very disciplined STOP I will inquire into the damage and take care of it* (ACS, MI, PS NP, b. 50, f. 16/7, 16. 7. 1920).

One element emerging from this account is that Millo had no serious intention to counter or condemn this expression of violence. In fact, the action of the crowd merely intensified on a less institutionalized level the repressive measures he had taken in regard to Serbs and Croats in Zadar. Millo's depiction of the events is characterized by a certain ambiguity as to who was involved in the disorders. Whereas the presence of later fascist activists can be taken for granted, contrary to the events in Trieste the *squadracce* do not appear in the source. Neither did a local newspaper article on the ceremony in Zara on July 14 in memory of the two victims mention fascists. Interestingly, the newspaper edited by the irredentist and future fascist leader Michelangelo

Zimolo represented this solemn homage without linking a gendered language to the ideal of violence. Whereas all those sitting in the front rows of the church where the ceremony took place were men (*Arditi* – veterans of WWI, sailors, *Carabinieri*, soldiers of army and navy, the army's fanfare, *legionari*, etc.), a sense of religious veneration for the "victims", "martyrs", "heroes" was not yet radicalized in a rhetoric of violence or vengeance.[3] Moreover, the role of the "Fiuman Batallion" – D'Annunzio's followers in town – remains quite ambiguous. One could speculate about their attitude vis-à-vis the regular troops, whether the "discipline" quoted above refers to an active participation in the riot without degeneration, or to a contribution to the reestablishment of public order. This should not necessarily be interpreted as a paradox or a contradiction, but rather as a sign of the blurriness of order and disorder in the months between the landing of Italian troops in late 1918 and the agreement of Rapallo between Italy and the Kingdom SHS two years later.

Thus, the prelude to the emergence of fascism in Zadar was characterized by two features. On the one hand, violence in terms of state repression as well as a high number of military – and, after 1918, paramilitary – forces had become a prominent element in the repertoire of rule in both the last Habsburg and the first Italian years. Weapons became increasingly visible in the public space, and they were meant both as a way of threatening civilians and as a way to grant "public security", although the boundaries between the two dynamics were often not clear-cut.

On the other hand, like in Fiume but unlike other newly occupied provinces, the Italian state represented an ambiguous reference from the very beginning of the occupation. Whereas the population of Zadar identifying with Italian sentiments supported the annexation quite unanimously, the capacity of the Italian state and its government to represent its interests and that of Italians in Dalmatia in general raised many doubts. This concerned the old local elite, although it was a privileged partner in the eyes of Rome for settling the terms of state integration, but also, and especially, the hardliner irredentists. These latter claimed to speak in the name of the Nation and, following their leader D'Annunzio, started to criticize both the local and the national authorities in order to find their own profile in the political arena.

THE EMERGENCE OF FASCISM

In this context, some fascist groups began to emerge in Zadar as early as April 1919. The degree of actual commitment of the members, their number, and their everyday activities in town is difficult to reconstruct on the basis of scarce and fragmented information. Some accounts optimistically highlight an early and rapid adherence to fascism, as well as exchanges and contacts in the form of participation to fascist gatherings organized in the Peninsula (ACS, MRF, b. 43, f. 113, 16. 4. 1919). At the same time, several other notes reveal logistic and financial scarcity (ACS, MRF, b. 43, f. 113, 5. 7. 1919) and non-linear ideological trajectories among the prominent members.

3 La vita in Dalmazia, July 1920: Per l'assassinio di Spalato a Zara.

This complexity mirrors the relationship between the two main figures of Italy's extra parliamentary politics of 1920, Mussolini and D'Annunzio, which mixed elements of symbiosis and of rivalry (De Felice, 1965, 545–598; Gentile, 1975, 166–184). One crucial difference emerged in the direct aftermath of the Treaty of Rapallo, with Mussolini pragmatically welcoming its terms on the columns of *Il Popolo d'Italia* (Giannini, 1921, 10) and D'Annunzio accusing the Italian government of betraying the Dalmatian irredentist cause. After the end of his rule in Fiume on Christmas 1920, D'Annunzio also mobilized a discourse on violence with a new, more aggressive tone, idealizing the popular resistance of the inhabitants of Zadar throwing rocks at the Italian army which was implementing the Treaty of Rapallo and evacuating occupied territories (D'Annunzio, 1974, 400–403). Rocks were then opposed to rifles which came to represent a State violence guilty of imposing an unjust agreement. Interestingly, D'Annunzio included women as positive actors of violence, something that disappeared wherever such episodes where commented upon by fascists later on.

At first, the nebulous faction opposed to the terms of the Treaty of Rapallo was also the one more prone to the rhetoric and the use of violence. After the evacuation of Fiume, the identification previously dominated by D'Annunzio now revealed a more nuanced profile along two main components. One identified with nationalist republicanism, the other one intensified the relationship with the fascist movement in Italy. The first test for this condominium were the parliamentary elections of May 1921, through which the population of Italian Zadar was asked to send its representative to a national legislative institution within a multi-party system.

At the national level, Mussolini steered its movement toward an alliance with conservative forces around the coalition named *Blocchi Nazionali*. This move marked a success in terms of seats gained in the Parliament, but also created an ambiguous bond to Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti, who was criticized by intransigent irredentist circles close to D'Annunzio. In Zadar, given the delicate diplomatic status of the city, local and state institutions put significant efforts in creating consensus around one single list called *Unione Nazionale,* including members from the whole range of the city's factions. At first, fascists and republicans showed interest in cooperating with the local elite composed of Italian politicians already represented in Habsburg institutions before 1914. This shows that there was no mutual ideological veto between conservatives and fascists, although a final agreement was not reached due to irreconcilable positions on the choice of the delegate in the list to be sent to Rome (Monzali, 2007, 300–310).

Eventually, fascists and republicans boycotted the elections, a choice that forced them to motivate their distance from the *Unione*. Interestingly, such pressure for defining an own political identity heavily relied on the rhetoric of violence. Only a few days after the elections, an article appearing on the new local newspaper *L'Adriatico* (co-edited by fascists and republicans) replied to criticism on the side of the *Unione,* which had discredited the boycotters calling them "*minorenni*" (minors) and "*bamboccioni*", a term which designates idle and immature men. The self-portrait appearing on the *Adriatico* replied:

> *these minors are the remains of that holy malaria* [in Triest's dialect, "bad boys"] *that smashed the Croats' heads and threw stones at Austrian policemen* [...]. *The lazy*

kids made the Croatian ghost vanish in a second, without hesitating, in an elastic and dynamic way.[4]

The retrospective apology of violence constructed a new ideal of activism centered on masculinity. Dynamism, instinct, youth vigor and force were highlighted to discredit the conservative elite, who had used the language of masculine mature "wisdom" and "experience" against their competitors. In the fascist-republican reply, this elite is described as a corrupted model consisting of idleness, servility, betrayal. Moreover, the positive markers of masculinity based on the readiness to use violence were supposed to serve equally idealized, impersonal, feminized elements such as the "holy Zadar", "Mother Italy", "Sacred Dalmatia", etc.

Violence was not simply projected on the past as a distinctive sign of activism against Habsburg authorities and other ethnic groups, but also a practice used to transform local politics in the present. In April 1921, after it became clear that no agreement could be reached with the *Unione,* the printing office preparing propaganda material for the list was attacked and burned down. The authorities reacted and sanctioned four persons explicitly profiled as fascists, although they were released soon afterwards (ACS, MI, PS NP, b. 68Bis, f. 8/15, 18. 4. 1921).

At the beginning, the *Unione* did not actually include the whole range of political factions present in Zadar in 1921, but only those who managed to obtain legitimacy in the eyes of the Italian state authorities, represented in Zadar by the *Commissario Civile* Corrado Bonfanti-Linares. In fact, the main target of violence at this point was still the non-Italian(ized) population of Zadar. For fascists and republicans, but also for Bonfanti-Linares, Croats and Serbs should not be explicitly represented in the local political field. During the early phase of the electoral campaign in spring 1921, there was indeed an attempt by the landowner Conte Alfonso Borelli to create a list appealing the lower-class population of Croats and Serbs in Zadar, but he withdrew a few weeks before the election day. Borelli, the descendant of an aristocratic family who had already been in positions of power in the nineteenth century, had chosen crossed hoe and shovel as a symbol in order to attract peasants. He complained about being victim of threats of physical aggression and "terror" during the campaign. The civil commissary Bonfanti admitted that "fifteen fascists, mostly students" had taken part in an intimidation, but minimized the withdrawal of the list and related it to an intervention of Yugoslav state authorities in order to avoid diplomatic tension with Italy. Bonfanti claimed that "no violence" occurred and represented the event as a small accident (ACS, MI, PS NP, b. 68bis, f. 8/15, 3. 5. 1921; 4. 5.1921).

To sum up, fascist violence was already a constitutive element in defining the balance of power in local politics in 1921. Of course, this was not peculiar to Zadar. This year in Italy saw the peak of violent confrontations between the far left and the far right, the latter being protected or at least not hampered by state institutions in spreading terror among the local population. In fact, compared to other settings along Italy's Eastern Borderland,

4 L'Adriatico, 21. 5. 1921: I minorenni.

one could argue that the degree of violence in Zadar was significantly lower, and precisely the limits of violence can allow for a better understanding of the place of this setting in the new Italian political space.

PEAKS AND LIMITS OF FASCIST VIOLENCE

The article quoted at the beginning dates to only a few days after the May 1921 elections. This phase marks a transition during which violence became the main distinctive element of fascist political actions. Violence was not anymore simply a legacy of war experiences, it became an element of self-representation for a movement with ambitions within party politics. In July 1921, some fascists attacked the representatives of the Yugoslav National Council (*Narodno Vijeće*) in Zadar, one of the institutions of the neighboring state not officially recognized under the terms of the Treaty or Rapallo. A few days earlier, a column in *L'Adriatico* had already threatened an action complaining about the existence of this institution, and arguing that the only acceptable representation of the Kingdom SHS in Zadar was its consulate.

> *To show respect toward foreigners is fine, but when these break the most basic rules of hospitality, or even conspire against us clandestinely (...) it is not. We neither want nor can tolerate their presence in Zadar. May the Royal Government care for pushing them out of the Italian soil before the population, which is justly resentful, handles it on its own*.[5]

Here, the motives highlighted in the first quotation reappear. The ambiguity of the subject between a first-person plural and an undefined "population", the warning addressed to the Italian authorities turning into a threat for individuals deemed hostile to Italy, the fear of their conspiracy. In August, three members of the National Council mentioned in the article were beaten up by fascists in Zadar, and this episode represents an important moment in the negotiation of the boundaries of tolerated violence. In fact, the local section of the *Fascio* officially denied its involvement, whereas the Yugoslav newspaper in Split *Novo Doba* clearly pointed to Fascists as executioners of this act:

> *It has also been ascertained that fascists waited for our persons* [*naša ljude*, sic!] *outside the National Council, they followed the group of Dr. Metličić, they attacked it from the back* […]. *First they beat up Prof. Ježina, then Dr. Metličić, and lastly the Engineer Gasperini. While some of them beat them, others held a charged revolver in their hand. We have been informed that during the fascist meeting on August 8, it had been decided to beat up our best persons in Zadar*.[6]

5 L'Adriatico, 27. 7. 1921: Zara o Zadar? R.Governo o Narodno Vijeće?
6 Novo Doba, 18. 8. 1921: Još o napadaju na našeg namjesnika. Stjepan Metličić was the president of the local Narodno Vijeće, Marko Ježina was a professor at the Croatian gymnasium.

The *Corriere di Zara*, a newspaper close to the political elite of the town, mildly condemned this attack on important and respectful personalities,[7] while a letter co-signed by many local citizens went as far as denouncing the passivity or even complicity of the Italian police and army in regard to fascist violence (ACS, MI, PS NP, b. 51, f. 7/5, 10. 8. 1921). Compared to other settings, the fact that fascists did not claim the leading role in this attack to impose their presence as a political entity might appear striking. However, they were anyways recognized as those behind this initiative by other observers, and even by the authorities (ACS, MI, PS NP, b. 51, f. 7/5, 9. 8. 1921). Thus, fascists managed to emerge as the most radical faction in local politics.

On the other hand, this also affected the trajectory of fascism in a negative way. The problem of using violence against Croats and Serbs appeared on different levels. First of all, the attack provoked a retaliation in Šibenik against one of the prominent figures of fascism in Zadar, Trifone Radovani.[8] Secondly, it proved to be ineffective as a way to mobilize the local population more broadly. Thirdly, this happened a few weeks after the formation of the government led by Ivanoe Bonomi, who pushed for a "national pacification" between socialists and fascists aimed at hampering the use of violence on both sides. In this framework, fascists in Zadar could not count on strong support from fascist central structures, since these were as well undergoing a troublesome redefinition of their strategy.

TOWARD DISCIPLINE?

During 1921, Mussolini came to the decision to "discipline" the movement. His aim, however, was to neutralize internal factions and consolidate his control rather than extirpate the *squadracce*'s violent actions. In fact, these latter continued to play an important role in the self-representation and the praxis of fascism, and episodes of violence continued, although with other modalities (Millan, 2014) throughout Italy, including Zadar. However, this change also projected fascism in the political field as a more institutionalized entity, above all through its transformation into a proper party, the *Partito Nazionale Fascista* (PNF) in November 1921.

In Zadar, this went hand in hand with a discourse on "discipline", which resonated in the newspapers reporting on political meetings. Already in late August 1921, a few days after the attack on the members of the *Narodno Vijeće, L'Adriatico* published a statement of the local *Fascio di Combattimento* calling for the discipline of his members as the only means which could "lead to ultimate victory".[9] The fascists in Zadar adapted to the "pacification" in Italy, although they declared to be ready to attack the enemy whenever it happened to break the terms of the truce. Moreover, local fascists became aware of the need for intensifying the cooperation with sections of the *Fascio* in other towns at the Eastern Border as well as with central institutions. This resulted in a greater organizational capacity but also in an increased dependency on decisions taken in Rome.

7 Corriere di Zara, 9. 8. 1921: Spiacevole incidente.
8 Corriere di Zara, 24. 8. 1921: Aggressione.
9 L'Adriatico, 24. 8. 1921: Assemblea del Fascio di Combattimento.

The way to the creation of a local section of the PNF also led to efforts to redefine the political profile vis-à-vis other factions in Zadar, mostly nationalists and republicans. The former entered a symbiosis with the fascists, and although they had an own political section, several activists operated in both groups simultaneously. The twist in the relationship between fascists and republicans went in the opposite direction, and their divergence evolved to a large extent in regard to political violence. Already during the opening ceremony of the local section of the *Partito Repubblicano Italiano della Dalmazia* (PRID) in January 1921, its members distanced themselves from "the seeds of violent turmoil of dubious origin" (DAZD, ERCO, 353, 26, 326, undated), a statement through which the fascists were implicitly accused of deviance from the original common spirit of the *legionari*. Thus, in spite of the rhetoric on discipline, violence became once again the factor which redefined the relationship between the two factions.

During the national convention of the *Fasci di combattimento* in Rome ending with the creation of the PNF in November 1921, fascists in Zadar attacked and destroyed the republicans' headquarters, the *Circolo Giuseppe Mazzini*. This episode of political violence allegedly originated from a brawl in a café between republicans and Italian soldiers. Annoyed by this altercation perceived as a subversive provocation, a group of fascists intervened the day after and stormed the *Circolo* (ACS, MI, PS NP, b. 55, 7. 11. 1921). Interestingly, the authorities shared the concerns about the republicans in Zadar, who gathered to chant "subversive anthems" (ACS, MI, PS NP, b. 55, 21. 11. 1921) and shout slogans like "Down with the King, Long live the Republic!".

The new civil commissary Moroni ordered to shut down both the republican and the fascist associations in the aftermath of these incidents. This intervention was a fatal blow for the capacity of the local republicans to organize, since the *Circolo* was the only institution of the faction in town. At first, the republicans attempted to re-conciliate with the fascists. They condemned the brutality of fascist violence and called for ending it in the name of the common goal of preserving Italy's interests in Dalmatia.[10] Soon afterwards, however, the republicans recognized that a convergence was not viable, and they changed their rhetoric becoming closer to socialism. For this reason, they were marginalized by the ruling elite, which at the same time sided more and more with the fascists. This became manifest most notably through the local press. While the republicans managed to gain control of *L'Adriatico,* formerly jointly edited with fascists, the conservative *Corriere di Zara* became less and less critical towards fascists, sometimes even explicitly supporting their activities.

The events of November 1921 are exemplar for the role played by violence in the redefinition of the balance of power in the local political field. Although the episode itself did not cause casualties and was confined to a small number of individuals, it represented an irreversible fracture between two previously proximate political forces. This rupture was provoked at the same time by an act of violence against the public order (the brawl between fascists and republicans), and by a repressive measure of the local authorities, which was meant to preserve this order. Interestingly, the outcome was the marginaliza-

10 L'Adriatico, 8. 11. 1921: Lotta fraterna.

tion of the common enemy, the PRID, and a convergence of interests among fascists, the conservative elite, and the representatives of the state.

The chain of events also shows that violence was not a gender-neutral phenomenon. It was, rather, almost exclusively employed by men against other men in situations in which masculinity was at stake.[11] Thus, the original brawl between the republican and the soldier originated from notions of honor, in a typical escalation for paying back an offense, but it did not have serious consequences for those involved. By their intervention on the following day, however, the fascists added a higher level and a new modality of violence by directly attacking, in a much greater number and with a better equipment, the enemy to settle the issue once and for all. In other words, to defend a man's own honor and to defend the honor of the *Patria* in a post-imperial territory increasingly adhered. Whereas the soldiers did not fulfill this double role in front of a subversive insult, the *squadraccia* proved that a violent assault was an effective reaction to such a provocation.

THE SMOOTH PATH TOWARD THE SEIZURE OF POWER

After the shift from an alliance with irredentist republicans to one with monarchist nationalists, fascism in Zadar evolved along a more synchronous trajectory in regard to central party structures in Italy. All factions in the Dalmatian town were, however, convinced of the crucial role of local politics for the broader question of stable relationships between Italy and the Kingdom SHS. Political disputes and conflicts were seen as extremely dangerous by Francesco Salata, the President of the *Ufficio Centrale per le Nuove Provincie* (Central Bureau of the New Provinces, UCNP) a body responsible for the integration of the newly acquired territories in the Italian administration. At the national level, Salata was accused by fascists of having a pro-Germans and pro-Slavs attitude. He was himself a victim of fascist violence in 1922 (Riccardi, 2001, 299), and the March on Rome marked the end of his political trajectory.

In Zadar, Salata relied on the old Italian Dalmatian autonomist and conservative political elite to steer the transition from Habsburg to Italian administration, although this elite was undergoing a troublesome phase as well. The list of the *Unione Nazionale* could again obtain the majority in the municipal elections of January 1922, while the list of the PNF and the Nationalists received half of the *Unione*'s votes, ahead of the Republicans (Corriere di Zara, 24. 1. 1922). This victory, however, did not represent a sign of demarcation in regard to fascism. On the contrary, the *Corriere di Zara* published some articles in the aftermath of the election in which proximity to the far-right party was explicitly claimed. In the eyes of the conservative newspaper, the fascists had made a mistake by not accepting an alliance with the *Unione*, and they had not realized that the population of Zadar was:

11 Here a qualification is needed. Whereas this article highlights the nexus between masculinity and violence, the local PNF also had a women section since its foundation. Therefore, fascism in Zadar was not merely a men's affair. Rather, the role played by women was marginalized in the rhetoric and actions of violence leading to the redefinition of institutional politics.

> *proud to have been fascist before fascism was born, because when defeatism committed its crimes in many Italian cities, no Bolshevist in Zadar would have burnt the* Tricolore *without being lynched*.[12]

Once again, violence (lynching) is evoked as the junction of fascism and patriotism against an enemy (this time identified with communism) which, in fact, never used violence against those who made its apology. This commentary is an explicit marker of the shift in the local conservative elite, which now openly flirted with fascism. In February 1922, a few weeks after the administrative elections, the leader of the *Unione* Luigi Ziliotto, who had just been reelected in its long-time function as mayor of Zadar, died and left a considerable vacuum of power and charisma, since he could count on almost unanimous respect. This also meant that fascists could further increase their visibility in the public sphere and their relevance in local politics as a force on the rise. Their acts of violence decreased in intensity, but increased in their acceptance, at least in the press and among local politicians. The Italian state authorities were contented with the absence of violence against citizens or institutions of the neighboring Kingdom SHS, and did not oppose this convergence toward fascism that, actually, reinforced them.

This trajectory is remarkably different from the one in Fiume, where fascists seized power through a local *Putsch* in March 1922 (Cattaruzza 2007, 165–166). In Zadar, fascists continued to represent a faction ready to use violence, without aspiring to subvert the status quo in the political field. In spring 1922, a group of them almost had a fight with some Italian soldiers, whom they accused of being "traitors", referring to the still ongoing evacuation of troops from the third occupation zone according to the Treaty of Rapallo. The brawl was avoided only through a last minute mediation by an officer, and the civil governor even sided with the fascists. He reported to Rome that they had been "provoked" by the soldiers who booed at them as they passed by the barracks singing "patriotic songs" (ACS, MI, PS 1922, b. 162, f. 1, 3. 4. 1922).

In fact, these fascists were returning from an "excursion" to the suburb of Stani. Before meeting the soldiers, they spread terror in the neighborhood Voštarnica (Ceraria). Their use of violence followed the usual pattern, as condemned by the now pro-republican *L'Adriatico*: Insults, threats with revolvers, beating, humiliations, vandalism against houses. The newspaper also accused the authorities and the police to grant the fascists impunity for these violent actions against republicans, and also highlighted that the victims could claim to be more patriotic than them.[13]

The violence-masculinity complex of fascism re-emerged in a statement published by the local PNF which directly attacked Emilio Erco, the author of the *Adriatico* article quoted above. In the statement, Erco was insulted as "*omuncolo*" (homunculus), "*vigliacco*" (coward), "*figura losca e intrigante*" (suspicious and seditious character) (DAZD, ERCO, 353, 26, 7. 4. 1922). The gap between the "new" praxis of fascist violence and an "old" one is symbolically represented by Erco's reaction. Feeling offended in his honor

12 Corriere di Zara, 26. 1 1922: Tutti per Zara, nessuno per sè stesso.
13 L'Adriatico, 4. 4. 1922: Gite avventurose di primavera.

by the PNF's statement, Erco challenged the already mentioned Trifone Radovani in a private duel (DAZD, ERCO, 353, 26, 20. 4. 1922). On the contrary, fascism did not require any chivalry code nor an intimate space to settle these issues. As the threatening articles quoted above show, violence could be even anticipated by a public statement, after which a brutal physical group attack in the public space did not leave any room for conciliation.

A quite different interpretation emerged in an article published by the Split based *Novo Doba* a few days after the incidents in Voštarnica, in which the victims of fascist violence were described as *naši* (ours, "Yugoslavs").[14] The fact that both republicans and Yugoslavs claimed to be the victims of the attack is not a paradox. Situated outside the walled city and next to the harbor, the neighborhood was inhabited by both people identifying as Italians and as Croats, and being from the lower classes made many sympathetic for the republicans. Therefore, the categories of belonging of those targeted by fascist violence were fluid and contingent, and most of all interpreted through a retrospective description of the facts. Whereas it is clear that episodes of violence involving male actors were the most common pattern, fascism continuously played on the ambiguity between the "inner enemy" (mostly the republicans) and "outer enemy" (the Serbs and Croats) in order to demarcate the normative national body to be established in Zadar.

When the Italian government was informed about these incidents, it expressed concerns about a possible diplomatic crisis with the Kingdom SHS. Radovani did not hesitate to deny any clash between fascists and citizens of the neighboring state on behalf of the PNF, stressing that the episode of violence occurred against republicans only.[15] Even before this potentially embarrassing situation, the authorities did not change their favorable attitude toward local fascists. As an example, one could mention that one of the leaders, Maurizio Mandel, who militated both in the PNF and in the Nationalist Party, was among the few politicians officially received by the King of Italy Vittorio Emanuele III when he visited Zadar in May 1922.[16]

Mandel's trajectory can be useful to summarize how fascists managed to increase their symbolic capital by navigating in the ambiguity of tolerated and illicit violence across time. Born in Cattaro in 1888 from a petit-bourgeoise family, Mandel grew up in Zadar and started his studies in Vienna. In the Habsburg capital, he took part in the clashes between Italian and German students during the debates on the opening of an Italian university in Trieste in 1908. Arrested by the police for firing from a revolver (OeStA, AVA Justiz OLG Wien 6, 6D, VZ 5, 22. 2. 1909), he proudly claimed the use of violence for patriotic demonstrations which at the same constructed the masculine model of the "*goliardo irredento*" (irredentist student-rascal). This term appeared in the title of an article written by Mandel twenty years after those events with the clear intent to construct a pre-history of fascist political activism (Mandel, 1928). After the clashes, Mandel was banned by Habsburg universities and continued his studies in Medicine in Italy, where

14 Novo Doba, 10. 4. 1922: Osvete Fašista.
15 L'Adriatico, 16. 5. 1922: La politica del Fascio di Zara.
16 Corriere di Zara, 31. 5. 1922: Ancora della visita a Zara delle Loro Maestà.

he further radicalized within irredentist circles. He later took part in World War I as a volunteer doctor in the Italian army, while his family was put under strict surveillance by the Austrian authorities (DAZD, CIV KOM, 118, 40, 4, 16. 9. 1915). After the Italian occupation of Zadar in 1918, he returned there and became active in the local *legionari* (AV, GEN ZARA, 22. 4. 1921). Interestingly, Mandel never appears as involved in first person in episodes of fascist violence in the Dalmatian town. He is therefore a perfect example of how local fascists managed to combine violence and respectability until they reached a favorable position in the balance of power not only vis-à-vis the other political factions, but also the very state authorities.

Through this process, compared to many other Italian localities, the last months before the March on Rome were not marked by a confrontation between the local government and fascists in Zadar. While, for example, blackshirts overthrew the municipal council of Bolzano in early October 1922, the symbiosis between the ruling political elite, the civil governor, the police and the fascists continued and actually facilitated the *Gleichschaltung*, the cooptation of most public institutions after the seizure of power. Not surprisingly, then, the civil commissary Moroni could report to the capital on October 28 that, during the March on Rome, fascist in Zadar simply held a meeting with "no actions", while the day in Zadar passed "normally" (ACS, MI, PS NP, b. 52, f. 7/5, 28. 10. 1922).

CONCLUSIONS

Fascist violence in post-Habsburg Zadar served two main purposes: To redefine the political landscape and to accentuate the gendered dimension of politics. A close reading of actions observable in this post-war setting can, indeed, create a link with the contemporary evolution of the notion of violence in philosophy and sociology since, in the same years as the events described above, major thinkers such as Max Weber and Walter Benjamin thoroughly reflected on it. It is well known that, in German, the word usually employed for translating violence, *Gewalt*, has a quite ambiguous meaning, that also signifies "authority" (Derrida, 1994, 19; Balibar, 2009). This is not only a semantic issue, but one historically rooted in the production of an intellectual discourse. These authors were confronted with a political landscape in post-WWI Germany in which the legitimacy of state institutions was challenged through paramilitary violence, and their reflections are therefore significant and useful for understanding Italian fascism as well. Weber formulated the notorious argument according to which, *Gewalt* is "specific" to the notion of the State as "the human community which […] aspires (with success) to the monopole of legitimate physical force/violence [*Gewaltsamkeit*]" (Weber, 1919, 4). For Benjamin, *Gewalt* is not a natural phenomenon, but the result of a changing balance of power. By dissociating violence from its ends and analyzing it as a means, he therefore distinguishes between "*rechtserhaltende Gewalt*", that is one aiming at conserving the existing institutional social order, and "*rechtssetzende Gewalt*", that this one mobilized to challenge and question this order (Benjamin, 1999 [1921], 188).

The analysis of fascist violence in Zadar emerges with features that can be situated at the crossroad of these interpretations in regard to both "state" and "right". Local fascism

was not revolutionary since it never sought a conflict with those in power, but it used violence to gain its own legitimacy. Although the modalities of the *squadracce*'s assaults bear many similarities with metropolitan settings, Zadar represents a peculiarity in the sense that neither "state" nor "right" were properly present at the moment when fascism appeared. This was a consequence, on the one hand, of the shift in the rationale of governance from Habsburg Empire to Italian Nation-State. On the other hand, the ambiguity of "right" derived from the continuity of a state of emergency in terms of military authority during and after World War I.

In a way, then, fascism was both a factor of state-building and a factor of right-building. It became a force that efficiently claimed to defend the legitimacy of the Italian rule in Zadar. Therefore, it actually helped the establishment of a monopoly of violence of the new ruling state. Fascist activism was located in the gap between a local conservative elite not used to employing violence, and Italian military sent from the center who did not embody an "autochthonous" Italianness. Its success laid in constructing its legitimacy within this gap by skillfully combining symbiosis and autonomy vis-à-vis those two entities. In terms of right-building, fascism implemented in a conservative fashion the narrative of the Nation's exclusive right on a territory, along which the negotiations at Rapallo were conducted. After a brief moment of disorientation, fascism quickly accepted the borders drawn in the Treaty, and at the same time it acted to ensure that only Italian and only pro-monarchy political entities have a legitimacy in this new territory. Violence, then, was the means used to marginalize the non-Italian population as well as the former allies, the republicans, who claimed other issues such as class conflict in their own doctrine of nationalism. In so doing, fascism continued under a regime of civil administration (after 1920) what the former military governor Millo had started at the very arrival of Italian troops. In other words, it was the force who managed to steer the potentially conflicting para-military and military, subversive and repressive, pro-local and pro-national types of *Gewalt* into a convergence which eventually resulted in its own seizure of power.

A close reading of the episodes of violence has shown that such process went hand in hand with a shift in the gendered dimension of politics, which was conceived of as the domain of a new ideal-type of male activist. Both the praxis of fascist violence and the rhetoric acts that represented it revolved around the idea that, in order to be considered legitimate, the male politician must have experience of violence, readiness to use it, and words to translate acts of brutality into political language. Considering the first aspect, the individual trajectory during World War I, the Fiume enterprise and even previous events related to irredentism were central for a respectable political "curriculum" in the eyes of fascists. These experiences were valued as symbolic capital only in their masculine dimension, that is the in terms of fighting in the army, enrolling in D'Annunzio's *legionari*, etc. The role played by women or other men not adhering to this ideal, or the way in which they were affected by these events, were deprived of any importance in the self-representation of fascism in this phase. Secondly, fascist masculine violence was mostly practiced against other men. Many male political figures or representatives of categories deemed "unwelcome" were silenced or marginalized after being victims of fascist attacks. No such group storms happened against fascism in Zadar, meaning that it

was the only political faction effectively acting through violence. However, “readiness” implied that threats of violence were often enough for fascists to gain the overhand, as Count Borelli’s withdrawal shows. Physical violence occurred, but it was only one of the modalities through which the fascists imposed a new climate of intimidation in the public sphere.

When targeted singularly, these opponents, including the republican Emilio Erco, were aware that their “honor” was at stake, but they were not ready to respond to these attack on the fascists’ own ground. Thus, they either appealed to the authorities, or responded with articles, or with duels, all ways of settling issues becoming increasingly ineffective in terms of social capital and political legitimacy. Lastly, fascist violence relied on the capacity to transform brutal acts into language of masculine values such as vigor, dynamism, audacity. They were highlighted as bonds of loyalty to other leaders praised for their masculinity, first D’Annunzio and then Mussolini, by at the same time constructing a feminized ideal needing to be rescued and protected, such as the *Madrepatria,* the *Nazione*, or *Italia* tout-court.

Implanting a new rationale of sovereignty into an Habsburg setting implied redrawing a political field and negotiating social order. Without winning on the electoral front, fascism in Zadar eventually reached a quite favorable position in the balance of power by provoking a new convergence between violence as display of patriotism and violence as a display of masculinity.

FAŠISTIČNO NASILJE V ZADRU PRED POHODOM NA RIM. AVTORITETA IN MOŠKOST V NEKEM POST-IMPERIALNEM OKOLJU

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POVZETEK

Članek obravnava vlogo političnega nasilja pri nastanku fašizma v Zadru. Dalmatinsko mesto je bilo ločeno od svojega zaledja kot posledica rapalske pogodbe, ki sta jo novembra 1920 podpisali Italija in Kraljevina SHS. Mesece pred in po tem diplomatskem sporazumu so ga zaznamovale politične napetosti. Pokrajina je postala italijanska, saj lokalnih Srbov in Hrvatov ni zastopala nobena stranka, medtem ko so stare italijanske elite izpodbijale nove sile. V tem post-imperialnem multietničnem okolju je fašizem izhajal iz heterogene skupine aktivistov. Nasilje je predstavljalo glavni vektor, s katerim se je fašizem profiliral v odnosu do drugih političnih elementov, saj je bilo prisotno tako v diskurzu kot tudi konkretnih dejanjih, katerih cilj je bilo ustrahovanje nasprotnikov. Poleg tega je bilo nasilje pogosto prikazano kot soodvisno od pojma moškosti. Nov jezik in nova oblika političnega vedenja sta tako bila uporabljena, da bi podeljevali legitimnost fašističnemu moškemu politiku ter diskreditirali ideje drugih in odnose v političnem življenju. Povezava nasilja in moškosti po prvi svetovni vojni je služila kot način za diskreditacijo stare politične elite, za zanikanje kakršnekoli možnosti, da bi bili ne-Italijani del političnega telesa, in – ne nazadnje –, da bi postavili jasno ločnico med fašisti in staro Republikansko stranko; v prvih povojnih letih jih je namreč družila skupna pripadnost D'Annunzijevemu aktivizmu. Poleg tega je nasilje sčasoma spremenilo ravnotežje moči glede razmerja do državnih organov in lokalne elite. Oba elementa v praksi nista ovirala fašističnega nasilja ter sta – vzporedno z močnim vzponom fašizma na nacionalni ravni – končno pristala na njegovo večjo prepoznavnost v javnosti. Konvergenca med konzervativno elito in fašizmom v Zadru je tako predvidela in olajšala prevzem oblasti po pohodu na Rim oktobra 1922. Članek s pomočjo arhivskega gradiva in lokalnega tiska natančno obravnava epizode fašističnega nasilja ter dokazuje, da je bilo nasilje fleksibilno orodje, ki je bilo v raznih momentih usmerjeno proti različnim nasprotnikom, in da je uporaba nasilja potekala na robu sprejemljivega. Fašistično nasilje je imelo tudi svoje meje, poskuse discipliniranja pa je treba razumeti kot prizadevanja za postopno napredovanje legitimnosti fašističnega gibanja. V Zadru sta nova semantika in praksa nasilja ustvarila vse večjo konvergenco med imaginarijem moške časti in imaginarijem nove nacionalne italijanske suverenosti v Zadru, s čimer sta odigrali osrednjo vlogo v post-habsburški transformaciji iz imperialnega provincialnega središča v »odrešeno« mesto, simbolično pomembno, a dejansko marginalno področje fašistične Italije.

Ključne besede: nasilje, fašizem, Zadar, Dalmacija, moškost, politika

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QUOTIDIAN INTIMIDATION AND MUSSOLINI'S SPECIAL TRIBUNAL IN ISTRIA AND THE EASTERN BORDERLANDS

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ABSTRACT

The article examines the Special Tribunal for the Defense of the State's use of the "no grounds to proceed" ruling to intimidate anti-fascists and extend the fascist government's power in the Adriatic borderlands. It demonstrates how the Tribunal's judges used their sentencing prerogatives to support repression in Istria and cloak persecution in the mantel of legal action in defense of the state.

Keywords: border fascism, Special Tribunal for the Defense of the State, Istria, intimidation, violence

INTIMIDAZIONE QUOTIDIANA E IL TRIBUNALE SPECIALE DI MUSSOLINI IN ISTRIA E AL CONFINE ORIENTALE

SINTESI

L'articolo esamina l'uso da parte del Tribunale speciale per la difesa dello Stato della pratica legale di "non luogo a procedere" per intimidire gli antifascisti ed estendere il potere del governo fascista nelle terre di confine adriatiche. Dimostra come i giudici del Tribunale usassero le proprie prerogative per sostenere la repressione in Istria e coprire la persecuzione antifascista sotto una veste di legalità in difesa dello stato.

Parole chiave: fascismo di confine, Tribunale Speciale per la Difesa dello Stato, Istria, intimidazione, violenza

In January 1929, the Italian police charged thirty-two men, most from Marezige (Maresego),[1] with terrorist acts. The charges brought against them, including association with a "subversive organization," bombings, arson, and even homicide, stemmed from various reactions to the Italian government's campaign to extend "border fascism" in the Adriatic territories. In July 1929, the Special Tribunal for the Defense of the State sentenced nine of the men to prison. Four were absolved of the crimes. Eight were declared fugitives, presumably having fled across the border to Yugoslavia. The remaining eleven were released on the ruling that there were "no grounds to proceed" (*non luogo a procedere* or *nlp*) (Dal Pont & Carolini, 1980, 376–377).[2] The fascist government's crackdown on dissidents in Istria and Italy's eastern borderland territories was a response to the "border in arms," regional violence sparked by political instability and clash that had begun decades earlier in the Adriatic provinces of the Habsburg empire. After World War I, with annexation to Italy and as the fascists sought to consolidate power, violence intensified as autochthonous populations cast as minorities in the borderland sought to articulate nationalist aspirations and defend political rights. The fascist government used various instruments in its arsenal including incitement of the blackshirts, intervention by the police and bringing to bear the power of institutions of justice to enforce its will. The Special Tribunal was the regime's most formidable institutional weapon, and *non luogo a procedere* was one of tribunal's most effective tactics of intimidation. Noted anti-fascist Gaetano Salvemini called the Tribunal "the ugliest of the evil works of the regime" due to its ability to "hid[e] under the mantle of a loathsome façade of legality" (Salvemini, 1932, 25). Established as a separate arm of the judicial system and staffed by military officers educated in law, the Tribunal had considerable powers at its disposal to crush political opposition.

Fascist Minister of Justice Alfredo Rocco created the Special Tribunal in the legislative reform of November 1926, and from 1927 to 1943, the extraordinary court considered cases brought against some 16,000 "enemies of the state." It sentenced more than 4,600 to incarceration, internal exile, hard labor, and or even death. Purportedly, the Special Tribunal was an organ of justice and protection, manned by judges who adhered scrupulously to the processes and rule of law. Both the Ministers of Justice and the Interior, Rocco and Luigi Federzoni respectively, at the time of the Tribunal's conception, were former leaders of the conservative Nationalist Party (see De Grand, 1978). Both were intent on

1 Placenames appear throughout as they are most commonly written today. Where the Tribunal used a different name, in the first reference to the locality the Tribunal's name is in parentheses as in Marezige (Maresego).

2 In several cases, sources offer conflicting counts of those indicted in the Special Tribunal's proceedings. Unless otherwise noted, the figures are derived from Dal Pont & Carolini, 1980, which counts those processes officially recorded in Rome. Zealous local enforcement, extra-legal collaboration with police and fascist officials and the general tolerance for ethnic persecution meant that many were threatened, arrested, or jailed without the benefit of official processing. Still others were referred to ordinary courts. Strategic official counting helps to explain the variation in estimates of those affected by the Court's rulings (and the higher figures cited by such scholars as Čermelj), and emphasizes the intentional nature of fascist efforts to underplay the Tribunal's role in undermining the Italian justice system and ignoring liberal legal precedents.

shaping the court in a manner that aligned with judicial precedent and, at the same time, they gave it broad powers to assess evidence, consider testimony, and investigate charges, which enabled it to become the most powerful fascist legal institution in the prosecution of political opponents and in the persecution of anti-fascist resistors. The Court's commitment to legality and due process of law was not mere camouflage or alibi. It was a mechanism of fascist repression.

In the Adriatic borderlands, anti-fascism was often associated with ethno-nationalist "foreignness," which was also often intertwined with anti-national separatism or calls for political autonomy. Political resistance had deep roots in opposition to central authority, particularly to Rome and Italian irredentism which had targeted the Habsburg Adriatic territories since the founding of the modern Italian state. Tensions and violence of the prewar period were heightened by wartime violence and bitterness over post-World War I treaty provisions which failed to take into account ethno-nationalist claims and drew new borders which created significant ethnic minority populations within Italy (see Gatterer, 1968 and Rusinow, 1969.) From the point of view of autochthonous Slovenes and Croats, the extension of Italian sovereignty amounted to what might be termed "proximate colonization" of the border territories, an unjust and prejudicial conquest by the metropole Rome that was resisted by the "colonized" populations that the fascists were trying simultaneously to quash with violence and erase by assimilation (Matajc, 2016).

Myriad studies explore fascist persecution through the lens of cases and individuals tried by the court, even focusing on the Tribunal's targeting of Slovenes and Croats and violations of the autochthonous populations' rights in attempts to assimilate or eliminate "foreign" or allogeneic elements in the eastern borderland (Puppini, Verginella & Verocchio, 2003; Verginella, 2008; Wörsdörfer, 2004). The thirty-two men charged in 1929 were well accustomed to Italian political repression in the Adriatic provinces, as Marezige had emerged as early as 1921 as a site of anti-fascist political violence. On 15 May 1921, the day of the first national elections held after Istria's annexation to Italy, a political showdown in the village had left twenty-two dead including six fascists, five socialists and communists, ten bystanders, and one policeman.[3] By January 1929 when the men from Marezige were arrested and referred to the Tribunal, they were already aware of the Italian government's suspicion and targeting of the village. When the eleven were released "nlp" in May 1929, they certainly recognized that the ruling did not restore their freedom. "Non luogo a procedere" differed from absolution (assoluzione), a release from the accusation, and it did not mean acquittal (proscoglimento), a "not guilty" ruling or declaration. "Nlp" offered a reprieve, freeing individuals and allowing them to return them to society, but keeping them under the government's thumb by subjecting them to surveillance and re-arrest should additional evidence come to light or if they ran afoul of the authorities again. The ruling reinforced the regime's authority, discouraging dissidence by implicit rather than explicit threat and sowing uncertainty and insecurity.

The Special Tribunal served, in many instances, as the velvet glove hiding the regime's iron fist. It systematized and generalized the climate of threat, instilling a subtle

3 Commemorated as the Marezige Revolt.



Fig. 1: The Commemoration of the Marezige Revolt in 2014 (photo by Darko Darovec).

and insidious fear that hung like a cloud over the eastern borderland for the entire period of the fascist *ventennio*. Targeted arrests and referrals to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal reminded the population of the government's omnipresence and power. The referral process, no matter what the outcome of the trials, affectedly profoundly not only the arrested individuals, their families, and associates, but also their communities.

Scholarly attention focuses on cases that illustrate the court's ferocity as a tool of the authoritarian fascist government. But, as legal scholars have noted, the Tribunal was inconsistent in its repression and in its mode of dispensing justice (or injustice). As it developed over the course of nearly two decades in the evolving fascist system, it served as a "laboratory of experimentation with roles and instruments that then found a definitive place in the penal code" (Lacchè, 2015). Many who were aware of the vagaries of the prewar justice system saw, in the judges' use of discretion and "nlp," proof of adherence to the rule of law and a sliver of hope for justice when the Court heard their cases.

In an article in La Stampa in May 1931, Minister of Justice Rocco assured Italians that the Special Tribunal was severe only in cases were severity was warranted. And in fact, a glance at the statistics of the Tribunal's sentencing seems to bear this out. The court did not punish the majority of those referred to it. Some 10,000 individuals' cases were sent to other courts, dismissed, suspended, or put aside. From its first cases in 1927 to the final hearings in 1943, the Court's most frequently rendered judgment was "no grounds to

proceed." In the first year alone, 1927, 405 of 915 accused were released "nlp" (Dal Pont and Carolini, 1980, 11). Rocco specifically referred to the use of "nlp" in cases where the "proof was not sure," it demonstrated, he claimed, that the Tribunal was "benevolent" in its treatment of the accused (Salvemini, 1932, 41–42).

In addition to nlp's utility in underlining the regime's "benevolence," the ruling had considerable propaganda value. In the Adriatic borderlands, attacks against the state were cast as Slavic irredentism and Yugoslav state-inspired violence, and were coupled often with worker, socialist, and communist unrest. Virginio Gayda, one of Mussolini's chief propagandists and an outspoken critic of the "Slavs" and of the Serbian government in Belgrade before the First World War, cited ninety "terrorist crimes" in Venezia Giulia in the three year period from 1927 to 1930, ranging from spying to homicide "always accompanied by a wide clandestine distribution of Slavic leaflets against Italy" (Gayda, 1933, 69). Playing to conceptions of the dangerous and uncivilized Balkans (Todorova, 1997), Gayda trumpeted allegations that use of "bloody violence in the service of politics" was an "ancient Serbian tactic" and charged Yugoslavia with pursuing "war against Italy accompanied by terrorist action of various armed bands" (Gayda, 1933, 65).

Gayda's tales of terror, while certainly exaggerated and skewed to emphasize threat from abroad, were not spun of air. The "scramble for Adria," or conflicts for territorial control of the Adriatic lands, had been on-going for centuries (Klabjan, 2011; Kacin Wohinz & Pirjevec, 1998). Ethnic Slovene and Croatian irredentists or separatists, some from across the border but many locally-based, met fascist aggression with reciprocal violence that included attacks on the *carabinieri*, border police, and the military as well as Slovene and Croat "collaborationists," supporters of the regime suspected as informers (Cattaruzza, 2017, 138–140). Resistors adopted tactics and strategies familiar from anti-government protest of the Habsburg period including the torching of schools and kindergartens, attacks on railways, and destruction of private and government property.

In places like Marezige, releases "nlp" and other seemingly lenient or just rulings had a chilling rather than placating effect on the population. The rulings were reminders of the unpredictability of fascist governance and enhanced local apprehensions regarding the vulnerability and liminality of borderland populations. The 1926 Provisions, which had created the Tribunal, allowed for draconian punishments and even re-introduced capital punishment (Legge 25 novembre 1926, No. 2008). The justices signaled their complicity in the state sanctioned violence in the use of harsh punishments and even the death penalty. Yet, the government insisted that the Tribunal adhered to legal processes guided by European notions of liberal justice, and it maintained that force and repression were used only in cases where clear proof of culpability for "terrorist" crimes was present.

The "nlp" ruling lent the Tribunal an air of legitimacy and offered an administrative screen for court officers. Its use affirmed court adherence to juridical procedures and evidentiary rules inherited from the liberal era and signaled that judges were committed to due process and acted with restraint. Once a suspect was released, the individual could be surveilled or harassed, beaten, or even murdered, but the court and judges were distanced from violence and "spontaneous" attacks that were blamed on "unruly" or overzealous elements taking justice into their own hands (often with the tacit consent of authorities).

Recent studies explore the impact of "everyday violence" on fascist society. Victims' perspectives tend to predominate in accounts that highlight aggressive tactics employed against those involved in episodic outbursts and incidents of clash (Ebner, 2011; Bosworth, 2006; Dunnage, 2012; Duggan, 2013; Pires Marques, 2013). Inspired by studies of the "everyday" predicated on the German experience, this scholarship shines a spotlight on violent acts, tending to present the experience of physical violence linked to squadrist violence, police brutality, and targeted attacks against political opponents as a normal, quotidian expectation under the regime. The fascist regime was certainly ushered in by violence, and a level of state-sanctioned violence, led generally by various arms of the police or military and assisted by "over exuberant" fascist supporters and adherents, continued throughout the twenty years of rule. Some level of institutional tolerance of violence had always been embedded in the legal system as part of the functioning of the state (Bosworth, 2006; Lyttelton, 1988; Olgiati & Podgorecki, 1996; Garfinkel, 2017). Yet, while fascist officialdom was complicit in allowing or even sponsoring attacks on the political opposition, by the time the Tribunal was created, violent incidents were not everyday occurrences. The fascists certainly persecuted thousands and used political exile and other repressive strategies (Ebner, 2011), but the regime did not depend on violence to eliminate its enemies. By the mid-1920s, new institutions that undermined the liberal foundation of the state and sought to maintain the fascist hold over Italian society impinged more often on the normal, everyday life of the majority. As was evident in the fascist rise to power and the March on Rome in 1922, intimidation and threat were tactics the fascists' employed with finesse.

Scholars frequently refer to the gaps between "legal Italy" and "real Italy," the schism between the government's rule and intents and the ways in which individuals experienced and negotiated them. But many have been hesitant to explore the legal processes that contributed to the establishment of fascist institutions and governed fascist society. Insistence that the regime's institutions were extraordinary, subject to the whims of dictatorship, and contingent on extra-legal manipulation, have limited the systematic study of what institutional "legal Italy" under fascism really entailed. Created as part of the Rocco legal reform as an extraordinary and temporary institution, the Special Tribunal became a permanent fixture of the fascist government in 1931. Established as a military tribunal composed of military personnel and using military legal procedure, it was inserted into the extant judiciary frameworks, and it worked in concert with policing institutions to address political concerns and serve political objectives. Despite its political function, the tribunal maintained an air of political legitimacy and served as a tool to garner international respect for the regime (Lacchè, 2015; D'Alessandro, 2015, 153; Vinci, 2016).

The regime's claims that the tribunal was an instrument of justice, no matter how spurious, were bolstered by comparison to the contemporaneous Nazi *Volksgerichtshof*. Both were created in the fashion of military tribunals to defend the interests of the authoritarian state. However, over the course of its existence, the Italian fascist Tribunal punished only twenty-eight percent of the 16,000 individuals who came before it. From 1927 to 1939, it sentenced fifteen to capital punishment. Even in the period of alignment with Hitler's Nazi Germany that led up to Italy's entry into the war and until the Italian

surrender, in the years from 1939 to 1943, the court used the death penalty with relative restraint, 53 were condemned to death (Torrisi & Salvatore, 2016, 90). By comparison, the *Volksgerichtshof*, over the course of its existence from 1934 to 1945, condemned more than 5,000 of 18,000 convicted to capital punishment (Eder, 2002; Wagner & Zarusky, 2011; Sweet, 1974). The contrast was evident even at the time, with the Nazi court garnering significantly more international attention as a tool of dictatorship.

The literature of fascism does often label Mussolini's institutions and those involved in them as part of the "problem" or "evil" of fascism or the fascist system. The Tribunal often appears as the infamous "Hall IV" or "Palazzacio," the dreaded courtroom on Capitoline Hill or as an example of the fascist regime's nefariousness (for example Salvemini, 1932; Longhitano, 1995; Čermelj, 1936; Lussu, 1997). Works on such figures as Antonio Gramsci, the Rosselli brothers, and Violet Gibson (the would-be assassin of Mussolini) detail the effects of encounters with the Special Tribunal, its reaction to anti-fascists and resistance, and its particular mode of dispensing justice (see, for example, Saunders, 2010; Tranfaglia, 1968; Pugliese, 1999; Camminati & Rosati 1980; Del Boca, 2005).

Recent works examine more closely the Tribunal's role in the fascist state and judicial system (Lacchè, 2015; Franzinelli, 2017; Torrisi & Salvatore, 2016). The Tribunal was not a kangaroo court punishing those suspected of crimes against the state. It was a part of the juridical structure with influence that extended far beyond its halls. Its importance lay not in the Court's ability to dole out draconian punishments, but in its power to legitimize intimidation and quell resistance under the guise of offering legal protections to maintain the stability of the state.

Detachment from direct violence and the ability to maintain the aura of lawfulness promoted the impression that Italian justice prevailed, even if the fascist police acted unfairly. As Gaetano Baroni, a committed anti-fascist associated with the communist painter's association in Lombardy wrote to his wife Maria Vaccari in August 1928 while awaiting his hearing before the Tribunal, "[…] justice must take its course […] I await questioning by the judge." Imprisoned for complicity in the assassination attempt on the King at the Fiera di Milano, as his wife pled for his liberty and suggested that his arrest had been based on suspicions alone (Arrigoni & Savini, 2008, 190–196), he expressed faith in the justice system. "Let's trust in justice and you will see that it will not wrongly punish the innocent" (Letter from Gaetano Baroni to Maria Baroni, 2 August 1928, ACS, TSDS, PG, b. 1, f. 3). Baroni would certainly have been aware that his letters from jail were censored, and his professed faith in the judges of the Tribunal may have been a ploy to help him win a more sympathetic hearing. And, as this was early in the Tribunal's existence, its motives and tactics might not yet have been fully recognized. Nonetheless, Baroni's declaration of hope reflected a popular conception that the tribunal's judges were committed to serving justice and would offer a fair hearing. In fact, on 14 September 1928, the judge did release Baroni on an "nlp" finding (Dal Pont & Carolini, 1980, 226).

In cases related to the eastern borderland and particularly those in areas with significant Slovene or Croat populations, from the tip of Pula to the northernmost point of Gorizia, dozens were freed "non luogo a procedere." The "nlp" ruling helped to support the regime's contention that elements from abroad instigated the crossfire of violence.

Gayda claimed that the *carabinieri* and the border police's increased activity protected the autochthonous population, which the regime touted as overwhelmingly supportive of fascism against the "bloody, savage, and gloomy violence" being perpetrated by "hostile emissaries" from across the border intent of spreading "misery and disorder" (Gayda, 1933, 65–66). The Special Tribunal took advantage of the perceived danger to mete out justice as if the borderlands were under siege and to justify harsh punishments considered necessary to deal with the foreign-backed threats associated with Balkan or Yugoslav conspirators.

Deep distrust of ethnic "others" and fascism's political enemies was embedded in the minds of those crafting the "protective" legislation. Francesco Giunta was among the fascist lawyers who examined the legislation for the defense of the state prior to its promulgation in 1926. As Undersecretary to the President of the Council of Ministers in 1927, he described the Tribunal as an organ to combat "known and hidden enemies" (Lacchè, 2015, xxii). His observation certain brought to bear the same prejudiced attitudes that had motivated him as the leader of the Fasci di combattimento in Trieste inciting violence as fascism gained power, and when in 1920 he was involved in the burning of Narodni Dom.

Members of the local population, accustomed to violent tactics and government repression, recognized the structural methods and tools of institutional persecution cloaked in the mantle of law. The Interior Ministry referred matters to the Special Tribunal. From the court's first case in February 1927, dealing with Oscar Hoharovic, the Tribunal's focus on threats in the borderland was evident. Hoharovic, born in 1894 in Sušak (Sussak) and living in Pivka (San Pietro del Carso), was charged with condoning the Zamboni assassination attempt, praising Bolshevism, defaming [government] institutions, and offending Mussolini. The Special Tribunal referred his case to the ordinary courts (Dal Pont & Carolini, 1980, 18), but calculated reference to his ethnic origins heightened fears that ethnic "Slavs" were plotting against Italy.

In 1929, three men charged with setting fire to the Lega Nazionale headquarters in Prosecco (Prosek), known "Yugoslav" sympathizers, were set free "nlp" (Dal Ponte & Carolini, 1980, 358–359). Their fate demonstrates the ambiguities inherent in the use of the "no grounds to proceed" ruling. The ruling seems to demonstrate that the Court sought sufficient legal evidence to proceed with its case. In actuality, if conviction had been the sole aim, charges against the men could have been trumped up from the time of their arrest as part of a concerted strategy involving the police and the court. Instead, the Tribunal seemed to exercise restraint. Perhaps the aim was to demonstrate devotion to the rule of law and benevolence for political or propagandistic purposes. The ruling also could have been intended as a warning to discourage future acts of resistance.

If for the Special Tribunal "repression" and "prevention" were "two sides of the same coin" (Lacchè 2015, xxi), then "nlp" functioned as a strategy of deterrence. The combination of harsh punishments for a few with a significant number of dismissals "nlp" was particularly suited to bolstering propaganda claims. The regime publicized crimes by "enemies of the state" to prove the need to protect Italy from foreign-backed terrorists linked to Yugoslavia, whose barbarous behavior was undertaken against the civilized and modern Italian state. While Gayda crowed about the desecration of monuments and the

effacing of the Venetian lion on city walls along the Adriatic coast, holding such incidents up as evidence of an organized anti-Italian conspiracy in Yugoslavia (Gayda, 1933, 33, 42–43), police arrested non-violent suspects in Italy, and the Ministry of the Interior, deeming them foreign terrorists and "enemies of the state." All the time, the Special Tribunal took care to preserve the pretense of justice and due process. For example, of five men charged in 1930 with being part of the Communist Party and spreading subversive propaganda in Pula, only one was actually condemned by the Court, receiving a punishment of four years in prison. The other four were released "nlp" (Dal Ponte & Carolini, 1980, 412) preserving the façade of attention to European legal norms, while contributing to the ongoing persecution.

"Nlp" reflected the Italian prejudice that allogeneic locals caught in the crosshairs of violence were vulnerable to the seduction of foreign-backed terrorist networks, but might, as assimilable peoples susceptible to the superior civilizing influence of Italy, require only a grave warning to ensure that they followed the Italian fascist path. The regime used the Tribunal to target communities where resistance was historically strong. The government cracked down on those harboring fugitives or engaged in other forms of resistance, which the fascists contended were linked to organized groups of criminals and terrorists. In the first years of the Special Tribunal's existence, the Ministry referred cases that stemmed from actions taken before the laws for the protection of the state were promulgated, a clear violation of European legal norms that precluded retroactive prosecution. Thirty people rounded up in Vižinada (Visinada) and charged with *soccorso rosso*, possession of ciphers, and circulating subversive materials were freed "nlp" *en masse* in September 1927 (Dal Ponte & Carolini, 1980, 117–118). Their arrests were clearly intended to tyrannize the population in the village of 1,000, and their release was part of the general amnesty granted in 1927 to individuals held on crimes committed prior to July 1925. Highly publicized by the government, the amnesty aimed to increase Mussolini's international prestige by underlining the regime's commitment to upholding justice and legal precedent. The well-touted triumph of "legality" deflected attention from the persecution of individuals arrested, and the fascist government made no apologies or recompense for their detention.

Regardless of the Court's intents, any belief that the Court could sap the strength of the local resistance to fascism proved vain. As the regime's priorities shifted, the Tribunal's targets evolved. From 1927 to 1940, the Court was transformed from an "extraordinary tribunal to defend the fascist revolution" to a "fascist tribunal to defend the regime" (Torrisi & Salvatore, 2016, 23–35). From its initial focus on those involved in assassination attempts, the Court's attention shifted by 1929 to those involved in "terrorist" activity, irredentism, and the "Slavic" threat in the Adriatic provinces. By 1932, the Special Tribunal had turned to subversive organizations in northern and north central Italy, the actions of anti-fascist communists, socialists and members of Giustizia e Libertà.

Prosecution of "enemies" in the eastern borderland continued throughout the *ventennio* (Puppini, Verginella & Verrocchio, 2003). Repression of political opposition became the basis for cyclical, escalating violence (Verginella, 2008; Piazza, 2001). In March 1929, a plebiscite on government policy sparked violence near Pazin (Pisino) in which

anti-fascists fired on a column of peasants being escorted to the polls, killing one villager and wounding another. The police arrested a number of locals and the Special Tribunal tried the men in a proceeding held in Pula (Pola). The fascists suspected the accused of associating with local anti-fascist organizations including TIGR (Trst, Istra, Gorica, Rijeka) and Borba (Struggle), modelled on the Irish Republican Army, known for adopting violent tactics (Dell'Osa, 2017, 81).

On his way to Pula for the proceedings, President of the Tribunal Guido Cristini granted an interview, published on the front page of *Il Giornale d'Italia* on 15 October 1929, which made clear the sham trial and the court's murderous intents. Cristini claimed that "the guilt of the accused" was "beyond doubt." He declared the court willing to use the death penalty (Dell'Osa, 2017, 263–264), despite several questions relating to the proof of the crime including: the fact that the evidence suggested that the shooters had intended to fire above the heads of those in column; the contention that the death resulted from crossfire between the police escorts and those in the column; and the fact that the person who actually shot the victims could not be identified. Four received 30 year sentences, and Vladimiro Gortan, named as the leader of the attack, was executed (Gayda, 1933, 72–73; Cattaruzza, 2017, 138–139; Dell'Osa, 2017, 73–80). Three were released "nlp" (Dal Ponte & Carolini, 1980, 373). The execution transformed Gortan into an anti-fascist martyr and a symbol of national struggle for the Croats in Istria (Dell'Osa, 2017, 73).

The Tribunal's rulings sent a message to local populations contemplating further resistance. For example, in Dolina (San Dorligo), a municipality of 5000 residents, four were sentenced to significant prison terms of 5 to 25 years and an additional two dozen, who had been arrested, were released "nlp" (Dal Pont & Carolini, 1980, 414–417). They returned to the village under a cloud of suspicion, closely surveilled by authorities. The arrests and prosecutions were likely retaliation for attacks on fascist officials and sympathizers carried out by villagers or Yugoslav nationals hiding in the area (Apollonio, 2004, 193–194).

In 1930, in the Court's most nefarious borderland verdict, four of the defendants in the *Il Popolo di Trieste* bombing trial were sentenced to death by firing squad. A dozen others received prison terms ranging from 2 ½ to 30 years. The Tribunal marshalled mountains of evidence against the accused in apparent adherence to standards and rules of European law. The evidence linked the defendants to numerous terrorist acts including the mining of bridges, destruction of train track, and plotting to destroy local monuments including the Victory Lighthouse (Apollonio, 2004, 195). In both the Pazin shooting in 1929 and the *Il popolo* bombing in Trieste in 1930, anti-fascist political acts were construed as ethnic or nationalist crimes supported by Yugoslav irredentists seeking to terrorize those in the region. The press, including *Il Popolo di Trieste*, characterized the accused as "Slavic" criminals, describing them in physical terms that played on anti-Slavic prejudices and associating their delinquency with hatred for Italy and an "uncivilized" nature (Klabjan, s.a.).

Yet, in the late 1920s and early 1930s, ethnic identification was not a defining factor in Istria where ethnic lines and distinctions were impossible to draw on an individual basis among individuals in the lands recently annexed from the multi-ethnic Habsburg empire

(D'Alessio, 2008). Neither those accused of terrorism nor the regime's supporters in the borderland were identifiable in ethnic terms. A "Slovene" alerted police to a suspicious package outside police headquarters in Trieste that turned out to be a pipe bomb (ACS, TSDS, PG, b. 367 and ASTs, AG). Slovenes who "collaborated" with Italian authorities were targeted by anti-fascist "Slovene" groups. In the investigations of the *Il Popolo* bombing, Slovene interpreters were available and used by a few defendants, but most of the accused spoke and chose to be interrogated in Italian. Several bore Slavic last names, but these were common particularly in Istrian villages and towns in the borderland, despite the fascist surname italianization campaign.

Evidence collected from the home of suspect Alojz Valenčič, an envelope containing a souvenir marked "a hair from the head of the martyred Oberdan" (ACS, TSDS, PG, b. 359) testified to the "terrorists'" political rather than ethnic motives. In the first decades of the twentieth century, Guglielmo Oberdan or Wilhelm Oberdank, executed in 1882 for an assassination attempt on the life of Austrian Emperor Franz Josef, was hailed as an anti-Habsburg, protestor against oppressive government. Prior to World War I, he was counted a "martyr" by both Slovene and Italian nationalists (Salata, 1924; Wörsdörfer, 2004). Instructions sent to Trieste from Rome on 31 August 1930 noted that leaflets found at both the Victory Lighthouse and *Il Popolo* crime scenes implicated the Italian anti-fascist organization Giustizia e Libertà (ASTs, Pref. Gab., b. 191). While the materials may have been planted, they further testify to the interethnic nature of anti-fascist activity.

Although border fascism had targeted ethnic Slavs (Croats and Slovenes), thought to be in league with Yugoslav irredentists (see Cattaruzza, 2017, 125–138), Cristini hesitated to condemn individuals on ethnic grounds. In *Il Giornale d'Italia*, he claimed that the Tribunal protected "pacific, hard-working autochthonous population of Central Istria," and that its harsh rulings aimed only at the "Balkan mentality of terrorist organizations" illegally agitating inside Italy's borders. Like Gayda, Cristini distinguished between local residents and foreign terrorists, and he argued, "Public security forces cannot allow this type of [foreign-inspired] brigandage to take place in a tranquil zone" (Dell'Osa, 2017, 263–264).

Resistance to the fascist denationalization campaign, linked both to Rome's nationalizing schemes and to the local ethno-nationalist antagonism (Cattaruzza, 2017, 146), brought many individuals before the Special Tribunal for violating prohibitions on the use of the Slovene and Croatian languages. Giovanni Smrdel, from Kal (Cal di San Michele) in Pivka, was charged with subversive propaganda in May 1928, when in a tavern in Rome while serving his final months of compulsory military service he was overheard to say in Slovene, "We are still Italians for three months" (Dal Pont & Carolini, 1980, 216). In 1931, Gaspare Barcovich from Mošćenice (Moschiena) allegedly incited his son to ignore the requirement to speak Italian in school (Dal Pont & Carolini, 1980, 526). Both were arrested and later released "nlp." In 1931, Antonio Prosen came before the Court charged with subversive activity for "defacing" a tombstone with a Slovene inscription dedicated to his friend. The Tribunal referred him to the ordinary court, declaring it as a simple act of vandalism (Dal Ponte & Carolini, 1980, 441). The Tribunal's failure to punish the accused in these and similar cases contributed to a sense that the court might

temper the actions of police and prosecutors, but the arrests and process had a chilling effect nonetheless.

In the celebrated *Il Popolo* case, forty-one individuals in the group of eighty-seven named at the sentencing were set free "nlp," and two were absolved of the crimes. These individuals, along with the twenty-seven fugitives, faded back into the tapestry of borderland society. But, international attention focused on the four executed "martyrs of Basovizza" (Bazovica) and the 45 year old farmer who died in prison. The severity of the penalties fueled the narrative of fascist persecution and contributed to the martyrology of the borderland resistance. Those sentenced to death in the extraordinary Tribunal session held in Trieste were convicted of *strage* or aggravated homicide, not *omicidio* or simple homicide. Literally translated *strage* means slaughter of many people or animals, and the fascist government used the charge to underline the dangerous, evil, and unprovoked nature of a murder. The execution of the four signaled the Court's willingness to support the fascist campaign of ethnic prejudice and repression and to facilitate controlled, sanctioned, and officially condoned violence.

The repercussions of the *Il Popolo* case rippled through the borderlands in the coming years. In 1933 in Branik (Rifembergo) in Gorizia, a commemoration of anniversary of the condemnation and death the "martyrs" of September 1930 led to the arrest and conviction of 8 people, all of whom received sentences ranging from 1 to 5 years on charges of illegal association and subversive propaganda (Dal Pont & Carolini, 1980, 732–733).

By the mid-1930s, the Tribunal became a "revolutionary organ" to combat all forms of anti-fascism at home and abroad (Lacchè, 2015, xxii). The regime's foray into East Africa added opponents of racial and imperial policies to the mix of "national enemies," but "criminals" in the borderland remained a significant concern. Bruno Pobega, a smallholder in Koper, was accused of public insult to the nation in 1935 for saying to his grandson, "You are ashamed to speak [Slavic] now that you have become a fascist, but you should be ashamed of being a fascist" (Dal Pont & Carolini, 1980, 825). In 1938, 26 people in Motovun (Montona) (Pula) were charged with reconstructing the Communist Party and spreading subversive propaganda. The group seemed particularly dangerous, because it operated in an area the fascists had deemed socially and politically "cleansed" (bonifica), and the defendants' "Slavic" identity challenged claims that the fascists were succeeding in their efforts to mold a "pure" Italian nation. Four of those charged in Motovun were absolved, and seven were released "no grounds to proceed." The remaining 15 received sentences ranging from 1 to 10 years (Dal Ponte & Carolini, 1980, 962–963).

After Italy's entry into World War II in 1940, the Tribunal took on the character of a military tribunal, meting out punishments to those considered traitors (Torrisi & Salvatore, 2016, 35–38). Fascist authorities made several hundred arrests in Venezia Giulia, and in proceedings that came to be known as the "Second Proceedings in Trieste" (second after the 1930 trial), seventy-two people divided into three groups – allegedly according to their political leanings (communists, liberal irredentists, and supporters of [Yugoslav] political emigres) – were tried on charges of irredentist and clandestine anti-fascist activity. The political divisions fascist officials drew to define

the three most dangerous elements in the borderland were artificial at best. The groups were permeable and intertwined, and the arrests really represented a renewed attack on Slovenes in the Snežnik (Monte Nevoso) area, a hot-bed of anti-fascist activity since the mid-1920s. The assault on the liberal irredentists targeted the professional classes and signified a renewed effort at denationalization (Verginella, 2003, 108–109). The Tribunal condemned eight to death (several had their punishments commuted to life in prison) and twenty-three others, linked to TIGR, to thirty years imprisonment on a variety of charges including spying, attacks on the security of the state, and subversive propaganda and association in prohibited political organizations (Dal Ponte & Carolini, 1980, 1117–1120; Cattaruzza, 2017, 170–171). The rulings indicated the Court's shift from an instrument of control and intimidation to an instrument of punishment. In the group of seventy-two, only four were released "nlp," four were absolved of their crimes, and ten were recorded as fugitives.

In 1941, Italian fascist wartime occupation of Slovenia and Dalmatia prompted an increase in resistance and terrorist activity (Cattaruzza, 2017, 170–171) in the Adriatic territories. In the final years of the Tribunal's existence, the majority faced charges connected to wartime crimes including defeatism, failure to support the regime, subversive actions, or aiding or abetting the enemy. The final sentences handed down between February and May 1943 dealt almost exclusively with partisan activity and charges of support for the enemy in Istria, Gorizia, and Rijeka. Investigations and arrests by the Special Inspectorate of the Security Forces, founded in Trieste in 1942 to respond to increasing sympathy and support for partisan violence, contributed to the uptick in referrals to the Tribunal. Still, the regime and the Court sought to maintain the façade of legality (see Cernigoi, 2013, 17–37). In April 1943, ten suspects, seven men and three women ranging in age from 30 to 69, charged with aiding rebel bands in Rijeka (Fiume) area were freed "nlp" after seven months in jail (Dal Ponte & Carolini, 1980, 1257).

The Special Tribunal dissolved along with Mussolini's government in 1943. Yet, the policing structures and persecution it had enabled, along with the example of judicial prejudice, had eroded local confidence in Italian institutions. The population was inured to injustice and, in the circumstances of wartime after 1943, this sentiment may have helped to lay the structural groundwork that allowed for persecution, torture, and murder in the construction and local functioning of the camp at the Risiera di San Sabba, where the Nazis adopted their own methods to eliminate "enemies," particularly members of the local autochthonous populations already accustomed to police repression and persecution. The Tribunal certainly contributed to local toleration of violence and the climate of suspicion, reprisal, and vengeance, well documented in studies of the abrogation of minority rights (Piergigli, 2005) and controversies over the use of violence, charges of genocide and ethnic cleansing associated with the *foibes* (Pirjevec, 2009; Cernigoi, 2013) during the war and in the immediate post-World War II period.

Even at its most intimidating, the fascist government insured that the Tribunal could plausibly be referred to as a body committed to upholding the rule of law. Officers of the Tribunal hid behind a screen of legal precedent and sham justice supporting an institutional climate and structures that intimidated the public into a coerced cooperation with

the regime that, in certain circumstances, bled over into consensus and even collaboration. Salvemini claimed that the Special Tribunal was "not a court of justice," but "an instrument of civil war" (Salvemini, 1932, 44). The "no grounds to proceed" ruling was employed as a mechanism of fascist repression. It offered cover to fascist officials by supporting claims of adherence to the norms of the rule of law in a regime that justified the abnegation of liberal freedoms in the name of state defense.

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VSAKODNEVNO ZASTRAŠEVANJE IN MUSSOLINIJEVO POSEBNO SODIŠČE V ISTRI IN VZHODNIH OBMEJNIH OBMOČJIH

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POVZETEK

Spirale nasilja, ki jih je izzvala fašistična represija na obmejnih območjih severnega Jadrana, vzbujajo zanimanje raziskovalcev že od obdobja med svetovnima vojnama. Manj pozornosti je bilo namenjene naporom fašističnega režima, da bi zatrl antifašizem z uporabo pravnih sredstev in sodnega sistema. Prispevek obravnava delovanje Posebnega sodišča za zaščito države v vzhodnih obmejnih pokrajinah od leta 1927 do leta 1943 skozi prizmo sklepa sodišča »brez pravne podlage za nadaljevanje«. Fašistični sodniki so na izrednih vojaških sodiščih uporabili ta sklep, da bi povečali zaupanje javnosti v redne pravne postopke in ob tem istočasno okrepili občutek zastrašenosti in preganjanja z namenom zadušiti upor ter opraviti z »oboroženo mejo« po pravni poti. Široka pooblastila, ki jih je dobilo Posebno sodišče, so omogočila fašistični vladi povečati domet diktatorskega vladanja preko vloge policije in vojaške sile, tako da so sodni organi sodelovali pri ustvarjanju podobe nasprotnikov kot etno-nacionalističnih sovražnikov in političnih teroristov.

Ključne besede: obmejni fašizem, Posebno sodišče za zaščito države, Istra, zastraševanje, nasilje

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AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF REMEMBERING THE FASCIST ERA IN THE ISTRIAN COUNTRYSIDE – A CASE STUDY OF THE VILLAGE RAKITOVEC

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ABSTRACT

Memories which are painful and do not correspond to one's current identity are buried because of unresolved past trauma and pressure. In my research of the Istrian countryside in the fascist era, I observed how memories of ordinary people were in (dis)accord with the official interpretations of the past and how individual memory is intertwined with the collective national representations of the past which are founded on a politically motivated black-and-white interpretation. The article is based on interviewees memories of "the fascist era" in an Istrian village. On the face of it, their testimonies correspond to the national collective memory and refer to the denationalization-related pressure exerted by Italians and to Slovenes' resistance, whereupon they transmute into the discovery of grey zones of the non-addressed and traumatic past, which refer to various forms of collaboration with the fascist regime.

Key words: individual memory, collective memory, Istrian countryside, fascism, forgetting, trauma

L'ARCHEOLOGIA DELLA RIMEMBRANZA DEL PERIODO FASCISTA NELLA CAMPAGNA ISTRIANA – IL CASO DELLA VILLA DI RAKITOVEC

SINTESI

I ricordi dolorosi e incompatibili con l'identità attuale vengono relegati nell'oblio per il fatto che i traumi e le pressioni non sono stati risolti. Nella ricerca di storia orale condotta nella campagna istriana e incentrata sul periodo fascista ho perciò indagato sulla concordanza o discordanza dei ricordi della gente comune con le interpretazioni ufficiali del passato, ossia su quanto la memoria individuale sia intrecciata con le rappresentazioni collettive nazionali del passato basate su una politicamente motivata interpretazione in bianco e nero. L'articolo poggia su interviste di storia orale, ovvero su ricordi individuali dei testimoni del "tempo del fascismo" raccolti in un villaggio istriano. Le testimonianze che, inizialmente, riferendosi alle pressioni snazionalizzanti degli

italiani e la resistenza degli sloveni, coincidono con la memoria collettiva nazionale, in seguito passano alla scoperta di zone grigie di un passato sottaciuto e traumatico che si ricollegano a varie forme di collaborazione con il regime fascista.

Parole chiave: memoria individuale, memoria collettiva, campagna istriana, fascismo, oblio, trauma

INTRODUCTION[1]

The case study is based on life stories that I collected in the Istrian village of Rakitovec over a long period of time. Presently populated by 114 inhabitants, Rakitovec is a small village on the border of Croatia and Slovenia. In the interwar period the village was part of the municipality of Buzet, Croatia, and later became part of the Republic of Slovenia after World War II.

My aim is to analyse the relationship between individuals' memories and the collective myth. Memories of everyday life during fascist period in the Istrian countryside are at the forefront of my historical and ethnographic research. As the editors of *The Politics of Everyday Life in Fascist Italy* (Arthurs, Ebner & Ferris, 2017) have pointed out, the study of everyday history traces the conjunctions and conjunctures, the encounters and interactions, between different levels of historical analysis. This conception contrasts with more unidirectional approaches, whether totalitarian pressures "from above" (as in much of cultural historiography) or social history's reconstruction of resistance "from below". The historiography of the everyday also embraces the complications and contradictions – the "messiness" – of historical experience that do not always emerge easily from analyses that privilege official policies or grand narratives of political, social, and economic transformations. In the context of dictatorship, this can mean capturing the interplay of rationality and irrationality, of subjectivity and emotion, that guides individuals' choices and beliefs, and recognizing the multiplicity of individuals' relationships to the regime. At different moments, and in myriad ways, Italians could be "inside", "outside", and "against" the state. People who were effectively supporters of, and participants

1 This article is the result of research activities in the research projects: *Oborožena meja. Politično nasilje v severnem Jadranu, 1914–1941* n. J6-7152, and *Antifašizem v Julijski krajini v transnacionalni perspektivi, 1919–1954* n. J6-9356, financed by the Slovenian Research Agency (ARRS).



Fig. 1: An architectural detail of Rakitovec (photo by Darko Darovec).

in, the Fascist project could also become its "victims" and vice versa; this is perhaps most evident in the story of Italian Jews under Fascism, but as the contributions to this volume suggest, it equally shaped the lives of colonial settlers, soldiers, housewives, and schoolchildren. As pioneers of "history from below" long ago noted, ordinary people do not necessarily consent to an entire system of governance and all of its policies and their effects; on the contrary, they are more likely to be both perpetrators and victims, supporters and dissenters, participants and evaders. They could also change their minds, as well as their actions, over time. Consent and repression could co-exist, ebb and flow, according to changing circumstances and exigencies. Beyond the binaries that have characterized the study of Benito Mussolini's regime – repression and persuasion, compulsion and enticement, perpetrators and victims, consent and resistance – the scope therefore exists for investigating the complex ways by which people lived and worked within this system, resisting it, appropriating it, accommodating it, ignoring it, and reproducing it (Arthurs, Ebner & Ferris, 2017, 9).

The discrepancy between the official and vernacular memory is a consistent feature in the process of nation-building, similar to how the regional, local, and individual identity – as expected – contrasts with the national one.

Because resistance to Nazi-fascism signifies one of the Slovenian nation's central identification points in collective memory, it is an appropriate starting point for exploring the

theory and practice or the relationship between the collective and individual memories of Nazi-fascism. My research draws on the standpoints developed by the "Popular Memory Group" at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in Birmingham, England, which has examined the interactions between "private" and "public" remembering, establishing that memory is a construction and that memories are constructed so that they help us feel relatively comfortable with our lives, which makes us feel appeased. If the traumas that we had experienced are left unresolved, the memories, painful and disharmonious with the current identity, would be suppressed to the back of our minds. In a way, we are constantly bringing in harmony our past, present, and future. The private process of "safe" remembering is, in fact, a very public one. Our memories can be very risky and painful if they are not adjusted to the official versions of the past (Johnson, 1982).

Due to the fact that memories are a social construction critics of oral history regard oral sources as irrelevant to historiography. This could be true if oral sources are used when assessing actual events taking place in the past. On the other hand, if we are interested in how the past affects our lives at present, oral s testimonies are a crucial source for analyzing the relationship between the past and the present, but also between memory and mythology. Although the partial nature of everyday life sources can present difficulties, there are nevertheless ways in which historians can work around or mitigate gaps, recover fragments, and interpret documentary silences. So-called ego-documents – meaning source material "in which an author writes about his or her own acts, thoughts and feelings," like diaries or private letters – are especially useful, though not without limitations of their own. They tend to be produced by individuals with the necessary literacy skills and cultural propensities to commit thoughts to paper, and they are also inherently subjective, presenting a partial and "curated" version of reality. One must therefore be careful to view them less as unmediated accounts of events and attitudes, and more as subjective, historically contingent expressions of how people made meaning of their lives (Arthurs, Ebner & Ferris, 2017, 10).

FASCISM IN THE COUNTRYSIDE

In my research, I have observed how ordinary people's memories were in accord or discord with official representations of the past or how the individual memory is brought in line with collective national representations of the past.

A look at the Slovene historiography addressing the subject of fascism shows that the bulk of historiographical production deals with research into the fascist politics of denationalisation in the Julian March and the anti-fascist resistance.[2] A special issue of Acta Histriae (Acta Histriae 24, 2016, 4), which includes articles discussing ideational, cultural, and social aspects of border fascism (Verginella, 2016; Smotlak, 2016; Matajc, 2016), has shed new light on the subject. Egon Pelikan's most recent studies on Tone

2 Milica Kacin Wohinz's *Primorski upor fašizmu 1920–1941* (Kacin Wohinz & Verginella, 2008), which has to this day remained the most fundamental work, and her volume *Prvi antifašizem v Evropi* (Kacin Wohinz, 1990), along with works by Tone Ferenc, Jože Pirjevec , Branko Marušič, Milan Pahor, and Egon Pelikan.

Kralj's ecclesiastical paintings, which marked the Slovene ethnic border by means of iconography in the period of fascism (Pelikan, 2016 and 2018), should be mentioned, as should Borut Klabjan's study of the fascist marking of Trieste by means of monuments (Klabjan, 2014).

However, Marta Verginella pointed out that certain questions are still poorly researched; particularly the questions of "the form and support the fascist regime was given by individual strata of the population, but also the question of the social and economic impact of material benefits provided by Musollini's authorities to the poor in the Littoral and elsewhere in Italy ..." Verginella argues that the reason for this situation is the "delicacy of questions, which even at the present level of knowledge does not allow for straightforward dividing lines between the fascist state and the Slovene society, and that does not draw an unambiguous line between Italians as fascists and Slovenes as antifascists." This means that it does not allow for a black-and-white representation of the Littoral's history, the only functional one in terms of the "ideal" national narrative (Verginella, 2008, 10–11).

Even a decade after the aforementioned work no significant shifts had occurred in this field, with the exception of Boris Mlakar's study *Fašistična stranka na Primorskem v tridesetih letih 20. stoletja in poskus predstavitve njenega slovenskega članstva* (The Fascist Party in the Littoral in the 1930s and an Attempt to Present Its Slovene Members) (Mlakar, 2016). Based mostly on the original archival material, Mlakar's writing shows the organizational structure of the Fascist Party throughout the Slovene ethnic territory of the Julian March in the mid-1930s. It highlights all *fasci*, their respective leaderships and number of members, touching also upon membership in individual segments of parties or affiliate organizations. Despite the unevenly preserved material, the article at the same time seeks to identify Slovenes in the leaderships of respective *fasci* or fascist organizations, but also their relative and absolute share in the party's membership. Mlakar's findings indicate that a large number of Slovenes joined fascist organizations in the Idrija and the Karst region, i.e. areas located in western Slovenia that became part of Italy with the Treaty of Rapallo. Darko Dukovski (1998) discussed the Istrian experience in *Fašizam u Istri* [Fascism in Istria] and also maintains that in Istria fascism entered all pores of political and social life without regard to nationality. Dukovski distinguishes between the "urban" and "agrarian" fascism, stating in terms of Istrian fascism that "[...] Istria is becoming an Italian province ravaged by prematurely flourished fascists squads organizations" (Dukovski, 1998, 264). In Istria, fascism was widely accepted in the first half of the 1930s, which coincides with the establishment of the fascist corporate state. However, as pointed out already by Miroslav Bertoša, "the interwar period in Istria was a period of the most basic survival, i.e. biological, national, cultural, moral, and human [survival]. Some managed to survive biologically but lost their national identity, others their cultural or moral identity, while some, as philosophers would put it, lived and died without having been born in the first place." The involvement of Slovene and Croatian peasantry in fascist organizations must be understood in this context (Dukovski, 1998, 267). It must also be kept in mind that the violent fascist politics intimidated the population with its squads, and it would be illusory to expect the impoverished Istrian



Fig. 2: A mailbox on the house located at 6 Rakitovec, which was an inn in the period of Italy (photo by Darko Darovec).

population to have successfully staged a revolt against the aggressive politics in the long run, particularly if we take into consideration certain benefits that the new regime offered in exchange for loyalty.

This subject is addressed by several fragmentary ethnographic studies that mention eyewitness testimonies on Slovenes' participation in fascist organizations. Here, I would like to mention Borut Brumen's work, who carried out fieldwork in the village of Sv. Peter. In his volume *Sv. Peter in njegovi časi* (2000) he maintains that the consensus with fascism among the villagers of Sv. Peter was to a great extent present due to the increased chances of survival, but also owing to "ideological brainwashing from kindergarten to the school of the "fascist avant-garde" (Brumen, 2000).

I primarily focus on eyewitnesses testimonies, on the "period of fascism", which holds a special place in the stories of their lives, as this is the period of their youth and socialization, in this particular instance in fascist society. The bulk of testimonies was gathered in 2003 and 2004, when several individuals witnessing that period were still alive, and, in fragments, the gathering has continued to this day.

Fifteen villagers over 65 were interviewed, all of whom were born and had lived in the village their entire lives. The men were for the most part "semi-proletarians" employed by the railway company as members of an untrained or trained workforce; they worked

the fields in their spare time. Their wives were mostly housewives who worked occasionally as housekeepers in Trieste.

Being a native of this area, I have been in regular contact with the interviewees, and they present me new stories in every conversation. Therefore, despite the difficulties arising from maintaining scientific distance and, at times, personal feelings of injury, I have managed to penetrate deeper into the subject matter. Gathering testimonies is like peeling an onion; from the sphere where memories were in complete harmony with the official interpretations of the past in the initial stage of my interest in the village's memory, dating back to 1989, it moved in the course of my systematic field research into the grey zone of the untold and suppressed individual and collective past, which probably does not differ from the Littoral average at all.

Luisa Passerini, who explored the historical experience of workers in Turin in the 1970s, pointed out that many eyewitness testimonies do not tell us much about the areas where consensus with the regime was believed to have been established, ascribing the "silence" to the impact of the official historiography (Passerini, 2008). The situation in terms of remembering was similar in the case of my interviewees. It is interesting to note that, in the villages to which I arrived in the capacity of a researcher, people did not want to talk about the aforementioned issue. It was only in my native village that I managed to penetrate deeper into the subject over a long period of time. I remember being a child and hearing people blaming each other in conflicts for having Italian surnames and similar things, which I did not understand at the time. When I began my systematic research, I ran across inconsistencies in interviewees' narratives, their avoidance of answering certain questions, etc., all of which aroused my interest. Since the interviewees told me the stories of their lives, they started by talking about their enrolment in Italian schools, where they were faced with a language that they did not understand, and about unfeeling, oppressive Italian teachers. These stories were completely in line with fascism-related memoiristics and historiography. At the symbolic level, the village was given a new name, namely Aquaviva della Venna. They spoke about not being allowed to speak Slovene, sing Slovene songs, and about the presence of the Italian *carabinieri* in the village. The village seniors had the most difficulties adjusting to the Italian presence and found it difficult to adapt to the new regime, expressing openly their nostalgia for the former Austro-Hungarian state.

In the family of one of the informants the distrust of the new regime went so deep that they refused to exchange Austrian currency for Italian money in 1919 and, consequently, a considerable amount of money was lost:

> *Our seniors couldn't stand Italians; as a result my grandfather lost a great deal of money because he refused to exchange it for Italian currency. He believed that it was all temporary, saying that Italian money was nothing but rags. Some other older villagers, Tripar and Mohor, refused to exchange it as well. I remember us finding that money in an old double-bottom chest, the money was lying there and it was quite a pretty penny* (Milan, 2004).[3]

3 To ensure anonymity, I use pseudonyms when referring to interviewees. Milan is a pseudonym.

Although the Italians' arrival in 1919 was met with mixed emotions, the majority of the residents soon adjusted to the new political conditions. The Italian soldiers' arrival in the village was immediately followed by a range of activities aimed at improving living conditions. People were even paid to repair roads and retaining walls or regulate torrential waters. In those years the Italian authorities built the new road to Čičerija, mostly for military purposes. Additionally, a soup kitchen was organized in the village. All this convinced people to accept the new authority with greater ease:

> *When Italians came to the village, their policy was peaceable; there was a captain, they slept wherever there was room. The captain went to see the mayor Lisjak, saying that they wanted to do something in the village, as there was no road. Well, they paid people and walled up Lokev, mended roads, food was cooked at the Rijanovs', and people went there to fetch lunch. They blasted the road as far as the station and so our people were happy with them* (Ivan, 2004).

There were a few minor incidents with Italian carabinieri, who often came to the village from the municipality of Buzet and spent the night at the village inn, where a room – the so-called carabinieri room – was reserved for them.

> *Some people quickly came to terms with that, but our elders, my grandfather for instance, was involved in a fight with a carabinieri member who married a young woman called Milka. His name was Paolo and he gave my grandfather a couple of slaps for speaking against Italy* (Milan, 2004).

Initially, the interviewees avoided speaking about their consensus with the regime; however, when I specifically asked about their participation in fascist organizations, the informant Ivan provided the following explanation:

> *Nobody was exactly against fascists in our village; our people were peaceful and they accepted all of them, Austria, Italy, and Yugoslavia. What could we, poor souls, have done? Life had to go on. If you wanted benefits, you had to yield; that is how it was and always will be. That is why some people joined Balilla, others Partito Fascista, but they did not do anyone any harm. They were not like those squadristi around Trieste* (Ivan, 2004).

Even though there was no organized resistance in the village, not all villagers joined fascist organizations, nor did they change their names and join the Italian imperialistic army as volunteers. One of the informants believes that that was the case with those who were more ambitious: "those who wanted a better life, a job, an inn", which can be understood as a strategy of survival. Their co-villagers did not particularly condemn such behaviour. With regard to the previously stated, I initially assumed that the adjustment to the new state and totalitarian regime did not pose great problems to the majority.

That the situation was not altogether unproblematic and that the period of the Italian presence in the village was traumatically imprinted in the community's memory was

hinted at by further testimonies about wartime. At first, I came to the conclusion that on-site misunderstandings did occur between Croatian partisans and the Slovene population in the border area, despite the ZAVNOH's (Zemaljsko antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Hrvatske – the State Anti-fascist Council for the National Liberation of Croatia) decision that Istria was to be included in Croatia. In order to settle operative issues with greater ease, the Slovene and Croatian liberation movement reached in Malija on 10 February 1944 an agreement about the delimitation line, which extended from the mouth of the Dragonja River as far as the village of Topolovec, running to the southwest below the village of Pregara towards the east above Štrped before Buzet and in the direction of Vodice (Marin, 1992, 161). A report dated to 10 February 1944, which was written by Milan Javor, a representative of the Liberation Front in the Slovene part of Istria, reveals that the Croats intended to include settlements located in the linguistically mixed territory in their formations, even though the local population was believed to be opposed to that plan (Ostanek, 1991, 281).

Rakitovec belonged to the Slovene side; nevertheless, Croatian partisans and activists from Čičarija pressured the villagers to mobilize young men and send them to Croatian partisan formations in Lanišče, in Čičarija. The question of why they responded to this pressure remained unanswered for some time. At first I was given the answer that the villagers had been intimidated by the Croatian Čiči, who had threatened to burn down the village unless their young men were sent to join the Croatian partisans. Eventually I was told by one of the witnesses, who is now deceased, that this was the result of fear of revenge, since many villagers were members of fascist organizations in the period of Italy; consequently, a mobilization was organized and in March 1944 young men from the village of Rakitovec were conscripted into the Croatian partisan army:

> *When the Italians capitulated and we went down to Šmarje Hill and then Germans arrived, we were frightened and things were quiet until December, in December a brigade was formed up in Čiči, and a villager* [named] *Keko, who played accordion at Brest and was in contact with Čiči, told us that we had to go. But they had no right to mobilize us because we were Slovenes. But our people offered to go themselves because they had been in the fascist party. And they were scared, so they organized a committee and made old Tarantin their president. Keko came and summoned everyone who had only sons and said 'my boys, what are you waiting for, why didn't you join the partisans, Čiči will set us on fire if you don't go.' And Šilar replied to him: 'Oh, well done, you have only women.'* [...] *And so we went and joined the partisans in March; I and some other people fell ill and came back, while others went to Gorski Kotar* (Ivan, 2004).

The pressure exerted from Čičarija or Croatia, which stemmed from the attempt to include Rakitovec in the Croatian territory, was ended when the regional political leaders came to an agreement that Rakitovec was in fact part of Slovenia. The decision was confirmed by the arrival of the partisan activist Darko Peca from the neighbouring village of Dol, when the villagers organized a "committee" helmed by Anton Miklavčič – Tarantin,



Fig. 3: Graffiti sprayed on the house at 6 Rakitovec (photo by Darko Darovec).

who at the time was also the village mayor. After that several other young men were conscripted into the Slovene partisan army in June 1944.

It was not until recently, after several conversations with one of the informants, that I obtained an insight into untold deeper dimensions of the fascist presence in the village, which were distressing in many respects. On the one hand, the testimony is indicative of the general consensus or even the fascination with the regime that people experienced through the presence of Italian carabinieri in the village. It was precisely their presence that traumatically cut into the community and undermined the very foundations of its traditional familial relations. Members of the carabinieri namely had relationships with the local women, regardless of their marital status.

> *The carabinieri, who were in the village throughout the period of Italian occupation, had everything under control. But the worst thing was that they meddled with our women. Even with married ones and young girls* (Ivana, 2018).

Having been asked how their husbands coped with that, the informant explained that their husbands had been rendered helpless due to the position of power that the carabinieri held. She added that the men had been unable to protect their honour, which left a deep scar on relationships within their families and the entire community that lasted for long after the Italians left:

> *Their husbands had to endure it and couldn't do anything. Because they were afraid of them. My uncle was beside himself and wanted to kill himself because of that. Some woman had a child with an Italian. Nothing could be done, it had to be endured. One of those husbands who fostered him left for Marezige to sell socks, so that he could baptize the child. He told my cousin that he was off to earn some money to baptize the "taxman*" [the child of an Italian tax officer]. *And then he kept the child as if it had been his own. Traditionally, our men didn't even let men from the neighbouring village near our women, but there nothing that could be done* (Ivana, 2018).

Immediately after Italy's capitulation, political players from the period of fascism, as a rule, turned into fervent advocates of the National Liberation War and were not sanctioned by the new regime in any way. According to an opinion expressed by one of the witnesses, they had been better off than those who had not joined the partisans:

> *I was sent to the partisans in Gorski Kotar in 43. Those who had been fascists were in the 'committee' and were in command even after the war. Not a single committee member joined the partisans, they decided where everyone will go. When war veterans' pensions were given away, the fascists and those who had remained at home received higher pensions. They were handing out food stamps and ordered everyone in the village around* [...] (Anton, 2004).

CONCLUSION

The events that unfolded in the village during the period of fascism, in modified political circumstances that saw not only the change of the regime but also that of the state, posed a burden to the community, not only in a political sense, but the invaders also trampled on traditional familial and interpersonal relations within the community. These relationships were marked by feelings of guilt, which accompanied them throughout the post-war period. However, can this really be understood as a lack of national sense? Ethnic identity in Istria, which for over a millennium has been located at the meeting point of three worlds, i.e. the Slavic, the Romance, and the Germanic, is to be understood in the context of fast and frequent changes in state frameworks. National identity, which usually stems from interactions between a centre and a periphery, was subject to pressure exerted by fascist Rome, which was merely a continuation of colonial relations in what was already a multicultural environment. Istrians' interests centred around their families and the immediate community, and everything that failed to contribute to the preservation of the community at hand was regarded as deviant. To them, national belonging was of secondary importance. They adjusted to each respective authority without exceptions; nonetheless, they kept a certain distance from it. It is therefore not surprising that they easily adjusted to each regime change. Yet, as far as fascism is concerned, the change of authority brought about specific traumas, which could be felt long after the fall of the regime.

ARHEOLOGIJA SPOMINJANJA NA ČAS FAŠIZMA NA ISTRSKEM PODEŽELJU – PRIMER VASI RAKITOVEC

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POVZETEK

Prispevek temelji na ustno-zgodovinskih intervjujih oz. na individualnih spominih pričevalcev na primeru ene od istrskih vasi na »čas fašizma«, ki prehajajo od spominov, ki sovpadajo z nacionalnim kolektivnim spominom in se nanašajo na raznarodovalne pritiske Italijanov in upor Slovencev, pa vse do odkrivanj sivih con zamolčane in travmatične preteklosti, ki se nanašajo na različne oblike sodelovanje s fašističnim režimom. Pri raziskavi na istrskem podeželju na čas fašizma sem zato zasledovala, kako so spomini navadnih ljudi usklajeni oz. neusklajeni z uradnimi interpretacijami preteklosti oz. kako se individualni spomin prepleta s kolektivnimi nacionalnimi reprezentacijami preteklosti, ki temeljijo na črno-beli interpretaciji in je v politični funkciji. Dogajanje v vasi v času fašizma je v spremenjenih političnih okoliščinah, ko se ni spremenil le režim, ampak tudi država, obremenjevalo skupnost, ne le v političnem smislu, ampak je poteptalo tradicionalne družinske in medosebne odnose v skupnosti. Zaznamovali so jih z občutkom krivde, ki jih je spremljal ves povojni čas. Toda ali to res lahko razumemo, kot pomanjkanje nacionalnega čuta? Etnično identiteto v Istri, ki je bila vseskozi na stičišču treh svetov, slovanskega, romanskega in germanskega, je potrebno razumeti v kontekstu hitrega in pogostega menjavanja državnih okvirov. Nacionalna identiteta, ki je običajno rezultat interakcij med centrom in periferijo je bila podvržena pritiskom fašističnega Rima, kar je bilo le nadaljevanje kolonialnih odnosov v takratnem multikulturnem okolju. V ospredju zanimanja istrskega človeka je bila njegova družina in ožja skupnost in deviantno je bilo vse tisto, kar ni prispevalo k ohranjanju te skupnosti. Pripadnost narodu je bila zanje drugotnega pomena. Brez izjeme so se prilagajali vsakokratni oblasti, vendar do nje ohranjali nekakšno distanco. Zato ne čudi, da so se lahko brez težav prilagodili vsakokratnim spremembam oblasti, ki pa je v primeru fašizma pustila določene travme in jih je bilo čutit še dolgo po padcu režima.

Ključne besede: individualni spomin, kolektivni spomin, istrsko podeželje, fašizem, pozaba, travma

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OPPRESSION OF CHRISTIAN MINORITIES IN INTERWAR ITALY INCLUDING THE TRIESTE REGION: THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE FASCIST REGIME AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

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ABSTRACT

The author, on the basis of the sources of the 'two powers', the State and the Catholic Church, analyses various levels and forms of violence exercised by the Fascist regime against religious minorities in Italy in the 1920s and the 1930s. The 'intimidations' were in most cases incited by the Catholic Church, which disapproved especially Protestant proselytic activities and requested intervention of civil authorities. The interference increased after the signing of the Lateran Treaty and the introduction of the Law of Allowed Religions in 1929. Particular attention is dedicated to Seventh-day Adventists, which among all non-Catholic Christians in Venezia Giulia experienced the most oppressive measures. Moreover, many Adventists were Slovenians, which made them more suspicious in the eyes of the regime.

Keywords: religion, Fascism, oppression, religious minorities, Catholic Church, Italy, Trieste, Venezia Giulia

L'OPPRESSIONE DELLE MINORANZE CRISTIANE IN ITALIA E NELLA PROVINCIA DI TRIESTE TRA LE DUE GUERRE: LA PROSPETTIVA DEL REGIME FASCISTA E DELLA CHIESA CATTOLICA

SINTESI

L'autore sulla base delle fonti archivistiche dei "due poteri" – Stato e Chiesa cattolica – analizza i diversi livelli e forme di violenza esercitate dal regime fascista contro le minoranze cristiane in Italia tra le due guerre. Le intimidazioni erano nella maggior parte dei casi istigate dalla Chiesa cattolica che disapprovava in particolare il proselitismo dei protestanti e chiedeva l'intervento delle autorità civili. L'intromissione crebbe in seguito alla firma del Patti Lateranensi e all'introduzione della legge sui culti ammessi nel 1929. Un'attenzione particolare è dedicata agli Avventisti del Settimo Giorno che, tra tutti i cristiani non cattolici della Venezia Giulia, hanno subito le misure più oppressive. Inoltre, molti Avventisti erano di nazionalità slovena, un fatto che li rendeva ancora più sospetti agli occhi del regime.

Parole chiave: religione, fascismo, oppressione, minoranze religiose, Chiesa cattolica, Italia, Trieste, Venezia Giulia

INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS[1]

The article on Fascists' control over, oppression and persecution of religious minorities, which was often incited by Catholic officials, firstly dwells on Italy as a whole, including referential legislation, and afterwards focuses on the particular situation in the borderland city of Trieste and its hinterland. The matter of religious minorities under the Fascist regime in the interwar period is in the region of Venezia Giulia (the Julian March) a scarcely researched issue, with an exception of the repression of Jews after the introduction of the Italian Racial Laws. Although the vast majority of the population in Italy and the northern Adriatic were Catholic, whether of Italian, Slovenian, Croatian, German, Friulian or other origin, and only approximately 135,000 people belonged to non-Catholic religions (Piccioli, 2003, 497), we must take into account that major centres, including in the borderland, displayed religious diversity in the 19th century and even before. For instance, Greek-Orthodox and the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Jewish community, and the Evangelical Church of the Helvetic Confession, the Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Augsburg Confession, the Evangelical Methodist Church and the Anglican Church all have a long tradition in Trieste, and to varying degrees in Gorizia, Rijeka and Pula; and several other Protestant denominations appeared in this province in the interwar period (such as the Waldensian Evangelical Church and the Christian Adventist Church [The Seventh-day Adventist Church]) – and some of these communities enjoyed substantial socio-political influence.

New Protestant religious communities – Baptists, Adventists, Pentecostals, Methodists and others – spread into Italy mostly through Italian immigrants to North America, where a small but significant minority converted to Protestantism. The returning emigrants helped to found many small Protestant communities in their places of origin (Zanini, 2015, 688) and thus vitally contributed to the diffusion of these locally novel forms of worship.

The present contribution provides an overview of studies on the oppression of Christian (non-Catholic) minorities during the period of interwar Italy and an archival study of the situation in the multicultural borderland of Venezia Giulia, particularly in Trieste and its surroundings. The focus is on the entanglement of similar interests (though of different motivation) of two institutions – the Fascist regime and the Catholic Church – in relation to the minorities in question. These are the viewpoints that will be examined, dwelling on the sources of the state and church archives in Trieste and Ljubljana, which exhibit specific discourse of exclusion with references to 'freely interpreted' legal documents (foremost the Lateran Pacts and the Law of Allowed Religions). The primarily 'top-down' approach is complemented by the concepts of 'the Other' (religious and national) and power relations that will enable a comparison of commonalities and differences between the politics and practices towards religious minorities of the state apparatus (state and

1 The author acknowledges that the research project (Antifascism in the Julian March in Transnational Perspective, 1919–1954, J6-9356) in the scope of which this publication was published, has been financially supported by the Slovenian Research Agency (ARRS).

secret police, prefectures and other facets of the civil administration) and the party militia on the one hand, and the Catholic clergy, episcopate and the Holy See on the other.

The perspective primarily emphasises the issue of the power relations between majority and minority religions (cf. Ghanea, 2012, 60–61) in respective overlapping religious fields, and the inconsistences of the promoted 'Fascist' discourse of one national culture that assumed further solidification by promotion of religious (Catholic) unification (cf. Mack Smith, 1981, 159–163). This was to some degree challenged in the case of national minorities of non-Catholic belief. Such a study contributes to the well-established field of the History of Fascism, as well as of religions, of which in the region of Venezia Giulia there is a gap.

In the case of Italy we can speak of a *Catholic* religious field, as the Catholic Church was (and still is) the dominant religious entity in the country. In terms of this religious field, Italy exhibited the characteristics of an overwhelming Catholic society, a society that for centuries has been dominated by the Catholic Church, similar to Lithuania, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Poland (Schröder & Petrušauskaitė, 2013, 70; Bourdieu, 1991, 20–25). The main features of predominantly Catholic society is

> *the marginal position of other religions, and the fact that the statistical dominance of the Catholic Church masks a wide variety in the attitudes toward Catholicism and modes of belonging to the Catholic Church throughout the population, as well as substantial differences within the Church itself.* (Schröder & Petrušauskaitė, 2013, 70).

The attention will be dedicated mostly to Protestant communities that at some point became one of several 'internal enemies' (cf. Gentile, 2012, 95) or were at least suspected of subversive actions. No significant pressure on Christian Orthodox Churches has been noticed during that time, while the case of Jews has already been quite extensively explored (by authors as: Bettin, 2007; De Felice, 2001; Bon, 2000) and is in Italy very specific, so will only be mentioned to contextualise the opposition to religious minorities more in general.

Bourdieu's postulation that human existence is essentially conflictual can serve as an opening in the case at hand. Nevertheless, we need to be aware that conflicts can take many forms depending on the kinds of 'capital' that agents or actors own (Benson, 2009, 175–197).

FASCIST ITALY AND THE LEGAL REGULATION OF NON-CATHOLIC RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES

The Italian Fascist regime's attitude towards non-Catholic minority religions, especially Evangelical Churches, was deeply dependent on the state of the relationship between the civil authorities and the Holy See. Even though some incidents have been registered from before 1929 (see: Scoppola, 1973, 334; Davis, 2010, 66), the year the Lateran Pacts and the so-called law on 'admitted cults' or Law of Allowed Religions n. 1159 [la legge sui culti ammessi n. 1159] were passed, is a turning point. With the Lateran

Treaty the Catholic Church in Italy was explicitly acknowledged as the State religion:

> *Italy recognizes and reaffirms the principle established in the first Article of the Statute of the Kingdom of 4 March 1848, according to which the Catholic, Apostolic and Roman Religion is the only religion of the State.*[2]

Mussolini's government followed the politics of re-confessionalization, recognizing Article 1 of the Albertine Statute. This clause was ignored in pre-war Italy with the gradual liberalization of legislation regarding non-Catholic religions, especially with the 1889 Italian Penal Code, commonly known as the Zanardelli Code, which guaranteed equality before the criminal law for all religious communities (Tokrri, 2015, 52–53). The Italian legal experience, however, was still based on the principle of tolerance that assumes an unequal treatment of religious minorities, and was for many years a condition for the non-Catholic religions that were reaffirmed in 1929 with the effects of the Lateran Treaty and particularly of the Law of Allowed Religions, which due to the absence of a general law on religious freedom is still in force today for those religious communities that did not sign an agreement with the state (Ervas, 2017, 874), should have adequately regulated the various religions in the country.

At first, the law of 1929 was reasonably well accepted by the Protestants, as the legislative context in which the confrontation between the Catholic Church and Protestant religious communities took place changed from tolerated to allowed (Rochat 1990, 127–147; Spini, 2007, 127–130; Zanini, 2015, 690–691). The Catholic perception that the change of status of minority religions was the basic reason for the recommencement of Protestant Proselytism and a deviation from the Lateran Pacts, resulted in a fervent response on the part of the Italian episcopate, the Holy See and Pope Pius XI (Perin, 2011, 154–165; Zanini, 2015, 691).

If Article 1 of the law of 1929:

> *Cults other than the Apostolic and Roman Catholic religion are allowed in the State, provided they do not profess principles and do not follow rites contrary to public order and morality. The exercise, even in public, of these cults is free,*[3]

does seem to support some expression of religious freedom, the Royal Decree – no. 289 (28 February 1930) that was to implement the law of the prior year – 'clarifies' some of the questions that were left open to interpretation. The Fascist authorities legalized the policy of unequal treatment of religions by reconciling with the Catholics on the one side, and returning to jurisdictionalism for non-Catholics on the other. The law provided a system suitable for guaranteeing political control and extensive interference with faiths

2 For the text of the Lateran Treaty see: http://www.vaticanstate.va/content/dam/vaticanstate/documenti/leggi-e-decreti/Normative-Penali-e-Amministrative/LateranTreaty.pdf

3 For the text of the Law of Allowed Religions see: http://win.minervaistruzione.it/cd/testi/leggi/L.%20 1159%2024-06-1929.pdf

other than the Catholic through a series of considerable restrictions on the freedom of religion. One extreme act of intervention of the Law of Allowed Religions and the Royal Decree was that religious officials of admitted religions had to be appointed by the Minister of the Interior. Furthermore, especially restrictive were conditions for the opening of a temple or oratory that also required specific approval of the Minister of Justice and Affairs of Religion in agreement with the Minister of the Interior. The proselytic activities of non-Catholics were also constrained (Madonna, 2016, 13–14).

According to Art. 2 of the Royal Decree No. 289,[4] the members of an admitted religious community could hold 'public meetings' in places of worship, on condition that they were presided over or authorized by an approved religious official. In this case, the prior authorization according to Art. 18 of the Consolidated Law on Public Security [Testo unico delle leggi di pubblica sicurezza], approved by the Royal Decree No. 773 of 18 June 1931, was not required. However, the same Art. 18 provided that a meeting, although held in a private form, could also be considered public due to the place where it was held or the number of people present or the purpose or the subject of the meeting. The police applied this last provision to religious meetings of non-Catholics in private places, forbidding and dissolving by force those meetings which were not authorized. This was a serious breach of basic religious rights when even worship at home could thereby be denied (Madonna, 2016, 13–14).

Broader discrimination of religious minorities was enforced in 1930 by the Rocco Penal Code, which outlined a specific protection for the Catholic Church. The punishment was less severe if a crime was committed against a person of a minority religion than it would have been against a Catholic (Tokrri, 2015, 55).

The legal order of treatment of religious communities by the State had in fact three levels: the Catholic Church with the Concordat regained the position of an established Church in Italy, some minority religions recognized by the State had a special juridical status (e.g., Waldensians, Baptists, Methodists, Jews, etc.), while all other religious communities that did not make an agreement with the State (e.g., Pentecostals) or chose not to (e.g., Adventists) were subjected to the common law, and were most vulnerable to attacks (with the exception of Jews).

INTIMIDATION OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN ITALY BY THE AUTHORITIES AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

The situation of religious minorities in Italy since the Risorgimento has been conditioned by the relations between the state and the majority religion. Steps toward secularization of the state with the reforms of legislations in the 19th and early 20th centuries in favour of religious equality were taken primarily because of the anti-Catholic sentiments of the governments in power at the time. Moreover, a major part of Italian Protestants strongly identified with the liberal state, as the regime guaranteed their freedom of

4 For the text of the Royal Decree No. 289 [Regio Decreto 28 febbraio 1930, n. 289] see: http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/cedir/cedir/Lex-doc/It_rg_28-2-30.pdf

worship and allowed evangelization. Protestant churches did not declare any political positions, although Baptists and Methodists did often actively support the Democratic Left, while Waldensians tended to endorse the ‘trasformismo’ of Giolittian politics – i.e., the flexible centrist position (cf. Valbruzzi, 2015, 32; Mack Smith, 1997, 103). The convergence between moderate progressivism and anti-Catholicism was well represented through tight connections between freemasonry and Italian Protestantism (Rochat, 1990, 12). However, after the Fascists’ measures against freemasons via a decree introduced in 1925 (Fedele, 2006, 678–679; Mithans, 2016, 750–751), all evangelical leaders chose to defend their Churches rather than to maintain good relations with the freemasons. When liberal and democratic political powers and state institutions, including the monarchy, gave support to the introduction of the Fascist regime, despite their sympathies towards *stato liberale* evangelical churches could not but conform and accept Mussolini and Fascism (Rochat, 1990, 12–14).

Basically, the notion of religious freedom initiated in the period of the liberal regime was a product of particular political developments in Italian politics, not an overall acceptance of religious differences (Rochat, 1990, 12–13). A rather intolerant response on the part of several Catholic priests and laity against religious minorities during the interwar years, especially traditional anti-Judaism, was therefore not just a result of Fascist propaganda.

Catholics perceived in the 1920s the ‘Protestant danger’ as an indistinct entity, and, foremost, wanted to oppose the proliferation of that ‘heresy’ among the citizens of central and northern Italy. Protestants bound to liberal policies, a cultural elite and to the Democratic and Socialist circles, were considered more threatening. Hence the fixation of the leading members of the Catholic Church with Waldensian, Baptist and especially Methodist proselytism (Zanini, 2015, 690; cf. Moro, 1998, 45–63). The Fascist authorities, however, as early as 1925 closed a Pentecostal meeting house in Melfi, a small town in Basilicata, and the Interior Ministry in the next decade ordered the closure of others. In the meantime, Protestant pastors and preachers were being arrested on a variety of pretexts, including charges of blasphemy. In April 1927, the regime’s campaign against the evangelical communities took a further step when Arturo Bocchini, Mussolini’s Chief of Police and the head of the Italian secret political police, Organization for Vigilance and Repression of Anti-Fascism (OVRA), instructed the prefects in each province to provide him with regular reports on their activities and memberships (Davis, 2010, 66).

Robert Paxton claims that Italy under the Fascist regime went through several cycles of radicalization and normalization, with Fascist seizure of power, the Matteotti crisis, the Lateran Pacts, the Ethiopian War and the beginning of World War II in Europe as decisive events (2004, 148–153; cf. Ferrari, 2013, 8). Fonio argues that the country also experienced at least two interwoven stages of surveillance. The latter, crucial to maintaining control over all aspects of society, was implemented from 1926 and changed in nature and purpose throughout the dictatorship. Whereas the first stage, that lasted approximately from 1926 until 1938, was characterized by the reorganization of the police under a new chief – Bocchini – the creation of official bodies (e.g., the Political Police or PolPol and the OVRA) and a specific focus on anti-Fascist movements, the second phase was

marked both by the anti-Semitic turn in 1938 and World War II, which fostered categorical surveillance respectively on religious groups and on 'defeatists' (Fonio, 2011, 82).

Frequent police reports were filed by anonymous informers, civilians, willing to improve the efficiency of State surveillance, making numerous accusations against Jews, Pentecostals, and other religious minorities (Fonio, 2011, 87). In particular, they collected detailed information on jobs, incomes, and behaviours and attitudes towards the regime (Franzinelli, 2001, 141). Usually the root causes of denunciations were ideological hate, competition in business or mere personal dislike. Accusations by thousands of anonymous informers over the years of the Fascist era show, as Fonio states, that surveillance had become an integral part of Italian society (Fonio, 2011, 87).

Strengthened by the climate created by the 1929 Pacts, Catholic priests and bishops requested the involvement of state authorities in the defence of the Catholic faith (Scoppola, 1973, 331–394; Davis, 2010, 66–70). Subsequently, in the 1930s hostility towards the religious minorities increased, usually due to the fear of anti-Fascist/anti-Italian sentiments of their representatives perceived by the State authorities. The suspicions the regime harboured towards any minority, religious or otherwise, which maintained international ties, was combined with a general prejudice regarding the popular classes and their capacity for self-determination (Rochat, 1990, 74–75; Zanini, 2015, 692). Not only did many Protestant churches preserve contacts across the border, many pastors of Adventist, Baptist, Methodist and other denominations were educated outside Italy; and almost all (e.g., except Waldensians as 'originally Italian') were funded from abroad to varying degrees, usually the United States of America (Rochat, 1990, 17–20). That raised additional suspicions, especially with further German-Italian rapprochement and when World War II finally broke out. Foreign 'ethnic' Protestant Churches, like German speaking Lutherans and Reformed Evangelicals,[5] as well as Anglicans, were usually not under suspicion by the Italian regime nor an adversary to the Catholic Church as they also did not proselytize outside their ethnic communities (Rochat, 1990, 20, 144–145). A parallel can also be made to the Greek and Serbian Orthodox communities. Of course, for most of the mentioned community the situation changed with the beginning of the World War II; and in the case of religious communities associated with the UK in 1935 with British opposition to the war in Ethiopia.

While denominations were tolerated, their activities were in large part removed from the public sphere, especially 'religious propaganda' – proselytizing was strongly opposed by the Catholic Church and often also the Fascist militia. Firstly, the freedom of discussion in religious matters stated in the Law of Allowed Religions, was not understood as permission to proselytize by the Catholic Church; secondly, the religious communities were admitted on condition that they did not profess 'principles contrary to the public order or public morality,' verification of which was left to the State apparatus (see: Scoppola, 1973, 352–363).

Proselytizing, especially when practiced by the Protestants was a very sensitive matter for the Catholic hierarchy. Even Pope Pius XI on multiple occasions asked civil authorities

5 Cf. ACVCVTs, Prefecture to the Evangelical Community of Helvetic Confession recognizing its 'Italian character' and thus considering it as an institution under public law, Trieste, 7. 10. 1924.

to restrict non-Catholic proselytism in the State. The question of ‘religious propaganda’ was discussed in the only meeting between the Pope and the Duce on 11 February 1932. Mussolini seemed to agree to some extent with papal requests, though for political, not religious, reasons (Scoppola, 1973, 340–342).

The Vatican went so far as to send the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through Apostolic Nunciature of Italy a publication titled *Il proselitismo dei protestanti in Italia* [Protestant Proselytism in Italy] (1934) that explicitly demanded the government limit the spread of Protestantism (Rochat, 1990, 49–55). In 1938 Pope Pius XI was pleased when he received the information that the Fascist regime declined to build a mosque in Rome. He also requested control over the missionary activities of Waldensians and other Protestants in newly acquired territories in Africa (Bosworth, 2006, 258).

Nevertheless, the civil administration in some disputes acted as a protector of the rights of religious minorities, particularly Evangelicals, against the pressures of the Catholic Church aligned with the *Milizia volontaria per la sicurezza nazionale* (MVSN, Voluntary Militia for National Security). According to Scoppola, the reasons for this attitude on the part of civil authorities, especially in the case of the General Directorate of Religious Affairs, which in 1931 moved from the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of the Interior, may be in the remaining functionaries’ loyalty to the tradition and practices of the liberal state. Even more likely, the cause was related to the regime’s preoccupation with distancing itself from the Catholic Church (Scoppola, 1973, 339).

For instance, in the case of Waldensians in the valleys of Piedmont, the difference in opinions between the Fascist Party (that shared the attitude of the Catholic Church towards Waldensians) and the police was evident. On 30 July 1941 the secretary of the *Partito Nazionale Fascista* Adelchi Serena wrote to the secretary of the *Federazione dei Fasci di Combattimento* of Turin:

> *Irreducible anti-Fascism was reported from the side of the Waldensians in the valleys Pellice and Germanasca /…/ These Waldensians do not hide that they feel foreigners in Italy, they pretentiously speak only in French, they attend political and military events, and give remarks to manifestations only in accordance with their anti-Italian sentiments. The Catholic population lives in those valleys in condition of true humiliation, also because the Waldensians seem to have succeeded to acquire all leading positions in the public life.* (Scoppola, 1973, 356; cf. Viallet, 1985, 287–290).

The police reports, however, in large part do not confirm these allegations, stating that no specific elements that can be interpreted as manifestations of anti-Italian views – i.e., none of the proclaimed pro-American/pro-British attitudes, or usurpation of public offices – could be found (Scoppola, 1973, 356).

It is important to point out that while surveillance and intimidation of Protestant groups was part of the everyday life during the interwar years in Italy, we cannot in fact speak of *persecution* prior to 1939. Only the years of the war would clearly show that those legal acts concealed a wide range of possibility of administrative intervention according to the changing political directions. In the first decade of the application of the

Law of Allowed Religions, interpretation of that law was not generally hostile to religious minorities, with the exception of the Pentecostals (Scoppola, 1973, 346; Rochat, 1990, 241–274) and the Jews.

Furthermore, as Ebner points out, political and social repression of the Fascist state and party coercion was never constant or evenly distributed, but also evolved over time. While binaries such as Fascism and anti-Fascism, perpetrators and victims, consensus and resistance, may be useful to some extent for understanding aspects of police-state repression and resistance to it, they do not take into account the context that affected everyday lives of people living under the Fascist regime (Ebner, 2017, 79).

In the case of the Pentecostals, Catholic hierarchies had always shown a deep aversion towards the diffusion of this denomination in Italy. The approaches of the Fascist state were different and more complex. If generalisation must be made, the bureaucracy and the police apparatus had always shown a measure of diffidence towards Pentecostals. The police showed interest in the Pentecostal community in Rome around 1927 after multiple complaints of the Catholic clergy. In 1928 the Catholic Church presented the first medical-psychiatric evaluation by doctor Osvaldo Zacchi, who concentrated on the emotional aspects present in Pentecostal worship, such as certain 'convulsive' movements made by the faithful during prayers. These were the first attempts to portray Pentecostal worship as dangerous to public health and morals. The Zacchi report played an important role in developing the regime's suspicion towards Pentecostalism; in fact, it represented the point of departure for all subsequent inquiries. Still, Pentecostal services were not prohibited yet and prayer halls continued to function. The change in the attitude towards Pentecostalism occurred between 1933 and 1934, characterized by a shift of attention from the cities of northern Italy to the rural areas mostly in the south. In addition, the 1929 economic crisis in Italy appeared to favour a Protestant proselytism, since Protestants were perceived as having unlimited financial resources, and, therefore, could attract the impoverished population. The result of these changes was that the Pentecostals, who, up until 1932–1933 had been considered just one of the adversaries, began being perceived as the greatest danger to Italian Catholicism (Rochat, 1990, 74–75, 113–122; Zanini, 2015, 692–693).

This shift in opinion occurred during the third phase of interwar Catholic anti-Protestantism according to Renato Moro, following *national* anti-Protestantism of the 1920s with hostility towards Protestants as *foreigners*, and the phase of *national religion* and *national-Catholic ideology* in the years between 1929 and 1933, which was marked by the hostility towards Protestants as *enemies of religious peace* between the Catholic Church and the state in the time of serious crisis over the question of Italian Catholic Action and its autonomy in 1931. The third phase of *catholic Fascism* of the mid-1930s with hostility towards Protestants considered as *anti-Italian* (Moro, 2003, 318) were years of convergence between the Catholic Church and the regime that lasted until 1938. Then frequent protests of the Catholic side were mostly backed up by the State authorities, supporting the argument of the Catholic clergy based on presumption that Pentecostals' service and customs were dangerous to the public. On 9 April 1935 the Pentecostal denomination was banned on the grounds that its rites had proved "*harmful to the physical and mental health of the razza*" (Scoppola, 1973, 359).

In spite of this animosity in police reports, it was almost always protests from the Catholics which initiated inquiries or restrictive orders. The local authorities rarely raised the measures on their own. After all, Fascist bureaucrats were aware that the Pentecostals represented no political threat whatsoever (Zanini, 2015, 692), and the same was true for other religious minorities in Italy. Ultimately, therefore, the Protestant Churches until 1939 appeared closed in their isolation and continuously controlled (see: Scoppola, 1973, 351). In addition, Protestants usually were not politically active and can be designated as 'a-fascist'.

The situation profoundly changed in the last years of the regime, after the alliance between Italy and Nazi Germany, which also marks the rupture in the agreement between Italian Fascism and the Catholic Church. Of Protestant groups, again the Pentecostals were most severely persecuted as they could continue their activities only at clandestine meetings. These gatherings were often reported to the police by the Catholic clergy with a request to intervene against this community. It is significant and distressing that the bishop of Benevento's attempt to put the Pentecostals into a bad light in the eyes of the Government was based on the accusation of defeatism and espionage, and that in this case the civil authorities dropped the allegations. Although, as Scoppola points out, numerous files on confined Pentecostals in *Archivio Centrale dello Stato* are based on the accusation of antimilitarism (Scoppola, 1973, 352–363; Piccioli, 2003, 496–510).

The Salvation Army, which has also had a hall in Trieste, was another religious group that was dissolved by the Fascist authorities by the provision dated 17 August 1940. At first, the authorities did not know how to legally handle this organization, which the General Directorate of Religious Affairs considered more as a militant religious order than a Church and was during most of the interwar period treated as a non-recognized religious community. The Salvation Army in Italy did seek to be allowed to function as an autonomous organization distinguished from other Protestant religious groups. Considering their characteristics, such as a profoundly British appearance and direct dependence on London, their paramilitary character, and that they as the only religious entity in Italy allowed women to become preachers, it was almost inevitable that the Fascist regime would eventually perceive them as a threat or at least enough of a nuisance they would need to be moved against. By 1934 the situation for the Salvation Army deteriorated to the point where several halls were closed (although a year later during the moment of great tension between Italy and Great Britain, due to British opposition to the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, a compromise was reached allowing the organization to reopen the halls, without recognition of the Salvation Army as a religious organization). However, in February 1936, deputy chief of the Italian police, Carmino Senise, ordered prefects to exercise strict control over the activities of the Salvation Army that should be considered outside the directives pertinent for religious associations. A short period of frequent police interventions, provocations and Catholic mobilizations against the Salvation Army followed, when a diplomatic agreement between the Foreign Office and Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Galeazzo Ciano, was made in favour of the Salvation Army. During the years 1937–1940 they were allowed to resume their activities on a nearly regular basis, but the war made life for the Salvationists difficult again (Rochat, 1990, 229–239).

Jehovah's Witnesses were, especially during the 1920s, a Christian religious group with a negligible number of adherents scattered around Italy that were connected almost entirely by their publications (e.g., *The Watchtower*) and correspondence. Usually civil authorities thought they were Protestants, and most often mistook them for Pentecostals or Adventists. As Rochat argues, the differences between the non-Catholic Christian Churches mattered to the Fascist regime only if they had political implications, while the Catholic Church fought all without exception (1990, 275). Eventually *The Watchtower* was prohibited on the grounds that the publication conflicted with the politics of the regime and attacked the Catholic Church. A smaller group of people formed in the province of Trento and was only one of the four communities of Jehovah's Witnesses in Italy that was oppressed by the regime before the summer of 1939. The prefect in his report to Rome on 30 September 1936 firmly stated that the 'sect' functioned as an instrument of disintegration and in their pamphlet *Un governo desiderabile* [A desirable government] openly criticized the authorities, politics, religion, and even patriotism. Consequently, four people were confined for five years, let out after a couple of months, and later arrested again. The reason for the arrest was, according to the prefect of Trento, their continued proselytism. In 1937, another five Jehovah's Witnesses were confined, and the group was disbanded (Rochat, 1990, 275–280). In 1939 and 1940 the oppression of this group reached its peak, when OVRA became involved and due to a combination of different factors began to persecute Jehovah's Witnesses in even more 'efficient' ways than Pentecostals. This group came under the radar of OVRA because they thought they were Pentecostals, which exaggerated their supposed threat; furthermore, the doctrine of Jehovah's Witnesses rejected the moral authority of the State (which did not mean disobedience or rebellion). Still, Fascist authorities, sensitive to any form of dissidence, mostly on the grounds of their refusal to join the army (see: Piccioli, 2003, 501–510) and relations with foreign powers, systematically intervened against Jehovah's Witnesses. Several Jehovah's Witnesses were prosecuted also at the Special Tribunal for the Defence of the State, the community considered a form of political opposition disguised as a religious organization (Rochat, 1990, 275–302).

The case of Jews is very different and too complex to be discussed in detail in this contribution. While many members of the Catholic hierarchy and Catholic newspapers did not agree with the Racial Laws – i.e., racial anti-Semitism (cf. Moro, 2015, 87) – the traditional form of Catholic anti-Judaism gave rise to the aversion of a significant number of Catholics in Italy towards the Jews (cf. Miccoli, 2000, 605–606). Despite the opposition of the Catholic Church towards such repressive anti-Jewish legislation, no official rupture between the Catholic Church and the state occurred, although the relationship evidently deteriorated, even more because the Catholic Church generally disagreed with the 'friendship' between Mussolini and Hitler (see: Gentile, 2015, 40–41).

Complaints against several religious minorities after 1938 and especially with the involvement of Italy in the war were followed by hostile measures much more than in the past: premises were seized under the laws of war, oratories were closed, and permits for particular religious officials were revoked (Scoppola, 1973, 352–355; cf. Rochat, 1990, 256–330).

The exaltation of the national value of the unity of faith propagated by Fascism created an illusion of a confessional restoration, which incited the spirit of intolerance while the illiberal mentality of conservative Catholics assured the success of the regime's intention to use religion as a political instrument (Scoppola, 1973, 367).

RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN THE TRIESTE REGION AND VENEZIA GIULIA

When referring to 'fascismo di confine' (see: Vinci, 2011, 7) in Venezia Giulia often that which is specific to this area is stressed, and consequently similarities with other parts of Italy or Europe are undermined or even overlooked. This contribution attempts to address both, by presenting the issue of religious minorities at both the local and national levels.

The great majority of Protestants in Trieste, the seat of the province of Venezia Giulia, were of Italian or German background. A nuncio to Vienna, Emilio Taliani, made an observation in the beginning of the 20th century to the effect that Italian believers converted to Methodism not to 'become Slavs.' However, Methodist Pastor Dardi did imagine a 'Methodist mission' to bring a concord between Slovenians and Italians by eventually converting also the former to Methodism. His mission among Slovenians was not particularly successful because Methodists did not have enough resources and people that could speak Slovenian (Carrari, 2002, 122).

As many Protestants were members of the Masonic lodges, organisations that were banned in 1925 by the state authorities due to their supposed anti-Fascism, in 1927 the prefect of Trieste raised the alarm that Protestant Churches were taking cautious anti-Fascist action through their dependent institutions as well, which was disproved by the police. The surveillance of the Waldensian Evangelical Church, the Evangelical Church of Helvetic confession, the Methodist Church, the Anglican Church and the Evangelical Lutheran Church continued as in other parts of Italy due to Bocchini's order, but no particular information that would disturb the authorities was found (cf. Carrari, 2002, 156–158). Although some individuals were suspected to have anti-Fascist sentiments, among them pastor Umberto Ghetti from Pula and pastor Dardi, no measures were then taken (Carrari, 2002, 158). The 'suspicious behaviour' of Protestants in Venezia Giulia were thus especially in the 1920s mostly related to their involvement in Freemasonry.[6] However, in Trieste, also leading members of the Jewish community were freemasons (Apollonio, 2004, 78–80; Pirjevec, 2016, 722), which was a peculiar occurrence.

In Venezia Giulia the oppression of some non-Catholic religious communities intensified during the years before World War II. Most evidently in the case of Jews after the introduction of the Italian Racial Laws in October 1938, when Mussolini chose Trieste as a central stage for the attack. Previously, Jews were very influential in Trieste, with high-ranking members even in the Fascist Party. Jewish communities also existed in other cities in Venezia Giulia, such as Gorizia, Rijeka and Opatija.

Anti-Semites were in the time of the implementation of the Italian Racial Laws warning people of a 'Jewish conspiracy,' including that they possess too much power in the

6 ASTs, 37, 11511/481. The letter of the prefect of Trieste to the attorney general. Trieste, 5. 4. 1930.

economy and in politics in proportion to the Catholic majority (Podbersič, 2016, 843; Bon, 2000, 85–86). In Venezia Giulia the society was overrun by the strong emotions of nationalism and ethnocentrism of so-called border fascism that had since the rise of fascism a clear 'racial' connotation especially in relation to Slovenians and Croats. The public had no particular issues accepting discriminatory measures against another ethnic/religious community (Podbersič, 2016, 845; Bon, 2000, 85–86, 153). However, there was also some weak opposition to the Racial Laws, particularly based on two grounds: some entrepreneurs noted the unfavourable economic effects of these measures on the commerce, while politically the difference in opinion arose in regard to the relations with the Third Reich and especially the Anschluss (Bon, 2000, 154).

Another religious denomination that was in other parts of Italy relatively tolerated by the authorities, but stands out due to state oppression and the opposition of the Catholic Church in Venezia Giulia, is The Seventh-day Adventists that formed its first group with a pastor, Franco Einspieler, in Trieste in 1925. There is not much information on the early years of community's existence present in the city of Trieste and the countryside area between Trieste and Koper, but when in 1939 pastor Loosen returned to Germany, a crisis emerged. Consequently, part of the followers joined the movement called 'reformed Adventists' [avventisti riformati], while at the same time the community underwent increased police oppression that nearly put an end to this church. Only after World War II, however, the Adventist church really started to prosper (Rochat, 1990, 187; Carrari, 2002, 152).

In the borderland, forced Italianization made the Catholic Church and Fascist regime more susceptible to any form of 'disturbance' (cf. Pelikan, 2018a, 208–211; Pelikan, 2013, 314–316) that did not fit their image of *italianità* (cf. Batič, 2016, 819–820). As among the front-runners of the Adventist Church were Slovenians, a 'double minority' (cf. Măran & Đurić-Milovanović, 2015, 87) – i.e., a religious and national 'Other' – they were a more likely target of denunciations and police surveillance. Moreover, some Adventist publications were printed in Yugoslavia – although 'pacifist' Christian groups (Adventists, Jehovah Witnesses, Nazarenes etc.) were not recognized there and thus all gatherings were technically prohibited (Đurić-Milovanović, 2017, 450) – which brought about further suspicion (Rochat, 1990, 187; Sala, 1974, 37–41).

Still, as in other parts of Italy, in Venezia Giulia the oppression of the non-Catholic population was almost non-existent before 1938. In addition, there was no Pentecostal community in the region. The Serbian Orthodox congregation, for example, was allowed to have a non-Italian school in the region, which continued to operate after 1930, though only citizens of Yugoslavia were allowed to visit it (Bajc, 2003, 34). Still, Protestants and 'other religious sects' were under surveillance by the police from as early as 1927 and a subject of reports by anonymous informants. Worse oppression was experienced only by Jews and Adventists (particularly beginning in 1940) in Venezia Giulia. Adventists were several times reported to the police by the diocesan curia bothered by the 'religious propaganda' of various evangelical groups (Sala, 1974, 40). In the document from the Diocesan archive of Trieste sent by the police commissioner of Trieste to the bishop of Trieste and Koper Antonio Santin on 7 November 1938 the dissemination of the Adventists' periodical (*L'Araldo di Verità*) is mentioned, a matter which had been reported by

the Office of the Bishop to the police already in September 1936 and dealt with. The commissioner concluded with the words that he would examine whether the same or other people were engaged, and proceed according to the findings.[7] This interference and breach of religious autonomy was just a prologue. The curia in January 1940 received a complaint by the Slovenian Catholic priest Mazzarolli [Macarol] from Servola/Škedenj. Among the 'disturbances' stated by the priest Mazzarolli was Adventists' non-attendance at school on 'Fascist Saturday' because their masses took place on that day of the week.[8] Accordingly, the Bishop's office ordered a report on the activities of Adventists also from the parish priest of S. Antonio Taumaturgo in Trieste, where religious services took place every Saturday at Via Coroneo. This Adventist community was, according to the priest, comprised of about 150 people, and the service was hosted by a Slovenian family.[9]

Following the response of the Bishop's office to the reports of the priests on Adventist proselytization, the police commissioner agreed with the Catholic curia about the seriousness of the 'issue,' indicating that Adventists' activities were false and subversive propaganda that divide people, citing Mussolini that what is done against the State and the Nation is a crime.[10] Naturally, the police measures became more aggressive towards Adventists soon after Italy joined the war; many of the Adventists were Slovenians and so considered more likely to be a fifth column; they were associated with the United States as well, and promoted pacifism as did certain other Protestant denominations. The priest Mazzarolli correctly foresaw in his letter from August 1940 that

> *the civil authority will do much more* [than before Martial law was imposed] *because, the sect takes advantage of the war by paying the poor people to join their flock, they draw children in their midst while their fathers perhaps pour their blood for their country.*[11]

The hint of bribery, that may not have any foundation, is present also in a report from a priest from Trieste who mentioned that most of the adherents are poor workers to whom, 'in a certain abundance,' subsidies (money, food and clothing) are distributed. Often, in this way, whole families would be supported.[12] In fact, Adventists in Italy were dependent on the Adventist mission, in particular the European division located in Bern, who appointed their leadership and provided the necessary funds, in addition to a very high level of internal contributions (the Adventists paid a tithing) for the maintenance of

7 ADT, 1938/623, Curia vescovile di Trieste e Capodistria, Police commissioner of Trieste to the bishop Antonio Santin. Trieste, 22. 11. 1938.

8 ADT, 1940/40, Curia vescovile di Trieste e Capodistria, Propaganda protestante. Priest of Servola/Škedenj to the Office of the Bishop of Trieste and Koper. Trieste, 8. 1. 1940.

9 ADT, 1940/40, Curia vescovile di Trieste e Capodistria, Propaganda protestante. Priest of S. Antonio Taumaturgo to the Office of the Bishop of Trieste and Koper. Trieste, 5. 3. 1940.

10 ADT, 1940/40, Curia vescovile di Trieste e Capodistria, Propaganda protestante. Police commissioner of Trieste to the Office of the Bishop of Trieste and Koper. Trieste, 4. 4. 1940.

11 ADT, 1940/40, Curia vescovile di Trieste e Capodistria, Propaganda protestante. Priest of Servola/Škedenj to the Office of the Bishop of Trieste and Koper. Trieste, 5. 8. 1940.

12 ADT, 1940/40, Curia vescovile di Trieste e Capodistria, Propaganda protestante. Priest of S. Antonio Taumaturgo to the Office of the Bishop of Trieste and Koper. Trieste, 5. 3. 1940.

an exceptional number of full-time pastors and missionaries, and also peddlers for the dissemination of biblical texts and widespread evangelization (Rochat, 1990, 19). Whether or not Adventist funding was dependent on their success in proselytizing, throughout history in times of civil strife poverty and repression have indeed been engines of religious change, while during times of plenty evangelicals rarely succeed in adding to their flock by preaching in suburbs of plenty.

The war did change the attitude of the civil authorities towards the Adventists. In December 1940 one of the weekly reports of the police in Trieste to the Ministry of the Interior stated:

> […] *the Catholic organizations grouped in the Catholic Action are directed by the Curia and have for some time shown a certain awakening, especially to counteract the Adventist action. The activity of these organizations has so far remained within purely religious limits* […][13]

The next section of the report mentions:

> […] *various Protestant and pseudo-religious sects that exist in this province do not cause excessive concern, because they still have little adherents and limited activity, with the exception of the 'Adventists', a community which has been recently developing especially among Slovenians. Their development has been cut short by known repressive measures and the Adventist sect is currently completely disorganized.*[14]

If the police on the volition of the Catholic diocese intervened against the Adventists in 1940, the year when Italy entered World War II, based on their likely 'subversive' actions due to the significant number of Slovenians in this religious organisation, connections with the United States and proclaimed antimilitarism, the opposition of the Catholic Church was a response to the increased Adventists' proselytization activities. Furthermore, two different, but partially overlapping discourses of 'Othering' (Dervin, 2016, 43–55) are present regarding *Slovenian* Adventists in particular: discourse, mostly propagated by the Catholic officials considering Slovenians as 'buona gente', good naïve peasants, who needed to be protected, and another, anti-Slavic discourse based on assumptions of the Fascist authorities that recognized Slovenians as inherently anti-Fascists (cf. Klabjan, 2007, 250–252) – i.e., separatist terrorists who just seek to avoid their military and other duties to the *patria*. However, both authorities – civil and Catholic – in Venezia Giulia, agreed that non-Catholic 'religious propaganda' was unacceptable as it threatens the unity of the nation.

13 ARS, SI AS 1829, t.e. 31, a.e. 575. Report on political and economic conditions in the province of Trieste. Trieste, 28. 12. 1940.

14 ARS, SI AS 1829, t.e. 31, a.e. 575. Report on political and economic conditions in the province of Trieste. Trieste, 28. 12. 1940.

CONCLUSION

The reasons for the Italian Fascist regime to intervene against religious minorities were usually based on suspicion of a non-Catholic community being involved in subversive activities, particularly in cases of connections with foreign powers, or when the state powers expected to gain some political advantage by supporting the accusations of the Catholic officials. Meanwhile, the Catholic Church sought every opportunity to condemn the 'heretics,' the religious 'Other.' On the other hand, civil authorities sometimes – within limits that suited them – backed Christian minorities, mostly in order to reduce the power of the Catholic Church. Throughout the years of the regime the surveillance and intervention intensified, the religious communities that experienced severe oppression in Italy aside from the Jews were especially Pentecostals, Jehovah's Witnesses and the Salvation Army, and mostly after 1938 and during the war when special laws were applied. For example, the Anglican Church in Trieste was closed in 1939 and the community dissolved (Carrari, 2002, 139, 156–157); and the Greek Orthodox' members found themselves in a difficult situation. Moreover, many religious minorities were dependent on financing from abroad and had central leadership in foreign countries that were not Italy's allies, which complicated their existence and relation with the Italian state.

In Venezia Giulia, on the one hand, there seem to have been fewer attempts on the part of the Catholic clergy and state regime to undermine non-Catholic religious groups than in other parts of Italy. After all, plenty of Catholic priests of Slovenian and Croat origin were already under surveillance, intimidated and confined (Kacin Wohinz & Verginella, 2008, 82–83), evidently oppressed by the Fascist regime due to their support of anti-Fascism or because they tried to preserve their national minority's language and heritage. These issues of the Fascist regime and since mid-1930s of the exclusively 'Italian' Catholic hierarchy with the Slavic Catholic clergy at least to some extent decreased their dislike of religious minorities. We should not assume, though, that Catholic clergy in Venezia Giulia was religiously tolerant or rather that the co-existence of religious communities was exemplary in the border region (cf. Pelikan, 2018b [forthcoming]), but foremost that where other divisions existed religion was not as important a divisive factor. On the other hand, as previously indicated, in the case of Adventists the reaction of the Catholic clergy and hierarchy as well as the police was practically the same as in other cases of intimidation of minority Christian groups all over Italy. The police proceeded in the way the Catholic Church wished.

If the treatment of Protestants and some other marginal religious groups in Fascist Italy was dependent on the relations between the Catholic Church and the state authorities, the situation in Venezia Giulia was even more complicated and forced assimilation of national minorities left even less space for pluralism of any kind.

ZATIRANJE KRŠČANSKIH MANJŠIN V ITALIJI IN NA TRŽAŠKEM MED OBEMA VOJNAMA IZ PERSPEKTIVE FAŠISTIČNEGA REŽIMA IN KATOLIŠKE CERKVE

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POVZETEK

V članku je analizirano stopnjevanje fašističnega nasilja nad verskimi manjšinami v obdobju med obema vojnama v Italiji. Na podlagi arhivskih virov predvsem policije in tržaško-koprske škofije ter literature so obravnavana posredovanja bodisi Fašistične milice bodisi civilnih oblasti, ki jih je večinoma spodbudila Katoliška cerkev. Le-to so izrazito motile prozelitistične dejavnosti protestantskih skupnosti. Vmešavanja v avtonomijo nekatoliških verskih skupnosti so se povečala po letu 1929, ko je bila podpisana Lateranska pogodba, ki je ponovno potrdila Katoliško cerkev kot državno Cerkev, in s sprejemom Zakona o priznanih verskih skupnostih istega leta. Ta zakon, ki mu je sledil dopolnilni dekret leta 1930, je na videz strpno urejal razmere med državo in verskimi manjšinami, dejansko pa so bile določbe zakona kasneje, predvsem po letu 1939, zlorabljene za upravičevanje nasilnih ukrepov proti priznanim in nepriznanim verskim skupnostim. Tako so binkoštnike leta 1935 prepovedali na podlagi argumenta, da so njihove aktivnosti v nasprotju z javno moralo; preganjane so bile med drugimi tudi Jehove priče, zlasti zaradi njihovega antimilitarizma in povezav s tujino.

V okviru raziskave razmer na področju Julijske krajine, kjer so bili v ospredju medetnični spori, se posebna pozornost namenja adventistom v Trstu in okolici. Ti so bili med vsemi ne-katoliškimi krščanskimi skupnostmi podvrženi najbolj nasilnim ukrepom fašističnih oblasti na pobudo škofijske kurije v Trstu. Ta sprega med najvplivnejšima institucijama v državi se pojavlja kot vzorec v celotni Italiji. Mnogi adventisti so bili slovenske narodnosti, kar je bil pri fašističnih oblasteh dodaten razlog za sumničavost, saj so pripisovali domala vsem pripadnikom narodnih manjšin protifašistična ‚čustva'. S posredovanjem leta 1940 je kvestura izrazila strinjanje s katoliško hierarhijo, da verska propaganda protestantov škodi enotnosti italijanske države, in tako povzročila skorajšnji razpust Krščanske adventistične cerkve na tem območju.

Ključne besede: religija, fašizem, zatiranje, verske manjšine, Katoliška cerkev, Italija, Julijska krajina, Trst

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PREPOVED RABE SLOVENŠČINE V BENEČIJI LETA 1933 V LUČI NA NOVO ODPRTIH VATIKANSKIH ARHIVOV

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IZVLEČEK

O zgodovini Cerkve v Julijski krajini v času med obema vojnama je bilo že veliko napisanega. Temeljni premik na področju dostopnosti arhivskega gradiva se je zgodil z odprtjem arhivov za obdobje Pija XI. Preseneča tako z obsegom gradiva kakor z množico dokumentov, ki minuciozno obravnavajo razmere v Julijski krajini v trikotniku Cerkev--režim-manjšina. Gre prav za prav za nekakšen "Wikileaks", ki z dokumentacijo razkriva vse pomembnejše dogodke, ki so imeli kakršenkoli odmev v lokalni, državni (italijanski) ali širši jugoslovanski oziroma evropski javnosti. Na podlagi teh novo dostopnih dokumentov avtor opisuje prepoved rabe slovenščine v Benečiji leta 1933.

Ključne besede: Julijska krajina, Pij XI., Vatikanski arhivi, slovenščina v Cerkvi, Benečija leta 1933

IL DIVIETO DELL'USO DELLO SLOVENO NELLA SLAVIA FRIULANA NEL 1933 ALLA LUCE DEI DOCUMENTI VATICANI RECENTEMENTE RESI PUBBLICI

SINTESI

Tanto è stato già scritto sulla storia della Chiesa in Venezia Giulia nel periodo tra le due guerre. La svolta fondamentale per quanto riguarda l'accessibilità del materiale archivistico, però, è avvenuta con l'apertura degli archivi relativi al pontificato di Pio XI. Sorprende sia il volume dell'intero materiale sia la moltitudine di documenti che affrontano minuziosamente la situazione nella Venezia Giulia all'interno del triangolo Chiesa-regime-minoranza. Si tratta di un "Wikileaks", per così dire, che in maniera documentata fornisce informazioni su ciascun evento di risonanza, anche minima, a livello locale, nazionale (italiano), jugoslavo o più ampiamente europeo. In base a questi documenti resi solo di recente accessibili, l'autore fornisce quindi una descrizione del divieto dell'uso dello sloveno nella Slavia Friulana del 1933.

Parole chiave: Venezia Giulia, Pio XI, Archivi vaticani, lingua slovena nella Chiesa, Slavia Friulana nel 1933

UVOD[1]

O zgodovini Cerkve v Julijski krajini v času med obema vojnama je bilo že veliko napisanega. Že pregled literature je obsežen tako v slovenskem (Kacin Wohinz, 1986; Marušič, 1987) kot v italijanskem zgodovinopisju (Blasina, 1993; Ferrari, 1981). V zadnjih desetih letih pa sta se zgodila dva premika, ki prinašata dostop do novih virov in sta za zgodovino Cerkve v Julijski krajini, ključna: prvi je odprtje arhiva Tajnega krščanskosocialnega gibanja za celotno obdobje med obema vojnama leta 2010, ki ga zdaj hrani Pokrajinski arhiv v Novi Gorici, drugi je odprtje Vatikanskih arhivov za obdobje Pija XI. leta 2006. Za problematiko odnosov v trikotniku med slovensko duhovščino in italijansko cerkveno hierarhijo ter fašističnimi oblastmi v Rimu in v Julijski krajini so posebej zanimivi fondi v AA.EE.SS – *Congregazione degli Affari Ecclesiastici Straordinari, Italia* (III e IV periodo). To področje delovanja Svetega sedeža je spadalo pod *Segreteria di Stato, Sezione per i Rapporti con gli Stati, Archivio Storico* (S.RR.SS.).

Danes je mogoče tako zgodovino odnosa med Cerkvijo in državo v fašistični Italiji kakor specifike relacije Cerkev – fašizem v Julijski krajini, opisovati torej iz štirih zornih kotov, ki nam dajejo možnost oblikovanja raziskav na prvovrstnem arhivskem gradivu: arhivih lokalnih cerkvenih in posvetnih oblasti (dekanij, škofij, policije, kvesture in prefektur), Državnih arhivih v Rimu (pri Zunanjem ministrstvu, Notranjem ministrstvu, itd.), arhivu krščanskosocialnega gibanja in nazadnje in za našo razpravo najpomembnejše – Vatikanskih arhivih za obdobje Pija XI. (tj. 1922–1939).

Temeljni premik na področju dostopnosti arhivskega gradiva se je zgodil pred dobrimi desetimi leti, z odprtjem arhivov za obdobje Pija XI., ki nas preseneča tako z obsegom gradiva kakor z vsebinami množice dokumentov, ki zelo minuciozno obravnavajo razmere v Julijski krajini v trikotniku Cerkev–režim–manjšina ob "oboroženi meji". Gre pravzaprav za nekakšen "Wikileaks", ki z dokumentacijo razkriva ozadja vseh pomembnejših dogodkov znotraj Cerkve v Julijski krajini, ki so imeli kakršenkoli odmev v lokalni, državni (italijanski) ali širši (jugoslovanski oziroma evropski) javnosti. O vsebinah na novo dostopnega gradiva je bilo do sedaj malo objavljenih raziskav (Pirjevec, 2006; Pelikan, 2012).

Dokumenti nam nazorno prikazujejo, kako natančno je probleme v Julijski krajini spremljala papeška pisarna, pravzaprav kardinal Eugenio Pacelli, poznejši Pij XII. osebno, saj je z njegovim podpisom oziroma parafo (signaturo) označena tudi večina omenjene dokumentacije. Iz dokumentov Komisije za izredne zadeve (*Affari Ecclesiastici Straordinari*) izhaja, da je bila Julijski krajini in Slovencem namenjena prav posebno intenzivna pozornost papeške pisarne, v kontekstu obravnave slovenske manjšine. Uničujoča politika do manjšine znotraj Katoliške cerkve se je začela šele po konkordatu leta 1929. Čas sovpada z nastopom kardinala Eugenija Pacellija (leta 1930), poznejšega Pija XII., na čelo vatikanske državne pisarne (*Segreteria di Stato*). Danes je torej mogoče osvetliti

1 Članek je nastal v okviru raziskovalnega programa *Sredozemlje in Slovenija* št. P6-0272 in raziskovalnih projektov *Oborožena meja. Politično nasilje v severnem Jadranu, 1914–1941* št. J6-7152 ter *Antifašizem v julijski krajini v transnacionalni perspektivi, 1919–1954* št. J6-9356, ki jih financira Javna agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije.

dogajanje v Julijski krajini na podlagi dokumentov iz arhiva Pija XI. in s tem zaokrožiti pomanjkljivo vedenje o ozadjih ključnih dogodkov na relaciji Cerkev – režim – slovenska manjšina v Julijski krajini. V dokumentih je zdaj pojasnjena vrsta, do sedaj spornih oziroma ne dovolj jasno raziskanih dogodkov v zgodovini Cerkve v Julijski krajini med obema vojnama (izsiljen odstop nadškofa Sedeja, izsiljen odstop škofa Fogarja, ukinitev slovenskega cerkvenega tiska, zamenjava slovenskih redovnikov z italijanskimi itd.).

Na primeru dokumentacije iz omenjenega arhiva v Vatikanu bom v prispevku (kot študijo primera) predstavil ozadje prepovedi rabe slovenskega jezika v Benečiji leta 1933.

SPLOŠNA SLIKA

Pred konkordatom – dvajseta leta

Dvajseta leta so bila čas, ko se je bil Sv. Sedež za preganjano slovensko in hrvaško duhovščino pripravljen zavzeti. Slednja je imela resnične težave predvsem z državnimi oblastmi, ki so dopuščale nasilje lokalnih fašistov nad duhovščino in slovenskim ter hrvaškim prebivalstvom v Julijski krajini. Nasilju nad duhovščino, ki je izbruhnilo ob božiču 1920 v Istri pred volitvami spomladi 1921 je namreč sledila javna reakcija Vatikana. Te dogodke je v pastirskem pismu dne 21. maja 1921 najprej obsodil novi tržaški škof, Karlinov naslednik Angelo Bartolomasi, za tem pa tudi papež Benedikt XV. Benedikt XV. se je v odgovoru tržaškemu škofu zavzel za preganjane slovenske in hrvaške duhovnike (Klinec, 1979, 19).

Zbor svečenikov sv. Pavla je poslal Bendiktu XV. zahvalno pismo v imenu vse duhovščine, katoliške inteligence ter slovenskega in hrvaškega ljudstva v Julijski krajini (ACS, UCNP, f. 81).

Tajne vizitacije in poročila iz Julijske krajine pred konkordatom leta 1929

Tudi poročila o položaju v Julijski krajini, ki so iz primorskih škofij prihajala v Vatikan, so bila v 20ih letih slovenski in hrvaški manjšini naklonjena. Lahko bi govorili o nekakšni generalni "liniji papeža Benedikta XV." v odnosu do Slovencev in Hrvatov v Julijski krajini, ki sovpada z nerešenim "rimskim vprašanjem" in relacijo fašizem – Katoliška cerkev v širšem italijanskem državnem okviru. Kot primer takega dokumenta, rezultata tajne vizitacije (kakršnih je v Vatikanskem arhivu več), bom kratko predstavil poročilo tajne vizitacije v Julijski krajini julija in avgusta 1928. Tajni papežev vizitator (nadškof Gaetano Malchiodi), ki je vizitacijo izvajal, je v uvodu v poročilo naslovljeno na tedanjega državnega tajnika Sv. Sedeža Pietra Gasparrija, zapisal:

> *Imam čast predstaviti vaši prevzvišenosti poročilo o moji tajni vizitaciji, ki sem jo opravil po nalogu sv.* očeta*, v škofijah Trst, Koper, Poreč in Pula, Reka in Zadar z namenom, da bi ugotovili kak*šno *je stanje Slovanov glede njihove verske oskrbe.* […] *Pred drugimi cerkvenimi dostojanstveniki v Julijski krajini sem skrbno čuval skrivnost misije in jim dal verjeti, da se tam nahajam kot turist na dopustu.* (ASV-AES, f. 141, dok. 16).

V nadaljevanju poročila vidimo, kako vestno je tajni vizitator opravil svojo nalogo, saj v poročilu ne manjka minucioznih opisov položaja v posameznih škofijah ali dekanijah, o ekscesih fašističnih oblasti v posameznih slovenskih vaseh, vse do npr. natančnega poročila o ozadju dogodkov ob bombnem napadu fašistov na koprsko semenišče leta 1925 (ASV-AES, f. 141, dok. 57).

Po mnenju vizitatorja, ki se sklicuje na slovensko in hrvaško nižjo duhovščino, "med ljudmi vlada prepričanje, da italijanski škofje podpirajo vlado v prizadevanju, da bi odvzeli Slovanom še tisto kar je ostalo od njihove narodne zavesti." (ASV-AES, f. 141, dok. 28).

Vizitator je bil tudi osebno očitno na strani slovenske in hrvaške populacije, saj v poročilu (v sicer nekoliko kolonialnem tonu) npr. preberemo, "to slovansko prebivalstvo ni nikoli delalo težav vladam, katerim jim je bilo podložno a ne dovoljuje, da se oblast dotika tistega kar jim je najbolj sveto, vere in jezika." (ASV-AES, f. 141, dok. 29).

Očitki o "panslavizmu" (s čemer je bila očitno mišljena naklonjenost Kraljevini SHS) naj bi po mnenju vizitatorja bili zgolj pretveza oblasti za politično preganjanje duhovnikov in ljudstva, saj je "očitno, da je program vlade čim hitrejša italijanizacija ‚tujerodcev' (*allogeni*) in se bo v ta namen uporabilo vsa sredstva." (ASV-AES, f. 141, dok. 29). Tajni vizitator ugotavlja tudi, da v šolah že zdaj ni več sledi česa slovanskega in tudi veronauk je v šoli povsem italijaniziran, kar se (njemu osebno) zdi nedopustno. Sicer minuciozno poroča o položaju v posameznih krajih Julijske krajine, o težavah tržaškega škofa Angela Bartolomasija, ki je svoje mesto zapustil, in o težkem položaju škofa Alojzija Fogarja, ki ga je nasledil.

Skratka, vizitacijsko poročilo je polno razumevanja za Slovence in Hrvate, vizitator ostro obsoja fašistične raznarodovalne metode, opozarja na nesprejemljivost nastavljanja italijanskih duhovnikov, ki ne znajo jezika ljudstva, med "slovansko" populacijo itd. Zaključuje z mislijo, da je program režima jasen, in sicer likvidirati slovansko duhovščino. Obtožbe o antiitalijanstvu slovenske duhovščine so po mnenju vizitatorja zgolj podtikanja in laži, v vzpostavljanju Zbora svečenikov svetega Pavla, v katerega so se leta 1920 organizirali slovanski duhovniki, pa vidi zgolj logično posledico nasilja nad njimi (ASV-AES, f. 141, dok. 65). Zaključuje z ugotovitvijo, da bo nastala nepopravljiva škoda, saj "se skuša nasilno uničiti vse kar je slovanskega, poteptati se skuša vse principe naravnega prava in iztrgati iz src tisočev in tisočev tisto, kar je pravica vseh ljudstev, pravica, da govorijo z Bogom v jeziku svojih očetov. […] Uresničuje se program, ki sega od Istre in Goriške do Trentina." (ASV-AES, f. 141, dok. 66).

Vizitator Malchiodi najbrž ni vedel, kako potekajo pogovori med fašistično vlado in Sv. sedežem o sklenitvi konkordata, ki se bo zgodil slabih šest mesecev po njegovem vizitacijskem poročilu.

Njegova naklonjenost manjšini pa je bila očitno tudi izraz splošne usmeritve v Vatikanu, ki pa se bo kmalu radikalno spremenila.

Konkordat 1929

Med Sv. sedežem in fašistično državo je bil dne 11. februarja 1929 po dolgotrajnih pogajanjih sklenjen konkordat, ki je pomenil konec skoraj 70-letnega spora med Katoliško

cerkvijo in državo v Italiji. Cerkev je dosti dobila in režim tudi – slovenska in hrvaška manjšina v Italiji pa veliko izgubila.

Med pogajanji je Sv. sedež najprej očitno res skušal zavarovati jezikovne pravice manjšin in izrecno je bilo v pogajanjih izpostavljeno tudi vprašanje verouka v maternem jeziku v novih provincah (v Julijski krajini in na Južnem Tirolskem). Vsebina tajnih pogajanj je postala znana zaradi indiskretnosti fašistične vlade in izvedelo se je, da je Vatikan postavil celo zahtevo, naj bi bili povsod tam, kjer primanjkuje duhovnikov slovenskega in nemškega jezika, nastavljeni duhovniki iz matičnih držav (PANG, BA, dok. 548).[2] Predstavniki italijanske vlade niso le zavrnili te zahteve, ampak tudi določbo, ki bi v konkordatu zagotavljala pravico do verouka v maternem jeziku. Obe zahtevi so potem predstavniki Vatikana umaknili. Po Besednjakovem in Bitežnikovem mnenju je bilo tako popuščanje Vatikana tem bolj nesprejemljivo, ker je italijanski šolski zakon (Gentile/Acerbo) posredno prepovedoval rabo slovenščine in nemščine pri verouku v šoli, razložljivo pa morda z obljubo, da bo fašistična oblast (še nadalje) dopuščala vsaj verouk v maternem jeziku (PANG, BA, dok. št. 548). Poleg tega konkordat ni prinesel niti zagotovila, da je verouk v maternem jeziku dovoljen vsaj še izven šolskih stavb, v cerkvah, vrata šole pa je odprl italijanskim duhovnikom (Juvančič, 1974, 105).

Spremembe

Po konkordatu 1929 se položaj hipoma popolnoma spremeni. Takoj so se pričeli stopnjevati represivni ukrepi oblasti, ki so multietnično podobo Julijske krajine radikalno spreminjali tudi na cerkvenem področju:

- ukinitev vsega slovenskega, tudi katoliškega periodičnega tiska (1930);
- odstavitev zadnjega slovenskega nadškofa v Julijski krajini Frančiška Borgie Sedeja 1931 in imenovanje italijanskega nacionalista in filofašista Giovannija Sirottija na čelo goriške nadškofije;
- prepoved rabe slovenščine v cerkvah v Benečiji leta 1933, na kar se Vatikan ni odzval;
- sistematična raznarodovalna politika administratorja Giovannija Sirottija v goriški nadškofiji (1931–1934);
- raznarodovalna politika njegovega naslednika Carla Margottija (1934);
- ukinitev vseh slovenskih in hrvaških samostanov v Julijski krajini do leta 1934 oziroma zamenjava slovenskih redovnikov z italijanskimi;
- prepoved rabe slovenščine v cerkvah v predmestjih Trsta leta 1936;
- prisilni odstop tržaškega škofa Alojzija Fogarja leta 1936, ki se je sodelovanju z režimom pri raznarodovanju manjšine s pomočjo Katoliške cerkve upiral;

2 PANG, BA, dok. 548. Glej tudi *Mussolini, der Vatikan und die Minderheiten*, ki je kot poseba številka časopisa Mittelungen über die Lage der nationalen Minderheiten in Italien izšla leta 1933 na Dunaju (Besednjak & Bitežnik, 1933). Ima knjižno obliko (80. str.), podpisana pa je z "južnoslovanski katoličani v Italiji". Avtorja sta Besednjak in Bitežnik, kar je razvidno iz rokopisa (Bitežnikova kaligrafija), ki je v arhivu (glej PANG, BA, 589, rokopis, nemščina). Med drugim je razvidno, da sta se pri kritiki konkordata sklicevala na delo dr. Theodorja Grentrupa (1932).

- pritiski s strani cerkvene hierarhije (tj. škofov G. Margottija, A. Santina, G. Nogare itd.) na slovenske in hrvaške duhovnike, naj poučujejo verouk italijanščini itn.

Vsi ti ukrepi so, kot je zdaj razvidno iz dokumentacije, potekali s soglasjem ali pogosto celo z navodili iz Vatikana. Ozadja naštetih dogodkov so danes nedvoumno razložljiva z novimi vatikanskimi dokumenti.

Preden se posvetimo primeru prepovedi rabe slovenščine v Benečiji leta 1933 velja kratko opozoriti na širši kontekst, ki ga lahko po konkordatu leta 1929 spremljamo kot specifičen pojav zlitja dveh ideoloških strategij, ki ju v historiografiji označujemo s specifičnima terminoma "fascismo di confine" (obmejni fašizem) s strani režima in "romanizzazione" (romanizacija) znotraj Katoliške cerkve.

Obmejni fašizem (*fascismo di confine*)

Na Primorskem sta v času med obema vojnama ideologija in politična praksa fašizma "mutirali" v posebno obliko, v t. i. "obmejni fašizem" (*fascismo di confine*). Obmejni fašizem je v praksi pomenil nekakšno podvajanje represije, saj specifiko obmejnega fašizma v "novo priključenih provincah" Julijske krajine (t. i. *provincie nuove*) definira nekakšna "dvojna usmeritev". Na eni strani gre za ideološko-politično usmeritev, ki je značilna za vso italijansko državo (sloni na mobilizaciji množic proti razrednemu boju v notranji politiki, v zunanji politiki pa je usmerjena v imperializem), na drugi strani pa je sočasno prisoten specifičen, pol-kolonialen odnos do novo priključenih pokrajin,[3] kjer je živelo slovensko in hrvaško prebivalstvo, takrat imenovano tudi "tujerodno" (t. i. *allogeni*). V diskurzih obmejnega fašizma je očitna "jukstapozicija" pojmov, kot so "manjvredni", "barbarski", "rasa" in "imperializem", ki nedvoumno signalizirajo kolonialni diskurz (Matajc, 2016, 943; Mithans, 2015). Francesco Giunta, ideolog obmejnega fašizma, je že leta 1919 v svojih govorih uporabljal sintagmo "slavo-comunisti". S tem pa ni označeval sprege med slovanstvom in komunizmom (in socializmom), kakor pozneje v času po drugi svetovni vojni, temveč je v kontekstu pojma *fascismo di confine* poudarjal njegovo bistveno značilnost – sočasno nevarnost slovanstva na eni in razrednega sovražnika fašizma (delavstva) na drugi strani. Videl ju je kot dve ločeni a sočasni nevarnosti: nacionalnih nasprotnikov (slovanskih/slovenskih) v novih provincah ter razrednih nasprotnikov (socialdemokratov/komunistov), ki so sicer predstavljali problem fašistični oblasti v vsedržavnem okviru (Vinci, 2011).

"Romanizacija" (*romanizzazione*)

"Generalno" usmeritev, ki je pogojevala razmere po konkordatu 1929, je predstavljala t. i. "romanizacija", ki je v praksi pomenila italijanizacijo Cerkve v Julijski krajini v kateri

3 V diskurzih obmejnega fašizma, npr. v Mussolinijevem govoru v Puli 20. 9. 1920 "jukstapozicija" pojmov, kot so "manjvredni", "barbarski", "rasa" in "imperializem" nedvoumno signalizira kolonialni diskurz (Matajc, 2016, 943): odnos do priključenih pokrajin se v analizi diskurzov kaže kot kolonialna politika do "kolonije v bližini" (*proximate colony*).

je imela slovenska in hrvaška duhovščina v tridesetih letih še vedno številčno večino. Represivne ukrepe nad slovensko in hrvaško manjšino znotraj Cerkve v Julijski krajini, je praviloma spremljal predhodni neposredni tajni dogovor na relaciji fašistični režim – Vatikan. Temu je sledil odločen nastop lokalnih oblasti, na njihove pritožbe pa so predstavniki Vatikana odgovorili, da so proti zakonom državnih oblasti - nemočni. Slovenski in hrvaški duhovniki so se "romanizaciji" upirali povezani v Zboru svečenikov sv. Pavla. Prav tako so se romanizaciji upirali furlanski duhovniki saj je slednja posegala v pravice vseh etničnih manjšin v Julijski krajini. Kot je zapisal italijanski zgodovinar Luigi Tavano, je "romanizacija" pomenila soočenje dveh oblik katolicizma, v prvi vrsti pa dveh cerkveno-političnih stvarnosti: "Ni mogoče razumeti aktualnega zgodovinskega dogajanja v vsej kompleksnosti, kakor tudi ne globokega prepada, ki se je odprl v njem po prvi svetovni vojni, brez upoštevanja temeljnega cenzurnega mehanizma – preteklost naj bi bila v celoti cenzurirana, saj 'se je dogajala pod Avstrijo ...', kar bi imelo za posledico izgubo zgodovinskega spomina, brez katerega narod ne obstoji." [4] Od konca prve svetovne vojne se je v Julijski krajini hitro zmanjševalo število slovenskih in hrvaških duhovnikov. Teh je bilo leta 1918 še več kot 500, leta 1929 pa samo še 272. Popolno izključitev slovenskega in hrvaškega elementa v Cerkvi Julijske krajine pa je nazadnje preprečila druga svetovna vojna. Arhivsko gradivo v Vatikanu ne pušča o tem nobenega dvoma več. Prav tako ni dvoma o tem, da se je radikalen obračun z manjšino v Julijski krajini znotraj Cerkve začel šele po podpisu konkordata leta 1929, saj dokumenti tu kažejo na jasno cezuro.

Človek "božje previdnosti" (kot je Mussolinija imenoval Pij XI.) pa tudi po konkordatu 1929 ni mogel radikalno dezavuirati dotedanje politike Sv. sedeža do manjšine ali ga kompromitirati pred domačo in tujo javnostjo s preveč "radikalnimi ukrepi", saj je ta z režimom sodeloval kot nikoli poprej v zgodovini združene italijanske države. Paradoks je bil v tem, da radikalen obračun (z "enim zamahom") s slovanskimi duhovniki torej ni bil mogoč, ker je bila Cerkev preblizu režimu.

Vatikansko gradivo tako prinaša dober vpogled v postopke pri imenovanju škofov, zakulisja odstavljanja cerkvenih dostojanstvenikov v Julijski krajini z intrigami, če so predstavljali oviro italijanizaciji manjšine znotraj Cerkve, intrige v vrhu lokalne cerkvene hierarhije, vse do poročil o povsem zasebnih zadevah posameznih dostojanstvenikov, ki so nastala na temelju omenjenih tajnih vizitacij papeževih zaupnikov, ki so po Julijski krajini potovali tudi kot "turisti" (ASV-AES, f. 141).[5]

PREPOVED RABE SLOVENŠČINE V CERKVAH V BENEČIJI LETA 1933

Kot raziskovalni primer enega od zgoraj navedenih ukrepov proti slovenski in hrvaški manjšini v Cerkvi Julijske krajine, bomo v luči novo dostopnih dokumentov v

4 "*Non sembra possibile intendere tutta la storia locale, nella profonda cesura che si apri in essa nel dopoguerra, senza tenere presente questo fondamentale meccanismo di censura – il passato era tutto da censurare, perche "sotto l'Austria": con la conseguente perdita della memoria, senza cui un popolo non sussiste piu ...*" (Tavano, 1982, 167–168).

5 *Trieste, Parenzo, Pola, 1928 Visita del Rev. Malchiodi per verificare la condizione dell'assistenza religiosa degli slavi.* Poročilo tajne vizitacije obsega 40 tipkanih strani.

Vatikanskem arhivu, predstavili primer prepovedi rabe slovenščine v Benečiji, poleti leta 1933. Natančen pregled dosedanje literature na temo je leta 2012 pripravil Tomaž Simčič (Simčič, 2012, 591–607). Od tujih avtorjev bi veljalo omeniti temeljno delo Lucie Ceci, ki se usmerja v analizo relacije med Vatikanom in fašističnim režimom (Ceci, 2013) ter delo Faustina Nazzija, ki analizira prepoved rabe slovenščine v Benečiji (Nazzi, 1995).

V prispevku pa predstavljam nove dokumente, ki nam omogočajo uvid v ozadje dogajanja. Za osvetlitev dogodkov v Benečiji leta 1933 je dobro seči nekoliko nazaj. Od 8. do 15. julija 1932 je bil eden vodilnih krščanskih socialcev, dr. Janko Kralj v Rimu, kjer je bil, kakor pravi, "v dolgih avdijencah pri škofu Pizzardu". (PANG, BA, dok. 537).[6] Mons. Giuseppe Pizzardo je bil tajnik vatikanske "Komisije za izredne zadeve"*,* ki je skrbela za stike z vladami posameznih držav (za sklepanja konkordatov,[7] imenovanja nuncijev itd.). Prvi človek omenjene komisije, nekakšnega "zunanjega ministrstva Vatikana", je s svojimi stališči dobra priča tedanjega časa in razmer. Iz poročila Janka Kralja je razbrati, na kakšni ravni je bila takrat pri Sv. sedežu obravnavana manjšinska problematika. V daljšem poročilu Engelbertu Besednjaku je opisal razgovore v Rimu:

> *Dosegli smo, da so se naša vprašanja dejansko (ne formalno) osredotočila v drž. Tajništvu. Med drugimi razgovori je načelno važen za vladajočo miselnost oni v torek 12. 7. P. je načel vprašanje o verouku – zakaj naši duhovniki ne gredo v šolo - saj otroci znajo laško, – prvo je zveličanje duš – Cerkev je zato poklicana, ne za obrambo jezika. ‚E una questione di alta morale cristiana. Mi dica, quale e per lei il valore piu alto, la salvezza delle anime o la lingua?‘*[8] *Prvi hip sem obstal, potem pa priznal, da pač vera; toda vprašanje je pri nas drugače postavljeno: Kaj koristi bolj zveličanju: verouk v domačem ali v tujem jeziku?* […] *P. je mimo argumenta vztrajal, da če otroci znajo laški za druge predmete, znajo tudi za verouk.* […] *Potem sem na listič napisal njegovo tezo: ‚Quando la gioventu di una minoranza ha imparato la lingua della maggioranza, la minoranza perde il diritto all' insegnamento religioso in lingua materna',*[9] *ter dejal: ‚Naj sv. Stolica izvoli razglasiti to načelo. Kaj bodo rekle nemške, madjarske, evropske manjšine!' P. je nato dejal, da to ni njegovo načelo marveč, da je hotel slišati naše argumente. Zahvalil sem se, rekoč, da sem bil v srcu prepričan, da sv. Stolica ne more razglašati takih načel državnega panteizma.* (PANG, BA, dok. 537).

Janko Kralj je svoje vtise o vatikanskih razgovorih v pismu Besednjaku strnil v ugotovitev: "Reči moram, da imam vtis, da v Vatikanu ne odloča toliko hoteni [namerni]

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6 Poročilo Janka Kralja Engelbertu Besednjaku o intervenciji v Vatikanu z dne 26. julija 1932.

7 Giuseppe Pizzardo je z Eugeniem Pacellijem na vatikanski strani vodil pogajanja za sklenitev konkordata tudi s Kraljevino Jugoslavijo. Engelbert Besednjak pa je kot zaupnik jugoslovanskega pogajalca Nikole Moscatella vplival zlasti na oblikovanje določbe o manjšinah v jugoslovanskem konkordatu, ki je predvidevala recipročnost za manjšine jugoslovanskih narodov v novo sklenjenih konkordatih (Mithans, 2013).

8 "*Gre za vprašanje katoliške morale. Povejte, katera vrednota je za vas višja, zveličanje duš ali materni jezik?*"

9 "*Kadar se mladina neke nacionalne manjšine nauči jezika večinskega naroda, izgubi pravico do veronauka v maternem jeziku.*"

nacionalizem kot nenavadna ozkost obzorja in nesposobnost vživeti se v tujo kožo." (PANG, BA, dok. 537).

Poznejši dogodki tega niso potrdili, niti jih ne potrjuje zdaj dostopna nova dokumentacija.

V Benečiji poleti 1933

V praksi je izgledalo drugače. Prvi temni oblaki so se nad slovenščino v Cerkvi v Benečiji pričeli zbirati, ko je videmski prefekt Temistocle Testa, 29. julija 1933 sporočil videmskemu nadškofu Giuseppu Nogari, da bo zaplenil slovenski katekizem, ki ga slovenski beneški duhovniki, kot je izvedel, nameravajo tiskati v Gorici. Zahteve prefekta lahko spremljamo v vatikanskem arhivu v pismu, ki ga je že naslednjega dne (30. julija) poslal kardinalu Pacelliju osebno nadškof Giuseppe Nogara (ASV-AES, f. 98, dok. 37). V njem se nadškof na kardinala Pacellija obrača z vprašanjem, "kaj mu je storiti?" (ASV--AES, f. 98, dok. 37).

Že v treh dneh, 4. avgusta, je sledil Pacellijev odgovor:

> *Upoštevajoč dejstvo, ki ste ga navedli vi sami – da populacija že zna tudi italijansko – in tudi dejstvo, da bo novi slovenski molitvenik takoj zaplenjen, se zdi smiselno, da se vaša ekscelenca ne vpleta v to vprašanje in tudi obvesti izdajatelje, da se distancira od vsake odgovornosti.* (ASV-AES, f. 98, dok. 38).

Dogodek pa je bil zgolj uvod v katastrofo.

Pij XI. in prepoved rabe slovenščine

Kot beremo v naslednjem pismu nadškofa Nogare državnemu tajniku kardinalu Pacelliju z dne 10. avgusta 1933, se je položaj v nekaj dneh ponovno in tokrat do skrajnosti zaostril. Nadškof Nogara se je znašel tudi v hudi osebni stiski in naslovil na državnega tajnika kopico vprašanj. Po intervenciji nadškofa Nogare je bila ideja o slovenskem katekizmu opuščena, a kot beremo v naslednjem pismu kardinalu Pacelliju se je položaj zdaj ponovno skrajno zaostril:

> *Prečastita eminenca,*
> *Zdaj je prišlo na sceno novo vprašanje, mnogo težje kot poprejšnje. Včeraj me je ponovno obiskal Njegova ekscelenca Prefekt in dejal, da ima neposredno od predsednika vlade Mussolinija ukaz, da zapleni vse primerke slovenskega katekizma, ki so še v obtoku in istočasno zaukaže v Benečiji izključno rabo italijan*ščine. […] *Duhovniki, ki bi se ukazu zoperstavljali bodo brez odlašanja zaprti ali poslani v konfinacijo. Ponovil mi je, da gre za ukaze predsednika vlade, ki je kot tak brez priziva in mi zatrdil, da ne bo odstopal niti, če bi interveniral Sv. sedež.*
> *Njegova ekscelenca Prefekt je zahteval, da jaz osebno sporočim slovenskim duhovnikom ukaze duceja.* […] *Quid faciendum? Duhovščina bo odgovarjala, da so to vpra-*

šanja o katerih odloča škof in obračali se bodo name. Kaj naj jim odgovorim? Naj jih pozovem k poslušnosti? In če kdo ne bo hotel ubogati kljub prefektovim grožnjam s sodiščem? In bo zato poslan v konfinacijo? Kaj naj storim?
NAPETO PRIČAKUJEM VAŠIH HITRIH IN NATANČNIH NAVODIL [velike tiskane črke v originalu]*, da se bom znal ravnati.* […] *Težko mi je tudi, da se vse to dogaja tik pred mojim odhodom na romanje v Rim.* (ASV-AES, f. 98, dok. 43).

Začel se je namreč neposreden in odkrit napad oblasti na rabo slovenščine v Cerkvi v Julijski krajini. Prepoved nadškofa ni dosegla v Rimu, kot beremo v dosedanji historiografiji (prim. Klinec, 1967, 79), temveč je bilo romanje priložnost za izogib nastalemu problemu …

V Beneški Sloveniji je bila slovenščina v rabi več kot tisoč let in tudi po priključitvi Beneške Slovenije Italiji leta 1866 je bila raba slovenščine v Cerkvi nemotena. Papež Benedikt XV., ki se je, kot smo videli, za ogroženo manjšino odkrito zavzel, je celo izrecno izjavil, da pravice rabe slovenščine v Cerkvi v Benečiji nihče in nikoli ne sme odvzeti (PANG, BA, dok. 853).[10] Enako določbo je vseboval tudi 27. člen takrat veljavnega cerkvenega zakonika, ki je to pravico označil kot pravico, ki “nikoli ne zastara” in ki “v nobenem primeru ne more biti odpravljena ali preklicana” (PANG, BA, dok. 853). Poleg tega je italijansko državo k temu zavezoval 22. člen konkordata. Tako je pomenil poseg civilnih oblasti v pristojnosti škofa kršitev 1. člena konkordata, s prepovedjo slovenščine v Cerkvi pa še kršitev 22. člena konkordata.

Čez dober teden, 21. avgusta 1933, je nadškof Nogara dobil odgovor neposredno – od samega Pija XI. In to (za čas in razmere) ni bila majhna stvar. Pošiljatelj in podpisnik je bil sicer državni tajnik kardinal Eugenio Pacelli, a na robu dokumenta lahko preberemo v drobni pisavi kardinala Pacellija stavek, ki je opremljen tudi z njegovim znakom (parafo):

“Besedilo tega pisma je kardinalu Eugeniju Pacelliju diktirala njegova svetost Pij XI.” (ASV-AES, f. 98, dok. 44).

Pismo se glasi:

Prečastita ekscelenca,
zaradi odsotnosti njegove prevzvišenosti mons. Pizzarda in lahko rečemo v splošni odsotnosti, ki je posledica letnega časa, vam moram na vaše pismo z dne 10. avgusta odgovoriti sam. Po vsestranskem premisleku se zdi, da je to primer, ko je potrebno aplicirati klasični in najjasnejši rek:
Episcopus utatur iure et munere suo! ...[11]

Duhovščina v Julijski krajini in posebej v Benečiji je v tem trenutku pričakovala pomoč Sv. sedeža. Nad trideset beneških slovenskih duhovnikov je pooblastilo duhovnika Josipa Kramarja in Boža Zufferlija, naj gresta posredovat k videmskemu nadškofu

10 Spomenica papeškemu legatu kardinalu Augustu Hlondu, izročene na II. Evharističnem kongresu v Ljubljani leta 1935, 5.

11 “Škof naj uveljavi svojo oblast in avtoriteto!”



Sl. 1: Engelbert Besednjak, vodja Tajne krščanskosocialne organizacije (fotografija v lasti avtorja članka).

Giuseppu Nogari. Škof se je znašel pod pritiskom duhovščine in vernikov. Duhovnika sta poslala tudi Piju XI. obsežno spomenico, ki jo lahko najdemo v državnem tajništvu (ASV-AES, f. 98, dok. 66–68).

V korespondenci med nadškofom Nogaro in kardinalom Pacellijem je zdaj (27. septembra 1933) sledila kar sedem tipkanih strani dolga spomenica položaja v Beneški Sloveniji s strani škofa Nogare (ASV-AES, f. 98, dok. 45–52). V njej se škof postavil na stran slovenske manjšine – ljudstva in še bolj slovenskih duhovnikov: “Kako naj se slovenski duhovniki zagovarjajo pred ljudstvom?” sprašuje nadškof Nogara kardinala

Pacellija (ASV-AES, f. 98, dok. 48). Očitno je kot poznavalec položaja v svoji škofiji vedel, da je prepoved absurdna in bil to pripravljen zagovarjati tudi pred kardinalom Pacellijem. V njegovi logični argumentaciji lahko v zaključku preberemo npr.:

> *Zakaj furlanski jezik ne predstavlja nobene nevarnosti za domoljubna čustva? Zakaj bi to lahko predstavljala peščica Italijanov* [Slovencev v Benečiji]*, ki govorijo drug jezik?* (ASV-AES, f. 98, dok. 48).

In opozoril tudi na posledice:

> *Ukaz o pridigah zgolj v italijanščini je prizadel večino prebivalstva, ki je tiho, ker se boji represalij. Nekateri pa so izjavili, da bodo v primeru nadaljnje prepovedi slovenščine, prenehali dajati običajne prispevke za vzdrževanje duhovnikov.* (ASV-AES, f. 98, dok. 45).

Nogara je nazadnje predlagal, da se vendar dopusti povzetke pridig v slovenščini, za mlajše od tretjega razreda osnovne šole pa tudi pouk verouka v slovenščini in italijanščini (ASV-AES, f. 98, dok. 49).

Prepoved pa je takoj dobila tudi evropske razsežnosti, za kar sta na Dunaju in v Ženevi skrbela Engelbert Besednjak in Jože Bitežnik. Prav tako sta sproti informirala tisk v Jugoslaviji, Avstriji in Nemčiji. Zelo hitro sta sestavila spomenico z naslovom "Denkschrift über die Lage der deutschen und südslawischen Katholiken in Italien".[12] V javnosti je bila prvič predstavljena in razdeljena novinarjem na vsenemškem katoliškem shodu na Dunaju (od 7. do 12. septembra 1933) (PANG, BA. dok. 1002). V njej ni manjkalo precej ostrih tonov. Med drugim je bilo zapisano, da "malopridnih načrtov italijanske države z manjšino ni mogoče izvesti brez sodelovanja Vatikana ..." (PANG, BA. dok. 1002) V spomenici sta bila odkrito napadena tudi administrator goriške nadškofije Giovanni Sirotti in tridentski škof Carlo Enrici (PANG, BA. dok. 1002).

V Kraljevini Jugoslaviji so o dogajanju poročali v "Slovencu" in "Jadranski straži", kar seveda ni ušlo izjemno obveščenemu papeškemu nunciju v Jugoslaviji Ermenegildu Pellegrinetiju, ki je takoj obsežno poročal kardinalu Pacelliju (ASV-AES, f. 98, dok. 60).

Še bolj originalen je bil beneški duhovnik Božo Zufferli, ki je obsežno spomenico že 4. septembra 1933 naslovil kar na predsednika vlade Benita Mussolinija. Odgovora sicer, dokaj razumljivo, ni dobil nikoli, a zanimivo bi bilo izvedeti, kako da se je njegova spomenica takoj znašla tudi v državnem tajništvu v Vatikanu, v rokah kardinala Pacellija (ASV-AES, f. 98, dok. 61–65).

Očitno je, da je fašistična vlada o zadevi sproti obveščala Vatikan! Posledično se nam vsiljuje še bolj zanimivo vprašanje, ki ostaja za zdaj brez odgovora – se je dogajalo tudi obratno?

Spomenico neposredno na Pija XI. sta 28. septembra sestavila in odposlala beneška duhovnika Josip Kramar in Božo Zufferli (ASV-AES, f. 98, dok. 66–68).

V dogajanje se je vmešal še administrator goriške nadškofije mons. Giovanni Sirotti, ki je pisal pismo nadškofu Nogari ter ga bodril, naj pri prepovedi slovenščine vztraja. V

12 "Memorandum o položaju nemških in južnoslovanskih katolikov v Italiji".

pismu navaja, da je končni cilj slovanskih duhovnikov tudi na Goriškem doseči imenovanje "slovanskega" nadškofa. Tudi to pismo se je takoj znašlo v rokah Pacellija (ASV-AES, f. 98, dok. 77–79). V teh razmerah se je oglasil tudi ljubljanski "Ponedeljski Slovenec". Med njim in tržaškim "Il Piccolo" se je vnela polemika v zvezi s slovenščino v cerkvah v Benečiji, o čemer je promptno poročal Pacelliju nuncij Ermenegildo Pellegrinetti v pismu z dne 18. septembra 1933.

V državnem tajništvu se sproži prava poplava spomenic, poročil in pisem – med drugim npr. spomenica skoraj celotnega uredništva ljubljanskega "Slovenca" papežu z dne 28. septembra 1933 (ASV-AES, f. 98, dok. št. 85–86). ali serija Pellegrinettijevih poročil iz Kraljevine Jugoslavije, skratka preveč dokumentov, da bi lahko našteli vse.

Najpomembnejši dokument v zadevi je brez dvoma dokončen ukaz kardinala Pacellija nadškofu Nogari, ki je 31. oktobra 1933 polemiko zaključil – kratko in jedrnato, očitno brez možnosti priziva:

Naš odgovor v poznani zadevi se glasi:
1. *Uporabljeno bo nekaj tolerance glede verske vzgoje fantkov in deklic;*
2. *Pridiga odraslim mora biti v italijanščini in tu ni dovoljen nikakršen povzetek* [v slovenščini]*;*
3. *Duhovniki, ki so se pritoževali v Vatikan so se izkazali zelo strastni* [v nacionalnem smislu].

S spoštljivim pozdravom. (ASV-AES, f. 98, dok. 83).

Videmskemu nadškofu Giuseppu Nogari pravzaprav ni kaj očitati. Do konca je ostal na strani svojih duhovnikov in slovenskega ljudstva v Benečiji. Dokončnemu ukazu se ni smel niti mogel več upirati. Vsa ta korespondenca, ki priča o njegovi drži, pa bi se morala prav za prav nahajati tudi v katerem od predalov videmske nadškofije …

Škof Gregorij Rožman pri Piju XI.

Dne 2. oktobra 1933 je skušal v zvezi s tem vprašanjem pri Piju XI. (na Besednjakovo in Bitežnikovo prošnjo) intervenirati tudi škof Rožman. Po Besednjakovem poročilu, ki navaja Rožmanove besede, je sprejem potekal precej napeto:

Dr. Rožman je bil v avdijenci 2. oktobra in imel zaradi manjšine z njim spor. Takoj, ko je začel pojasnjevati papežu težko cerkveno-politično situacijo našega naroda, ga je Pij XI. prekinil in se hudo razjezil. Rekel mu je, da je on bolje informiran o položaju kot je lahko Rožman in pokazal svojo indignacijo nad tem, da jugoslovanski katoliki sumijo v njegovo pravičnost. Rožman ga je skušal pomiriti rekoč, da papeža osebno nihče ne obtožuje in da so za razmere v Julijski krajini odgovorne civilne oblasti. Vendar Pij XI. ni poslušal njegove replikacije, temveč mu je v obraz povedal, da tudi on (Rožman) verjame v obtožbe, na račun svetega Očeta. Od besa je metal po zraku papirje in Rožman je moral prekiniti pogovor o tej stvari. (PANG, BA, dok. 12).

Intervencijo pri Piju XI. nam, po pričevanju škofa Rožmana, podaja tudi njegov biograf Jakob Kolarič, ki takrat sicer ni vedel za natančen datum avdience a vsebinsko v bistvenem potrjuje pričevanje Engelberta Besednjaka (Kolarič, 1970, 127–130). Zagotovo je papeževo občutljivost do vprašanja slovenske manjšine pogojevala vrsta mednarodnih akcij Engelberta Besednjaka in Josipa Bitežnika. Leta 1931 tudi nastop jugoslovanske škofovske konference, ki je močno odmevala v mednarodni javnosti. Takrat je namreč na pobudo Engelberta Besednjaka, zagrebški nadškof in predsednik jugoslovanske škofovske konference Antun Bauer, za 19. marec 1931 razglasil javne molitve za preganjano manjšino v Julijski krajini. Bauerjeva akcija je, kot je razvidno iz korespondence, presegla pričakovanja njenih idejnih avtorjev, saj je o tem pisala večina pomembnejših evropskih časopisov (Pelikan, 2002, 258–259).

Nazadnje v zvezi s problemom slovenščine v Benečiji ni zalegla nobena intervencija. Nasprotno, ukrep pa so še dodatno zaostrile lokalne policijske oblasti, saj je policija po župniščih sistematično izvajala hišne preiskave, pri katerih je plenila slovenske molitvenike in slovensko literaturo in časopise. Čez dobro leto je lahko videmski prefekt z zadovoljstvom sporočil v Rim:

> *Spoštovano ministrstvo obveščam, da je uspelo z energično akcijo, ki jo je sprožila tukajšnja prefektura, zdaj zlomiti še zadnji odpor najbolj zagrizenih slovenskih duhovnikov. Že pred nekaj meseci so v cerkvah prenehali tudi s kratkim povzetkom v slovenščini, ki so ga v zadnjem času še izvajali po koncu italijanske pridige. Tako je povsem uveljavljena odredba vlade z dne 7. avgusta 1933 ...* (ACS, NAW, T-586, mikrofilm št. 102, dok. 027426).

Prepoved rabe slovenščine v Benečiji je nazadnje obveljala za naslednjega pol stoletja.[13]

Epilog

V že omenjeni posebni številki dunajskega "Mitteilungen über die Lage der nationalen Minderheiten in Italien" sta nazadnje Engelbert Besednjak in Jože Bitežnik zapisala (1933), da gre v Benečiji leta 1933 za dogodek, ki je posebno nevaren kot precedenčni primer in kot "odločitev zgodovinskega pomena" (PANG, BA, dok. 853). To dejstvo je predstavljalo tudi učinkovit argument za nastop pred mednarodno javnostjo: "Odločitev sv. Stolice v svojem bistvu prinaša daljnosežne posledice, ne le za prizadeto manjšino, temveč za vse katoliške manjšine v Evropi." (PANG, BA, dok. 903).

Po Besednjakovem mnenju je šlo za pojav, ki naj bi bil v nasprotju z najbolj osnovnimi principi katolicizma:

13 Povsem jasno in nedvoumno je na ta vprašanja v resnici odgovoril šele poznejši Drugi vatikanski koncil – 30 let pozneje –, prepoved rabe slovenščine pri bogoslužju v Benečiji pa se je ohranila vse do leta 1976 (glej Kralj, 1991, 192).

Odločitev [Vatikana] *v sporu glede jezika v Beneški Sloveniji predstavlja prvi primer v zgodovini evropskih nacionalnih gibanj, ko se je Sv. sedež na škodo manjšine odločil odpovedati svojim najbolj izvornim, in tudi sicer vedno najbolj čuvanim in varovanim suverenim pravicam, in je pristal na to, da je državni program raznarodovanja, segel na versko področje. Gre za precedenčni primer, ki ga katoliški svet lahko sprejme le z največjo skrbjo.* (PANG, BA, dok. 903).

Obnašanje Vatikana v "beneškem primeru" pa je bilo po Besednjakovem mnenju nedopustno tudi s stališča konkordatne politike Vatikana:

Odločitev v vprašanju ‚Beneške Slovenije' je v zgodovini povojnih konkordatov prvi primer, da je sv. Stolica – namesto da bi se postavila v odločno javno obrambo kršenja državnega sporazuma – kršenje državne pogodbe na škodo manjšine s svojim obnašanjem dejansko sankcionirala. To pa je drugi precedenčni primer, ki ga katoliški svet prav tako lahko sprejme le z največjim vznemirjenjem. (PANG, BA, dok. 903).

V poročilu Janka Kralja Engelbertu Besednjaku na Dunaj lahko leta 1936 preberemo:

Beneška Slovenija:
Pretekla so že tri leta odkar v tej deželi ni več slovenske besede v cerkvah. Toda ljudstvo, kar ga je iskreno vernega, se ne more sprijazniti z novim stanjem. V avgustu so štirje možje iz Kozic (vikarija Kozice) šli k nadškofu prosit, naj jim pošlje vikarja veščega slovenščine. ‚Ga nimam, sicer pa je itak vseeno, ko je zdaj v cerkvah v rabi samo italijanščina', je dejal škof. Nato je vodja deputacije, mlad kmečki gospodar, rekel: ‚Eccelenza, si, a noi e stata fatta questa grande ingiustizia, ci hanno tolte le prediche slovene. Chi ha causato questo, ha commesso un criminalismo!'[14] *Nadškof mučno zadet.* [...] *Značilna je izjava mons. Kjačiča (Chiazig) v Terčmunu: ‚Neka stara pobožna žena mi je po laški pridigi dejala: Zdej videm, de je res, de so nam svet oča jezik ukrali'. (Inf. mons. Trinka.) Beneško-slovenska duhovščina je sestavila novo spomenico na papeža, ki jo po naših znancih dostavimo v Vatikan…* (PANG, BA, dok. 424).[15]

ZAKLJUČEK

Če sklenemo – v polemiko v zvezi s prepovedjo slovenščine v Benečiji so bili leta 1933 neposredno vključeni predsednik vlade Mussolini osebno (z navodilom videmskemu prefektu Temistocleju Testi, naj slovenščino prepove pod grožnjo konfinacije duhovnikov), Pij XI. in državni tajnik Eugenio Pacelli (poznejši Pij XII.), ki sta (očitno v dogovoru) dajala navodila videmskemu nadškofu Giuseppu Nogari, nazadnje, lokalna

14 "Da, vaša ekscelenca, nam je bila storjena velika krivica, odvzete so nam bile pridige v slovenščini. Kdor je to povzročil, je zagrešil zločin …"

15 Poročilo Janka Kralja Engelbertu Besednjaku in Jožetu Bitežniku z dne 30. septembra 1936.

slovenska duhovščina (oz. v njenem imenu slovenski duhovniki: Božo Zufferli, ki je pisal Mussoliniju osebno, duhovniki, ki so poslali spomenice v Vatikan, Ivan Trinko, Josip Kramar in Božo Zufferli), pa še administrator goriške nadškofije Giovanni Sirotti, ki se je s strastnimi antislovenskimi pismi v Vatikan kazal kot "poznavalec razmer" in si tudi na tak način prizadeval za mesto goriškega nadškofa. Nazadnje celotna jugoslovanska škofovska konferenca (Antun Bauer, Gregorij Rožman, itd.), jugoslovanski katoliški tisk, publikacije *Europäischer Nationalitäten-Kongreß*-a, za kar sta skrbela Engelbert Besednjak in Josip Bitežnik na Dunaju in v Ženevi, z vso zadevo se je ukvarjal tudi papeški nuncij v Jugoslaviji Ermenegildo Pellegrinetti, ki je imel s svojo obveščevalno mrežo popoln pregled nad tiskom in tudi siceršnjim dogajanjem v Kraljevini Jugoslaviji, in še bi lahko naštevali … Skratka, z vprašanjem slovenščine v Benečiji se je ukvarjala cela vrsta institucij in posameznikov, eminenc evropskega formata.

Ko danes prebiramo poročila o incidentih v Julijski krajini, poročila uradnih in še bolj tajnih vizitacij vrhunskih papeških diplomatov (Gaetano Malchiodi, Carlo Raffaello Rossi, Luca Passetto, itd.), tajne ankete med duhovščino, gore poročil, obtožb in diskreditacij slovenske duhovščine, ki so se (s strani administratorja Giovannija Sirottija, goriškega nadškofa Carla Margottija in drugih) znašle na mizi kardinala Pacellija (ki je, kot je razvidno, pripravljal krajše povzetke za Pija XI.), je očitno, da je bil Vatikan o razmerah v Julijski krajini izjemno natančno obveščen. Zagotovo bolje kot fašistična vlada.

Očitno je tudi, da je za analize položaja v Julijski krajini bilo porabljeno precej časa in energije – tudi z najvišjega mesta v Vatikanu, in očitno nikakor ni šlo za obrobno, minorno zadevo "nekje ob vzhodni meji", kjer bi se morda "po pomoti" zgodilo to ali ono, npr. prepoved rabe jezika ali zamenjava "slovanskega ali Slovanom naklonjenega" škofa.

Za natančen pregled celotne dokumentacije o Julijski krajini bi v Vatikanskem arhivu namreč potrebovali leta.

Iz vatikanskih dokumentov pa je jasno tudi, da so papeška pisarna, Kongregacija za izredne zadeve in Pij XI. po konkordatu leta 1929 dvignili roke od "nacionalističnih slovenskih in hrvaških duhovnikov", kot lahko preberemo v vrsti vatikanskih dokumentov (prim. PANG, BA, dok. 377). V resnici je imela cerkvena politika Vatikana v Julijski krajini po konkordatu 1929 povsem isti cilj kot posvetna oblast – izbrisati manjšino. Samo bolj postopno, v smislu poznanega "fortiter in re – suaviter in modo".[16]

Kar se je dogajalo v Julijski krajini med obema vojnama, je tako bil svojevrsten "Cuius regio eius religio",[17] ki ga je fašistična oblast uspela vsiliti Vatikanu po letu 1929.

V širšem kontekstu je šlo ne nazadnje tudi za ideološka spogledovanja Cerkve z režimom: od korporativizma do enopartijskega sistema ali kulta osebnosti in nazadnje vse do enačaja med državljansko in nacionalno pripadnostjo, tako značilnega za ideologijo režima. Mnoga od teh načel so formalno ali neformalno prevladovala tudi v Vatikanu.

Vendar in ne nazadnje, če vzamemo Vatikan tudi nekoliko v bran, v luči tedanjih geopolitičnih razmer – kdo si je takrat lahko predstavljal, da ta ozemlja dejansko ne bodo pripadala italijanski državi "za večno"?

16 "V zasledovanju cilja odločno, v pristopu blago."

17 "Čigar vlada, tega vera."

To ni bila več Italija 19. stoletja, ki je vojaško in politično nizala poraz za porazom in opazovala politično in vojaško dogajanje v svetu "iz tretje vrste".

Kdo bi lahko predvidel, da se bo spremenila meja države, ki je zmagovala v Španiji, severni Afriki in predstavljala eno od političnih, vojaških in diplomatskih velesil Evrope.

Kaj naj potem tu na njeni vzhodni meji počne peščica iredentistično in nacionalistično usmerjenih duhovnikov ter njim naklonjenih škofov, z idejami o lastni "slovanski" Katoliški akciji (prim. Mithans, 2016), z zahtevami po nastavljanju slovenskih duhovnikov med slovensko populacijo, z željo po učenju verouka v slovenščini, širjenjem knjig v slovenskem jeziku in tako naprej?

Niti Pij XI. ni mogel predvideti, da bo imperializem, kot ključna ideološka premisa fašistične ideologije, nazadnje zaigral italijansko vzhodno mejo, ki je bila – če seveda nanjo pogledamo s stališča nacionalne optike Kraljevine Italije – po prvi svetovni vojni več kot zgolj "zelo ugodna", taka, da je njen sopodpisnik, italijanski zunanji minister Carlo Sforza, menil: "rapalska razmejitev je dala Italiji kopensko mejo, ki je bolj popolna kot je bila pod rimskim imperijem ..." (Pleterski, 1996, 6).

BAN ON THE USE OF SLOVENE IN SLAVIA FRIULANA IN 1933 IN LIGHT OF THE NEWLY OPENED VATICAN ARCHIVES

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SUMMARY

Much has already been written about the history of the Church in the Venezia Giulia region during the interwar period. Yet a fundamental increase of available archival material has now occurred with the opening of archives related to the reign of Pope Pius XI. These are surprising in terms of both the extent of material and the multitude of documents dealing in painstaking detail with the situation in Venezia Giulia within the church-regime-minority triangle. They represent a sort of "Wikileaks", with the documents revealing all the events with any considerable amount of resonance in the local, national (Italian), Yugoslav or broader European publics. The destructive policy towards the minority within the Catholic Church, as the evidence shows, was only initiated after the Lateran Pacts of 1929. The moment coincides with the accession of Cardinal Eugenio Pacelli, later Pius XII, to the head of the Secretariat of State (Segreteria di Stato) in 1930. The measures against the Slovene minority within the Church in Venezia Giulia were thus implemented with the consensus of and often even according to the instructions by the Holy See, as is now clear given the new material providing information regarding the Church in Venezia Giulia. From the documents of the Congregation on the Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs (Affari Ecclesiastici Straordinari) it emerges that the Pope focussed particularly intense attention on Venezia Giulia and the Slovenes, in terms of the treatment of the Slovene minority in the region. Based on these new documents the author describes the ban on the use of the Slovene language in the Slavia Friulana of the 1933.

Key words: Venezia Giulia, Pius XI, Vatican Archives, Slovene language in church, Slavia Friulana in 1933

VIRI IN LITERATURA

ACS, **UCNP –** Archivio Centrale dello Stato (ACS), fond Capo dell'Ufficio centrale (UCNP).

ACS, NAW – ACS, fond The National Archives in Washington (NAW).

ASV-AES – Archivio Segreto Vaticano (ASV), fond Affari ecclesiastici straordinari (AES) (Italia (III e IV periodo).

PANG, BA – Pokrajinski arhiv v Novi Gorici (PANG). Besednjakov arhiv (BA).

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DINARSKA ALI JADRANSKA RASA? ITALIJANSKI ZNANSTVENI RASIZEM, SEVERNI JADRAN IN BALKAN

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IZVLEČEK

S pomočjo analize antropoloških znanstvenih člankov, monografskih publikacij in ego dokumentov prispevek naslavlja vprašanje, kako so italijanski rasni teoretiki, posebno tisti iz Severno-Jadranske regije, rasno definirali Slovane in kako se je slovenski znanstveni prostor odzval na italijanski znanstveni rasizem. Relativno številni italijanski rasni antropologi so povsem ali vsaj delno svoje raziskovanje posvetili Severno-Jadranski regiji ali Balkanu. Njihove artikulacije se običajno niso opirale na grobo retoriko in v nasprotju s fašističnim dnevnim tiskom, o Slovencih/Jugoslovanih niso pisali kot o “manjvredni rasi”. Kljub temu pa so vendarle podajali politično-motivirane izjave, s katerimi so zagovarjali italijansko ekspanzijo na balkanski prostor in so tako vsaj posredno diskriminirali Jugoslovane.

Ključne besede: rasizem, rasna antropologija, slovensko-italijanski odnosi, fašizem, Severno-Vzhodni Jadranski prostor

RAZZA DINARICA O ADRIATICA? RAZZISMO SCIETIFICO ITALIANO, L’ALTO ADRIATICO E I BALCANI

SINTESI

Con l’aiuto dell’analisi degli articoli scientifici antropologici, le pubblicazioni monografiche e gli ego documenti, il seguente articolo affronta la questione su come i teorici razziali italiani, specialmente quelli della regione del nord Adriatico, definirono dal punto di vista raziale gli Slavi e come reagirono gli esperti del campo scientifico sloveno al razzismo scientifico italiano. Un numero relativamente alto di antropologi razziali italiani ha completamente ovvero almeno parzialmente dedicato le loro ricerche alla regione del nord Adriatico o ai Balcani. Solitamente il loro linguaggio non si basava su una retorica austera e a differenza dai quotidiani fascisti non si riferivano agli Sloveni/Jugoslavi come a una “razza inferiore”. Nonostante ciò presentavano affermazioni politicamente motivate con le quali incoraggiavano l’espansione italiana sull’area balcanica e in questo modo almeno indirettamente discriminarono i Jugoslavi.

Parole chiave: razzismo, antropologia razziale, relazioni italo-slovene, fascismo, regione adriatica nord-orientale

UVOD[1]

Razlage, ki se opirajo samo na pomen izključevalnih ideologij kot je rasizem, in zanemarjajo vlogo drugih silnic, npr. geopolitičnih in gospodarskih okoliščin, nezadostno pojasnjujejo vlogo in razsežnosti političnega nasilja v odnosu do drugih etničnih skupin (Moses & Bloxam, 2011). Kljub temu ne gre spregledati, da so v preteklosti in še posebej v obdobju med obema vojnama psevdoznanstvene teorije pomembno utemeljevale grobo nasilne prakse v nacionalni in mednarodni politiki. Ideološka legitimacija nasilja tudi ni zaposlovala samo »običajno osumljenih« humanistov, torej literatov, novinarjev, zgodovinarjev in jezikoslovcev pri gradnji izključevalne narodne identitete, pač pa so jo z izumljanjem novih, domnevno biološko utemeljenih znanstvenih smeri podpirali celo naravoslovci (Ash, 2012; Turda, 2010; Turda & Quine, 2017).

Vede kot so rasna antropologija, rasna psihologija, statistika, evgenika, biotipologija, pa tudi geografija, serologija in demografija so z domnevno naravoslovno natančnostjo in objektivnostjo podpirale znanstveni rasizem in hranile ekspanzionistično politiko tudi italijanskega fašističnega režima. V zadnjem obdobju so izšla pomembna historiografska dela, ki pojasnjujejo vlogo uveljavljenih italijanskih znanstvenikov pri utemeljevanju rasističnih/diskriminatornih praks italijanskega fašizma (Israel, 2010; Cassata, 2011; Beer, Foa & Iannuzzi, 2010; Burgio, 1999; Gillette, 2002). Tovrstne študije pomembno razbijajo mit o »dobrih Italijanih«, saj postavljajo pod vprašaj zastarelo tezo, da italijanski fašizem biološkega rasizma sploh ni poznal, oziroma ga je šele tik na predvečer druge svetovne vojne bolj ali manj nepovoljno/pod prisilo prevzel od Nemcev. Toda, med tem ko natančno razdelajo odnos italijanskega znanstvenega rasizma do Judov in temnopoltega prebivalstva italijanskih kolonij, se njegovemu odnosu do Slovencev oziroma Južnih Slovanov po večini ne posvečajo (Collotti, 1999), zato ga bom vsaj v obrisih predstavila v pričujoči študiji. Vprašala se torej bom, če in kako so italijanskih rasni teoretiki, predvsem fizični antropologi iz obmejne regije, prispevali k legitimaciji fašističnega nasilja do slovenskega prebivalstva in ekpanzionistične politike na Balkanu in kako je na njihov diskurz s protiargumenti odgovorila slovenska (psevdo)znanstvena srenja.

O RASNI ANTROPOLOGIJI NASPLOH

Na prehodu iz 19. v 20. stoletje je dednostna teorija širila svoj vpliv na številne stroke, posebej fizično antropologijo. Raziskovalna vprašanja o »rasnem izvoru«, »rasnih spremembah«, »rasnem mešanju« in poglavitnih komponentah domnevno čistih ras, so se pomaknila v središča številnih raziskav. Koncept rase se ni več toliko gradil na kulturnih kriterijih, kolikor na bioloških, v ozadju telesnih in psiholoških razlik so raziskovalci iskali genske dejavnike (Teschler-Nicola, 2006; Turda, 2010; Turda & Quine, 2017).

Rasni antropologi niso uspeli povsem poenotiti kriterijev za določanje rasnih tipov. Nekateri so se pri svoji kategorizaciji ravnali »po tipični kombinaciji štirih dednih znakov

1 Članek je nastal v okviru projekta *Oborožena meja. Politično nasilje v severnem Jadranu, 1914-1941* št. J6-7152, ki ga je financirala Javna agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije.

(lastnostih)« (Škerlj, 1937, 158), torej po višini, barvi oči, barvi las in okrogloglavi (brahikefalni) ali podolgovati (dolihokefalni) obliki lobanje. Na podlagi naštetih kriterijev so razlikovali več evropskih ras, npr. dinarsko, norijsko, savsko, nordijsko, baltsko, alparmensko, sredozemsko in druge (Škerlj, 1937; Biasutti, 1941).

Mnogi fizični antropologi so deklarativno zavračali idejo o rasni čistosti posameznih etničnih skupin in nenehno poudarjali, da koncepta naroda ne gre enačiti s konceptom rase (Škerlj, 1934).

Kljub tovrstnim benevolentnim izhodiščem pa so, kakor opozorja Marius Turda, vendarle s podatki, ki so jih pridobivali s pomočjo raziskav na živih populacijah, poudarjali kvalitete na njihovem narodnostnem območju domnevno prevladujočih ras in s tem še dodatno krepili kulturne teorije o etnogenezi naroda (Turda, 2010).

Jugoslovanski raziskovalci so v skladu z antropološko šolo avstrijskega avtorja Viktorja Lebzelterja denimo svojo državo opisovali kot poseljeno s prebivalstvom, ki naj bi imelo poteze več ras, od katerih so zlasti dinarsko, prepoznavno po visoki rasti, temnih očeh, svetlih laseh in okrogli obliki lobanje, razumeli kot najbolj razširjeno in avtohtono (Škerlj, 1928; Biasutti, 1941). Združevala jih je tudi kritična drža do nacističnega nasprotovanja mešanju (evropskih) ras in poveličevanja čiste nordijske rase (Cergol Paradiž, 2015).

Italijanski fizični antropologi, so se pri razumevanju rase običajno umeščali v dve smeri, mediteranistično in nordicistično. Prva, ki jo je v začetku 20. stoletja utemeljil Giuseppe Sergi (1841–1936), je zarisovala kontinuiteto med novodobno italijansko državo in rimskim imperijem. Italijanom je pripisovala pomen utemeljiteljev zahodne civilizacije. Predvsem pa je poudarjala veljavo na apeninskem polotoku in tudi širše bojda avtohtone »mediteranske rase«, ki naj bi jo zaznamovali temni lasje in oči, nizka rast in podolgovata oblika lobanje (Gillette, 2002; Biasutti, 1941).

Nordicisti so na drugi strani sledili nemškim antropologom v poveličevanju nordijske rase, s svetlimi lasmi in očmi, visoko rastjo in podolgovato obliko lobanje. H nordijski rasi so na vsak način hoteli šteti tudi Italijane, zagovarjali so grob biološki rasizem do Judov in temnopoltega kolonialnega prebivalstva. Ta njihov skrajno rasistični pristop je leta 1938 dobil svojo materialno podlago v zloglasnem Rasnem manifestu (*Manifesto della razza*) in rasnih zakonih, s katerimi so med drugim prepovedali poroke Italijanov z afriškim prebivalstvom ali Judi. Glavni predstavniki nordicističnega tabora, med njimi npr. Guido Landra (1913–1980), Telesio Interlandi (1894–1965) in Lidio Cipriani (1892–1962), so svoje prispevke objavljali v reviji *La difesa della razza*, glasilu italijanskega znanstvenega rasizma (Israel, 2010; Cassata, 2011; Beer, Foa & Iannuzzi, 2010; Burgio, 1999; Gillette, 2002).

Poleg nordicistov in mediteranostov so se v Italiji s z rasnimi teorijami ukvarjali še drugi avtorji, npr. znani filozof in ezoterik Julius Evola (1898–1898), ki je poudarjal pomen duhovnih in zgodovinsko-kulturnih lastnosti ras pred antropološkimi (Gillette, 2002).

Tako kot ni bilo enoznačnih potez italijanskih rasističnih teorij, tako tudi najbrž ni bilo enovitega pogleda italijanskih rasnih teoretikov na Slovence, oziroma širše, jugovzhodni Slovane. Kakor pojasnjuje Marta Verginella, se je načeloma v historiografiji uveljavila teza, da italijanski fašistični režim do Slovanov ni vzpostavljal biološkega, ampak kulturni rasizem. Fašisti so verjeli v manjvrednost slovanske kulture, Slovence pokušali

podjarmiti z intenzivno raznarodovalno politiko, niso pa jih denimo diskriminirali na strogo biološki ravni recimo s prepovedjo mešanih zakonov. Najnovejše historiografske študije pa vendarle opozarjajo na to, da je ločnica med biološkim in kulturnim rasizmom pogosto zabrisana in je zato odgovor na vprašanje o pogledu italijanski rasnih teoretikov na Slovane morda veliko bolj kompleksen kot se je sprva mislilo.

O tem pričajo tudi stališča, ki so se že pred prvo svetovno vojno izoblikovala na narodnostno mešanem območju Avstrijskega Primorja, kjer so bila nacionalna trenja bolj poudarjena. Italijanski publicisti in zgodovinarji, ki so v Primorju nastopali s pozicije (politične in gospodarske) moči, so Slovane opisovali kot manjvredno, grobo in neotesano barbarsko ljudstvo, »kmetavzarje«. Negativna nastrojenost se je z napredovanjem političnega iredentizma in hkratnega vznika južnoslovanskih nacionalističnih gibanj samo stopnjevala (Verginella, 2016; Collotti, 1999). Tullia Catalan prepoznava dve fazi tovrstne stereotipizacije. V prvi, med letoma 1880 do leta 1907, so Slovane prvenstveno prikazovali kot neizobražene in necivilizirane. V drugi, radikalnejši fazi, med letoma 1908–1914, pa se omenjene prikaze (podobno kot v antisemitističnem diskurzu) še obtežili z metaforami iz živalskega sveta, ki so še bolj izpostavile podrejenost Slovanov (Catalan, 2015). Tik pred prvo svetovno vojno je denimo publicist Ruggiero Timeus reševanje domnevno nespravljivih odnosov med Italijani in Slovani predstavljal na načine, ki so se v svojem poudarjanju kvalitativnih razlik med rasami že močno približali odkritemu biološkemu rasizmu. Trdil je, da »civilizacije ne napredujejo s sporazumi, temveč z rasnimi boji«, ki se lahko končajo šele s popolnim uničenjem nasprotne rase (Verginella, 2016).

Med vojno, tik po njej in zlasti v obdobju fašizma se je protislovanska retorika okrepila, v tekstih italijanskih intelektualcev iz Avstrijskega Primorja sta se termina »kri« in »rasa« začela še pogosteje pojavljati (Catalan, 2018). Giuseppe Cobol je npr. predlagal prisilno asimilacijo in postopke za dokončno izselitev subverzivnih elementov slovanskega prebivalstva (Verginella, 2016). Tudi Mussolini je, kljub svojemu sprejemljivemu odnosu do rasnih konceptov (Gillette, 2002), na več mestih govoril o Slovanih kot «manjvredni in barbarski rasi», proti kateri je treba nastopiti z najstrožjimi političnimi sredstvi.[2] Toda ali so se tovrstne koncepcije »obmejnega rasizma«, ki jih je prevzemal Mussolini, oblikovale znotraj takratne znanosti in se zrcalile v utemeljevanjih najbolj znanih in pomembnih italijanskih antropologov?

ITALIJANSKI RASNI ANTROPOLOGI O SLOVENCIH IN SLOVANIH

Posamezni italijanski rasni antropologi so svojo raziskovalno pot vsaj delno, če ne celo v celoti posvetili severno jadranskemu prostoru ali Balkanu. Zanimanje za omenjene regije se je okrepilo že pred prvo svetovno vojno posebno med avtorji, ki so se rodili v Avstrijskem Primorju ali so delali na inštitutu za antropologijo v Padovi. Tako je v Trstu rojeni antropolog Ugo Vram že leta 1903 preučeval lobanje na Kranjskem (Vram, 1903), Vincenzo Giuffrida Ruggieri pa je raziskovalno polje še razširil z antropološkim razisko-

2 Glede Mussolinijevega odnosa do Slovencev glej npr. Pirjevec, 2016.

vanjem Dalmacije in celo Albanije (Giuffrida Ruggieri, 1906; Pizzato, 2011/2012). Med tem je Enrico Tedeschi (1860–1931), vodja zgoraj omenjenega inštituta, pisal o kraniologiji antičnih in živečih populacij v Istri in o alpskih rasah.[3] Celo starosta italijanske rasne antropologije in Tedeschijev ter Vramov mentor, Giuseppe Sergi je manjši delež svojih raziskav posvetil sorodnim tematikam. V svojem monumentalnem delu *Italia. Le origini*, ki je izšlo leta 1919, je denimo pisal o Keltih kot prvih prebivalcih Veneta in o Venetih kot daljnih sorodnikih Slovanov, ki so se na balkanskem območju naselili dolgo pred Srbi, Hrvati in Slovenci (Sergi, 1919).

V obdobju fašizma pa je morda največ raziskovalne pozornosti Balkanu in Julijski krajini posvetil Francesco Battaglia (1896–1958). Antropolog, ki se je rodil v Trstu, je poučeval na univerzi v Padovi in vodil tamkajšnji antropološki inštitut, kasneje je zaradi uvedbe rasne politike v državi, ki je zapovedovala poučevanje demografije ras, dobil še priložnost poučevanja na Univerzi v Trstu (Vinci, 1997).

Battaglia zagotovo ni pripadal tisti skupini italijanskih antropologov, ki so izražali najbolj neposredno rasistična stališča do Slovencev ali Jugoslovanov, saj se je podobno kot denimo Giuffrida Ruggieri in v nasprotju z avtorji kot je bil Giudo Landra, h kateremu se vrnemo v nadaljevanju, v svojih tekstih običajno izogibal neposrednim vrednostnim sodbam (Pizzato, 2011/2012; Puccini, 1996). Kljub temu ob pozornem branju njegovih zamisli o rasni sliki Jugoslavije zasledimo nekatera politično tendenčna mesta.

V prispevku, ki ga je Battaglia objavil v *Geopolitici*, je sicer Jugoslovane uvodoma označil kot »mlad in perspektiven narod,« (Battaglia, 1939, 275), ki jih v etnično-jezikovnem smislu sestavljajo jugozahodni Slovani s pripadajočimi jeziki, med katerimi tudi slovenščini-morda presenetljivo- ni odrekel statusa knjižnega jezika, prav tako ni zanikal prisotnosti slovenskega življa v Julijski krajini. Toda jezikovno-etnične slike Jugoslavije ni neposredno zrcalil v antropološko.

Posamezne skupine Slovencev, Hrvatov in Srbov naj bi se po njegovem mnenju v 6. stoletju iz Vhodne Evrope preselile na Balkan in pomešale z avtohtonim prebivalstvom. Izvorno naj bi med njimi prevladovala kratkoglava baltska rasa. Tako kot naj bi nordijska rasa predstavljala antropološki izvor Germanov, mediteranska rasa pa Italijanom, naj bi baltska rasa razkrivala etnogenezo Slovanov (Battaglia, 1939). Njegovo mnenje se je na tem mestu krepko razlikovalo od mnenja slovenskih antropologov, npr. Zupaniča[4] in Škerlja, ki so trdili, da so bili prvotni Slovani dolgoglavi in zvečine pripadniki *nordijske rase* (sic!) (Škerlj, 1928). Toda Battaglia je vztrajal[5]: sodeč po srednjeveških arheoloških najdiščih so slovanski priseljenci na področje Jugoslavije prinesli baltski rasni tip, vendar

3 Glej npr. Tedeschi, 1895.

4 Zupanič je pokušal ovreči idejo o (južnih) Slovanih kot inferiorni nearijski rasi ter celo dokazoval nasprotno, da so Slovani izvorno pripadali arijskim oziroma nordijskim rasam. Meritve lobanj iz srednjega veka, naj bi namreč po njegovih izračunih pokazale, da so bili »Jugosloveni narod visoke rasti, dolihoidnih lobanj in svetle kompleksije«, da pa so se potem skozi stoletja spremenili in so sedaj povečini brahikefalni (Zupanič, 1933; Jezernik, 2009).

5 Sergi je posmehljivo pisal o slovanskih antropologih, ki na vsak način želijo, da bi bili njihovi predniki dolikohefalni in si zato izmišljujejo nenavadne teorije o metamorfozi lobanj, kar ne ustreza biološkim evolucijskim pravilom (Sergi, 1919).

se je kasneje ohranil le v zametkih. Kajti antropološke meritve na živečih ljudeh sedaj kažejo, da v jugoslovanskem prostoru prevladuje Jadranska rasa, kakor je poimenoval tisto raso, ki so jo jugoslovanski antropologi označevali za dinarsko.[6]

Najbolj čista je v srednjih dinarskih predelih, med tem kot so obrobja, npr. Dalmacija in Slovenija, bolj rasno pisana.

Po Battagli so odnosi med Slovani in Jadransko (dinarsko) raso ter ugotavljanjem njenega izvora, vse prej kot preprosti tudi zaradi vpliva politike (Battaglia, 1941). Jadranski rasni element v Jugoslavijo naj ne bi prinesli Slovani, pač pa ljudstva, ki naj bi na balkanskem polotoku in v Benečiji živela pred njihovim prihodom in so etnično najverjetneje pripadala Veneto-ilirom. Čeprav naj bi se ljudstva na tem območju v jezikovnem smislu slovanizirala, pa naj bi v biološkem smislu torej nekako ohranjala značilnosti predslovanskih ras (Battaglia, 1941; Battaglia, 1939).

K predslovanskemu izvoru dinarske rase so se tedaj nagibali tudi nekateri jugoslovanski antropologi, vendar so pokušali dokazati njeno avtohtnonost v balkanskem prostoru (Škerlj, 1928). Battaglia se ni strinjal. Predpostavljati je mogoče da zato, ker je s poudarjanjem pomena Veneto-ilirov posredno balkanski prostor pokušal izvorno navezati na italijanski prostor (Battaglia, 1941; Battaglia, 1939).

To njegovo morebitno politično agendo še bolj nazorno kot raziskovanja o prebivalstvu Jugoslavije potrjujejo njegova raziskovanja o prebivalstvu Julijske krajine.

V študiji, ki jo je spisal že leta 1934, je poudaril, da na območju Julijske krajine prevladujejo skupine, ki govorijo beneške in prabeneške dialekte in so iz antropološkega vidika slabo raziskane. Sicer so antropološki značaj teh predelov preučevali nekateri tuji strokovnjaki (Weisbach, Škerlj), vendar so se ti zvečine osredotočali na skupne »aloglotov« in »alogenov«[7], glede na to, da je bil njihov osrednji namen raziskovanje nemških in slovanskih etničnih skupin s področja Alp in Balkanije (Battaglia, 1934). Toda v »tem strastnem obdobju aktivnosti in del, ki zaznamujejo v vseh poljih drugi preporod naših narodnih energij,«, tako Battaglia, »je naloga našega inštituta [torej inštituta za antropologijo v Padovi] antropološko preučevanje iredentističnih ozemelj, še zlasti jadranskega, iz katerega je izšel prastari rod *Venetov*, ki je dal zgodovini beneške dože« (Battaglia, 1934, 77). Battaglia je torej antropologijo razumel v službi uresničevanja nacionalističnih ciljev na področju severnega Jadrana. Z merjenjem arheoloških ostankov je dokazoval, da naj bil brahikefalni (kratkoglavi) tip v Julijski krajini in Umbrijskih Apeninih prisoten že v železni dobi, na Balkanu pa naj bi vse do poznega srednjega veka prevladoval dolikokefalni tip, potem pa naj bi sledila hitra »brahikefalizacija«, ki ni imela slovanskega izvora (Battaglia, 1934).

Da naj bilo prvotna plemena Balkana dolgoglava in sredozemskega izvora, je pred njim trdil že Giuffirda Ruggieri. Nasprotno pa so jugoslovanski raziskovalci trmasto

6 Tako je Škerlj utemeljeval zgrešenost izraza jadranska rasa: »naziv 'jadranska' bi mogel ustvariti napačen pojem o razširjenosti te rase. Na drugi strani Jadrana je namreč dinarska rasa že znatno redkeje zastopana in predvsem že jako pomešana z alpsko in sredozemsko. Njeno jedro je gotovo pri nas v Jugoslaviji, in sicer res v Dinarskem sistemu.« (Škerlj, 1928, 36).

7 S tema izrazoma so fašistične oblasti praviloma označevale slovansko in hrvaško prebivalstvo v Italiji (Kacin Wohinz, 1990; Verginella, 2009; Klabjan, 2007).

zagovarjali pozen prihod dolgoglavcev na balkanski polotok, kar jih je nekako ponovno pripeljalo k tezi o avtohtonosti brahikefalnih(kratkoglavih) in od apeninskega polotoka ter germanskih ozemelj neodvisnih Dinarcev (Škerlj, 1928; Battaglia, 1941).

Nekatere teze o Jugoslovanih, ki so jih nakazali Sergi, Battaglia in ostali zgoraj omenjeni avtorji, so dodelali sodelavci revije *La difesa della razza* in jih še bistveno bolj podredili političnih interesom.

Spočetka sicer, v prvih številkah, *La difesa della razza* o teh tematikah ni izrazito veliko pisala. Članki denimo, o rasah v Jugoslaviji, so bili tudi bolj opisne narave in z manj jasno politično agendo v ozadju (Puccini, 1996; Puccini, 1994; Sluga, 2003), med drugim tudi zato, ker so povzemali po jugoslovanskih avtorjih, zlasti Božu Škerlju in Branimirju Malešu (Landra, 1939). Leta 1939 je revija celo objavila Škerljev članek. Urednik revije, Telesio Interlandi, je v opombah pri tekstu Škerlja opisal kot pomembnega strokovnjaka, vendar je dodal nekaj polemičnih pripomb, s katerimi je podobno kot zgoraj omenjeni avtorji nasprotoval sklepom o rasni različnosti v italijanskem in balkanskem prostoru. Trdil je, da prebivalstvo na Vzhodni in Zahodni strani Jadrana, od Julijske krajine pa do Umbrije, skupaj pripada »Jadranski rasi«, ki je le veja v Italiji prevladujoče Mediteranske rase (Interlandi pri Škerlj, 1939).

V *Difesi* je o Slovencih nato še bolj podcenjujoče pisal Giorgio Almirante (1914–1988). V prispevku o Istri je tako poudarjal: »Vse tisto, kar je lepo tu v Istri je zgodovinsko in rasno gledano italijansko. Slovanska jedra, ki so imigrirala v izjemno poznih obdobjih, kljub njihovi številčnosti, minimalno prispevajo civilizacijskemu napredku regije« (Almirante, 1940, 34).

Več prispevkov, ki so se navezovali na jugoslovanski prostor, je *La difesa* prinašala po letu 1941, ko so si Italija, Nemčija in Madžarska po kratkotrajni vojni in porazu Jugoslavije razdelili del njenega ozemlja. Na zasedenem ozemlju so fašisti naleteli na odporniško gibanje, ki ga je *La difesa* poskušala interpretirati v rasnem smislu. O Slovanih je pisala kot o izjemno snažnem ljudstvu, ki navidezno daje občutek o rasni večvrednosti. Z njimi so Italijani sprva lepo sodelovali, potem pa so sčasoma pojavili uporniški elementi, ki so pokazali na podtalno izprijenost rase (A.U. [neznani avtor], 1942).

Po letu 1941 se je *La difesa* večkrat vrnila k (bivšemu) jugoslovanskemu prostoru. Hrvate je predstavljala kot napredno ljudstvo, ki rasno ne pripada Slovanom. Pozdravljala je ustanovitev Neodvisne države Hrvaške, marionetne države sil osi. O Srbih se je revija izražala kot o pretirano megalomanskem ljudstvu, nezmožnem za uresničitev svojih prevelikih osvajalskih ambicij, Slovencev pa sploh ni omenjala (Graziani, 1941).

Na več mestih je poudarila, da so se po prvi vojni na Balkanu ustvarile rasno neskladne državne tvorbe, ki bi jih lahko s svojo rasno politiko in asimilacijo pravilno disciplinirala samo Italija (Landra, 1942; Cipriani, 1941). Kakor je razlagal Lidio Cipriani: «Gre za civilizacijo, ki zahteva dolgo obravnavo, med so se je ji oni šele približujejo. Lahko jo asimiliramo zato, ker so njihovi rasni elementi odlični in pripadajo najboljši evropskim sestavinam, toda potrebno jih je urediti in disciplinirati« (Cipriani, 1941, 9).

Fašistični rasni teoretiki, vsaj tisti, ki so objavljali v *Difesi* običajno o prebivalcih bivše Jugoslavije niso pisali kot o (biološko) manjvredni rasi, vendar so hkrati definirali za zmotne tiste rasne teorije, ki so kakorkoli na področju bivše Jugoslavije propagirale

(pan)slavizem. Prvič zato, ker naj bi krepil vpliv Rusije ter s tem tudi boljševizma. V propagiranju slovanstva regije so italijanski rasni teoretiki torej ponovno videli le sredstvo za uveljavljanje interesov močnejših, »zunanjih« sil. Če so pred prvo svetovno vojno to močnejšo silo enačili z nemškim oziroma avstrijskim imperializmom, so ju na predvečer druge svetovne vojne enačili predvsem z anglosaškimi samaritanskimi prizadevanji ali s sovjetskem ekspanzionizmom.

La difesa della razza je poročala, da je leta 1938 Urad za preučevanje in propagando rase (*Ufficio Studi e propaganda sulla razza*) opravil neke vrste anketo, v kateri je rasne teoretike iz različnih držav spraševal za mnenje o italijanskem rasizmu. »Zahodni« rasni teoretiki naj bi se o njem izrekli odklonilno, med tem ko so ga balkanski rasni teoretiki podpirali.

Če se osredotočimo na jugoslovanske antropologe, predvsem na Škerlja, bi lahko verjeli, da jih je italijanski fašistični rasizem s svojim poudarjanjem »mediteranske rase« spočetka morda res plašil manj kot nacistični.

Škerlju predstavljena strokovna nesoglasja tudi niso preprečila, da bi z italijanskimi antropologi korespondiral in z njimi celo raziskovalno sodeloval.[8]

Toda začetek izhajanja revije *La difesa della razza* je vendarle pritegnil nekaj kritične pozornosti tudi v slovenskem tisku in med slovenskimi avtorji. Primorske Slovence, kakor je poročalo časopisje, je posebej razburila naslovnica prve številke revije z zemljevidom, ki je prikazoval, predele, kjer naj bi bivala izključno italijanska rasa. Med temi so bili, kakor so neodobravajoče pisali slovenski avtorji, tudi »naša Notranjska, Gorski Kotar, Hrvaško Primorje in Dalmacija«[9].

Slovensko intelektualno okolje je tudi nasploh zaznalo obrat v italijanski rasni politiki konec tridesetih let. V nekaterih primerih ga je pozdravilo s tihim odobravanjem,[10] toda v številčnejših je do njega izrazilo nelagodje. Tako je je npr. leta 1938 pisala poljudno znanstvena revija Življenje in svet:

> *Enciclopedia Italiana* [...] *izvaja pod značko razza: ‚Plemen ni. Biva samo italijansko ljudstvo ali italijanski narod* [...]*‘ Vse mine, gine, se razblini. Med tem je germanski rasizem pognal laško vejico. Danes imamo italijansko raso, ki je ‚nordijska‘ (severnjaška). Tako nam odločno razlaga Cogni v pravoverni knjigi ‚I valori della razza italiana‘. Poslušajmo ga: ‚Prave nordijske prosvete so na jugu, zlasti v Sredozemlju. Veliki Italijani so narodijski mediteranci ali mediternaski nordijci‘* [...] *‚Italijanski narod je v celoti duhovno dokaj bližji nordijskim rodovom – na primer Nemcem in Angležem – nego Francozi.‘ Te domislice bi bile nedolžne, da niso uradno naročene.*[11]

8 BF UNILJ, Korepondenca Škerlja, Korepondenca med Škerljem in Lidijem Cipriani (1935–1941); Korepondenca med Škerljem in Francescom Battaglia (1935–1941).

9 Slovenski dom, 30. 1. 1939: Plemena v štirih barvah, 3.

10 Slovenec, 3. 9. 1938: Italija proti Židom, 1.

11 Življenje in svet, 3. 10. 1938: Rasizem, 222. Podobno tudi: Naša misel, 20. 4. 1939: Besede in dejanja, 5.



Sl. 1: La difesa della razza, letnik 2, št. 5, 5. januar 1939 (XVIII), 7.

UHAJANJE V DRUGE DISCIPLINE

Rasne interpretacije v odnosu do Jugoslovanov zasledimo tudi pri nekaterih prominentnih italijanskih geografih. Tako je eno najpomembnejših italijanskih monumentalnih del o človeških rasah z naslovom *Le Razze e i popoli della terra (Rase in ljudstva sveta)* (Biasutti, 1941) izšlo pod uredništvom uglednega geografa Renata Biasuttija (1878–1965). V njem je sicer odlomke o balkanskih predelih prispeval zgoraj omenjeni antropolog Francesco Battaglia (Battaglia, 1941). Vendar se je tudi sam Biasutti raziskovalno zanimal za balkanske narode. Po prvi svetovni vojni je denimo antropološko raziskal avstro-ogrske ujetnike, specifično Hrvate, Slovence, Romune in Madžare (Biasutti, 1921; Turda, 2010) in tvoril sorodne zaključke kot Sergi ali Battaglia.

Podobno je pristranskost v odnosu do Jugoslovanov pokazal geograf Gioto Dainelli, ki je že pred nastopom fašizma npr. pisal o nepremostljivih razlikah med Srbi in Hrvati, o hegemonskih težnjah Srbov kot tudi o nesmiselnosti podpiranja združevanja Blakanske regije (Dainelli, 1922).

Še najbolj eksplicitno pa je italijansko nadvlado na Balkanu in v severno jadranskem prostoru iz perspektive geografskih znanosti, ampak s ponekod podobnimi argumenti kot *Difesa* utemeljevala revija *Geopolitica*, ki je izhajala med letoma 1939–1942 v Milanu ob navdušeni podpori italijanskega šolskega ministra Giuseppeja Bottaia in na znanstveno pobudo geografov Giorgia Roletta in Ernesta Massija iz Univerze v Trstu.

Revija, ki se je dejansko porodila znotraj tržaškega univerzitetnega okolja kot izraz »posebne obmejne realnosti« (Antonsich, 1994, 271), je predstavljala smernice samosvoje italijanske geopolitike, ki se je tedaj želela otresti vplivov starejših nemških geopolitičnih doktrin, usmerjenih k geografskemu determinizmu (Ratzel).

Njeni predstavniki so pokušali postaviti temelje fašistične zunanje (in kolonialne) politike, čeprav so s svojim premišljenim in domnevno znanstveno podprtim pristopom bolj potrjevali kot krojili že sprejete strateške načrte italijanske države v povezavi z severozahodno Afriko, vzhodnim Jadranom, in nekaterimi drugimi območji. Glede vzhodno jadranskega prostora so se v njihovih traktatih ponavljale afirmacije, ki smo jih zasledili tudi v *La difesi* in drugih fašističnih revijah, in sicer, da je izid prve svetovne vojne Italiji prinesel »pohabljeno zmago« (vittoria mutilata) v korist Slovanov in da gre pri Jugoslaviji za povsem umetno, s pomočjo zahodnih sil ustvarjeno tvorbo. Kasneje, v času vojne je revija podpirala nastanek NDH (Antonsich, 1994; Perrone, 2014). Vinci meni, da je prav ta revija predstavljala tisto iz znanstvene perspektive najbolj ugledno sredstvo za promocijo spremenljivosti italijanske ekspanzije na Balkan (Sluga, 2003 po Vinci, 1992).

Geopolitica je pozivala k oblikovanju sinteze vseh vej geografije, tudi »človeške« oziroma antropološke, s katero je posegala v raziskovalne tematike rasnih teoretikov. Tako se je pri utemeljevanju svojih strateških stališč opirala na antropološke argumente. Pisala je denimo o obstoju posebne »rimske rase« kot rezultatu popolne spojitve mediteranskih dolihokefalnih elementov z arijskimi brahikefalnimi elementi in z njo opravičevala hegemonijo v Mediteranu, ki ga je razglašala za italijanski »vitalni interes« (Antonsich, 1994; Perrone, 2014).

Da bi še bolj znanstveno okrepila rasnoteoretično strujo znotraj svoje revije sta Giorgio Roletto in Ernesto Massi v njeno uredništvo povabila prav omenjenega Battagglio, ki

je v prispevku v reviji tudi obelodanil svoj že opisan pogled antropološke slike Julijske krajine in Balkana (Battaglia, 1939).

Poleg rasističnih ideologov okoli ved, kakor sta bili antropologija in geopolitika, je imela pomemben vpliv na znanstveno definiranje rasnih razlik tudi italijanska rasna psihologija z njunima glavnima predstavnikoma, Mariom Canella (1898–1982) in Nicolom Pende (1880–1970). Nicola Pende, ki je vseskozi ostal zvest mediteranist, je menil, da se tri temnolase rase (mediteranska, alpska in dinarska) naravno ujemajo, med tem kot odbijajo svetlolase rase (nordijce in baltike). Rimska kultura, kakor je menil, lahko obstoji samo s skupnim delovanjem rjavolasih ras, med tem, ko se nordijska in slovanska duša ne skladata z mediteranskim okoljem (Gillette, 2002). Mario Canella pa je drugače opredeljeval dinarsko raso kot Pende in zgoraj navedeni avtorji. Če so ti pozitivne rasne lastnosti pripisovali celotni dinarski rasni skupini, jih je po drugi strani Canella pripisal samo njenim določenim segmentom, predvsem venetskim in dalmatinskim podskupinam, medtem kot je hrvaške, bosanske, albanske in bolgarske podskupine Dinarcev imel za manjvredne (v primerjavi z nordijsko ali mediteransko raso) ter tako odpiral pot smeri, ki bi lahko nad njimi izvajala povsem odkriti »biološki rasizem« (Volpato, 2000).[12]

Toda tovrstne ideje ga niso odvrnile, da bi iskal stike z jugoslovanskih okoljem. Po drugi svetovni vojni je celo pokušal prepričati jugoslovanske oblasti in antropologe, da njegovo knjigo prevedejo v srbščino, kar so slednji sprejemali z relativno naklonjenostjo, glede na to, da je Canella v obdobju med vojno domnevno veliko pomagal jugoslovanskemu ljudstvu.[13]

Tudi Pende v svojem zasebnem življenju, kakor kažejo nekateri indici, ni gojil vnaprejšnje nenaklonjenosti do slovenskih/jugoslovanskih raziskovalcev. Ko je Škerlj v času druge svetovne vojne prebival v Rimu, ga je Pende z veseljem povabil na svoj inštitut in ga tudi »dobro založil s separati in eno knjigo.«[14] In tudi sam Škerlj do Pendejevega strokovnega dela ni izražal posebno kritičnih stališč, čeprav je od Ginija izvedel, da ga v Italiji bojda nimajo za »resnega znanstvenika«.[15] Po vojni je Pende uspešno gradil svojo kariero. Zaradi prispevka k endokrinologiji mu je za las ušla celo Nobelova nagrada (Cassata, 2011).

TEŽA ŠTEVILA

Z nastopom fašizma, zlasti po letu 1927, ko je Mussolini v znamenitem govoru podprl maksimo za večjo rodnost, se je Italija izrazito usmerila k pronatalizmu, v svojem zanosu je odklanjala vse metode za preprečevanje rojstev in si močno prizadevala za zajezitev padanja italijanske rodnosti. Za idejno utemeljevanje tovrstnih politik so ponovno poskrbeli različni etablirani znanstveniki, poleg antropologov in zdravnikov, zagotovo statistiki in

12 V svoji monografiji je tudi podprl kritike, ki so jih v odnosu do jugoslovanskih antropologov naslovila Biasutti in Battaglia, torej da je teza o avtohtonosti denarcev na Balkanu napačna (Canella, 1942).
13 BF UNILJ, Korependenca Škerlj, pismo Pismo Matije Radičevića Božu Škerlju, 18. 5. 1947.
14 BF UNILJ, Škerlj, Medvojna leta in spomini, 212.
15 BF UNILJ, Škerlj, Medvojna leta in spomini, 212.

demografi, med katerimi je kot predsednik evgeničnega združenja in vodja italijanske pronatalistične politike izstopal Corrado Gini.[16] Čeprav je vsaj do leta 1938 v osredju italijanske demografske politike ostajal kvantitativni vidik prebivalstva in ne kvalitativni, so tudi demografi v svojih evgeničnih utemeljevanjih pogosto zahajali v vrednostne sodbe o različnih skupinah prebivalstva in ponekod izražali izrazito rasistični podton.

Sam Corrado Gini je, kakor ugotavljata Verginella in Israel, že na predavanju v Trstu leta 1911 zavzel izrazito rasistično stališče prav do Slovanov (Verginella, 2016). Njegov tekst je tedaj izzval burne reakcije. Prav tako bruno pa sta se javnost in politika odzvali, ko je veliko zatem, v tridesetih letih spet načel podobna vprašanja, vendar tokrat v nekoliko spremenjenem tonu (Verginella, 2016; Israel 2010; Cassata, 2006). V svoji monografiji je namreč pripomnil, da napredek in ustvarjalnost v Trstu gre deloma pripisati prav mešanim zakonom s Slovani, Nemci in drugimi rasnimi elementi, čeprav se iz slednjih lahko po drugi strani razvijejo tudi določene patologije. Lokalni italijanski časopis *Il Piccolo* je nad tovrstnimi izvajanji nezadovoljen, kar pa je izzvalo zbadljive (in presenetljivo navdušene) komentarje v slovenskem tisku. V *Jutru*, pod naslovom *Tržaški bastardi*, beremo: »Italijanski statistik prof. C. Gini piše […] o Trstu, da je prebivalstvo močno mešano s slovanskimi, grškimi, levantskimi in nemškimi elementi. To prebivalstvo kaže fizične in psihične neskladnosti in motnje, kakor se dobivajo pri bastardih. Tak je vtis, ki ga napravljajo Tržačani na Italijane. ‚Piccolo' protestira proti žalitvi z bastardi, priznava pa da tvorijo tržaško prebivalstvo res slovanski grški, levantski, nemški in še drugi elementi, ali vse to je tržaško italijanstvo nagloma asimiliralo. Učenjaki v stari Italiji se naslanjajo pri presoji tržaške narodnosti na istino, da je bilo od nekdaj v Trstu čistokrvnih Italijanov bore malo.«[17] Slovenski časopis je očitno zadovolji že podatek, da je sloviti demograf v nasprotju prepričanjem lokalnih fašistov, sploh priznal prisotnost ne-asimiliranega slovanskega elementa v mestu, četudi je mešane zakone razumel kot bastardizacijo.

Običajno pa je slovenski tisk do italijanskih statistikov in njihove agresivne demografske politike pokazal bolj kritično držo.

Če je biološki rasizem namreč slovenske avtorje vendarle spomnil predvsem na nacistično Nemčijo, pa jih je pronatalizem asociral na Italijo. Še več. Zaradi jasne povezave z Mussolinijevo državo je pri nekateri liberalnih in socialističnih avtorjih pronatalizem izzval izrazito sovražnost.

»Obsedenost z rojstvi« so brali/videli le kot koščček v mozaiku drakonske, ideološko zgrešene in hkrati do Slovanov sovražne Mussolinijeve politike (Petrič, 1934, Černe, 1937). Kakor je denimo razmišljala slovenska feministka Angela Vode: »Številčno močne družine najvstrajneje propagirajo fašistične države, ki jim prednjači Italija. Zadnje leto, ko je beda v Italiji dosegla višek, ko je Mussolini sam priznal polom gospodarstva, se je začela širokopotezna akcija: ‚Imejmo več otrok!' […] V Trstu so v splošni bolnici osnovali brezplačen ambulatorij za zdravljenje neplodnosti. Tržaška deželna uprava je uvedla stalne nagrade za svoje nameščence, da bi jim vzpodbudila voljo po čim večji družini. […] Toda Italija je vendar preobljudena; čemu tedaj propaganda za porast prebivalstva?

16 Glede Ginijevega znastvenega dela glej: Cassata, 2006.
17 Jutro, 19. 12. 1931: Tržaški bastardi, 2–3.

[…] Tu mora biti vsakomur jasno, da pomenja tako pisanje vojno napoved in da hoče Italija prav naše ozemlje« (Vode, 1997, 196–197).

Toda tako kot drugod tudi na Slovenskem ni bilo povsem enoznačnega pogleda na pronatalizem. Posebno katoliško usmerjene avtorje je skrbela t. i. »bela kuga«, torej zmanjševanje rodnosti zaradi splavov, kontracepcije in sterilizacije, zato so ukrepe za dvig rojstev vneto zagovarjali in v teh zagovorih so v nekaterih primerih tudi pohvalili italijansko demografijo.[18] Celo liberalno usmerjeni Škerlj, ki je v zgodnjih tridesetih letih kot evgenik zagovarjal prisilne sterilizacije in svaril pred slepim pronatalizmom, katerega cilj je zgolj povečanje rodnosti brez ozira na »kvaliteto« prebivalstva, je kasneje, ko je bival v Rimu, občudoval rezultate italijanskega pronatalizma. Kakor je zapisal v svoj dnevnik: »v Rimu obvlada otrok sliko mesta, zlasti če primerjam v mislih z Dunajem ali celo Berlinom in Oslom […] za narod ima po svoji biološki sili res bodočnost samo – vojske naj se ne gre! Korakati tu ne znajo […], hodijo kakor čreda. Ampak z mirnim, tihim delom, z ekspandzijo s pomočjo rojstev, se morajo Italijani še daleč razširiti. In proti vzhodu naj ne silijo […] Ampak – na zapad!«[19]

Na to spremembo v odnosu do pronatalizma bi lahko vplival prav Corrado Gini, s katerim si je konec tridesetih let Škerlj korespondiral. Sredi leta 1940 je nato slovenski antropolog izrazil bojazen, da bosta z Ginijem zaradi vojne prenehala sodelovati (Cergol, 2015) toda napetosti med Jugoslavijo in Italijo in kasnejša italijanska zasedba Ljubljane spočetka niso skrhale njunih vezi. Ravno nasprotno je Škerlj slednjo izkoristil takoj za to, da je Ginija vprašal, če mu lahko priskrbi štipendijo za raziskovanje v Rimu predvsem z namenom, da se izpopolni v statistiki, ki jo kot antropolog zelo potrebuje.[20] V resnici, kot je Škerlj kasneje zapisal v svoj dnevnik, naj bi iz Ljubljane želel oditi vsled nevarnega političnega ozračja.[21]

V pismu, poslanem v začetku maja 1941, je nato Gini pokazal izrazito navdušenje nad italijansko zasedbo Ljubljane, in upal, da se je tudi Škerlj veselil političnih sprememb, ki naj bi še olajšale njuno sodelovanje in omogočale Škerlju bivanje v Rimu. Kmalu za tem je slovenskemu antropologu tudi res priskrbel asistentsko mesto na svojem inštitutu (*Instituto di scienze statistiche, demografiche ed attuariali*), kjer je Škerlj raziskoval tri mesece.[22]

Po tem obdobju se Škerlj ni odločil, da bi v Rimu ostal dlje časa, saj si o Giniju po njunem osebnem srečanju ni ustvaril najboljšega mnenja. Italijanski statistik in evgenik se mu sicer ni zameril zaradi svojih političnih ali strokovnih stališč. Škerlj ga je namreč še vedno imel za odličnega znanstvenika, ampak zaradi osebnega značaja, predvsem odnosa, ki ga je gojil do kolegov, sodelavcev in podrejenih.[23]

Po ponovnem prihodu v Ljubljano sta antropolog in demograf ostala v stiku vsaj še do aprila 1942, ko je med drugim Škerlj Giniju laskal, da je italijanska statistika, posebno

18 Slovenec, 15. 1. 1930: Tudi Italijani izumirajo, 2.
19 BF UNILJ, Škerlj, Medvojna leta in spomini.
20 BF UNILJ, Korependenca Škerlj, Pismo Boža Škerlja Corradu Giniju, 23. 4. 1939.
21 BF UNILJ, Škerlj, Medvojna leta in spomini.
22 BF UNILJ, Korependenca Škerlj, Pismo Corrada Ginija Škerlju, 6. 5. 1941 in 27. 5. 1941.
23 BF UNILJ, Korependenca Škerlj; BF UNILJ, Medvojna leta in spomini.

pa njegova šola veliko bolj napredna kot nemška. Toda nujni odnosi so se med tem le nekoliko ohladili. Najverjetneje zato, ker Škerlj v dogovorjenem času ni končal študije na rimskem gradivu. Svoje so k rahljanju odnosov verjetno pripevale tudi vse bolj napete politične razmere in ideološka nesoglasja. Škerljevo neodobravanje glede Ginijeve sicer domnevno prej pasivne kot sovražne drže do Slovencev je mogoče razbrati iz kratkega odlomka v njegovem dnevniku: »Ko sem tu profesorju [Giniju] povedal o Rašici,[24] je bil prvi hip, se mi je zdelo, osupel; potem mi pa ni vedel drugega povedati kakor ,ja, to je pa v Nemčiji' – Zdaj sem bil osupel jaz in sem odgovoril samo še – ,ampak, tam so Slovenci ...' Pa kaj bi še dokazoval? V tej žalostni vlogi, ki jo danes igra Slovenec v svetu […] nihče ne razume tožb in krivic.«[25] Škerlj je bil nad medlim odzivom Ginija očitno razočaran, ni mu pa v tistem trenutku oporekal. Po prihodu v Ljubljano se je vključil v odporniško gibanje.

Poleg Škerlja je v obdobju pred drugo svetovno vojno prenesljivo dobre stike z Ginijem gojil tudi Niko Zupanič.

Kot že uveljavljeni antropolog je Zupanič leta 1931 sodeloval na mednarodnem kongresu za proučevanje ljudstev v Rimu (*Congresso internazionale per gli studi sulla popolazione*), kjer je pritegnil Ginijevo pozornost. Med njima se je tako razvila dokaj živahna korespondenca, iz katere je razvidno, da se je italijanski demograf zanimal za Zupaničeva raziskovanja.[26] Gini je Zupaniča tudi povabil, da sprejme častni naziv dopisnika Odbora, kateremu je predsedoval.[27] Slovenski antropolog ni odklonil povabila za sodelovanje v ugledni italijanski instituciji, čeprav je sam v preteklosti kot angažiran politik večkrat izrazil kritična stališča do Italije (Muršič, 2009).

Zupanič in Škerlj najverjetneje nista bila edina slovenska intelektualca, s katerimi je Gini gojil prijateljstvo. Predstavljati si je mogoče, da je italijanski demograf imel poznanstva tudi med slovenskimi pravniki, saj je leta 1942, torej že v času okupacije, predaval na Pravni Fakulteti Univerze v Ljubljani.[28] Stike s slovenskim okoljem je nato iskal tudi po vojni (Muršič, 2009).

ZAKLJUČEK

Biološka utemeljevanja so se v obdobju italijanskega fašizma uspela prikrasti v različne znanstvene discipline, ki so v nacionalističnem zanosu poskušale ujeti italijanski značaj in smoter. Pri spretnem in kdaj manj spretnem jadranju med iskreno željo po znanstvenem napredku in hlapčevskem sledenju uradni politiki, med enostavnimi propagandnimi pamfleti in zapletenimi referenčno, metodološko in empirično podprtimi teksti, so italijanski antropologi predstavljali izjemno različne ideje o rasnih kategorizacijah, ki so zadevale

24 Leta 1941 so Nemci požgali Rašico iz maščevanja zaradi partizanskega napada.

25 BF UNILJ, Korepondenca Škerlj; BF UNILJ, Škerlj, Medvojna leta in spomini, 187.

26 SEM, Korespondenca Zupanič, Pismo Corrada Ginija Niku Zupaniču, 10. 4. 1932; Pismo Corrada Ginija Niku Zupaniču, 25. 5. 1932; Pismo Corrada Ginija Niku Zupaniču, 23. 6. 1932; Pismo Corrada Ginija Niku Zupaniču, 9. 11. 1932.

27 SEM, Korespondenca Zupanič, Pismo Corrada Ginija Niku Zupaniču, 23. 6. 1932.

28 Jutro, 5. 12. 1942: Predavanje italijanskega znanstvenika, 4.

tudi slovensko oziroma jugoslovansko prebivalstvo. Relativno pogosto so svoje raziskovalno zanimanje na Balkan umerjali tisti, ki so delovali (ali se rodili) v severo-vzhodnih italijanski univerzitetnih središčih (v Padovi, v Trstu). Nekateri med njimi so gojili stike z jugoslovanskimi antropologi, zlasti Škerljem. Njihove artikulacije se običajno niso opirale na nasilno retoriko in v presenetljivem nasprotju s takratnih fašističnim tiskom Slovencev/Jugoslovanov niso neposredno označevali za »manjvredno raso.« Toda to še ne pomeni, da k svojim izvajanem niso dodajali politično motiviranih in jugoslovanski strani nenaklonjenih zaključkov. Jadranske rasne elemente so označevali kot sorodne italijanskim/mediteranskim in dobre, čeprav so s tem, ko so slovanske opredeljevali za tuje in nepomembne v regiji, potihem podpirali italijanske ekspanzionistične interese na Balkanu in Julijski krajini. Slovenski antropologi so tovrstna izvajanja spremljali in kdaj tudi citirali brez neposrednega odkritega nasprotovanja, čeprav so pri sebi gradili povsem drugačne pristranske antropološke argumentacije v politično korist jugoslovanstva. Lahko bi trdili, da so mukotrpne raziskave enih in drugih naposled izzvenele v prazno. Po drugi svetovni vojni so številni italijanski in slovenski rasni teoretiki še naprej uspešno gradili svoje akademske kariere, vendar so zvečine spremenili svoj raziskovalni fokus. Rasna antropologija s svojim merjenjem lobanj in klasifikacijo ras je namreč romala na smetišče zgodovine in znanosti. Danes se sodobnemu bralcu zdi nesmiselna, že skoraj smešna. Toda rasizem med tem še zdaleč ni zamrl, pač pa se samo potuhnil ter sedaj naprej gradi na drugih, zamotanih psevdoznanstvenih izmišljotinah.

DINARIC OR ADRIATIC RACE? ITALIAN SCIENTIFIC RACISM, NORTHERN ADRIATIC AND THE BALKANS

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SUMMARY

By analysing anthropological scientific articles and monographic publications as well as correspondence and other ego-documents, this article poses the question of how Italian racial theorists, especially racial anthropologists, but also geographers, psychologists and demographers, mainly those who came from the North-Eastern Adriatic region, racially defined the Slavs.

Several Italian racial anthropologists, at least partially if not entirely, dedicated their research to the North-Adriatic region or the Balkans. Their interest in these regions was strengthened even before the First World War, especially with those authors who were born in the Austrian Littoral or worked at the Institute of Anthropology in Padua.

During the fascist period, Francesco Battaglia (1896–1958) devoted most of his research to such subjects. He was a professor at the University of Padua and head of the anthropological institute there, later he also taught comparative demography of races at the University of Trieste.

Battaglia's articulations were generally not dependent on violent rhetoric and, in a striking contrast to the then fascist press, did not directly refer to the Slovenes / Yugoslavs as an "inferior race". However, this does not mean that he made inappropriate politically-motivated statements that were unfavourable towards the Yugoslavs. Battaglia, contrary to other racial anthropologists in Yugoslavia, did not interpret Adriatic racial elements, in particular, the Dinaric race which was supposedly predominant in Yugoslavia, as indigenous, but imputed it to the (North) Italian space with his complex argumentations. He defined the allegedly racial-specific elements Slavic peoples had, however, as foreign, irrelevant to the region, and of non-Aryan descent.

An even more unfavourable position towards the Southern Slavs was stated in "La difesa della razza" – the leading Italian magazine on scientific ("Nordicist") racism. Especially during WWII, it emphasized that after the WWI in the Balkans, several state formations grew from nations that were not compatible racially or culturally – only Italy was able to discipline the area with its racial politics. Thus, it produced a direct biological excuse to propagate Italian expansionism. Similar arguments for the Italian dominance in the Balkans were put forth by the magazine "Geopolitica", published between 1939 and 1942 in Milan at the enthusiastic support of the Italian Minister of education, Giuseppe Bottaia and the scientific initiative of the geographers Giorgio Roletta and Ernesto Massi from the University of Trieste.

Another influential representative of "Italian racial psychology", Mario Canella, defined some subsets of Slavs as biologically inferior, while the leading Italian demographer and eugenicist Corrado Gini developed an ambivalent attitude towards them.

The article also poses the question of how the Slovene scientific environment reacted to Italian scientific racism. Focusing on Slovene racial anthropologists, one could imply that Italian racial theory, with its emphasis on the "Mediterranean race", did not impose as much fear at the beginning as the Nazi racial theory did. Nevertheless, the birth of the magazine "La difesa" attracted some critical attention among Slovene authors. Some of them also disputed the Italian pronatalism in fear that it was directed specifically towards them. However, this did not stop them to collaborate with Italian researchers, especially the demographer Corrado Gini.

Keywords: racism, racial anthropology, Slovene-Italian relations, fascism, North-Eastern Adriatic Region

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BF UNILJ, Škerlj, Medvojna leta in spomini – BF UNILJ, Knjižnica Oddelka za biologijo, B. Škerlj, Medvojna leta in spomini na Dachau, Slekovec, D. (ur.) (Škerlj, Medvojna leta in spomini).

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ODPORNIŠKA KNJIŽEVNOST: PROSTOR EMANCIPACIJE? ANALIZA ŽENSKIH LIKOV NA PRIMERU ANTIFAŠISTIČNE KNJIŽEVNOSTI PRIMORSKE

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IZVLEČEK

Članek obravnava vlogo žensk v odporniški (antifašistični) književnosti Primorske. So bile ženske kot literarni liki nosilke zgodbe, polnokrvni pripovedni subjekti, ali je bila njihova vloga tipizirana in zreducirana na nekaj ponavljajočih se likov, objektov? So ženski liki avtorjev tega območja, ko je šlo za antifašistično tematiko, drugačni od likov, ki so jih ustvarjali sicer? Kakšno literaturo so pisale ženske? Kakšna literatura je bila namenjena ženskam? Raziskava je nastala na podlagi literarnega opusa Franceta Bevka, Cirila Kosmača, Lojza Kraigherja in Danila Lokarja, ki je nastajal v 30., 40. in 50. letih in je tematiziral odporniško gibanje. Pozornost je namenjena tudi glasilu Slovenka, ki ga je med junijem 1943 in marcem 1945 izdajala protifašistična slovenska zveza na Primorskem, v zadnjem delu pa prevečkrat prezirtima avtoricama primorskega odpora, Mari Samsa in Erni Muser.

Ključne besede: književnost, antifašizem, Primorska, ženske, odpor, Mara Samsa, Erna Muser, France Bevk, Ciril Kosmač, Lojz Kraigher, Danilo Lokar

LETTERATURA DI RESISTENZA: LUOGO DI EMANCIPAZIONE? LE DONNE NELLA LETTERATURA ANTIFASCISTA DELLA PRIMORSKA

SINTESI

L'articolo pone in evidenza il ruolo delle donne nella letteratura di Resistenza (antifascista) della regione Primorska. Le donne come figure letterarie erano personalità, soggetti, o il loro ruolo era tipizzato e ridotto a pochi personaggi, oggetti ripetitivi? Sono i personaggi femminili quando si tratta di temi antifascisti diversi dai personaggi che gli stessi autori avevano creato? Che tipo di letteratura è stata scritta dalle donne? Che tipo di letteratura era destinata alle donne? La ricerca si basa sulle opere letterarie di France Bevk, Ciril Kosmač, Lojz Kraigher e Danilo Lokar, emerse negli anni '30, '40 e '50 ed era incentrata sul movimento resistenziale. L'attenzione vine rivolta nache alla rivista Slovenka, pubblicata tra il giugno 1943 e il marzo 1945 dall'Associazione

slovena antifascista nella regione della Primorska. Un'attenzione particolare è infine rivolta a Mara Samsa ed Erna Muser, due scrtitrici dell'antifascismo nella Primorska troppo spesso ignorate.

Parole chiave: letteratura, antifascismo, donne, Resistenza, Primorska, Mara Samsa, Erna Muser, France Bevk, Ciril Kosmač, Lojz Kraigher, Danilo Lokar

UVOD[1]

Nekje sem bral, da je literatura z drugimi sredstvi napisana zgodovina človeštva.
(Vladimir Bartol, iz predgovora k novelam Mare Samsa *Trst je klical*).

Kadarkoli se lotimo analize preteklosti s pomočjo literature, leposlovja, se nam uvodoma odpre več vprašanj o tem, kakor ga je imenoval Michel Vovelle, *sumljivem viru* (Vovelle, 2004, 47). Ali lahko s pomočjo fikcije govorimo o pretekli resničnosti? Lahko, če se ukvarjamo s preučevanjem kolektivnih drž ljudi, kar je do neke mere namen tega prispevka. Lahko tudi, če verjamemo, kakor je verjel Alessandro Manzoni, da literatura zapolnjuje prazen prostor, ki je nastal po krivdi zgodovinark in zgodovinarjev ter če, kakor je italijanskega literarnega klasika dopolnil Roger Chartier, vemo, da zgodovino zanimata samo pena časov in površen pregled družbe med tem ko roman obvladuje mehanizme delovanja te družbe. Zgodovina nas glede posameznikov, še bolj pa posameznic, rada pušča v negotovosti in nam razodeva le trenutke, v katerih so bili del širšega dogajanja, splošna slika pa ostaja zamegljena (Bourdieu, Chartier & Ginzburg, 2011, 92–96).

Analiza odporniškega, antifašističnega gibanja v umetnosti je težka, ker ga je doletela usoda skrajnosti: iz tajnosti je preraslo v kanon, iz skritosti v vseprisotnost, iz prizadevanj manjšine v poduk večini. Če želimo ujeti idejo, še preden se je ta spremenila v ideologijo, jo moramo začeti spremljati v njenih zametkih. Če nas torej zanima antifašistična literatura, moramo ponjo na Primorsko, kjer je ob rapalski meji nastajala že desetletje pred drugo svetovno vojno. V ospredju članka bo leposlovno delo štirih kanonskih primorskih avtorjev protifašistične literature: Franceta Bevka (1890–1970), Cirila Kosmača (1910–1980), Danila Lokarja (1892–1989) in Lojza Kraigherja (1877–1959). Našteti avtorji se generacijsko, svetovnonazorsko in slogovno med seboj razlikujejo, vsem pa je

1 Članek je nastal v okviru raziskovalnega projekta *Oborožena meja. Politično nasilje v severnem Jadranu, 1914–1941* št. J6-7152, ki ga financira Javna agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije.

skupno to, da so živeli in delovali na področju Primorske, prav tako pa se tu odvija večina njihovih književnih del. Vsi štirje so se kot partizani tudi pridružili odporniškemu gibanju in so bili po drugi svetovni vojni deležni državnih časti. Za razumevanje vloge žensk v odporniški literaturi je pomembno primerjati vloge, ki so jih v delih omenjenih avtorjev imele pred drugo svetovno vojno, med njo in po njej ter spremljati, kako – in če sploh – so se ženski liki v literaturi spreminjali. Pri tem velja opozoriti, da literarna produkcija zaradi razmer med vojno ni bila velika, sploh pa je bila v službi NOB in je imela bolj kot umetniško propagandno in ideološko-mobilizacijsko vlogo (Bernik & Dolgan, 1988).

Da pa lahko literaturo umestimo v zgodovinski kontekst, ni pomembno le kdo in kako jo je pisal temveč tudi, komu je bila namenjena. Sploh v času druge svetovne vojne nam ta informacija pove, kakšno družbo je želela graditi prihodnja oblast. Zato je dragocen vir *Slovenka. Glasilo protifašistične slovenske zveze na Primorskem,* ki je izhajala med junijem 1943 in marcem 1945 ter objavljala tudi leposlovna besedila. Iz tega glasila, ki bo v nadaljevanju analizirano, lahko razberemo, kakšna naj bi bila vloga ženske med vojno in v novi družbeni ureditvi – ter – kar ni nič manj pomembno, kako so pisale ženske.

O vlogi žensk v jugoslovanskem odporniškem gibanju ter njihovi usodi po koncu druge svetovne vojne je bilo napisanih več obširnih del. Jelena Batinić v monografiji *Women and Yugoslav Partisans* (2015) analizira usodo dveh milijonov žensk, ki so bile do konca druge svetovne vojne vključene v partizansko gibanje (od tega približno 100.000 kot borke v vojski) ter žensko emancipacijo med vojno, sploh pa po vojni, opazuje na treh stopnjah: na ravni politične retorike (mit partizanke, herojke), na ravni institucij (Antifašistička fronta žena – AFŽ) in na ravni vsakdanjega življenja (razlika med revolucionarno agendo vrha in resničnostjo vsakdanjega življenja (Batinić, 2015, 2–5). Čeprav je njena analiza široko zastavljena, so njeni rezultati podobni tistim, ki so jih naredile njene predhodnice, mdr. Barbara Jancar-Webster z *Women&Revolution in Yugoslavia* (1990) in Marta Verginella z *Naše žene volijo* (1999). Eden od zaključkov vseh naštetih študij je, da vojna ni imela trajnih emancipatornih učinkov, saj so politične pravice sorazmerno neopazne, če hkrati ne pride do sprememb na drugih področjih. Prav tako obstaja velika razlika med vojno mobilizacijsko retoriko in vsakdanjo prakso, ki je tej retoriki sledila. Kljub korenitim družbenim in gospodarskim spremembam nova oblast ni redefinirala spolnih vlog (Verginella, 1999, 80). Batinić pri analizi vsakdanjega življenja upošteva tudi kulturo in popularno kulturo: tisk, revije, knjige in filme, pri čemer pa se naslanja predvsem na srbske vire. Natančno se je ženskam v odporniškem gibanju na Slovenskem posvetila Valerija Bernik v magistrski nalogi z naslovom *Vloga žensk v osvobodilnem gibanju na Slovenskem* (2001), ki tematizira ženske v partizanskih formacijah. Tudi tej študiji sledi zaključek, da niti med vojno, še bolj pa po vojni, ni prišlo do resocializacije moških in žensk za enakopravnejše sobivanje, sploh osebno življenje pa je ostajalo zaprto v konservativne okvire (Bernik, 2001, 280).

Vse naštete študije kažejo, da četudi se je enakopravnost moških in žensk znotraj samega partizanskega gibanja proti koncu vojne večala, po vojni ni prišlo do temeljnih sprememb na področju izenačitve spolov.

Kaj pa literatura in ženski liki v njej, so se ti spremenili, če sploh, na ravni politične retorike, ali so tudi dejansko dobili novo vsebino? Literatura medvojnega in sploh po-

vojnega obdobja je stala na stičišču popularne kulture, ki je bila namenjena zabavi, in ideološkega aparata, ki je bil namenjen politični vzgoji, zato je lahko dobra pokazateljica odnosa do žensk ter emancipacije. So ženski literarni liki prepričljivi, polnokrvni in prikazujejo novo, sodobno, emancipirano žensko, ali ostajajo tipizirani in klišejski ter žensko reducirajo na objekt? S posvečanjem ženski kot literarnemu subjektu, poskusom psihologizacije in razbijanjem ustaljenih prepričanj lahko literatura ustvarja nove svetove; in ženska emancipacija je eden od njih. Vprašanje pa je, ali je to poustvarjanje uspelo; in do kolikšne mere je avtorjem sploh bilo v interesu. V tem kontekstu je za kriterij mogoče vzeti literarno kakovost ali bolje rečeno, literarno ambicioznost: težnjo k izrisovanju likov onkraj tipizirane klišejskosti. Bolj kot je lik literarno ambiciozno zastavljen, več družbe, teženj, resničnosti in zgodovinskih determinacij se zrcali v njem.

Analiza literature se bo osredotočala izključno na območje Primorske, torej na avtorje, ki so v tem okolju živeli in ga literarno poustvarjali; na ta način je mogoče zamejiti vzorec, hkrati pa opazovati, kako so se jugoslovanske razmere zrcalile v mikrookolju – ter obratno. Je med njima mogoče opaziti razlike – in če ja, kakšne? Prav tako je Primorska primerna izbira zaradi daljše tradicije fašizma in posledično tudi odporniške literature; ta sega še v trideseta leta in tako je pri posameznih avtorjih mogoče spremljati, do kakšne spremembe, če sploh, je znotraj žanra prišlo zaradi druge svetovne vojne.

Poleg štirih kanonskih avorjev se bo raziskava v sklepnem delu ukvarjala tudi z delom dveh primorskih/tržaških pisateljic, Mare Samsa (1906–1959) in Erne Muser (1912–1991). Njuno delo bo v posebnem poglavju iz več razlogov: prvič – čeprav po literarni kakovosti v ničemer ne zaostajata za kolegi, se nista prebili skozi stekleni strop v kanon, drugič, zapustili sta le vsaka po eno odporniško zbirko in ju zato ni mogoče analizirati v kontekstu opusa in morebitnih sprememb v njem ter tretjič – ker se njuno delo po vsebinski plati precej razlikuje od dela njunih kolegov (čeprav sta tudi oni doživeli vojno, živeli in delali na istem območju ter se pridružili NOB). Pozornost bo namenjena tudi odporniškemu glasilu *Slovenka,* v katerem so bila objavljena krajša literarna dela, ki so jih pisale ženske, katerih literatura pa po vojni ni izšla v samostjojnih zbirkah. Poleg tem, s katerimi so se ukvarjale, je iz glasila, nad katerim je bedelo odporniško vodstvo, tudi mogoče sklepati, kakšna naj bi bila nova ženska za novi svet, ki se je obetal po vojni.

KMEČKA POVEST V NOVI PREOBLEKI

Literat z največjim narodnoosvobodilnim opusom med obravnavanimi avtorji je France Bevk in skozi njegovo pripoved lahko spremljamo Goriško v zelo dolgem časovnem razponu. V času fašizma nemalokrat seže tudi v preteklost, zgodovino, da bi s pripovedjo o nekem zgodovinskem dogodku lahko svobodneje, ne da bi v njegovo delo posegla cenzura, opisal razmere sodobnosti. Njegova najljubša oblika pripovedi, ki ji ostaja zvest tako pred drugo svetovno vojno kot po njej, je kmečka povest. Na kmečko povest, ki se skoraj dosledno odvija v vaseh na Goriškem, lepi različne tipe junakov, predvsem upornikov, in družbe, ki jih obdaja. Njegovo najbolj znano delo – in njegovo prvo antifašistično, je roman *Kaplan Martin Čedermac*, ki je prvič izšel leta 1938. Po pripovednem slogu se ne razlikuje bistveno od njegovih poprejšnjih del in ostaja v okvirih ljudske povesti, le da

je tu motivika bolj eksplicitno politična: slovenski kaplan Martin Čedermac se zoperstavi fašistični težnji, ki od njega zahteva, da bi bogoslužje vodil v italijanskem jeziku. Skozi roman spremljamo zaplete, ki jih je imel kaplan z oblastjo, sovaščani in Cerkvijo, pa tudi njegove notranje dvome, pomisleke in strahove.

Ženski liki v romanu so zelo tipizirani in zreducirani na minimum, kar kaže na kontinuiteto z njegovim poprejšnjim delom. Osrednjo vlogo v kaplanovem življenju ima mati, ki jo obožuje in predstavlja nekakšno svetnico, ideal požrtvovalne, mile, skrbne pametne in preudarne ženske, ki pa se tudi zaveda svoje materinske vloge in njenih omejitev. Poleg nje v romanu nastopa tudi sestra Katina, za katero se zdi, kakor bi bila otrok, saj je kaplan obravnava kot izrazito inferiorno, čeprav nekje izvemo, da šteje že skoraj štirideset let. Jasno je, da v kaplanovem življenju nikoli ne bo mogla nadomestiti matere, to da vedeti tudi ona sama, ko svojega, sicer tudi že ostarelega sina vpraša: »Ali ti Katina dobro postreže? Saj me ne pogrešaš prehudo?« (Bevk, 1965, 24). In res je vloga Katine, najbolj prisotnega ženskega lika v romanu, predvsem, da streže. Čeprav Katina ne naredi nič slabega, bralec vseskozi čuti nekakšen prezir, ki jo ima pripovedovalec do nje, največkrat jo imenuje »baba«, zmerja jo z nekom, ki ne zna zadržati skrivnosti zase in pri tem posplošuje do stereotipa: »Ženska je, zato je povedala.« (Bevk, 1965, 88). Poleg tega je Kaplan Martin Čedrmac, sicer pozitiven, malone moralistično zgleden lik, do svoje sestre tudi nasilen, nanjo veliko kriči in jo – brez pravega razloga – tudi skoraj pretepe (»Klepetulja, baba [...] dvignil je pest proti nji ...«). (Bevk, 1965, 56). Bevkovo najbolj znano predvojno antifašistično delo ne vsebuje nobenega ženskega lika, ki bi bil kakorkoli politično angažiran ali bi igral vlogo v odporu.

Ženski liki v *Kaplanu Martinu Čedrmacu* so precej podobni drugim, zelo tipiziranim ženskim likom tega avtorja. Skoraj vsem Bevkovim literarnim delom je skupno, da ženske v njih na neki točki jočejo in da s svojim strahom, nezaupanjem, upogljivostjo na nek način celo otežujejo antifašistični boj. Ne, ker bi tako hotele – ali iz zlobe – ampak ker drugače ne zmorejo (ženska kot diagnoza). Na tem mestu velja omeniti tudi, da se avtor nemalokrat ukvarja tudi z *moškostjo* – do prevpraševanja vloge moškega pa pride, ko je soočen z žensko, ki je (največkrat zato, ker služi denar), dominantna. Tako je denimo v povesti Bajtar Mihale iz leta 1937, v kateri Mihale za alkohol zapravi denar, ki bi ga moral prinesti domov, njegova žena pa nedolgo zatem zboli in umre. Mihale je poln gneva do žene, saj ju preživlja ona in še ko umira, jo krivi za bolezen in noče biti ob njej ter raje razmišlja o tem, da si je zaradi njunega odnosa še sam »kdaj pa kdaj očital nemoškost.« (Bevk, 1965, 215). Podobno je tudi v mladinski povesti Tonček, ki je bila prvič napisana pred vojno, a se je izgubila, nato pa jo je Bevk še enkrat napisal leta 1948 in so jo razglašali za mladinskega Čedrmaca (Bevk, 1970). V njej opisuje stisko, v kateri se znajde obubožana družina, od katere fašistična oblast zahteva, da govori izključno italijansko. Da bi obdržali streho nad glavo, mati, ki preživlja družino, želi, da se uklonijo zahtevi, oče pa ji ne upa ugovarjati, a pripovedovalec pripomni: »Da bi imel delo in zaslužil, bi zarohnel, da bi se stresla vsa hiša.« (Bevk, 1970, 21). Moški, ki so ob ženskah prisiljeni potlačevati svojo agresijo, so Bevkov priljubljen literarni motiv.

Kako pa je bilo z odporništvom in ženskimi liki pri Bevku po drugi svetovni vojni? Na prvi pogled lahko opazimo, da so se Bevkovi ženski liki prebili v naslovne, denimo

Učiteljica Breda (1963) in *Mati Polona* (1968). A čeprav sta tako učiteljica kot mati naslovna lika, sta za samo zgodbo skoraj nepomembna. Učiteljica Breda je mladinska pustolovska povest s partizansko kuliso, v kateri je učiteljica večji del odsotna, prikazana pa je predvsem kot ženska z izrazito toplim, materinskim odnosom do svojih učencev. Mati Polona je resda naslovni lik, a je njena naloga le, da je naratorka. Žensko vprašanje ali vprašanje odporništva ni obravnavano, osredotoča se predvsem na družinsko tragedijo, ki jo je povzročila vojna. Gre za povsem shematično pripoved, v kateri sta edini lastnosti pripovedovalke, da je mati in žena.

Tudi v drugih Bevkovih delih, ki imajo formalno v središču ženske like, so te precej pasivne, dosledno nastopajo v vlogi Drugega in ne kot samostojne pripovedovalke, razmišljevalke, borke. Še celo ko se njihovi partnerji nad njimi fizično znašajo, kot denimo v Štefa se vrača, ženske mož ne zapustijo, Bevkov pripovedovalec, ki mu je moralizem sicer vse prej kot tuj, pa temu nima navade posvečati posebne pozornosti. Za skoraj vse ženske like Bevkovih pripovedi bi lahko uporabili poved, ki jo je zapisal v povesti *Težka pot* (1956, 93): »Bil je navajen, da je zmeraj vdano sprejemala udarce življenja.« Bevkove ženske večkrat sklonijo glavo kot se uprejo in pri tem je konsistenten tako v predvojni kot povojni odporniški literaturi.

Ciril Kosmač je pripovedno sicer nekoliko manj tog od Franceta Bevka, si pa zato delita osnovni predsodek do žensk, ki so tudi v Kosmačevih pripovedih velikokrat le »babe« in »čeče«, nastopajo pa predvsem kot ne preveč pametne in velikokrat komične ali celo škodljive obrekovalke. Njegove povesti *Sreča* (1936) sicer ne moremo označiti za antifašistično, je pa v njej prikazana kruta usoda Tinke, ki je postala nezakonska mati, prostitutka, detomorilka in zloba vaške skupnosti, ki ne pozna prizanesljivosti do žensk, ki se ne uklonijo konvenciji. Kosmač se podobne tematike loti tudi v *Pomladnem dnevu* (1950), delu, v katerem nastopa Kadetka, njegov najpomembnejši ženski literarni lik. Po tem, ko je njen nezakonski oče umrl kot žrtev nesmiselne vojne, je njena mama naredila samomor in Kadetka je ostala v pripovedovalčevi družini. Pripovedovalec nameni precej pozornosti opisu pogreba in se spominja svoje otroške zgroženosti ob tem, ko Kadetkina mama ni bila deležna pogreba, ampak je bila obravnavna kot manjvredno bitje. Prav tako se Kosmač stika z Bevkom v opisih matere: tudi v Pomladnem dnevu je osrednja vloga mame, ki je požrtvovalna, ljubeča in ustvarja dom. Njena žrtev gre tako daleč, da zavrne zdravljenje, da bi se njen sin, pripovedovalec, lahko šolal. Tudi tu je odnos do žensk prezirljiv, veliko je primerjav s kokošmi, denimo: »Meni se zdi, da je vsaki kuri všeč, če petelin brusi kremplje okrog nje« (Kosmač, 1971, 223). ali pa je podobna poanta ubesedena z: »Še voda kamen omehča, pa ne bi dedec babnice.« (Kosmač, 1971, 223). Ženska svojo moralnost še vedno dokazuje tudi z deviškostjo in nevednostjo.

In tudi Kosmač s tem delom ostaja v ustaljenih okvirjih: gre za kmečki roman, tradicionalno slovensko pripoved, ki ji vojna služi kot kulisa, liki, vključno z osrednjim ženskim, pa ne premorejo kakovostnejše psihologizacije. Prav tako ženske niso nosilke odporniških gibanj, borke ali samostojni subjekti.

Ženski liki v Bevkovih in Kosmačevih literarnih delih se povsem skladajo z zgodovinskim časom, v katerem so nastajala. Čeprav je nova oblast obdržala radikalno retoriko vojne, je v svoji sporočilnosti ostajala predvojno konservativna. Tako kot v resničnem življenju ni

prišlo do soočenja med revolucionarnim in tradicionalnim, ampak se je zgodila le adaptacija tradicionalnih vrednot na revolucionarno besedišče, je bilo tudi pri obravnavanih avtorjih. Zaključek Jelene Batinić, da so lokalne tradicije ostale trdno zakoreninjene in se je edina sprememba zgodila na ravni folklore, ki je srečala revolucionarno besedišče, drži tudi na lokalnem literarnem primeru Bevka in Kosmača, avtorjev, ki sta bila za časa svojega življenja visoko cenjena in še danes ostajata kanonizirana (Bartinič, 2015, 259).

NOVA ŽENSKA

Z dvoličnim odnosom do žensk in nespoštovanjem njihovega telesa se je v svojem morda najboljšem in najpretresljivejšem delu, romanu *Krista Alba*, ukvarjal tudi Alojz Kraigher. Besedilo je bilo napisano leta 1933, izšlo pa je posthumno in še to samo v Zbranih delih in ne kot samostojno literarno delo. To delo prav tako izpostavlja odrekanje pravice do dostojnega pokopa ženski, ki se je po sili razmer znašla v stiski, stiska pa jo je vodila v javno hišo. A za razliko od Kosmača zmore Kraigher veliko natančneje opisati razmere, ki so žensko na njeni poti vodile in pokaže, kako so ji pot v pogubo tlakovali moški, ki so oblikovali in nadzorovali njen svet. Najprej so jo izigrali, na koncu pa so ji odrekli tudi poslednje dostojanstvo. Roman velja na tem mestu omeniti, ker gre za enega prvih v zgodovini slovenske književnosti, ki se ukvarja z žensko seksualnostjo, ne da bi pri tem moraliziral. Ne moremo ga tudi označiti za odporniški roman, čeprav pride pri delu Kriste Alba v javni hiši do očitnih nacionalnih trenj in je razbrati, da je najhujše od vseh ponižanj to, da mora biti kot Slovenka na razpolago Italijanom. Ni nemogoče, da v tem prepoznamo tudi splošno politično ozračje ob rapalski meji. Vendarle pa je to delo pomembno poznati, da ga lahko primerjamo z razvojem ženskih likov v Kraigherjevi povojni antifašistični prozi. V tem smislu je nedvomno prelomna novela *Njena krivda,* ki je bila napisana leta 1946, v celoti pa je bila prvič objavljena leta 1949.

V njej kot tovariša, enakovredna partnerja, nastopata Tomaž in Ljuba. Ko v naporni akciji skupaj rešita ilegalno partizansko tiskarno, se med njima razvnamejo strasti, ljubita se in iz tega se sredi vojne rodi sin Silvin. Iz opisov Ljube je jasno, da si Tomaža želi, tudi telesno – in v pripoved ni čudne okornosti pred telesnostjo, ki jo imata oba poprejšnja obravnavana avtorja. Ljuba se čuti svojemu tovarišu Tomažu enakovredno in ko razmišlja o njuni morebiti poroki, pravi: »Gospodarjem? Ali si je res želela gospodarja? Ali si ni želela samo tovariša? Ali se je strinjal z njenimi nazori o življenju, o enakopravnosti, da bi bil Tomaž njen gospodar?« (Kraigher, 1986, 138). Pod vprašaj pa protagonistka ne postavlja le zakonske skupnosti, tega malomeščanskega konstrukta, ki ženski pristriže peruti, ampak tudi druge stvari, ki jih tako radi pripisujejo ženskam. Denimo z žensko lepoto. O njej razmišlja v skladu s socialistično idejo in pravi: »Ženska lepota je zaklad, ki ni po pravici pridobljen.« Pripovedovalec njeno misel še nadgradi: »Od tedaj se je zavedala, da dela že s samo eksistenco te svoje lepe ženske maske krivico tovarišicam, ki tega obdarovanja od narave niso bile deležne.« (Kraigher, 1986, 143). Do zapleta v zgodbi pride, ko jo, medtem ko v večerni obleki doji otroka, obiščejo fašisti, pregledajo njeno stanovanje in jo zaradi domnevne ilegalne dejavnosti odvedejo v zapor. Otroka pusti svojim sosedom. Že prej, med dojenjem, je razmišljala o tem, da bi sinu morala

najti rejnike in se vrniti v boj. Razmišljala je o svoji materinski vlogi in se jezila, da jo je ta naredila tako nekoristno; ne more se boriti ampak mora skrbeti za otroka, medtem pa jo narod potrebuje. Tovrstne perspektive v odporniški literaturi sicer ni veliko zaslediti; vloga matere je največkrat trpeča, požrtvovalna in omejena na domače ognjišče. Ljubina je zasukana – sprašuje se o smiselnosti materinstva in v svojem delu ne vidi nič pomembnega, pomembnejši se ji zdi boj. Poleg tega si ne taji, da si želi v partizane vrniti tudi zaradi Tomaža in očita si: »Sebično bi se zagnala za svojo slo.« (Kraigher, 1986, 151). Kraigherju telesnost na splošno ni tuja, ne le žensko poželenje ampak tudi druge funkcije ženskega telesa si zaslužijo pozornost. Pred fašističnim zaslišanjem v zaporu Ljuba denimo premišljuje o tem, kako jo bolijo prsi, ker se ji v njih nabira mleko in kako si ga bo morala iztisniti. Ljuba je polnokrvna ženska, ki čuti svoje telo, uporablja svoj um in premore svoj pogum. Hkrati pa njeno telo, telo matere, ne pomeni, da ne zmore uporabljati uma. Načrtno se poskuša oddaljevati od mita materinstva in na neki točki razmišlja, da je materinstvo le filistrstvo, le »sentimentalen predsodek, samo malenkost v primerjavi z domovino, v primerjavi z OF.« Hkrati v zvezi z materinstvom zavrača vse vzorce, ko jo fašist na zaslišanju vpraša, če je nezakonska mati, mu odgovori: »Zame ne eksistira nezakonstvo matere.« (Kraigher, 1986, 161). In tako kot se ji zdi sentimentalno opevanje materinstva, je prezirljiva tudi do ljubezni. S tovarišico se v ječi pogovarjata, da so Italijani navajeni na svoje plitke Italijanke, »saj njihove buržujke ne poznajo drugih interesov kakor ljubezen«, kar je po njenem tudi razlog, da jih fašisti tako radi zapeljujejo; mislijo namreč, da jih bodo z ljubeznijo razorožili (Kraigher, 1986, 180).

Kraigherjeva novela *Njena krivda* žensko odpornico, njen duševni in telesni ustroj, obravnava v celoti in je v tem smislu prelomno delo v slovenski književnosti, ki daje ženski prostor, da kot antifašistka, upornica, zavrne vse klišeje, ki se lepijo nanjo kot žensko in ustvarja sebi lasten lik, žensko prihodnosti, svobodno in enakopravno.

Razlika med Bevkom in Kosmačem na eni strani in Kraigherjem na drugi je v tem, da gre slednji, čeprav najstarejši in bi ga zato zmotno lahko imeli za bolj konservativnega, v prevpraševanju družbenega položaja žensk še korak dlje in se ne zadovolji le z golim obsojanjem ob npr. nepokopu trupla ali nezakonskem otroku. Ženskim likom da možnost za lastno prevpraševanje sistema, da so akterke lastnega življenja. To lahko vidimo tudi v noveli Senčica, v kateri se Franca za prvega moža odloči, ker je privržen partiji in ji veliko pomeni njegova politična usmeritev, za ljubimca pa, ker ji ga uspe spreobrniti v komunizem. Pripovedovalec zaradi njene menjave moških tudi ne moralizira, kar je sicer v navadi, ampak ji v usta položi besede: »Kako krivičen je družbeni red, ki hoče siliti človeka, da vzdrži v razmerju, ki se mu v dno duše gabi.« (Kraigher, 1986, 39).

Avtorsko je zanimiv tudi Danilo Lokar, ki je bil tako kot Lojz Kraigher tudi sam zdravnik. Njegova odporniška literatura je izrazito neideološka, kar je pripisati tudi slogu, ki mu je pripadal, ekspresionizmu. Pripoved *Zlata verižica*, napisana v petdesetih letih (leta 1958 je izšla v zbirki *Sodni dan na vasi*) skozi oči prvoosebne pripovedovalke, ki nagovarja v drugi osebi, govori o več desetletij trajajočem obdobju od prve svetovne vojne do konca druge na območju Goriške. Vzpostavi tudi paralelo med materjo Karlo, pripovedovalko, ki je doživela prvo svetovno vojno, in hčerjo Zofko, ki je padla v drugi svetovni vojni. Gre za pretresljivo, pretanjeno prepoved, ki daje ženski avtentični glas,

jo postavi v središče nesmiselne morije in pokaže na tragično kontinuiteto med rodovi, ženskami. Kot se vpraša Karla, ko razmišlja o hčeri: »Ali te je spominjala nanjo, ki se je poganjala od debla do debla proti pokopališču, ko so klestile naokoli zašle krogle z bojišča?« (Lokar, 1958, 139).

Drugoosebna pripoved omogoča po eni strani potujitev, ločenost od pripovedovalke, po drugi strani pa deluje bolj intimno ker neposredno nagovarja tudi bralko, namiguje na občo izkušnjo.

Kaj lahko torej sklepamo iz literarnega dela štirih avtorjev, kako je antifašistični boj spremenil njihove ženske like? Najkrajši odgovor bi bil, da jih ni. Po drugi svetovni vojni vsi sledijo pripovednim slogom, ki so jih oblikovali pred vojno in osvobodilni boj služi le kot kulisa ne pa kot nekaj, kar bi bistveno spremenilo pogled na ženske like v literaturi. A ker literatura le redko ni odzivna čas, v katerem nastaja, je treba poudariti, da so teme, kakršni sta materinstvo in herojstvo ženske zaposlovali tudi sam politični vrh. Če se sprašujemo, zakaj denimo pri Bevku, ki je sproduciral največ besedil, ne najdemo lika herojske ženske, nam na to delno odgovori politična klima. Že kmalu po koncu vojne je na področju celotne Jugoslavije lik herojke zamenjal lik matere. Kot ugotavlja Batinić (2015, 5), se mit herojske partizanke takoj po vojni začne seksualizirati in iz nje nastane mati, po možnosti žrtev. Ikona *partizanke* je že v petdesetih letih z vrnitvijo neotradicionalizma skoraj povsem izginila. Na Slovenskem o tem priča Boris Kidrič, ki je že leta 1945 izražal izrazito protifeministična stališča, ženske pa so bile, seveda z revolucionarno retoriko, spet zreducirane na vlogo mater in varuhinj domačega ognjišča (Verginella, 1999, 75–79).

Kraigherjevo svobodnjaštvo je bilo partijski liniji že bistveno bolj tuje; o tem priča predvsem to, da se za časa svojega življenja kljub literarni ambicioznosti in starosti nikoli ni prebil v prvo kategrijo kanonskih avtorjev. Je pa vzporednice z resničnostjo mogoče najti tudi v njegovem delu: ko pri Ljubi poudarja spolno slo, nagovori očitke in predsodke, ki so jih partizankam velikokrat namenili konservativni krogi ter njihov tisk, češ da so ženske, ki gredo v partizane, spolno izprijene in gredo v hosto le zaradi zadovoljevanje svojih nagonov. Nekaj let po vojni v Jugoslaviji to sploh ni bila več tema o kateri bi se govorilo – morda tudi zato, ker so uspešno okronali lik matere – so se pa tovrstni predsodki mnogo bolj trdovratno obdržali v Sovjetski zvezi (Bernik, 2001, 295–296).

Pretirano bi bilo, če bi želeli izpostaviti eno skupno značilnost, ki druži prozo vseh obravnavanih avtorjev. Čeprav so ustvarjali na relativno majhnem obmejnem območju, na katerega so umestili tudi večji del svojih pripovedi, se njihovo delo med seboj razlikuje. V eni točki pa so si edini: da se vojna ni začela leta 1939, ampak se od leta 1914 tako rekoč ni končala, da je bila od prve svetovne vojne dalje ob meji napetost in je življenje ta tem območju zaznamovalo nasilje. Številne pripovedi vseh štirih avtorjev govorijo o dveh ali več generacijah, ki so zaznamovane z vojnim dogajanjem in prikazujejo, da obdobje med obema vojnama ni bilo tudi obdobje miru, ampak je bil čas pogostega nasilja, ki se je nemalokrat rodilo kot posledica prve svetovne vojne (brezposelnost, travme, alkoholizem, družinske tragedije, revščina …).[2] Čeprav v drugi polovici tridesetih let na Slovenskem še

2 Potrditev za tezo, da obdobje med svetovnima vojnama ni bilo nujno tudi obdobje miru, najdemo tudi v več zgodovinskih in socioloških raziskavah. Teoretsko izhodišče tovrstnega razmisleka izhaja iz koncepta

ni bilo vojne, jo je že mogoče zaslutiti v delih številnih literatov (Komelj, 2009, 21). Na območju, kjer so ljudje že od leta 1922 lahko občutili, kaj je fašizem, ima tovrstna slutnja v literaturi še daljšo tradicijo.

LITERATURA IN IDEOLOGIJA

Literarna dela, ki so bila v grobem opisana zgoraj, večinoma niso nastajala med samo drugo svetovno vojno. Literarna dejavnost je bila med samo vojno precej redka, po eni strani zaradi poziva h kulturnemu molku pod okupatorjem in po drugi strani zaradi nemogočih razmer in težkega dostopa do javnih občil, ki so delovala le v ilegali. Poleg tega je bila vsa literatura, ki se je producirala in razpečevala na ta način, v službi NOB in je imela ideološko vlogo. V partizanskem tisku poleg kratkih novic prevladujejo reportaže, službe, ki bi skrbela za leposlovje, pa ni bilo. Prav tako je pri preučevanju partizanskega tiska treba vedeti, da je bil podvržen cenzuri (Bernik & Dolgan 1988, 12–40). V glasilu *Smernice* so med vojno navajali, kakšen je namen partizanskega tiska, kjer so poudarjali, da mora biti tisk tak, da bo »utrjeval borbenost partizanov«, da bo »partizana politično utrjeval, da bo odpravljal politično nejasnost, da jih bo politično vzgajal.« Poudarili so tudi, da zaradi tega »umetnost ne bo ovirana«, bo pa »usmerjena« (Smernice 4, IV, 1944, 1, 7; citirano po Bernik & Dolgan, 1988, 39).

Dodati je tudi treba, da so glede na vojne okoliščine tovrstne zahteve razumljive.

Ker vemo, da je imel tisk ideološko funkcijo in da je moral ustrezati smernicam, lahko iz tistega, kar je mogoče prebrati v partizanskih časopisih, sklepamo, da ni šlo le za osebno stališče ali umetniško izražanje, ampak za idejo s širšo politično-ideološko zaslombo. Prav zato so ohranjene številke glasila *Slovenka*, ki ga je med junijem 1943 in marcem 1945 izdajala protifašistična slovenska zveza na Primorskem, tako pomembne. So namreč eno redkih pričevanj o tem, kako so med drugo svetovno vojno na območju Goriške pisale in objavljale ženske. Iz glasila lahko veliko izvemo tudi o tem, kakšne ženske so pričakovale za svoje bralke – in akterke v antifašističnem boju. Na tem mestu se bomo posvečali predvsem literarnim in polliterarnim besedilom v glasilu, čeprav si

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»brutalizacije množic« Georga L. Mosseja (Fallen Soldiers. Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars, 1990), ki dokazuje, da se mentalni okvir nasilja, vzpostavljen v prvi svetovni vojni, nadaljuje tudi v poznejše obdobje (domnevnega) miru. Ta »normalizacija« nasilja, je nekaj, kar s pridom izrabi tudi fašizem. Severni Jadran se je po prvi svetovni vojni spremenil v »razbito območje« (Bartov, Weitz, *Shatterzone of Empires,* 2013), kjer je zaradi dvoumnosti nastalega položaja prišlo do oblikovanja teritorija brez točno določene državne oblasti. Prehod, za katerega so bile značilne izrazite politične, gospodarske, vojaške in kulturne nestabilnosti je trajal več let in je postal laboratorij za nove oblike vojaškega in paravojaškega nasilja (fašistične milice). To se je dogajalo v vakuumu, ki je nastal po razpadu avstro-ogrske monarhije, hkrati je nasilje služilo kot dopolnilo k novi državni oblasti in njeni legitimaciji. Valovi političnega nasilja so se pojavljali v različnih oblikah, med letoma 1920 in 1930 pa je prišlo do vzpona proti nasilju, ki je temeljilo na terorističnem delovanju. Tako v kontekstu nasilja kot protinasilja se zrcali teza Hannah Arendt (*On Violence*, 1970), ki pravi, da se nasilje lahko pojavi le tam, kjer umanjka absolutna moč. Na primeru severnega Jadrana je razvidno, da je zaradi odsotnosti državnih struktur sprva prišlo do brezvladja, ki je nato čedalje jasneje dobivalo obrise fašističnega državnega aparata. To se odraža tudi v nekaterih delih vseh obravnavanih avtorjev tega članka.

vsekakor zasluži tudi širšo družbeno obravnavo, sploh v primerjalnem odnosu z drugimi odporniškimi glasili na Slovenskem.

Osnovno usmeritev glasila je mogoče razbrati že iz uvodnika prve številke, ki med drugim pravi, da je časopis namenjen delavkam, kmeticam, vajenkam, služkinjam in meščankam, dekletom in ženam, vsem, ki trpijo pod fašističnim jarmom. Zapisali so, da »Slovenka želi postati v resnici glasilo vaših želja, upov in pričakovanj, pa tudi vaših teženj in naporov v težkih časih.«[3] Glasilo na prvo mesto postavlja ženske, ki živijo pod fašizmom, ki pa si želijo enakopravnosti zase in boljšega življenja za svojo družino. Naloga glasila je, da odraža resničnost, popisuje, kaj se dogaja v antifašističnem boju, hkrati pa si prizadeva za boljše življenje vseh žensk ne glede na poklic, status ali stan. Že v tej številki lahko naletimo na opis stanja v tovarni in poziv k stavki, ki naj bi bila prvi korak k svobodi naroda, saj naj bi slovenske delavke za fašistične tovarnarje delale v nemogočih pogojih; boj za boljše plače pa je tako tudi boj proti fašizmu.[4]

Objavljena je tudi pesem Otona Župančiča s pozivom materam, naj otrokom berejo slovensko. Leposlovje je na tem mestu v vlogi vzgoje, ženske pa nagovarja kot matere.[5]

V naslednji številki je priobčeno tudi prvo polliterarno besedilo za ženske. Gre za priljubljeno formo pisma, ki skuša delovati avtentično, kot primarni dokument, pričevanje, a gre v resnici za literarni poskus. Morda je forma pisma za ta besedila izbrana tudi zato, ker nagovarja v drugi osebi ednine (kot smo že opazovali pri Lokarju) in se vsaka bralka čuti nagovorjeno. Objavljeno je *Pismo Materi,* v katerem piše, da so matere v »najtežjih dneh zgodovine«, ko se je bil boj s »fašistično zverjo«, pokazale, kaj je to herojstvo. In nato preide s splošnega na osebno – in z osebnega nazaj na kolektivno, ki nagovarja vse bralke: »Mati, kako Ti je bilo pri srcu, ko so ti fašisti odgnali sina? In kako vam je bilo, matere, ko so odhajali vaši sinovi in hčere v hribe, da se borijo za svobodo našega naroda?« Besedilo se nato zaključi s pretresljivim podpisom partizanke Zorke, ki pravi: »Mati, odšla sem, da bi postala junak, a postala sem – človek.«[6]

Pisma so bila objavljena v malone vsaki številki glasila, skoraj vedno na relaciji otrok-mama. Najdemo lahko denimo pismo mame partizanu, ki napoveduje, da se bodo sinovi in hčere kmalu srečno vrnili domov iz vojne, osvobodili bodo domovino in ji s tem postavili spomenik, kakršnega še ni imela. Opazimo lahko tudi, da bolj kot se zaostrujejo vojne razmere, mlajši postajajo namišljeni sinovi in hčere v pismih. Pisma so tudi zelo opisna, tako da pokažejo širše razmere vojne in družine. Beremo lahko denimo pismo štirinajstletnega dečka, ki ga je mami pustil pred odhodom v partizane:

> *Predraga tovarišica mama! Z bolečino v srcu te zapuščam samo z mojim malim bratom. Očeta imamo v Nemčiji in tam strada in ga preganja nemška zver. Kliče me dolžnost zavednega Slovenca in tudi premišljajoč te rane v naši družini, grem z veselim srcem med naše tovariše, v boj za našo zlato svobodo, ki bo v najkrajšem času*

3 Slovenka, 1. 6. 1943: Drage tovarišice!, 1.
4 Slovenka, 1. 6. 1943: Mlada delavka iz tekstilne tovarne v Gorici nam piše, 2.
5 Slovenka, 1. 6. 1943: Medved z medom, 3.
6 Slovenka, 1. 7. 1943: Pismo materi, 1.

> *zasijala. Mlad sem in s tem, da stopam v partizane naj bo to zgled ostalim. Za spomin tvojega sina ti pustim sliko, s partizanskim pozdravom se ločim od tebe, draga mama. Smrt fašizmu, svoboda narodu. Tovariš Ivo*.[7]

Pismo je hladno in lahko bi mu očitali ideološko pragmatičnost, ki gre do te mere, da se mama in sin nagovarjata tovariš in tovarišica. So pa tudi pisma, ki so toplejša, denimo to, ki naj bi ga mati pisala sinu, ki je odšel v boj:

> *Pišem ti prvo pismo. Komaj par dni je, odkar si odšel, a toliko reči bi ti rada povedala. Vse ono, kar sem pozabila ob slovesu. Težko sem te dala. Borila sem se v notranjosti sama s seboj, saj si mi edini sin; saj si mi oče in mati, sestra in brat, nobenega človeka nimam razen tebe na svetu. In ti imaš komaj dobrih 15 let. Res je, da si velik in močan, da si videti dve, tri leta starejši, da si v teh letih vojne preživel marsikaj hudega, kar te je deloma zresnilo – a vendar si še vihrav otrok, ki nima pravega pogleda v svet.* [...] *Vem, da se boš med partizanskimi tovariši in v trdnem življenju partizanov dogradil v človeka, da boš dobil vzgojo, katere ti ne bi mogla dati nobena šola, noben študij, ki jo lahko da samo borba. Bodi ponosen, da si član slavne Titove armade, ki se ji divi ves zavezniški svet, vojske, ki je uničila včeraj italijanske fašistične krvnike in ki bo jutri osvobodila domovino. Skrbno pazi, da bi je ne umazal z nobenim nepremišljenim dejanjem. Svojim tovarišem bodi dober tovariš! Če bi te ne bilo nazaj, bi mi bilo hudo, če bi pa zvedela kaj slabega o tebi, bi mi bilo še težje.* [...].[8]

To pismo deluje bistveno bolj čustveno in bralke, ki so tudi mame, nagovarja na osebnejši način. Vživlja se v čustva, ki so jih imele mame, ko so otroci zapuščali, da so odšli v partizane. Naloga tovrstnih pisem je predvsem dvojna: prva, da spodbudijo bralke k temu, da otrok ne ovirajo pri odhodu v partizane in druga, da tolažijo tiste mame, katerih otroci so že odšli, da v svoji bolečini niso osamljene. Vsa objavljena pisma tematizirajo odnos med materjo in otrokom. Iz tega je razvidno, da je najpomembnejša vloga ženske med vojno ostajala tradicionalna vloga matere. Ta pa ni bila prikazana le v pismih ampak tudi v drugih literarnih ali polliterarnih zvrsteh, denimo v zelo priljubljenih reportažah, ki dosledno tematizirajo partizanske vojaške uspehe in tudi v pravih literarnih poskusih. Eden od njih je zgodba *Slovenska mati*, ki prav tako kot pisma nagovarja v drugi osebi ednine:

> *Ti si tista, ki si v času najtežjega fašističnega terorja skrbela za prve partizanske skupinice, ti si tista, ki si hodila že pred tremi leti na prve sestanke, ti si tista, ki si pošiljala moža v borbo za pravico, ko ga je hotel italijanski fašizem vkleniti v svojo službo; ti si tista, ki s pesmijo v srcu in na ustnih sama obdelaš domačijo in z ljubeznijo rediš in vzgajaš mladi rod*.[9]

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7 Slovenka, 3. 3. 1944: Pismo 14 letnega dečka, ki ga je pustil materi pred odhodom v partizane, 17.
8 Slovenka, 5. 5. 1944: Prvo pismo, 14.
9 Slovenka, 1. 1. 1945: Slovenska mati, 22.

V isti številki je objavljena tudi črtica *Ustrelili so ga*, v kateri ženska ostane sama z otrokom, po tem, ko so ji moža ustrelili kot talca. Na koncu zgodbe lahko beremo: »Tako je stopala iz ulice v ulico, brez joka, brez solza v očeh. Nihče ni vedel za njeno silno bolest. Slovenska partizanska mati in žena ne razkazuje svojega trpljenja. Stopala je odločno dalje, v srcu je gorelo maščevanje [...].«[10]

Ženske v literarnih in polliterarnih delih odporniškega glasila Slovenka sicer nastopajo tudi v drugih vlogah, ne le v materinski, a materinska se pojavi največkrat. Za pogumne »bombašice«, »tovarišice mitraljezke«, bolničarke, učiteljice in kurirke so največkrat namenjene reportaže, ki jih ne moremo povsem umestiti med literarna dela, čeprav imajo nemalokrat leposlovne tendence in meja med resničnostjo in fikcijo ni vedno jasna. Prav tako kot polliterarno delo nastopa tudi nekrolog, ki dopušča še širši pripovedni zamah in večjo čustvenost od reportaž. Najlepši primer nekrologa je namenjen *Darinki Piščančevi – Slovenki na neznani grob,* ki ga je napisala Tržačanka Mara Samsa (1906–1959) govori o pogumni ženski, ki je v tržaškem mestnem jedru ustanavljala krožke za slovenski jezik, pripovedovalka pa se spominja, kako je bila najboljša učenka, ki pa nikoli ni skrivala svojega slovenskega ponosa. Besedilo je literarno spretno napisano, zanimivo pa je tudi, da je Mara Samsa podpisana z imenom in priimkom – v nasprotju z večino drugih avtoric, ki se skrivajo za partizanskimi imeni.[11]

Posebno pozornost si zasluži tudi partizanska poezija, te ne manjka niti v *Slovenki.* Večinoma gre za preproste rime in verzi nagovarjajo k sodelovanju v boju. Ena takih pesmi je denimo *Mobilizacija*, katere poanta je, da je žena *steber zaledja,* to pa dokazuje tudi s tem, da pomaga pri iskanju skrivačev in jih pregovori, naj gredo v partizane.[12] V tej številki glasila je sicer bistveno bolj zanimiva pesem *Nova slovenska žena*, ki ima izrazite emancipatorne težnje. Napisana je za več glasov, prvi, drugi in zbor, kar daje občutek skupnosti, kolektiva. Govori o tem, kako so bile ženske stoletja zaklete v suženjstvo, zdaj pa je pred njimi lepša bodočnost, ko lahko vzamejo usodo v svoje roke in gradijo boljši svet.[13] Naletimo lahko tudi na pesem z naslovom *Materi*, buditeljsko besedilo o razlogih, zakaj se je hči odločila za odhod v partizane. Med drugim zato, da maščuje smrt svojega očeta, ki je padel na bojišču pri Piavi (1918) in ga zato nikoli ni spoznala.[14] Ob tem se spet lahko spomnimo na zarezo, ki jo je zapustila prva svetovna vojna, katere posledice se v pripovedništvu vlečejo več kot dve desetletji.

Glasilo *Slovenka* nagovarja in prikazuje različne ženske. Največ leposlovnih besedil je namenjenih materinstvu, a še zdaleč ne moremo reči, da ženske niso prikazane v drugih vlogah: kot borke, učiteljice, herojke, volivke ipd. Zanimivo je tudi večkratno nagovarjanje žensk, naj ne bodo sentimentalne – ampak raje močne in borbene ter naj za nobeno ceno ne jočejo – kar kaže na željo po prelomu z ustaljenimi predstavami o ženskem obnašanju.

10 Slovenka, 1. 1. 1945: Ustrelili so ga, 24.
11 Slovenka, 1. 10. 1944: Darinki Piščančevi – Slovenki na neznani grob*,* 19–20.
12 Slovenka, 1. 3. 1945: Mobilizacija, 19.
13 Slovenka, 1. 3. 1945: Nova slovenska žena, 18.
14 Slovenka, 1. 10. 1944: Materi, 36.

»KRVAVO ZARES«

Mara Samsa in Erna Muser sta izdali vsaka svojo vojno zbirko; prva novele z naslovom *Trst je klical* (1958), druga pa pesniško zbirko *Vstal bo vihar* (1946). Obe zbirki sta nastajali že med vojno.Vladimir Bartol je v spremni besedi k zbirki Mare Samsa zapisal, da zlepa ni bral knjige, ki bi bila »tako izključno samo ženska.« (Samsa 1958, 7). Delo je v večjem delu avtobiografsko in literarizira življenje avtorice: od smrti njenega očeta v prvi svetovni vojni (spet: obdobje med prvo in drugo vojno je nenehni boj) preko njenih izkušenj s poučevanjem v času fašizma in narodnoosvobodilnega boja do njenega znamenitega pobega iz fašistične mučilnice na ulici Bellosguardo (pripoved o tem tudi nosi naslov celotne zbirke, *Trst je klical*). Bartol je poudaril, da gre avtorici »krvavo zares« in je njeno celotno delo »en sam protest zoper krivice ljudi in njihove ureditve sveta.« (Samsa, 1958, 8). Ugotavljal je, da Samsa za razliko od številnih drugih avtoric ni prevzela »moškega« načina pisanja in razmišljanja, ampak si je dovolila ostati ženska tudi ko je šlo za moški svet – torej javno, intelektualno sfero. In res, njena zbirka je polna likov, kakršnih v prej obravnavanih literarnih delih nismo srečali: razmišljujočih in empatičnih žensk, ki se jasno zavedajo svojega položaja: tako javno kot zasebno. Zgodbe o učiteljicah, borkah, kurirkah, hčerah in materah so v nasprotju z borbenim duhom Slovenke; so žalostne, malone meditativne – in si dovolijo prevpraševati smisel, ne da bi bralec ob tem podvomil o njihovem pogumu. Zanimivi so tudi odnosi, kakor so prikazani med partizankami in partizani; zaznati je mogoče obžalovanje, da bo vojne konec, kar bo za ženske pomenilo konec svobode in zaupnega ozračja med tovarišicami in tovariši (npr. v zgodbi *Umik*). Ženske v pripovedi Mare Samsa so izoblikovane in njihov svet je močno zvezan z obdobjem pred vojno in tistemu, kar bo sledilo po vojni; kaže se kontinuiteta družbenih odnosov. A hkrati izpušča sleheni moralizem, Mica, ki ima v povesti *Mica in njena poslednja zgodba* štiri nezakonske otroke s štirimi moškimi, je prikazana kot žrtev družbenih razmer in v ospredju stoji izključno njen boj za preživetje (»Ali ni nekje meja, kjer greh ni več greh? Ali ni ona z vsem svojim življenjem nekje onkraj te meje?« (Samsa, 1958, 65). Telesnost je nakazana le v obrisih, še najbolj v noveli *Nona, nonica,* kjer pride do posilstva kurirke, ki med zlorabo razmišlja le o tem, da upa, da ji pod obleko ne bo zašumel papir in bi razkrili njeno pošto (Samsa, 1959, 148). Žensko telo je tudi tu poligon za dokazovanje (družbene) moči in nadvlade.

Ta motiv se pojavi tudi v pesniški zbirki Erne Muser *Vstal bo vihar*, ki je izšla tik po vojni, večina pesmi pa je bila napisanih še pred letom 1944. V literarno izjemno močnem zadnjem delu zbirke, ki nosi naslov *Ne zlomiš src* in tematizira njeno jetništvo v taboriščih Ravensbrück in Neubrandenburg, zapiše: »Si ta, ki kljub prepovedi in grožnjam / v nelepem enoličju halj jetniških, / odkrivaš dražesti teles dekliških, / ne danih ti iz drugih, višjih vzrokov.« (Muser, 1946, 119).

Čeprav gre za izjemno lirično zbirko, je v njej mogoče čutiti odporniško tendenco; ni ji treba poimenovati fašizma, da bi vedeli, da govori o njem in vojna se kot temna senca vleče skozi celotno delo. Prav tako ima tudi jasne emancipatorne težnje in feministična sporočila; v eni od pesmi denimo naletimo na *lastno sobo:* »Ko bi se mogla vsaj v kamrico / majhno, prav majhno zapreti / in tam sama, prav sama / svoje hotenje izpeti.« (Muser, 1946, 21).

Feminizem je jasno izražen tudi v odnosu med moškimi in ženskami. V pesmi, ki jo posveti Ani Jelovšek, je mogoče razbrati obsodbo obračunavanj z zlorabljenimi ženskami »velikih mož«, nekje drugje jasno izpostavi, kako je svet ustvarjen po meri moških (»Vsa usta tvoje hvale so prepolna, / z bobnečim sijem se tvoj dan proslavlja, / z besedami vse zate se postavlja, / vsa naša srca so od tebe bolna.«: Muser, 1946, 26), v pesmi *Iz dveh svetov sva, dragi, ti in jaz* pa se kot ženska tudi postavi nad moškega (»Vendar sem zemlja, večnosti odraz / in ti le veter, ki semena nosi, / na plodne jih, neplodne njive trosi, / življenje dajem in ohranjam jaz: Muser, 1946, 59). Zbirka Erne Muser je nedvomno antifašistična, politična in angažirana; lahko bi celo rekli, da v slovenski poeziji prve polovice dvajsetega stoletja nikjer ne najdemo tako izrazitih teženj k emancipaciji kot v delu Erne Muser – pa vendar je nekako izginila iz literarnih pregledov dvajsetega stoletja – tako v Jugoslaviji kot Sloveniji.

Ženska Erne Muser lahko nastopa sama, a sploh v zadnjem delu se začne pojavljati kot kolektiv, *sestre*, »kot trsje smo, ki se v viharju stisne / in skloni k tlom, pa spet ponosno vstane!« (Muser, 1946, 106). Gre za žensko solidarnost in socialistično skupnost hkrati: »Vse naše misli – ena sama misel, / vseh src utrip kot en sam utrip, / vse naše želje – ena sama želja, / vsa naše čakanja na isti hip.« (Muser, 1946, 110).

Leta 1967 je Erna Muser v *Prispevkih za zgodovino delavskega gibanja* objavila članek o socialističnem in komunističnem boju Slovenk za enakopravnost. Čeprav je obema gibanjema pripisala velike zasluge, si je ob koncu med vrsticami privoščila tudi drobno kritiko sistema. Zapisala je, da gospodarska in politična preobrazba v zavesti večine ljudi nista zbudili »ustreznega čustvenega odseva« in da »gospodarske spremembe same po sabi ne prinesejo miselnega preskoka [...] in zato ne delamo med ženskami in za ženske [...] temveč samo po službeni dolžnosti.« (Muser, 1967, 211).

S tem je ubesedila tisto, kar je ena od osrednjih ugotovitev v uvodu citirane Jelene Batinić: druga svetovna vojna in po njej vzpostavljeni novi družbeni red sta poskrbela za spremembo diskurza, a folklora delitve spolnih vlog in predsodkov je ostajala taka, kakršna je bila pred vojno.

ZAKLJUČEK

Če v zaključku skušamo odgovoriti na vprašanje, kakšen vpliv je imel antifašistični boj na ženske kot literarne like, je odgovor (vsaj) dvojni. Po eni strani lahko opazimo, da so se avtorji, ki so že pred vojno resno tematizirali vlogo ženske, po vojni še naprej tudi bolj poglobljeno ukvarjali z njo (npr. Kraigher), a obenem vidimo tudi, da na druge avtorje (npr. Bevk) to ni imelo skoraj nobenega vpliva in so liki v veliki meri ostajali podobni tistim pred vojno. Na podlagi tega lahko potegnemo tudi zaključek, da je nova oblast resda *usmerjala* umetnost, a kar se tiče vloge žensk le na ravni diskurza, pa še to ne vedno; tako v družbi kot v literaturi so klub gospodarskim in političnim spremembam ostajali zakoreninjeni predvojni vzorci obnašanja. V nadaljnih raziskavah bi v obzir veljalo vzeti drugo, neliterarno zapuščino avtorjev ter poskušati ugotoviti, v kolikšni meri je njihov svetovni nazor ali siceršnji odnos do žensk, vplival na literaturo, ki so jo ustvarjali. Kolikšen vpliv na književnost in odnos do ženskih likov imata denimo izpričana religioznost (pri Bevku)

ali nereligioznost (pri Kraigherju)? Na podlagi opravljene raziskave lahko ugotovimo tudi, da ne moremo definirati tipičnega lika ženske v antifašistični književnosti. Resda so si vloge žensk med seboj podobne (mati, žena, učiteljica, bolničarka, borka), a prav tako so, čeprav manjkrat, klišejsko tipizirani moški liki – za oboje veljajo redki odmiki v natančnejšo psihologizacijo likov ali slogovne presežke. V nadaljevanju raziskav bi bilo nujno narediti tudi primerjalno študijo literature, ki je nastajala na celotnem slovenskem, jugoslovanskem in širšem evropskem ozemlju ter se natančneje posvetiti tudi motivu ženskega žrtvovanja in telesnosti, kot ju denimo lahko vidimo v Črni orhideji Edvarda Kocbeka (usmrtitev v poročni obleki) ali *Rojstvu v nevihti* Vitomila Zupana (porod med umiranjem). Predvsem pa bi bilo nujno več pozornosti nameniti književnosti avtoric, katerih življenja in dela so bolj ali manj potonila v pozabo. Med prvimi se v analizo ponuja delo Erne Muser in njenega feminizma v kontekstu zgodovinskega časa, v katerem je živela, pomembno pa bi bilo tudi raziskati recepcijo njenega dela in dela drugih avtoric ter skušati odgovoriti na zelo splošno, a izjemno zapleteno vprašanje: kako se je oblikoval literarni kanon in kdaj, zakaj in kako so bile iz njega izpuščene avtorice, katerih literarna kakovost v ničemer ne zaostaja za kakovostjo njihovih sodobnikov.

RESISTANCE LITERATURE: PLACE OF EMANCIPATION? WOMEN IN THE ANTIFASCIST LITERATURE OF PRIMORSKA

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SUMMARY

The article highlights the role of women in the resistance (anti-fascist) literature of the Primorska region. It focuses on the literary works of four authors (France Bevk, Ciril Kosmač, Alojz Kraigher, Danilo Lokar), who were all active in the anti-fascist movement and belonged to different generations, artistic styles and worldviews. Especially important is comparison between the female characters created by the authors before the First World War (before the official transfer to anti-fascism) and female characters created in the writings of resistance literature. We can conclude that the antifascism itself did not significantly characterize literary characters, although we may occasionally notice a shift in the thematization of women's social role. The best example of this type of literature is the story entitled Her Guilt, written by Alojz Kraigher. He questions the role of women, motherhood, marriage and love is written in accordance with the emancipatory commandments of the antifascist struggle.

Important are also expectations that the authors had for their readers. This can be observed in the women's resistance journal Slovenka. If the authors listed above often criticize sentimentality of women, many of the texts in this newspaper are directed against it. (Half) Literary texts try to empower women during the World War II. Thus, in the narratives of the authors, as well as in the Slovenka, the most common focus of the resistance texts is still based on women in the role mothers. Despite of this, women also gained many new roles that didn't exist before the outburst of World War II. At the end the article sheds light on two female authors, Mara Samsa and Erna Muser and their resistance literature and representation of women. Especially literature of Erna Muser is an important example of feminist poetry.

Keywords: literature, antifascism, women, resistance, Primorska, Mara Samsa, Erna Muser, France Bevk, Ciril Kosmač, Lojz Kraigher, Danilo Lokar

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2. Sprejemamo članke v slovenskem, italijanskem, hrvaškem in angleškem jeziku. Avtorji morajo zagotoviti jezikovno neoporečnost besedil.

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V *izvlečku* na kratko opišemo namen, metode dela in rezultate. Izvleček naj ne vsebuje komentarjev in priporočil.
Povzetek vsebuje opis namena in metod dela ter povzame analizo oziroma interpretacijo rezultatov. V povzetku ne sme biti ničesar, česar glavno besedilo ne vsebuje.

6. Avtorji naj pod izvleček članka pripišejo ustrezne **ključne besede (5–7)**. Potrebni so tudi **angleški (ali slovenski) in italijanski prevodi** izvlečka, povzetka, ključnih besed, podnapisov k slikovnemu in tabelarnemu gradivu.

7. Zaželeno je tudi (originalno) **slikovno gradivo**, ki ga avtor posreduje v ločenih datotekah (jpeg, tiff) z najmanj 300 dpi resolucije pri želeni velikosti. Največja velikost slikovnega gradiva je 12x15 cm. Vsa potrebna dovoljenja za objavo slikovnega in arhivskega gradiva (v skladu z Zakonom o avtorski in sorodnih pravicah) priskrbi avtor sam in jih predloži uredništvu pred objavo članka. Vse slike, tabele in grafične prikaze je potrebno tudi podnasloviti in zaporedno oštevilčiti.

8. **Vsebinske** *opombe*, ki besedilo še podrobneje razlagajo ali pojasnjujejo, postavimo *pod črto*.
Bibliografske opombe, s čimer mislimo na citat – torej sklicevanje na točno določeni del besedila iz neke druge publikacije, sestavljajo naslednji podatki: *avtor, leto izida* in – če citiramo točno določeni del besedila – tudi navedba *strani*. Bibliografske opombe vključimo v glavno besedilo. Primer: (Pirjevec, 2007, 219) ali (Pirjevec, 2007).

Celotni bibliografski podatki citiranih in uporabljenih virov so navedeni v poglavju *Viri in literatura* (najprej navedemo vse vire, nato literaturo). Pri tem avtor navede izključno dela ter izdaje, ki jih je v članku citiral.
Popolni podatki o tem delu v poglavju Literatura pa se glasijo:
Pirjevec, J. (2007): "Trst je naš!" Boj Slovencev za morje (1848–1954). Ljubljana, Nova revija.
Če citiramo *več del istega avtorja iz istega leta*, poleg priimka in kratice imena napišemo še črke po abecednem vrstnem redu, tako da se navedbe med seboj razlikujejo. Primer: (Pirjevec, 2007a) in (Pirjevec, 2007b).
Bibliografska opomba je lahko tudi del vsebinske opombe in jo zapisujemo na enak način.
Posamezna dela v isti opombi ločimo s podpičjem. Primer:
(Pirjevec, 2007a; Verginella, 2008).

9. Pri **citiranju arhivskih virov** *med oklepaji* navajamo kratico arhiva, kratico arhivskega fonda / signaturo, številko tehnične enote in številko arhivske enote.
Primer: (ARS-1851, 67, 1808).
V primeru, da arhivska enota ni znana, se dokument citira po naslovu *v opombi pod črto*, in sicer z navedbo kratice arhiva, kratice arhivskega fonda / signature, številke tehnične enote in naslova dokumenta. Primer:
ARS-1589, 1562, Zapisnik seje Okrajnega komiteja ZKS Koper, 19. 12. 1955.
Kratice razložimo v poglavju o virih na koncu članka, kjer arhivske vire navajamo po abecednem vrstnem redu. Primer:
ARS-1589 – Arhiv republike Slovenije (ARS), Centralni komite Zveze komunistov Slovenije (fond 1589).

10. Pri citiranju **časopisnih virov** med tekstom navedemo ime časopisa, datum izdaje ter strani:
(Primorske novice, 11. 5. 2009, 26).
V primeru, da je znan tudi naslov članka, celotno bibliografsko opombo navedemo pod črto:
Primorske novice, 11. 5. 2009: Ali podjetja merijo učinkovitost?, 26.
V seznam virov in literature izpišemo ime časopisa / revije. Kraj, založnika in periodo izhajanja:
Primorske novice. Koper, Primorske novice, 1963–.

11. **Poglavje o virih in literaturi** je obvezno. Bibliografske podatke navajamo takole:
- Opis zaključene publikacije kot celote – knjige:
Avtor (leto izida): Naslov. Kraj, Založba. Npr.:
Šelih, A., Antić, G. M., Puhar, A., Rener, T., Šuklje, R., Verginella, M. & L. Tavčar (2007): Pozabljena polovica. Portreti žensk 19. in 20. stoletja na Slovenskem. Ljubljana, Tuma - SAZU.
V zgornjem primeru, kjer je *avtorjev več kot dva*, je korekten tudi citat:
(Šelih et al., 2007)

Če navajamo določeni del iz zaključene publikacije, zgornjemu opisu dodamo še številke strani, od koder smo navedbo prevzeli.
- Opis prispevka v **zaključeni publikaciji** – npr. prispevka v zborniku:
Avtor (leto izida): Naslov prispevka. V: Avtor knjige: Naslov knjige. Kraj, Založba, strani od-do. Primer:
Darovec, D. (2011): Moderna štetja prebivalstva in slovensko-hrvaška etnična meja v Istri. V: Darovec, D. & Strčić, P. (ur.): Slovensko-hrvaško sosedstvo / Hrvatsko-slovensko susjedstvo. Koper, Univerzitetna založba Annales, 129-142.
- Opis članka v **reviji:**
Avtor (leto izida): Naslov članka. Naslov revije, letnik, številka, strani od-do. Primer:
Čeč, D. (2007): Nasilne detomorilke ali neprištevne žrtve? Spreminjanje podobe detomora v 18. in začetku 19. stoletja. Acta Histriae, 15, 2, 415-440.
- opis ustnega vira:
Informator (leto pričevanja): Ime in priimek informatorja, leto rojstva, vloga, funkcija ali položaj. Način pričevanja. Oblika in kraj nahajanja zapisa. Primer:
Žigante, A. (2008): Alojz Žigante, r. 1930, župnik v Vižinadi. Ustno pričevanje. Zvočni zapis pri avtorju.
- opis vira iz internetnih spletnih strani:
Če je mogoče, internetni vir zabeležimo enako kot članek in dodamo spletni naslov ter v oklepaju datum zadnjega pristopa na to stran:
Young, M. A. (2008): The victims movement: a confluence of forces. In: NOVA (National Organization for Victim Assistance). Http://www.trynova.org/ victiminfo/readings/VictimsMovement.pdf (15. 9. 2008).
Če avtor ni znan, navedemo nosilca spletne strani, leto objave, naslov in podnaslov besedila, spletni naslov in v oklepaju datum zadnjega pristopa na to stran.

12. **Kratice** v besedilu moramo razrešiti v oklepaju, ko se prvič pojavijo. Članku lahko dodamo tudi seznam uporabljenih kratic.

13. Pri **ocenah publikacij** navedemo v naslovu prispevka avtorja publikacije, naslov, kraj, založbo, leto izida in število strani (oziroma ustrezen opis iz točke 10).

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   I riferimenti bibliografici completi delle fonti vanno quindi inseriti nel capitolo Fonti e bibliografia (saranno prima indicate le fonti e poi la bibliografia). L'autore indicherà esclusivamente i lavori e le edizioni citati nell'articolo.
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   Isotton, R. (2006): Crimen in itinere. Profili della disciplina del tentativo dal diritto comune alle codificazioni moderne. Napoli, Jovene.
   Se si citano *più lavori dello stesso autore* pubblicati nello stesso anno accanto al cognome va aggiunta una lettera in ordine alfabetico progressivo per distinguere i vari lavori. Ad es.:
   (Isotton, 2006a) e (Isotton, 2006b).
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   Nel caso in cui un documento non fosse contraddistinto da un numero, ma solo da un titolo, la fonte d'archivio verrà citata *a piè di pagina*. In questo caso si indicherà: sigla dell'archivio - numero (oppure) sigla del fondo, numero della busta, titolo del documento. Ad es.:
   ACS-CPC, 3285, Milanovich Natale. Richiesta della Prefettura di Trieste spedita al Ministero degli Interni del 15 giugno 1940.
   Le sigle utilizzate verranno svolte per intero, in ordine alfabetico, nella sezione "Fonti" a fine testo. Ad es.:
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Il Corriere della Sera, 18. 5. 2009: Da Mestre all'Archivio segreto del Vaticano, 26. Nell'elenco Fonti e bibliografia scriviamo il nome del giornale. Il luogo di edizione, l'editore ed il periodo di pubblicazione.
Il Corriere della Sera. Milano, RCS Editoriale Quotidiani, 1876–.

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Cozzi, G., Knapton, M. & G. Scarabello (1995): La Repubblica di Venezia nell'età moderna – dal 1517 alla fine della Repubblica. Torino, Utet.
Se *gli autori sono più di due*, la citazione è corretta anche nel modo seguente:
(Cozzi et al., 1995).
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Clemente, P. (2001): Il punto sul folklore. In: Clemente, P., Mugnaini, F. (eds.): Oltre il folklore. Roma, Carocci, 187–219.
- Descrizione di un articolo in una **pubblicazione periodica – rivista**:
autore/i (anno di edizione): Titolo del contributo. Titolo del periodico, annata, nro. del periodico, pagine (da-a). Per es.:
Miletti, M. N. (2007): La follia nel processo. Alienisti e procedura penale nell'Italia postunitaria. Acta Histriae, 15, 1, 321–342.
- Descrizione di una fonte orale:
informatore (anno della testimonianza): nome e cognome dell'informatore, anno di nascita, ruolo, posizione o stato sociale. Tipo di testimonianza. Forma e luogo di trascrizione della fonte. Per es.:
Predonzan, G. (1998): Giuseppe Predonzan, a. 1923, contadino di Parenzo. Testimonianza orale. Appunti dattiloscritti dell'intervista presso l'archivio personale dell'autore.
- Descrizione di una fonte tratta da pagina internet:
Se è possibile registriamo la fonte internet come un articolo e aggiungiamo l'indirizzo della pagina web e tra parentesi la data dell'ultimo accesso:
Young, M. A. (2008): The victims movement: a confluence of forces. In: NOVA (National Organization for Victim Assistance). (15. 9. 2008). Http://www. trynova.org/victiminfo/readings/VictimsMovement.pdf
Se l'autore non è noto, si indichi il webmaster, anno della pubblicazione, titolo ed eventuale sottotitolo del testo, indirizzo web e tra parentesi la data dell'ultimo accesso.
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4. The front page should include the title and subtitle of the article, the author's name and surname, academic titles, affiliation (institutional name and address) or home address, including post code, and e-mail address. Except initials and acronyms type in lowercase.

5. The article should contain the **summary** and the **abstract,** with the former (max. 100 words) being longer than the latter (c. 200 words).
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The *summary* contains the description of the aim of the article and methods of work and a brief analysis or interpretation of results. It can contain only the information that appears in the text as well.

6. Beneath the abstract, the author should supply appropriate **(5–7) keywords**, as well as the **English (or Slovene) and italian translation** of the abstract, summary, keywords, and captions to figures and tables.

7. If possible, the author should also supply (original) **illustrative matter** submitted as separate files (in jpeg or tiff format) and saved at a minimum resolution of 300 dpi per size preferred, with the maximum possible publication size being 12x15 cm. Prior to publication, the author should obtain all necessary authorizations (as stipulated by the Copyright and Related Rights Act) for the publication of the illustrative and archival matter and submit them to the editorial board. All figures, tables and diagrams should be captioned and numbered.

8. **Footnotes** providing additional explanation to the text should be written at *the foot of the page*. **Bibliographic notes** – i.e. references to other articles or publications – sho-

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The entire list of sources cited and referred to should be published in the section *Sources and Bibliography* (starting with sources and ending with bibliography).

The author should list only the works and editions cited or referred to in their article.
In the section on *bibliography*, citations or references should be listed as follows:
Friedman, L. (1993): Crime and Punishment in American History. New York, Basic Books.
If you are listing *several works published by the same author in the same year*, they should be differentiated by adding a lower case letter after the year for each item.
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(ASMI-SLV, 273, 7r).
If the number of the document could not be specified, the record should be cited *in the footnote*, listing the archive acronym and the record group acronym (or signature), number of the folder, and document title. E.g.:
TNA-HS 4, 31, Note on Interview between Colonel Fišera and Captain Wilkinson on December 16th 1939.
The abbreviations should be explained in the section on sources in the end of the article, with the archival records arranged in an alphabetical order. E.g.:
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The New York Times. New York, H.J. Raymond & Co., 1857–.

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Rocke, M. (1998): Gender and Sexual Culture in Renaissance Italy. In: Brown, I. C., Davis, R. C. (eds.): Gender and Society in Renaissance Italy. New York, Longman, 150–170.
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- Description of an oral source:
Informant (year of transmission): Name and surname of informant, year of birth, role, function or position. Manner of transmission. Form and place of data storage. E.g.:
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- Description of an internet source:
If possible, the internet source should be cited in the same manner as an article. What you should add is the website address and date of last access (with the latter placed within the parenthesis):
Young, M. A. (2008): The victims movement: a confluence of forces. In: NOVA (National Organization for Victim Assistance). Http://www.trynova.org/ victiminfo/readings/VictimsMovement.pdf (15. 9. 2008).
If the author is unknown, you should cite the organization that set up the website, year of publication, title and subtitle of text, website address and date of last access (with the latter placed within the parenthesis).
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